Works

-• •

AN ARIZONA WATER-HOLE

From Painting by Frederic Remington

THE WORKS OF

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

IN FOURTEEN VOLUMES

Illustrated

.

\ \

THE WINNING OF THE WEST

VOLUME FOUR

jgxecutive jgdition

PUBLISHED WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE
PRESIDENT THROUGH SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
MOTH THE CENTURY CO., MESSRS. CHARLES
SCRIBNER'S SONS, AND G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK

P. F. COLLIER & SON, PUBLISHERS

8

COPYRIGHT 1896
BY G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

This edition is published under arrangement with
G. P. Putnam's Sons, of New York and London.

CONTENTS

ST. CLAIR AND WAYNE

(CONTINUED)

III. THE SOUTHWEST TERRITORY; TENNESSEE, 1788-

1790 i

IV. ST. CLAIR'S DEFEAT, 1791 23

V. MAD ANTHONY WAYNE; AND THE FIGHT OP THE

FALLEN TIMBERS, 1792-1795 75

LOUISIANA AND AARON BURR

I. TENNESSEE BECOMES A STATE, 1791-1796. . . . 133
II. INTRIGUES AND LAND SPECULATIONS — THE TREA-
TIES OP JAY AND PlNCKNEY, 1793-1797 . . . 205

III. THE MEN OP THE WESTERN WATERS, 1798-1802 . 248

IV. THE PURCHASE OP LOUISIANA; AND BURR'S CON-

SPIRACY, 1803-1807 293

V. THE EXPLORERS OF THE FAR WEST, 1804-1807 . 344

APPENDIX 380

ST. CLAIR AND WAYNE

(CONTINUED)

CHAPTER III

-

THE SOUTHWEST TERRITORY, I/SS-I/QO

DURING the years 1788 and 1789 there was
much disquiet and restlessness throughout the
Southwestern territory, the land lying between Ken-
tucky and the Southern Indians. The disturbances
caused by the erection of the State of Franklin were
subsiding, the authority of North Carolina was re-
established over the whole territory, and by degrees
a more assured and healthy feeling began to prevail
among the settlers; but as yet their future was by
no means certain, nor was their lot irrevocably cast
in with that of their fellows in the other portions of
the Union.

As already said, the sense of national unity among
the frontiersmen was small. The men of the Cum-
berland in writing to the Creeks spoke of the Frank-
lin people as if they belonged to an entirely distinct
nation, and as if a war with or by one community
concerned in no way the other ;* while the leaders of

1 Robertson MSS. Robertson to McGillivray, Nashville,
1788. "Those aggressors live in a different state and are gov-
erned by different laws, consequently we are not culpable for
their misconduct."

VOL. VIII.— i (i)

2 The Winning of the West

Franklin were carrying on with the Spaniards nego-
tiations quite incompatible with the continued sov-
ereignty of the United States. Indeed it was some
time before the Southwestern people realized that
after the Constitution went into effect they had no
authority to negotiate commercial treaties on their
own account. Andrew Jackson, who had recently
taken up his abode in the Cumberland country, was
one of the many men who endeavored to convince
the Spanish agents that it would be a good thing for
both parties if the Cumberland people were allowed
to trade with the Spaniards ; in which event the
latter would of course put a stop to the Indian hos-
tilities.2

This dangerous loosening of the Federal tie shows
that it would certainly have given way entirely had
the population at this time been scattered over a
wider territory. The obstinate and bloody warfare
waged by the Indians against the frontiersmen was
in one way of great service to the nation, for it kept
back the frontier and forced the settlements to re-
main more or less compact and in touch with the
country behind them. If the red men had been as
weak as, for instance, the black-fellows of Australia,
the settlers would have roamed hither and thither
without regard to them, and would have settled,
each man wherever he liked, across to the Pacific.
Moreover, the Indians formed the bulwarks which
defended the British and Spanish possessions from

9 Tennessee Hist. Soc. MSS. Andrew Jackson to D. Smith,
introducing the Spanish agent, Captain Fargo, Feb. 13, 1789.

St. Clair and Wayne 3

the adventurers of the border; save for the shield
thus offered by the fighting tribes it would have
been impossible to bar the frontiersmen from the
territory either to the north or to the south of the
boundaries of the United States.

Congress had tried hard to bring about peace with
the Southern Indians, both by sending commission-
ers to them and by trying to persuade the three
Southern States to enter into mutually beneficial
treaties with them. A successful effort was also
made to detach the Chickasaws from the others, and
keep them friendly with the United States. Con-
gress as usual sympathized with the Indians against
the intruding whites, although it was plain that only
by warfare could the red men be permanently sub-
dued.3

The Cumberland people felt the full weight of the
warfare, the Creeks being their special enemies.
Robertson himself lost a son and a brother in the
various Indian attacks. To him fell the task of try-
ing to put a stop to the ravages. He was the leader
of his people in every way, their commander in war
and their spokesman when they sought peace; and
early in 1788 he wrote a long letter on their behalf
to the Creek chief McGillivray. After disclaiming
all responsibility for or connection with the Frank-
lin men, he said that the settlers for whom he spoke
had not had the most distant idea that any Indians

3 State Dept. MSS., No. 180, p. 66; No. 151, p. 275. Also
letters of Richard Winn to Knox, June 25, 1788; James
White to Knox, Aug. i, 1788; Joseph Martin to Knox, July

25, 1788.

4 The Winning of the West

would object to their settling on the Cumberland,
in a country that had been purchased outright at the
Henderson treaty. He further stated that he had
believed the Creek chief would approve of the ex-
pedition to punish the marauders at the Muscle Shell
Shoals, inasmuch as the Creeks had repeatedly as-
sured him that these marauders were refractory peo-
ple who would pay no heed to their laws and com-
mands. Robertson knew this to be a good point, for
as a matter of fact the Creeks, though pretending to
be peaceful, had made no effort to suppress these
banditti, and had resented by force of arms the de-
struction of their strongholds.4

Robertson then came to his personal wrongs.
His quaintly worded letter runs in part: "I had the
mortification to see one of my children Killed and
uncommonly Massacred . . . from my earliest
youth I have endeavored to arm myself with a
sufficient share of Fortitude to meet anything that
Nature might have intended, but to see an innocent
child so Uncommonly Massacred by people who
ought to have both sense and bravery has in a meas-
ure unmanned me. ... I have always striven to
do justice to the red people; last fall, trusting in
Cherokee friendship, I with utmost difficulty pre-
vented a great army from marching against them.
The return is very inadequate to the services I have
rendered them as last summer they killed an affec-
tionate brother and three days ago an innocent

4 Robertson MSS. Robertson to McGillivray. Letters al-
ready cited.

St. Clair and Wayne 5

child." The letter concludes with an emphatic warn-
ing- that the Indians must expect heavy chastisement
if they do not stop their depredations.

Robertson looked on his own woes and losses
with much of the stoicism for which his Indian foes
were famed. He accepted the fate of his son with
a kind of grim stolidity ; and did not let it interfere
with his efforts to bring- about a peace. Writing to
his friend General Martin, he said: "On my return
home [from the North Carolina Legislature to which
he was a delegate] I found distressing times in the
country. A number of persons have been killed
since; among those unfortunate persons were my
third son. . . . We sent Captains Hackett and
Ewing to the Creeks who have brought very favor-
able accounts, and we do not doubt but a lasting
peace will be shortly concluded between us and that
nation. The Cherokees we shall flog, if they do
not behave well." 5 He wished to make peace
if he could; but if that was impossible, he was
ready to make war with the same steady accept-
ance of fate.

The letter then goes on to express the opinion
that, if Congress does not take action to bring about
a peace, the Creeks will undoubtedly invade Georgia
with some five thousand warriors, for McGillivray
has announced that he will consent to settle the
boundary question with Congress, but will do noth-
ing with Georgia. The letter shows with rather

5 State Department MSS., No. 71, Vol. II. Robertson to
Martin, Pleasant Grove, May 7, 1788.

6 The Winning of the West

startling clearness how little Robertson regarded
the Cumberland people and the Georgians as being
both, in the same nation ; he saw nothing strange in
one portion of the country concluding a firm peace
with an enemy who was about to devastate another
portion.

Robertson was anxious to encourage immigra-
tion, and for this purpose he had done his best to
hurry forward the construction of a road between
the Holston and the Cumberland settlements. In
his letter to Martin he urged him to proclaim to
possible settlers the likelihood of peace, and guaran-
teed that the road would be ready before winter. It
was opened in the fall ; and parties of settlers began
to come in over it. To protect them, the district
from time to time raised strong guards of mounted
riflemen to patrol the road, as well as the neighbor-
hood of the settlements, and to convoy the immi-
grant companies. To defray the expenses of the
troops, the Cumberland court raised taxes. Exactly
as the Franklin people had taken peltries as the basis
for their currency, so those of the Cumberland, in
arranging for payment in kind, chose the necessaries
of life as the best medium of exchange. They en-
acted that the tax should be paid one-quarter in
corn, one-half in beef, pork, bear meat, and venison,
one-eighth in salt, and one-eighth in money.6 It
was still as easy to shoot bear and deer as to raise
hogs and oxen.

Robertson wrote several times to McGillivray,

6 Ramsey, p. 504.

St. Clair and Wayne 7

alone or in conjunction with another veteran frontier
leader, Col. Anthony Bledsoe. Various other men
of note on the border, both from Virginia and North
Carolina, wrote likewise. To these letters McGil-
livray responded promptly in a style rather more pol-
ished though less frank than that of his correspon-
dents. His tone was distinctly more warlike and
less conciliatory than theirs. He avowed, without
hesitation, that the Creeks and not the Americans
had been the original aggressors, saying that "my
nation has waged war against your people for sev-
eral years past; but that we had no motive of re-
venge, nor did it proceed from any sense of injuries
sustained from your people, but being warmly at-
tached to the British and being under their influence
our operations were directed by them against you in
common with other Americans." He then acknowl-
edged that after the close of the war the Americans
had sent overtures of peace, which he had accepted
— although as a matter of fact the Creeks never
ceased their ravages, — but complained that Robert-
son's expedition against the Muscle Shoals again
brought on war.7

There was, of course, nothing in this complaint of
the injustice of Robertson's expedition, for the Mus-
cle Shoals Indians had been constantly plundering
and murdering before it was planned, and it was
undertaken merely to put a stop to their ravages.
However, McGillivray made adroit use of it. He

T State Department MSS., No. 71, Vol. II, p. 620. McGil-
livray to Bledsoe and Robertson : no date.

8 The Winning of the West

stated that the expedition itself, carried on, as he
understood it, mainly against the French traders,
"was no concern of ours and would have been en-
tirely disregarded by us; but in the execution of it
some of our people were there, who went as well
from motives of curiosity as to traffic in silverware ;
and six of whom were rashly killed by your men" ;8
and inasmuch as these slain men were prominent in
different Creek towns, the deed led to retaliatory
raids. But now that vengeance had been taken,
McGillivray declared that a stable peace would be
secured, and he expressed "considerable concern"
over the "tragical end" of Robertson's slain kinsfolk.
As for the Georgians, he announced that if they
were wise and would agree to an honorable peace he
would bury the red hatchet, and if not then he would
march against them whenever he saw fit.9 Writing
again at the end of the year, he reiterated his as-
surances of the peaceful inclinations of the Creeks,
though their troubles with Georgia were still unset-
tled.10

Nevertheless these peaceful protestations pro-
duced absolutely no effect upon the Indian ravages,
which continued with unabated fury. Many in-
stances of revolting brutality and aggression by the

8 McGillivray's Letter of April 17, 1788, p. 521.

9 Do., p. 625; McGillivray's Letter of April 15, 1788.

10 Robertson MSS. McGillivray to Robertson, December
i, 1788. This letter contains the cautious, non-committal an-
swer to Robertson's letter in which the latter proposed, that
Cumberland should be put under Spanish protection ; the let-
ter itself McGillivray had forwarded to the Spaniards.

St. Clair and Wayne 9

whites against the Cherokees took place in Tennes-
see, both earlier and later than this, and in eastern
Tennessee at this very time; but the Cumberland
people, from the earliest days of their settlement,
had not sinned against the red men, while as regards
all the Tennesseeans, the Creeks throughout this pe-
riod appeared always, and the Cherokees appeared
sometimes, as the wrongdoers, the men who began
the long and ferocious wars of reprisal.

Robertson's companion, Bledsoe, was among the
many settlers who suffered death in the summer of
1788. He was roused from sleep by the sound of
his cattle running across the yard in front of the
twin log-houses occupied by himself and his brother
and their families. As he opened the door he was
shot by Indians, who were lurking behind the fence,
and one of his hired men was also shot down.11 The
savages fled, and Bledsoe lived through the night,
while the other inmates of the house kept watch at
the loopholes until day broke and the fear was
passed. Under the laws of North Carolina at that
time, all the lands went to the sons of a man dying
intestate, and Bledsoe's wealth consisted almost ex-
clusively in great tracts of land. As he lay dying
in his cabin, his sister suggested to him that unless
he made a will he would leave his seven daughters
penniless; and so the will was drawn, and the old
frontiersman signed it just before he drew his last
breath, leaving each of his children provided with a
share of his land.

11 Putnam, 298.

io The Winning of the West

In the following year, 1789, Robertson himself
had a narrow escape. He was at work with some
of his field hands in a clearing. One man was on
guard and became alarmed at some sound; Robert-
son snatched up his gun, and, while he was peering
into the woods, the Indians fired on him. He ran
toward the station and escaped, but only at the cost
of a bullet through the foot. Immediately sixty
mounted riflemen gathered at Robertson's station,
and set out after the fleeing Indians ; but finding that
in the thick wood they did not gain on their foes,
and were hampered by their horses, twenty picked
men were sent ahead. Among these twenty men
was fierce, moody young Andrew Jackson. They
found the Indians in camp, at daybreak, but fired
from too great a distance ; they killed one, wounded
others, and scattered the rest, who left sixteen guns
behind them in their flight.12

During these two years many people were killed,
both in the settlements, on the trail through the
woods, and on the Tennessee River, as they drifted
down-stream in their boats. As always in these
contests, the innocent suffered with the guilty. The
hideous border ruffians, the brutal men who mur-
dered peaceful Indians in times of truce and butch-
ered squaws and children in time of war, fared no
worse than unoffending settlers or men of mark
who had been stanch friends of the Indian peoples.
The Legislatures of the seaboard States, and Con-
gress itself, passed laws to punish men who com-

12 Haywood, 244

St. Clair and Wayne 1 1

mitted outrages on the Indians, but they could not
be executed. Often the border people themselves
interfered to prevent such outrages, or expressed dis-
approval of them, and rescued the victims ; but they
never visited the criminals with the stern and ruth-
less punishment which alone would have availed to
check the crimes. For this failure they must receive
hearty condemnation, and be adjudged to have for-
feited much of the respect to which they were other-
wise entitled by their strong traits and their deeds
of daring. In the same way, but to an even greater
degree, the peaceful Indians always failed to punish
or restrain their brethren who were bent on mur-
der and plunder; and the braves who went on the
warpath made no discrimination between good and
bad, strong and weak, man and woman, young and
old.

One of the sufferers was General Joseph Martin,
who had always been a firm friend of the red race,
and had earnestly striven to secure justice for
them.13 He had gone for a few days to his plan-
tation on the borders of Georgia, and during his
visit the place was attacked by a Creek war party.
They drove away his horses and wounded his over-
seer ; but he managed to get into his house and stood
at bay, shooting one warrior and beating off the
others.

Among many attacks on the boats that went down
the Tennessee it happens that a full record has been
kept of one. A North Carolinian, named Brown,

18 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. I. Martin
to Knox, Jan. 15, 1789.

ii The Winning of the West

had served in the Revolutionary War with the troop
of Light-Horse Harry Lee, and had received in
payment a land certificate. Under this certificate he
entered several tracts of Western land, including
some on the Cumberland; and in the spring of 1788
he started by boat down the Tennessee, to take pos-
session of his claims. He took with him his wife
and 4iis seven children ; and three or four young men
also went along. When they reached the Chicka-
mauga towns the Indians swarmed out toward them
in canoes. On Brown's boat was a swivel, and
with this and the rifles of the men they might have
made good their defence ; but as soon as the In-
dians saw them preparing for resistance they halted
and hailed the crew, shouting out that they were
peaceful and that in consequence of the recent Hol-
ston treaties war had ceased between the white men
and the red. Brown was not used to Indians; he
was deceived, and before he made up his mind what
. to do, the Indians were alongside, and many of them
came aboard.14 They then seized the boat and mas-
sacred the men, while the mother and children were
taken ashore and hurried off in various directions
by the Indians who claimed to have captured them.
One of the boys, Joseph, long afterward wrote an
account of his captivity. He was not treated with
deliberate cruelty, though he suffered now and then
from the casual barbarity of some of his captors,

14 Narrative of Col. Joseph Brown, "Southwestern
Monthly," Nashville, 1851, I, p. 14. The story was told
when Brown was a very old man, and doubtless some of the
details are inaccurate.

St. Clair and Wayne 13

and toiled like an ordinary slave. Once he was
doomed to death by a party of Indians, who made
him undress so as to avoid bloodying his clothes;
but they abandoned this purpose through fear of his
owner, a half-breed and a dreaded warrior, who
had killed many whites.

After about a year's captivity, Joseph and his
mother and sisters were all released, though at dif-
ferent times. Their release was brought about by
Sevier. When in the fall of 1788 a big band of
Creeks and Cherokees took Gillespie's station, on
Little River, a branch of the upper Tennessee, they
carried off over a score of women and children. The
four highest chiefs, headed by one with the appro-
priate name of Bloody Fellow, left behind a note ad-
dressed to Sevier and Martin, in which they taunted
the whites with their barbarities, land especially with
the murder of the friendly Cherokee chief Tassel,
and warned them to move off the Indian land.15
In response Sevier made one of his swift raids, de-
stroyed an Indian town on the Coosa River, and took
prisoner a large number of Indian women and chil-
dren. These were well treated, but were carefully
guarded, and were exchanged for the white women
and children who were in captivity among the In-
dians. The Browns were among the fortunate peo-
ple who were thus rescued from the horrors of In-
dian slavery. It is small wonder that the rough
frontier people, whose wives and little ones, friends
and neighbors, were in such manner rescued by No-

15 Ramsey, 519.

14 The Winning of the West

lichucky Jack, should have looked with leniency on
their darling leader's shortcomings, even when these
shortcomings took the form of failure to prevent or
punish the massacre of friendly Indians.

The ravages of the Indians were precisely the
same in character that they had always been, and
always were until peace was won. There was the
usual endless succession of dwellings burned, horses
driven off, settlers slain while hunting or working,
and immigrant parties ambushed and destroyed ; and
there was the same ferocious retaliation when oppor-
tunity offered. When Robertson's hopes of peace
gave out he took steps to keep the militia in constant
readiness, to meet the foe; for he was the military
commander of the district. The county lieutenants
— there were now several counties on the Cumber-
land— were ordered to see that their men were well
mounted and ready to march at a moment's notice ;
and were warned that this was a duty to which they
must attend themselves, and not delegate it to their
subalterns. The laws were to be strictly enforced;
and the subalterns were promptly to notify their men
of the time and place to meet. Those who failed to
attend would be fined by court-martial. Frequent
private musters were to be held ; and each man was
to keep ready a good gun, nine charges of powder
and ball, and a spare flint. It was especially ordered
that every marauding band should be followed ; for
thus some would be overtaken and signally pun-
ished, which would be a warning to the others.16

16 Robertson MSS., General Orders, April 5, 1789.

St. Clair and Wayne 15

The wrath of the Creeks was directed chiefly
against the Georgians. The Georgians were push-
ing steadily westward, and were grasping the Creek
hunting-grounds with ferocious grejed. They had
repeatedly endeavored to hold treaties with the
Creeks. On each occasion the chiefs and warriors
of a few towns met them, and either declined to do
anything, or else signed an agreement which they
had no power to enforce. A sample treaty of this
kind was that entered into at Galphinton in 1785.
The Creeks had been solemnly summoned to meet
representatives both of the Federal Congress and of
Georgia; but on the appointed day only two towns
out of a hundred were represented. The Federal
Commissioners thereupon declined to enter into ne-
gotiations ; but those from Georgia persevered. By
presents and strong drink they procured, and their
government eagerly accepted, a large cession of
land to which the two towns in question had no
more title than was vested in all the others. The
treaty was fraudulent. The Georgians knew that
the Creeks who signed it were giving away what
they did not possess ; while the Indian signers cared
only to get the goods they were offered, and were
perfectly willing to make all kinds of promises, in-
asmuch as they had no intention whatever of keeping
any of them. The other Creeks immediately repu-
diated the transaction, and the war dragged on its
course of dismal savagery, growing fiercer year by
year, and being waged on nearly even terms.17

" American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. I, p. 15.

1 6 The Winning of the West

Soon after the Constitution went into effect the
National Government made a vigorous effort to
conclude peace on a stable basis. Commissioners
were sent to the Southern Indians. Under their
persuasion McGillivray and the leading kings and
chiefs of the Muscogee confederacy came to New
York and there entered into a solemn treaty. In
this treaty the Creeks acknowledged the United
States, to the exclusion of Spain, as the sole power
with which they could treat ; they covenanted to keep
faith and friendship with the Americans ; and in re-
turn for substantial payments and guarantees they
agreed to cede some land to the Georgians, though
less than was claimed under the treaty of Galphinton.

This treaty was solemnly entered into by the
recognized chiefs and leaders of the Creeks;
and the Americans fondly hoped that it would
end hostilities. It did nothing of the kind. Though
the terms were very favorable to the Indians,/
so much so as to make the frontiersmen grum-
ble, the Creeks scornfully repudiated the promises
made on their behalf by their authorized represen-
tatives. Their motive in going to war, and keep-
ing up the war, was not so much anger at the en-
croachments of the whites, as the eager thirst for
glory, scalps, and plunder, to be won at the expense
of the settlers. The war parties raided the frontier
as freely as ever.18 The simple truth was that the

18 Robertson MSS., Williamson to Robertson, Aug. 2, 1789,
and Aug. 7, 1790. American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I,
81. Milfort, 131, 142.

St. Clair and Wayne 17

Creeks could be kept quiet only when cowed by phys-
ical fear. If the white men did not break the trea-
ties, then the red men did. It is idle to dispute about
the rights or wrongs of the contests. Two peoples,
in two stages of culture which were separated by
untold ages, stood face to face; one or the other
had to perish ; and the whites went forward from
sheer necessity.

Throughout these years of Indian warfare the in-
flux of settlers into the Holston and Cumberland
regions steadily continued. Men in search of homes,
or seeking to acquire fortunes by the purchase of
wild lands, came more and more freely to the Cum-
berland country as the settlers therein increased in
number and became better able to cope with and re-
pel their savage foes. The settlements on the Hol-
ston grew with great rapidity as soon as the Frank-
lin disturbances were at an end. As the people in-
creased in military power, they increased also in
material comfort and political stability. The crude
social life deepened and broadened. Comfortable
homes began to appear among the huts and hovels
of the little towns. The outlying settlers still lived
in wooden forts or stations; but where the popula-
tion was thicker the terror of the Indians dimin-
ished, and the people lived in the ordinary style of
frontier farmers.

Early in 1790 North Carolina finally ceded, and
the National Government finally accepted, what is
now Tennessee; and in May Congress passed a law
for the government of this Territory Southwest of

1 8 The Winning of the West

the River Ohio, as they chose to call it. This law
followed on the general lines of the Ordinance of
1787 for the government of the Northwest; but
there was one important difference. North Caro-
lina had made her cession conditional upon the non-
passage of any law tending to emancipate slaves. At
that time such a condition was inevitable; but it
doomed the Southwest to suffer under the curse of
negro bondage.

William Blount of North Carolina was appointed
Governor of the Territory, and at once proceeded
to his new home to organize the civil government.19
He laid out Knoxville as his capital, where he built
a good house with a lawn in front. On his recom-
mendation Sevier was appointed Brigadier-General
for the Eastern District and Robertson for the West-
ern; the two districts known as Washington and
Miro respectively.

Blount was the first man of leadership in the West
who was of Cavalier ancestry; for though so much
is said of the Cavalier type in the Southern States
it was everywhere insignificant in numbers, and
comparatively few of the Southern men of mark have
belonged to it. Blount was really of Cavalier blood.
He was descended from a Royalist baronet, who was
roughly handled by the Cromwellians, and whose
three sons came to America. One of them settled
in North Carolina, near Albemarle Sound, and from
him came the new governor of the southwestern

19 Blount MSS. Biography of Blount, in manuscript, com-
piled by one of his descendants from the family papers.

St. Clair and Wayne 19

territory. Blount was a good-looking, well-bred
man, with cultivated tastes; but he was also a man
of force and energy, who knew well how to get on
with the backwoodsmen, so that he soon became pop-
ular among them.

The West had grown with astonishing rapidity
during the seven years following the close of the
Revolutionary War. In 1790 there were in Ken-
tucky nearly seventy-four thousand, and in the
Southwest Territory nearly thirty-six thousand,
souls. In the Northwest Territory the period of
rapid growth had not begun, the old French inhabi-
tants still forming the majority of the population.

The changes during these seven years had been
vital. In the West, as elsewhere through the Union,
the years succeeding the triumphant close of the
Revolution were those which determined whether
the victory was or was not worth winning. To
throw off the yoke of the stranger was useless and
worse than useless if we showed ourselves unable
to turn to good account the freedom we had gained.
Unless we could build up a gr.eat nation, and unless
we possessed the power and self-restraint to frame
an orderly and stable government, and to live un-
der its laws when framed, the long years of warfare
against the armies of the king were wasted and went
for naught.

At the close of the Revolution the West was seeth-
ing with sedition. There were three tasks before the
Westerners ; all three had to be accomplished, under

2o The Winning of the West

pain of utter failure. It was their duty to invade
and tame the shaggy wilderness; to drive back the
Indians and their European allies; and to erect free
governments which should form parts of the in-
dissoluble Union. If the spirit of sedition, of law-
lessness, and of wild individualism and separatism
had conquered, then our history would merely have
anticipated the dismal tale of the Spanish- American
republics.

Viewed from this standpoint the history of the
West during these eventful years has a special and
peculiar interest. The inflow of the teeming throng
of settlers was the most striking feature ; but it was
no more important than the half-seen struggle in
which the Union party finally triumphed over the
restless strivers for disunion. The extent and re-
ality of the danger are shown by the numerous sep-
aratist movements. The intrigues in which so many
of the leaders engaged with Spain, for the purpose
of setting up barrier States, in some degree feuda-
tory to the Spaniards; the movement in Kentucky
for violent separation from Virginia, and the more
secret movement for separation from the United
States ; the turbulent career of the commonwealth of
Franklin; the attitude of isolation of interest from
all their neighbors assumed by the Cumberland set-
tlers:— all these various movements and attitudes
were significant of the looseness of the Federal tie,
and were ominous of the anarchic violence, weak-
ness and misrule which would have followed the
breaking of that tie.

St. Clair and Wayne 21

The career of Franklin gave the clearest glimpse
of what might have been ; for it showed the gradual
breaking down of law and order, the rise of factions
ready to appeal to arms for success, the bitter broils
with neighboring States, the; reckless readiness to
provoke war with the Indians, unheeding their rights
or the woes such wars caused other frontier com-
munities, and finally the entire willingness of the
leaders to seek foreign aid when their cause was
declining.

Had not the Constitution been adopted, and a
more perfect union been thus called into being, the
history of the State of Franklin would have been
repeated in fifty communities from the Alleghanies
to the Pacific coast ; only these little States, instead
of dying in the bud, would have gone through a
rank flowering period of bloody and aimless revo-
lutions, of silly and ferocious warfare against their
neighbors, and of degrading alliance with the for-
eigner. From these and a hundred other woes the
West no less than the East was saved by the knitting
together of the States into a Nation.

This knitting process passed through its first and
most critical stage in the West during the period
intervening between the close of the war for inde-
pendence and the year which saw the organization
of the Southwest into a territory, ruled under the
laws, and by the agent, of the National Government.
During this time no step was taken toward settling
the question of boundary lines with our British and
Spanish neighbors ; that remained as it had been, the

22 The Winning of the West

Americans never abandoning claims which they had
not yet the power to enforce, and which their an-
tagonists declined to yield. Neither were the In-
dian wars settled ; on the contrary, they had become
steadily more serious, though for the first time a
definite solution was promised by the active inter-
ference of the National Government. But a vast
change had been made by the inflow of population;
and an even vaster by the growing solidarity of the
Western settlements with one another and with the
Central Government. The settlement of the North-
west, so different in some of its characteristics from
the settlement of the Southwest, had begun. Ken-
tucky was about to become a State of the Union.
The territories north and south of it were organized
as part of the domain of the United States. The
West was no longer a mere wilderness dotted with
cabins and hamlets, whose backwoods builders were
held by but the loosest tie of allegiance to any gov-
ernment, even their own. It had become an integral
part of the mighty American Republic.

CHAPTER IV
ST. CLAIR'S DEFEAT, 1791

THE backwoods folk, the stark hunters and tree-
fellers, and the war-worn regulars who fought
beside them in the forest, pushed ever westward the
frontier of the Republic. Year after year each
group of rough settlers and rough soldiers wrought
its part in the great epic of wilderness conquest.

The people that for one or more generations finds
its allotted task in the conquest of a continent has
before it the possibility of splendid victory, and the
certainty of incredible toil, suffering, and hardship.
The opportunity is great indeed; but the chance of
disaster is even greater. Success is for a mighty
race, in its vigorous and masterful prime. It is an
opportunity such as is offered to an army by a strug-
gle against a powerful foe ; only by great effort can
defeat be avoided, but triumph means lasting honor
and renown.

As it is in the battle, so it is in the infinitely
greater contests where the fields of fight are conti-
nents and the ages form the measure of time. In
actual life the victors win in spite of brutal blunders
and repeated checks. Watched nearby, while the
fight stamps to and fro, the doers and the deeds
stand out naked and ugly. We see all too clearly

(23)

24 The Winning of the West

the blood and sweat, the craft and cunning and blind
luck, the raw cruelty and stupidity, the shortcom-
ings of heart and hand, the mad abuse of victory.
Strands of meanness and cowardice are everywhere
shot through the warp of lofty and generous daring.
There are failures bitter and shameful side by side
with feats of triumphant prowess. Of those who
venture in the contest some achieve success; others
strive feebly and fail ignobly.

If a race is weak, if it is lacking in the physical
and moral traits which go to the makeup of a con-
quering people, it can not succeed. For three hun-
dred years the Portuguese possessed footholds in
South Africa ; but they left to the English and Dutch
the task of building free communities able to hold
in fact as well as in name the country south of the
Zambesi.. Temperate South America is as fertile
and healthy for the white man as temperate North
America, and is so much less in extent as to offer
a far simpler problem of conquest and settlement;
yet the Spaniard, who came to the Plata two cen-
turies before the American backwoodsman reached
the Mississippi, scarcely made as much progress in
a decade as his Northern rival did in a year.

The task must be given the race just at the time
when it is ready for the undertaking. The whole
future of the world would have been changed had
the period of trans-oceanic expansion among the
nations of Europe begun at a time when the Scandi-
navians or Germans were foremost in sea-trade and
sea-war; if it had begun when the fleets of the

St. Clair and Wayne 25

Norsemen threatened all coasts, or when the Hanse-
atic League was in its prime. But in the actual
event the days of Scandinavian supremacy at sea re-
sulted in no spread of the Scandinavian tongue or
culture; and the temporary maritime prosperity of
the North German cities bore no permanent fruit of
conquest for the German people. The only nations
that profited by the expansion beyond the seas, and
that built up in alien continents vast commonwealths
with the law, the language, the creed, and the cul-
ture, no less than the blood, of the parent stocks,
were those that during the centuries of expansion,
possessed power on the ocean, — Spain, Portugal,
France, Holland, and, above all, England.

Even a strong race, in its prime, and given the
task at the right moment, usually fails to perform
it ; for at the moment the immense importance of the
opportunity is hardly ever understood, while the
selfish interests of the individual and the generation
are opposed to the interest of the race as a whole.
Only the most far-seeing and high-minded states-
men can grasp the real weight, from the race-stand-
point, of the possibilities which to the men of their
day seem so trivial. The conquest and settlement
rarely take place save under seldom-occurring con-
ditions which happen to bring about identity of in-
terest between the individual and the race. Dutch
seamen knew the coasts of Australia and New Zea-
land generations before they were settled by the
English, and had the people of Holland willed to
take possession of them, the Dutch would now be

VOL. VIII.— 2

26 The Winning of the West

one of the leading races of mankind; but they pre-
ferred the immediate gains to be derived from the
ownership of the trade with the Spice Islands; and
so for the unimportant over-lordship of a few patches
of tropical soil, they bartered the chance of building
a giant Dutch Republic in the South Seas. Had
the Swedish successors of Gustavus Adolphus de-
voted their energies to colonization in America, in-
stead of squabbling with Slavs and Germans for one
or two wretched Baltic provinces, they could un-
doubtedly have built up in the new world a Sweden
tenfold greater than that in the old. If France had
sent to her possessions in America as many colo-
nists as she sent soldiers to war for petty townships
in Germany and Italy, the French would now be
masters of half the territory north of the Rio Grande.
England alone, because of a combination of causes,
was able to use aright the chances given her for the
conquest and settlement of the world's waste spaces ;
and in consequence the English-speaking peoples
now have before them a future more important than
that of all the continental European peoples com-
bined.

It is natural that most nations should be thus
blind to the possibilities of the future. Few indeed
are the men who can look a score of years into the
future, and fewer still those who will make great
sacrifices for the real, not the fancied, good of their
children's children ; but in questions of race suprem-
acy the look-ahead should be for centuries rather
than decades, and the self-sacrifice of the individual

St. Clair and Wayne 27

must be for the good not of the next generation but
perchance of the fourth or fifth in line of descent.
The Frenchman and the Hollander of the seven-
teenth century could not even dimly see the possibili-
ties that loomed vast and vague in the colonization
of America and Australia ; they did not have, and it
was hardly possible that they should have, the re-
motest idea that it would be well for them to surren-
der, one the glory gained by his German conquests,
the other the riches reaped from his East Indian
trade, in order that three hundred years later huge
unknown continents should be filled with French
and Dutch commonwealths. No nation, taken as a
whole, can ever see so far into the future ; no nation,
even if it could see such a future, would ever sacri-
fice so much to win it. Hitherto each race in turn
has expanded only because the interests of a certain
number of individuals of many succeeding genera-
tions have made them active and vigorous agents in
the work of expansion.

This indifference on the part of individuals to the
growth of the race is often nearly as marked in new
as in old communities, although the very existence
of these new communities depends upon that growth.
It is strange to see how the new settlers in the new
land tend to turn their faces, not toward the world
before them, but toward the world they have left
behind. Many of them, perhaps, wish rather to
take parts in the struggles of the old civilized pow-
ers, than to do their share in laying the obscure but
gigantic foundations of the empires of the future.

28 The Winning of the West

The New Englander who was not personally inter-
ested in the lands beyond the Alleghanies often felt
indifferent or hostile to the growth of the trans-
montane America; and in their turn these over-
mountain men, these Kentuckians and Tennessee-
ans, were concerned to obtain a port at the mouth
of the Mississippi rather than the right to move
westward to the Pacific. There were more men in
the new communities than in the old who saw, how-
ever imperfectly, the grandeur of the opportunity
and of the race-destiny ; but there were always very
many who did their share in working out their des-
tiny grudgingly and under protest. The race as a
whole, in its old homes and its new, learns the les-
son with such difficulty that it can scarcely be said
to be learnt at all until success or failure has done
away with the need of learning it. But in the case
of our own people, it has fortunately happened that
the concurrence of the interests of the individual and
of the whole organism has been normal throughout
most of its history.

The attitude of the United States and Great Brit-
ain, as they faced one another in the Western wil-
derness at the beginning of the year 1791, is but an-
other illustration of the truth of this fact. The British
held the lake posts, and more or less actively sup-
ported the Indians in their efforts to bar the Ameri-
cans from the Northwest. Nominally, they held the
posts because the Americans had themselves left un-
fulfilled some of the conditions of the treaty of
peace; but this was felt not to be the real reason,

St. Clair and Wayne 29

and the Americans loudly protested that their con-
duct was due to sheer hatred of the young Republic.
The explanation was simpler. The British had no
far-reaching design to prevent the spread and growth
of the English-speaking people on the American con-
tinent. They cared nothing, one way or the other,
for that spread and growth, and it is unlikely that
they wasted a moment's thought on the ultimate
future of the race. All that they desired was to
preserve the very valuable fur-trade of the region
round the Great Lakes for their own benefit. They
were acting from the motives of self-interest that
usually control nations; and it never entered their
heads to balance against these immediate interests
the future of a nation many of whose members were
to them mere foreigners.

The majority of the Americans, on their side, were
exceedingly loth to enter into aggressive war with
the Indians; but were reluctantly forced into the
contest by the necessity of supporting the back-
woodsmen. The frontier was pushed westward,
not because the leading statesmen of America, or
the bulk of the American people, foresaw the con-
tinental greatness of this country or strove for such
greatness; but because the bordermen of the West,
and the adventurous land-speculators of the East,
were personally interested in acquiring new terri-
tory, and because, against their will, the govern-
mental representatives of the nation were finally
forced to make the interests of the Westerners their
own. The people of the seaboard, the leaders of

30 The Winning of the West

opinion in the coast towns and old-settled districts,
were inclined to look eastward, rather than west-
ward. They were interested in the quarrels of the
Old- World nations; they were immediately con-
cerned in the rights of the fisheries they jealously
shared with England, or the trade they sought to se-
cure with Spain. They did not covet the Indian
lands. They had never heard of the Rocky Moun-
tains— nobody had as yet, — they cared as little for
the Missouri as for the Congo, and they thought of
the Pacific Slope as a savage country, only to be
reached by an ocean voyage longer than the voyage
to India. They believed that they were entitled, un-
der the treaty, to the country between the Allegha-
nies and the Great Lakes; but they were quite con-
tent to see the Indians remain in actual occupancy,
and they had no desire to spend men and money in
driving them out. Nevertheless, they were even
less disposed to proceed to extremities against their
own people, who in very fact were driving out the
Indians; and this was the only alternative, for in
the end they had to side with one or the other set
of combatants.

The governmental authorities of the newly created
Republic shared these feelings. They felt no hun-
ger for the Indian lands ; they felt no desire to stretch
their boundaries and thereby add to their already
heavy burdens and responsibilities. They wished
to do strict justice to the Indians ; the treaties they
held with them were carried on with scrupulous fair-
ness and were honorably lived up to by the United

St. Clair and Wayne 31

States officials. They strove to keep peace, and
made many efforts to persuade the frontiersmen to
observe the Indian boundary lines, and not to intrude
on the territory in dispute ; and they were quite un-
able to foresee the rapidity of the nation's westward
growth. Like the people of the Eastern seaboard,
the men high in govermental authority were apt to
look upon the frontiersmen with feelings danger-
ously akin to dislike and suspicion. Nor were these
feelings wholly unjustifiable. The men who settle
in a new country, and begin subduing the wilder-
ness, plunge back into the very conditions from
which the race has raised itself by the slow toil of
ages. The conditions can not but tell upon them.
Inevitably, and for more than one lifetime — perhaps
for several generations — they tend to retrograde,
instead of advancing. They drop away from the
standard which highly civilized nations have
reached. As with harsh and dangerous labor they
bring the new lands up toward the level of the old,
they themselves partly revert to their ancestral con-
ditions; they sink back toward the state of their
ages-dead barbarian forefathers. Few observers
can see beyond this temporary retrogression into the
future for which it is a preparation. There is small
cause for wonder in the fact that so many of the
leaders of Eastern thought looked with coldness
upon the effort of the Westerners to push north of
the Ohio.

Yet it was these Western frontiersmen who were
the real and vital factors in the solution o-f the prob-

32 The Winning of the West

lems which so annoyed the British Monarchy and
the American Republic. They eagerly craved the
Indian lands; they would not be denied entrance to
the thinly-peopled territory wherein they intended
to make homes for themselves and their children.
Rough, masterful, lawless, they were neither daunted
by the prowess of the red warriors whose wrath they
braved, nor awed by the displeasure of the Govern-
ment whose solemn engagements they violated. The
enormous extent of the frontier dividing the white
settler from the savage, and the tangled inaccessibil-
ity of the country in which it everywhere lay, ren-
dered it as difficult for the national authorities to
control the frontiersmen as it was to chastise the
Indians.

If the separation of interests between the thickly
settled East and the sparsely settled West had been
complete it may be that the East would have refused
outright to support the West, in which case the ad-
vance would have been very slow and halting. But
the separation was not complete. The frontiersmen
were numerically important in some of the States,
as in Virginia, Georgia, and even Pennsylvania and
New York; and under a democratic system of gov-
ernment this meant that these States were more or
less responsive to their demands. It was greatly to
the interest of the frontiersmen that their demands
should be gratified, while other citizens had no very
concrete concern in the matter one way or the other.
In addition to this, and even more important, was
the fact that there were large classes of the popula-

St. Clair and Wayne 33

tion everywhere who felt much sense of identity with
the frontiersmen, and sympathized with them. The
fathers or grandfathers of these peoples had them-
selves been frontiersmen, and they were still under
the influences of the traditions which told of a con-
stant march westward through the vast forests, and
a no less constant warfare with a hostile savagery.
Moreover, in many of the communities there were
people whose kinsmen or friends had gone to the
border; and the welfare of these adventurers was
a matter of more or less interest to those who had
stayed behind. Finally, and most important of all,
though the nation might be lukewarm originally, and
might wish to prevent the settlers from trespassing
on the Indian lands or entering into an Indian war,
yet when the war had become of real moment and
when victory was doubtful, the national power was
sure to be used in favor of the hard-pressed pio-
neers. At first the authorities at the national capi-
tal would blame the whites, and try to temporize
and make new treaties, or even threaten to drive
back the settlers with a strong hand; but when the
ravages of the Indians had become serious, when the
bloody details were sent to homes in every part of
the Union by letter after letter from the border,
when the little newspapers began to publish accounts
of the worst atrocities, when the county lieutenants
of the frontier counties were clamoring for help,
when the Congressmen from the frontier districts
were appealing to Congress, and the governors of
the States whose frontiers were molested were ap-

34 The Winning of the West

pealing to the President — then the feeling of race
and national kinship rose, and the Government no
longer hesitated to support in every way the hard-
pressed wilderness vanguard of the American peo-
ple.

The situation had reached this point by the year
1791. For seven years the Federal authorities had
been vainly endeavoring to make some final settle-
ment of the question by entering into treaties with
the Northwestern and Southwestern tribes. In the
earlier treaties the delegates from the Continental
Congress asserted that the United States were in-
vested with the fee of all the land claimed by the
Indians. In the later treaties the Indian proprietor-
ship of the lands was conceded.1 This concession
at the time seemed important to the whites; but the
Indians probably never understood that there had
been any change of attitude; nor did it make any
practical difference, for, whatever the theory might
be, the lands had eventually to be won, partly by
whipping the savages in fight, partly by making it
better worth their while to remain at peace than to
go to war.

The Federal officials under whose authority these
treaties were made had no idea of the complexity of
the problem. In 1789, the Secretary of War, the
New Englander Knox, solemnly reported to the
President that, if the treaties were only observed and

1 American State Papers, Vol. IV, Indian Affairs, I, p. 13.
Letter of H. Knox, June 15, 1789. This is the lettering on
the back of the volume, and for convenience it will be used
in referring to it.

St. Clair and Wayne 35

the Indians conciliated, they would become attached
to the United States, and the expense of managing
them, for the next half century, would be only some
fifteen thousand dollars a year.2 He probably rep-
resented, not unfairly, the ordinary Eastern view of
the matter. He had not the slightest idea of the
rate at which the settlements were increasing, though
he expected that tracts of Indian territory would
from time to time be acquired. He made no allow-
ance for a growth so rapid that within the half-cen-
tury six or eight populous States were to stand
within the Indian-owned wilderness of his day. He
utterly failed to grasp the central features of the
situation, which were that the settlers needed the
land, and were bound to have it within a few years ;
and that the Indians would not give it up, under no
matter what treaty, without an appeal to arms.

In the South the United States Commissioners, in
endeavoring to conclude treaties with the Creeks
and Cherokees, had been continually hampered by
the attitude of Georgia and the Franklin frontiers-
men. The Franklin men made war and peace with
the Cherokees just as they chose, and utterly refused
to be bound by the treaties concluded on behalf of
the United States. Georgia played the same part
with regard to the Creeks. The Georgian authori-
ties paid no heed whatever to the desires of Con-
gress, and negotiated on their own account a series
of treaties with the Creeks at Augusta, Gal'phinton,
and Shoulderbone, in 1783, 1785, and 1786. But

8 American State Papers, Vol. IV, Indian Affairs, I, p. 13.

36 The Winning of the West

these treaties amounted to nothing, for nobody could
tell exactly which towns or tribes owned a given
tract of land, or what individuals were competent
to speak for the Indians as a whole ; the Creeks and
Cherokees went through the form of surrendering
the same territory on the Oconee.3 The Georgians
knew that the Indians with whom they treated had
no power to surrender the lands ; but all they wished
was some shadowy color of title, that might serve
as an excuse for their seizing the coveted territory.
On the other hand, the Creeks, loudly though they
declaimed against the methods of the Georgian
treaty-makers, themselves shamelessly disregarded
the solemn engagements which their authorized rep-
resentatives made with the United States. More-
over their murderous forays on the Georgian settlers
were often as unprovoked as were the aggressions
of the brutal Georgia borderers.

The Creeks were prompt to seize every advan-
tage given by the impossibility of defining the rights
of the various component parts of their loosely knit
confederacy. They claimed or disclaimed responsi-
bility as best suited their plans for the moment.
When at Galphinton two of the Creek towns signed
away a large tract of territory, McGillivray, the fa-
mous half-breed, and the other chiefs, loudly pro-
tested that the land belonged to the whole confeder-
acy, and that the separate towns could do nothing
save by consent of all. But in May, 1787, a party

3 American State Papers, IV, 15. Letter of Knox, July 6,

1789.

St. Clair and Wayne 37

of Creeks from the upper towns made an unpro-
voked foray into Georgia, killed two settlers, and
carried off a negro and fourteen horses ; the militia
who followed them attacked the first Indians they
fell in with, who happened to be from the lower
towns, and killed twelve ; whereupon the same chiefs
disavowed all responsibility for the deeds of the
Upper Town warriors, and demanded the immedi-
ate surrender of the militia who had killed the
Lower Town people — to the huge indignation of the
Governor of Georgia.4

The United States Commissioners were angered
by the lawless greed with which the Georgians
grasped at the Indian lands; and they soon found
that though the Georgians were always ready to
clamor for help from the United States against the
Indians, in the event of hostilities, they were equally
prompt to defy the United States authorities if the
latter strove to obtain justice for the Indians, or if
the treaties concluded by the Federal and the State
authorities seemed likely to conflict.5 The Commis-
sioners were at first much impressed by the letters
sent them by McGillivray, and the "talks" they re-
ceived through the Scotch, French, and English
half-breed interpreters6 from the outlandishly named
Muscogee chiefs — the Hallowing King of the War

4 American State Papers, Vol. IV, 31, 32, 33. Letter of
Governor Matthews, August 4, 1787, etc.

8 Do., p. 49. Letter of Benjamin Hawkins and Andrew
Pickens, December 30, 1785.

6 Do., e. g., the letter of Galphin and Douzeazeaux, June
14, 1787.

38 The Winning of the West

Towns, the Fat King of the White or Peace Towns,
the White Bird King, the Mad Dog King, and many
more. But they soon found that the Creeks were
quite as much to blame as the Georgians, and were
playing fast and loose with the United States, prom-
ising to enter into treaties, and then refusing to at-
tend; their flagrant and unprovoked breaches of
faith causing intense anger and mortification to the
Commissioners, whose patient efforts to serve them
were so ill rewarded.7 Moreover, to offset the In-
dian complaints of lands taken from them under
fraudulent treaties, the Georgians submitted lists8 of
hundreds of whites and blacks killed, wounded, or
captured, and of thousands of horses, horned cattle,
and hogs butchered or driven off by Indian war
parties. The puzzled Commissioners having at first
been inclined to place the blame of the failure of
peace negotiations on the Georgians, next shifted the
responsibility to McGillivray, reporting that the
Creeks were strongly in favor of peace. The event
proved that they were in error ; for after McGillivray
and his fellow chiefs had come to New York, in the
summer of 1790, and concluded a solemn treaty of
peace, the Indians whom they nominally represented
refused to be bound by it in any way, and con-
tinued without a change their war of rapine and
murder.

In truth the red men were as little disposed as
the white to accept a peace on any terms that were

1 American State Papers, Vol. IV, p. 74, September 26, 1789.
8 Do., p. 77, October 5, 1789.

St. Clair and Wayne 39

possible. The Secretary of War, who knew noth-
ing of Indians by actual contact, wrote that it
would be indeed pleasing "to a philosophic mind to
reflect that, instead of exterminating a part of the
human race by our modes of population ... we
had imparted our knowledge of cultivation and the
arts to the aboriginals of the country," thus pre-
serving and civilizing them;9 and the public men
who represented districts remote from the frontier
shared these views of large, though vague, benefi-
cence. But neither the white frontiersmen nor their
red antagonists possessed "philosophic minds."
They represented two stages of progress, ages apart ;
and it would have needed many centuries to bring
the lower to the level of the higher. Both sides rec-
ognized the fact that their interests were incompati-
ble ; and that the question of their clashing rights
had to be settled by the strong hand.

In the Northwest matters culminated sooner than
in the Southwest. The Georgians, and the settlers
along the Tennessee and Cumberland, were harassed
rather than seriously menaced by the Creek war
parties; but in the North the more dangerous In-
dians of the Miami, the Wabash, and the Lakes
gathered in bodies so large as fairly to deserve the
name of armies. Moreover, the pressure of the white
advance was far heavier in the North. The pioneers
who settled in the Ohio basin were many times as
numerous as those who settled on the lands west

9 American State Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 53, 57, 60, 77, 79, 81,
etc.

40 The Winning of the West

of the Oconee and north of the Cumberland, and
were fed from States much more populous. The
advance was stronger, the resistance more desper-
ate; naturally the open break occurred where the
strain was most intense.

There was fierce border warfare in the South.
In the North there were regular campaigns carried
on, and pitched battles fought, between Federal
armies as large as those commanded by Washing-
ton at Trenton or Greene at Eutaw Springs, and
bodies of Indian warriors more numerous than had
ever yet appeared on any single field.

The newly created Government of the United
States was very reluctant to make formal war on
the Northwestern Indians. Not only were Presi-
dent Washington and the National Congress hon-
orably desirous of peace, but they were hampered
for funds, and dreaded any extra expense. Never-
theless they were forced into war. Throughout the
years 1789 and 1790 an increasing volume of ap-
peals for help came from the frontier countries. The
governor of the Northwestern Territory, the briga-
dier-general of the troops on the Ohio, the members
of the Kentucky Convention, and all the county lieu-
tenants of Kentucky, the lieutenants of the frontier
counties of Virginia proper, the representatives
from the counties, the field officers of the different
districts, the General Assembly of Virginia, all sent
bitter complaints and long catalogues of injuries to
the President, the Secretary of War, and the two
Houses of Congress; complaints which were re-

St. Clair and Wayne 41

doubled after Harmar's failure. With heavy hearts
the national authorities prepared for war.10

Their decision was justified by the redoubled fury
of the Indian raids during the early part of 1791.
Among others the settlements near Marietta were
attacked, a day or two after the new year began, yi
bitter winter weather. A dozen persons, including
a woman and two children, were killed, and five men
were taken prisoners. The New England settlers,
though brave and hardy, were unused to Indian war-
fare. They were taken completely by surprise, and
made no effective resistance; the only Indian hurt
was wounded with a hatchet by the wife of a fron-
tier hunter in the employ of the company.11 There
were some twenty-five Indians in the attacking
party; they were Wyandots and Dela wares, who
had been mixing on friendly terms with the settlers
throughout the preceding summer, and so knew how
best to deliver the assault. The settlers had not
only treated these Indians with much kindness, but
had never wronged any of the red race; and had
been lulled into a foolish feeling of security by the
apparent good-will of the treacherous foes. The as-
sault was made in the twilight, on the 2d of January,
the Indians crossing the frozen Muskingum and
stealthily approaching a blockhouse and two or three
cabins. The inmates were frying meat for supper,
and did not suspect harm, offering food to the In-

10 American State Papers, IV, pp. 83, 94, 109, and in.

11 "American Pioneer," II, no. American State Papers,
IV, 122.

42 The Winning of the West

dians; but the latter, once they were within doors,
dropped the garb of friendliness, and shot or toma-
hawked all save a couple of men who escaped and the
five who were made prisoners. The captives were
all taken to the Miami, or Detroit, and as usual were
treated with much kindness and humanity by the
British officers and traders with whom they came
in contact. McKee, the British Indian agent, who
•was always ready to incite the savages to war against
the Americans as a nation, but who was quite as
ready to treat them kindly as individuals, ransomed
one prisoner; the latter went to his Massachusetts
home to raise the amount of his ransom, and re-
turned to Detroit to refund it to his generous rescuer.
Another prisoner was ransomed by a Detroit trader,
and worked out his ransom in Detroit itself. Yet
another was redeemed from captivity by the famous
Iroquois chief Brant, who was ever a terrible and
implacable foe, but a great-hearted and kindly victor.
The fourth prisoner died ; while the Indians took so
great a liking to the fifth that they would not let
him go, but adopted him into the tribe, made him
dress as they did, and, in a spirit of pure friendli-
ness, pierced his ears and nose. After Wayne's
treaty he was released, and returned to Marietta to
work at his trade as a stone mason, his bored nose
and slit ears serving as mementos of his captivity.
The squalid little town of Cincinnati also suffered
from the Indian war parties in the spring of this
year,12 several of the townsmen being killed by the

"American Pioneer," II, 149.

St. Clair and Wayne 43

savages, who grew so bold that they lurked through
the streets at nights, and lay in ambush in the gar-
dens where the garrison of Fort Washington raised
their vegetables. One of the Indian attacks, made
upon a little palisaded "station" which had been
founded by a man named Dunlop, some seventeen
miles from Cincinnati, was noteworthy because of
an act of not uncommon cruelty by the Indians. In
the station there were some regulars. Aided by the
settlers they beat back their foes; whereupon the
enraged savages brought one of their prisoners with-
in earshot of the walls and tortured him to death.
The torture began at midnight, and the screams of
the wretched victim were heard until daylight.13

Until this year the war was not general. One
of the most bewildering problenis to be solved by
the Federal officers on the Ohio was to find out
which tribes were friendly and which hostile. Many
of the inveterate enemies of the Americans were as
forward in professions of friendship as the peaceful
Indians, and were just as apt to be found at the
treaties, or lounging about the settlements ; and this
widespread treachery and deceit made the task of
the army officers puzzling to a degree. As for the
frontiersmen, who had no means whatever of telling
a hostile from a friendly tribe, they followed their
usual custom and lumped all the Indians, good and
bad, together; for which they could hardly be
blamed. Even St. Clair, who had small sympathy
with the backwoodsmen, acknowledged14 that they

!S McBride, I, 88. " American State Papers, IV, 58.

44 The Winning of the West

could not and ought not to submit patiently to the
cruelties and depredations of the savages ; "they are
in the habit of retaliation, perhaps without attending
percisely to the nations from which the injuries are
received," said he. A long course of such aggres-
sions and retaliations resulted, by the year 1791, in
all the Northwestern Indians going on the warpath.
The hostile tribes had murdered and plundered the
frontiersmen; the vengeance of the latter, as often
as not, had fallen on friendly tribes; and these
justly angered friendly tribes usually signalized their
taking the red hatchet by some act of treacherous
hostility directed against the settlers who had not
molested them.

In the late winter of 1791 the hitherto friendly
Delawares who hunted or traded along the western
frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia proper took
this manner of showing that they had joined the
open foes of the Americans. A big band of war-
riors spread up and down the Alleghany for about
forty miles, and on the 9th of February attacked
all the outlying settlements. The Indians who de-
livered this attack had long been on intimate terms
with the Alleghany settlers, who were accustomed
to see them in and about their houses ; and as the
savages acted with seeming friendship to the last
moment, they were able to take the settlers com-
pletely unawares, so that no effective resistance was
made.15 Some settlers were killed and some cap-
tured. Among the captives was a lad named John

15 "American Pioneer," I, 44; Narrative of John Brickell.

St. Clair and Wayne 45

Brickell, who, though at first maltreated, and forced
to run the gantlet, was afterward adopted into the
tribe, and was not released until after Wayne's vic-
tory. After his adoption, he was treated with the
utmost kindness, and conceived a great liking for
his captors, admiring their many good qualities,
especially their courage and their kindness to their
children. Long afterward he wrote down his ex-
periences, which possess a certain value as giving,
from the Indian standpoint, an account of some of
the incidents of the forest warfare of the day.

The warriors who had engaged in this raid on
their former friends, the settlers along the Alle-
ghany, retreated two or three days' journey into the
wilderness to an appointed place, where they found
their families. One of the Girtys was with the In-
dians. No sooner had the last of the warriors come
in, with their scalps and prisoners, including the
boy Brickell, than ten of their number deliberately
started back to Pittsburg, to pass themselves as
friendly Indians, and trade. In a fortnight they
returned laden with goods of various kinds, includ-
ing whiskey. Some of the inhabitants, sore from
disaster, suspected that these Indians were only
masquerading as friendly, and prepared to attack
them; but one of the citizens warned them of their
danger and they escaped. Their effrontery was as
remarkable as their treachery and duplicity. They
had suddenly attacked and massacred settlers by
whom they had never been harmed, and with whom
they preserved an appearance of entire friendship

46 The Winning of the West

up to the very moment of the assault. Then, their
hands red with the blood of their murdered friends,
they came boldly into Pittsburg, among the near
neighbors of these same murdered men, and stayed
there several days to trade, pretending to be peace-
ful allies of the whites. With savages so treacher-
ous and so ferocious it was a mere impossibility for
the borderers to distinguish the hostile from the
friendly, as they hit out blindly to revenge the blows
that fell upon them from unknown hands. Brutal
though the frontiersmen often were, they never em-
ployed the systematic and deliberate bad faith which
was a favorite weapon with even the best of the red
tribes.

The people who were out of reach of the Indian
tomahawk, and especially the Federal officers, were
often unduly severe in judging the borderers for
their deeds of retaliation. Brickell's narrative
shows that the parties of seemingly friendly Indians
who came in to trade were sometimes — and indeed
in this year 1791 it was probable they were gener-
ally— composed of Indians who were engaged in
active hostilities against the settlers, and who were
always watching for a chance to murder and plun-
der. On March Qth, a month after the Delawares
had begun their attacks, the grim backwoods cap-
tain Brady, with some of his Virginian rangers, fell
on a party of them who had come to a block-house
to trade, and killed four. The Indians asserted that
they were friendly, and both the Federal Secretary
of War and the Governor of Pennsylvania de-

St. Clair and Wayne 47

nounced the deed, and threatened the offenders;
but the frontiersmen stood by them.16 Soon after-
ward a delegation of chiefs from the Seneca tribe
of the Iroquois arrived at Fort Pitt, and sent a mes-
sage to the President, complaining of the murder
of these alleged friendly Indians.17 On the very
day these Seneca chiefs started on their journey
home another Delaware war party killed nine set-
tlers, men, women, and children, within twenty
miles of Fort Pitt; which so enraged the people of
the neighborhood that the lives of the Senecas were
jeopardized. The United States authorities were
particularly anxious to keep at peace with the Six
Nations, and made repeated efforts to treat with
them ; but the Six Nations stood sullenly aloof, afraid
to enter openly into the struggle, and yet reluctant
to make a firm peace or cede any of their lands.18
The intimate relations between the Indians and
the British at the Lake Posts continued to perplex
and anger the Americans. While the frontiers were
being mercilessly ravaged, the same Indians who
were committing the ravages met in council with the
British agent, Alexander McKee, at the Miami
Rapids ; the council being held in this neighborhood

16 State Department MSS., Washington Papers, Ex. C., p.
ii, etc. Presly Neville to Richard Butler, March 19, 1791;
Isaac Craig to Secretary of War, March 16, 1791 ; Secretary
of War to President, March 31, 1791.

" American State Papers, IV, 145, Cornplanter and others
to the President, March 17, 1791.

18 State Department MSS., Washington Papers, Knox to
the President, April 10, 1791: American State Papers, IV,
pp. 139-170, 225-233, 477-482, etc.

48 The Winning of the West

for the special benefit of the very towns which were
most hostile to the Americans, and which had been
partially destroyed by Harmar the preceding fall.
The Indian war was at its height, and the murder-
ous forays never ceased throughout the spring and
summer. McKee came to Miami in April, and was
forced to wait nearly three months, because of the
absence of the Indian war parties, before the prin-
cipal chiefs and headmen gathered to meet him.
At last, on July ist, they were all assembled; not
only the Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots, Ottawas,
Pottawatomies and others who had openly taken the
hatchet against the Americans, but also representa-
tives of the Six Nations, and tribes of savages from
lands so remote that they carried no guns; but
warred with bows, spears, and tomahawks, and were
clad in buffalo-robes instead of blankets. McKee
in his speech to them did not incite them to war.
On the contrary, he advised them, in guarded lan-
guage, to make peace with the United States ; but
only upon terms consistent with their "honor and
interest." He assured them that, whatever they
did, he wished to know what they desired ; and that
the sole purpose of the British was to promote the
welfare of the confederated Indians. Such very
cautious advice was not of a kind to promote peace;
and the goods furnished the savages at the council
included not only cattle, corn, and tobacco, but also
quantities of powder and balls.19

19 Canadian Archives, McKee's speech to the Indians, July
i, 1791; and Francis Lafontaine's account of sundries to
Indians.

St. Clair and Wayne 49

The chief interest of the British was to preserve
the fur trade for their merchants, and it was mainly
for this reason that they clung so tenaciously to the
Lake Posts. For their purposes it was essential that
the Indians should remain lords of the soil. They
preferred to see the savages at peace with the Amer-
icans, provided that in this way they could keep
their lands ; but, whether through peace or war, they
wished the lands to remain Indian, and the Amer-
icans to be barred from them. While they did not
at the moment advise war, their advice to make
peace was so faintly uttered, and so hedged round
with conditions as to be of no weight ; and they fur-
nished the Indians not only with provisions but with
munitions of war. While McKee, and other Brit-
ish officers, were at the Miami Rapids, holding
councils with the Indians, and issuing to them goods
and weapons, bands of braves were continually re-
turning from forays against the American frontier,
bringing in scalps and prisoners; and the wilder
subjects of the British King, like the Girtys, and
some of the French from Detroit, went off with the
war parties on their forays.20 The authorities at
the capital of the new Republic were, deceived by
the warmth with which the British insisted that
they were striving to bring about a peace; but the
frontiersmen were not deceived, and they were right

20 American State Papers, IV, 196. Narrative of Thomas
Rhea, July 2, 1791. This narrative was distrusted; but it is
fully borne out by McKee's letter, and the narrative of
Brickell. He saw Brickell, whom he calls "Brittle," at the
Miami.

VOL. VIII.— 3

50 The Winning of the West

in their belief that the British were really the main-
stay and support of the Indians in. their warfare.

Peace could only be won by the unsheathed sword.
Even the National Government was reluctantly
driven to this view. As all the Northwestern tribes
were banded in open war, it was useless to let the
conflict remain a succession of raids and counter-
raids. Only a severe stroke, delivered by a formi-
dable army, could cow the tribes. It was hopeless
to try to deliver such a crippling blow with militia
alone, and it was very difficult for the infant Gov-
ernment to find enough money or men to equip an
army composed exclusively of regulars. According-
ly preparations were made for a campaign with a
mixed force of regulars, special levies, and militia;
and St. Clair, already Governor of the Northwest-
ern Territory, was put in command of the army as
Major-General.

Before the army was ready the Federal Govern-
ment was obliged to take other measures for the de-
fence of the border. Small bodies of rangers were
raised from among the frontier militia, being paid
at the usual rate for soldiers in the army, a net sum
of about two dollars a month while in service. In
addition, on the repeated and urgent request of the
frontiersmen, a few of the most active hunters and
best woodsmen, men like Brady, were enlisted as
scouts, being paid six or eight times the ordinary
rate. These men, because of their skill in wood-
craft and their thorough knowledge of Indian fight-
ing, were beyond comparison more valuable than

St. Clair and Wayne 51

ordinary militia or regulars, and were prized very
highly by the frontiersmen.21

Besides thus organizing the local militia for de-
fence, the President authorized the Kentuckians to
undertake two offensive expeditions against the
Wabash Indians so as to prevent them from giving
aid to the Miami tribes, whom St. Clair was to at-
tack. Both expeditions were carried on by bands of
mounted volunteers, such as had followed Clark on
his various raids. The first was commanded by
Brigadier-General Charles Scott ; Colonel John Har-
din led his advance guard, and Wilkinson was sec-
ond in command. Toward the end of May, Scott
crossed the Ohio, at the head of eight hundred horse-
riflemen, and marched rapidly and secretly toward
the Wabash towns. A mounted Indian discovered
the advance of the Americans and gave the alarm;
and so most of the Indians escaped just as the Ken-
tucky riders fell on the town. But little resistance
was offered by the surprised and outnumbered sav-
ages. Only five Americans were wounded, while
of the Indians thirty-two were slain, as they fought
or fled, and forty-one prisoners, chiefly women and
children, were brought in, either by Scott himself
or by his detachments under Hardin and Wilkinson.
Several towns were destroyed, and the growing
corn cut down. There were not a few French living
in the town, in well-finished log-houses, which were
burned with the wigwams.22 The second expedition

81 American State Papers, IV, 107, Jan. 5, 1791.
12 American State Papers, IV, 131, Scott's Report, June 28,
1791.

52 The Winning of the West

was under the command of Wilkinson, and con-
sisted of over five hundred men. He marched in
August, and repeated Scott's feats, again burning
down two or three of the towns, and destroying the
goods and the crops. He lost three or four men
killed or wounded, but killed ten Indians and cap-
tured thirty.23 In both expeditions the volunteers
behaved well and committed no barbarous act, ex-
cept that in the confusion of the actual onslaught
two or three non-combatants were slain. The Wa-
bash Indians were cowed and disheartened by their
punishment, and hi consequence gave no aid to the
Miami tribes; but beyond this the raids accom-
plished nothing, and brought no nearer the wished-
for time of peace.

Meanwhile St. Clair was striving vainly to hasten
the preparations for his own far more formidable
task. There was much delay in forwarding him the
men and the provisions and munitions. Congress
hesitated and debated; the Secretary of War, ham-
pered by a newly created office and insufficient
means, did not show to advantage in organizing the
campaign, and was slow in carrying out his plans;
while there was positive dereliction of duty on the
part of the quartermaster, and the contractors
proved both corrupt and inefficient. The army was
often on short commons, lacking alike food for the
men and fodder for the horses; the powder was
poor, the axes useless, the tents and clothing nearly
worthless ; while the delays were so extraordinary

** Do., Wilkinson's Letter, August 24, 1791.

St. Clair and Wayne 53

that the troops did not make the final move from
Fort Washington until mid-September.24

St. Clair himself was broken in health; he was
a sick, weak, elderly man, high minded, and zeal-
ous to do his duty, but totally unfit for the terrible
responsibilities of such an expedition against such
foes. The troops were of wretched stuff. There
were two small regiments of regular infantry, the
rest of the army being composed of six months'
levies and of militia ordered out for this particular
campaign. The pay was contemptible. Each pri-
vate was given three dollars a month, from which
ninety cents was deducted, leaving a net payment
of two dollars and ten cents a month.23 Sergeants
netted three dollars and sixty cents; while the lieu-
tenants received twenty-two, the captains thirty, and
the colonels sixty dollars. The mean parsimony of
the nation in paying such low wages to men about
to be sent on duties at once very arduous and very
dangerous met its fit and natural reward. Men of
good bodily powers, and in the prime of life, and
especially men able to do the rough work of frontier
farmers, could not be hired to fight Indians in un-
known forests for two dollars a month. Most of
the recruits were from the streets and prisons of
the seaboard cities. They were hurried into a cam-
paign against peculiarly formidable foes before they

24 St. Clair Papers, II, 286, Report of Special Committee of
Congress, March 27, 1792.

55 American State Papers, IV, 118, Report of Secy, of War.
January 22, 1791.

54 The Winning of the West

had acquired the rudiments of a soldier's training,
and, of course, they never even understood what
woodcraft meant.26 The officers were men of cour-
age, as in the end most of them showed by dying
bravely on the field of battle; but they were utterly
untrained themselves, and had no time in which to
train their men. Under such conditions it did not
need keen vision to foretell disaster. Harmar had
learned a bitter lesson the preceding year; he knew
well what Indians could do, and what raw troops
could not; and he insisted with emphasis that the
only possible outcome to St. Clair's expedition was
defeat.

As the raw troops straggled to Pittsburg they
were shipped down the Ohio to Fort Washington;
and St. Clair made the headquarters of his army at
a new fort some twenty-five miles northward, which
he christened Fort Hamilton. During September
the army slowly assembled; two small regiments of
regulars, two of six months' levies, a number of
Kentucky militia, a few cavalry, and a couple of
small batteries of light guns. After wearisome de-
lays, due mainly to the utter inefficiency of the quar-
termaster and contractor, the start for the Indian,
towns was made on October 4th.

The army trudged slowly through the deep woods
and across the wet prairies, cutting out its own road,
and making but five or six miles a day. It was in a
wilderness which abounded with game; both deer
and bear frequently ran into the very camps; and

86 Denny's Journal, 374.

St. Clair and Wayne 55

venison was a common food.2^ On October I3th
a halt was. made to build another little fort, chris-
tened in honor of Jefferson. There were further
delays, caused by the wretched management of the
commissariat department, and the march was not
resumed until the 24th, the numerous sick being
left in Fort Jefferson. Then the army once more
stumbled northward through the wilderness. The
regulars, though mostly raw recruits, had been re-
duced to some kind of discipline ; but the six months'
levies were almost worse than the militia.28 Ow-
ing to the long delays, and to the fact that they had
been enlisted at various times, their terms of ser-
vice were expiring day by day; and they wished
to go home, and tried to, while the militia deserted
in squads and bands. Those that remained were
very disorderly. Two who attempted to desert were
hanged; and another, who shot a comrade, was
hanged also; but even this severity in punishment
failed to stop the demoralization.

With such soldiers there would have been grave
risk of disaster under any commander; but St.
Clair's leadership made the risk a certainty. There
was Indian sign, old and new, all through the
woods; and the scouts and stragglers occasionally
interchanged shots with small parties of braves, and
now and then lost a man, killed or captured. It was,

5T Bradley MSS. The journal and letters of Captain Daniel
Bradley ; shown me by the courtesy of his descendants, Mr.
Daniel B. Bradley of Southport, Conn., and Mr. Arthur W.
Bradley of Cincinnati, Ohio.

28 Denny, October 29, 1791, etc.

56 The Winning of the West

therefore, certain that the savages knew every move-
ment of the army, which, as it slowly neared the
Miami towns, was putting itself within easy strik-
ing range of the most formidable Indian confed-
eracy in the Northwest. The density of the forest
was such that only the utmost watchfulness could
prevent the foe from approaching within arm's
length unperceived. It behooved St. Clair to be on
his guard, and he had been warned by Washington,
who had never forgotten the scenes of Braddock's
defeat, of the danger of a surprise. But St. Clair
was broken down by the worry and by continued
sickness; time and again it was doubtful whether
he could so much as stay with the army. The sec-
ond in command, Major-General Richard Butler,
was also sick most of the time; and, like St. Clair,
he possessed none of the qualities of leadership save
courage. The whole burden fell on the Adjutant-
General, Colonel Winthrop Sargent, an old Revo-
lutionary officer; without him the expedition would
probably have failed in ignominy even before the
Indians were reached, and he showed not only cool
courage but ability of a good order ; yet in the actual
arrangements for battle he was, of course, unable to
remedy the blunders of his superiors.

St. Clair should have covered his front and flanks
for miles around with scouting parties ; but he rarely
sent any out, and, thanks to letting the management
of those that did go devolve on his subordinates,
and to not having their reports made to him in per-
son, he derived no benefit from what they saw. He

St. Clair and Wayne 57

had twenty Chickasaws with him ; but he sent these
off on an extended trip, lost touch of them entirely,
and never saw them again until after the battle.
He did not seem to realize that he was himself in
danger of attack. When some fifty miles or so from
the Miami towns, on the last day of October, sixty
of the militia deserted; and he actually sent back
after them one of his two regular regiments, thus
weakening by one half the only trustworthy portion
of his force.29

On November 3d the doomed army, now re-
duced to a total of about fourteen hundred men,
camped on the eastern fork of the Wabash, high up,
where it was but twenty yards wide. There was
snow on the ground and the little pools were
skimmed with ice. The camp was on a narrow rise
of ground, where the troops were cramped together,
the artillery and most of the horse in the middle.
On both flanks, and along most of the rear, the
ground was low and wet. All around, the wintry
woods lay in frozen silence. In front the militia
were thrown across the creek, and nearly a quarter
of a mile beyond the rest of the troops.30 Parties
of Indians were seen during the afternoon, and they
skulked around the lines at night, so that the senti-

99 Bradley MSS. In his journal Captain Bradley ex-
presses his astonishment at seeing the regiment and his in-
ability to understand the object in sending it back. Captain
Bradley was not over-pleased with his life at the fort; as one
of the minor ills he mentions in one of his letters to Eben-
ezer Banks: "Please deliver the enclosed letter to my wife.
Not a drop of cider have I drinked this twelve month."

30 St Clair's Letter to the Secretary of War, Nov. g, 1791.

58 The Winning of the West

nels frequently fired at them; yet neither St. Clair
nor Butler took any adequate measures to ward off
the impending blow. It is improbable that, as things
actually were at this time, they could have won a
victory over their terrible foes ; but they might have
avoided overwhelming disaster.

On November" 4th the men were under arms, as
usual, by dawn, St. Clair intending to throw up
intrenchments and then make a forced march in
light order against the Indian towns. But he was
forestalled. Soon after sunrise, just as the men
were dismissed from parade, a sudden assault was
made upon the militia, who lay unprotected beyond
the creek. The unexpectedness and fury of the
onset and heavy firing, and the appalling whoops
and yells of the throngs of painted savages threw
the militia into disorder. After a few minutes' re-
sistance they broke and fled in wild panic to the
camp of the regulars, among whom they drove in a
frightened herd, spreading dismay and confusion.

The drums beat, and the troops sprang to arms,
as soon as they heard the heavy firing at the front ;
and their volleys for a moment checked the onrush
of the plumed woodland warriors. But the check
availed nothing. The braves filed off to one side
and the other, completely surrounded the camp,
killed or drove in the guards and pickets, and then
advanced close to the main lines.31

A furious battle followed. After the first onset
the Indians fought in silence, no sound coming from

31 Denny, November 4th; also p. 221.

St. Clair and Wayne 59

them save the incessant rattle of their fire, as they
crept from log to log, from tree to tree, ever closer
and closer. The soldiers stood in close order, in the
open; their musketry and artillery fire made a tre-
mendous noise, but did little damage to a foe they
could hardly see. Now and then through the hang-
ing smoke terrible figures flitted, painted black and
red, the feathers of the hawk and eagle braided in
their long scalp-locks; but save for these glimpses,
the soldiers knew the presence of their sombre
enemy only from the fearful rapidity with which
their comrades fell dead and wounded in the ranks.
They never even knew the numbers or leaders of the
Indians. At the time it was supposed that they out-
numbered the whites ; but it is probable that the re-
verse was the case, and it may even be that they were
not more than half as numerous. It is said that the
chief who led them, both in council and battle, was
Little Turtle, the Miami. At any rate, there were
present all the chiefs and picked warriors of the
Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Miamis, and
all the most reckless and adventurous young braves
from among the Iroquois and the Indians of the
Upper Lakes, as well as many of the ferocious
whites and half-breeds who dwelt in the Indian vil-
lages.

The Indians fought with the utmost boldness
and ferocity, and with the utmost skill and caution.
Under cover of the smoke of the heavy but harmless
fire from the army they came up so close that they
shot the troops down as hunters slaughter a herd of

60 The Winning of the West

standing buffalo. Watching their chance, they
charged again and again with the tomahawk, glid-
ing into close quarters while their bewildered foes
were still blindly firing into the smoke-shrouded
woods. The men saw no enemy as they stood in
the ranks to load and shoot; in a moment, without
warning, dark faces frowned through the haze, the
war-axes gleamed, and on the frozen ground the
weapons clattered as the soldiers fell. As the com-
rades of the fallen sprang forward to avenge them,
the lithe warriors vanished as rapidly as they had
appeared; and once more the soldiers saw before
them only the dim forest and the shifting smoke
wreaths, with vague half glimpses of the hidden
foe, while the steady singing of the Indian bullets
never ceased, and on every hand the bravest and
steadiest fell one by one.

At first the army as a whole fought firmly ; indeed
there was no choice, for it was ringed by a wall of
flame. The officers behaved very well, cheering and
encouraging their men; but they were the special
targets of the Indians, and fell rapidly. St. Clair
and Butler by their cool fearlessness in the hour of
extreme peril made some amends for their short-
comings as commanders. They walked up and down
the lines from flank to flank, passing and repassing
one another ; for the two lines of battle were facing
outward, and each general was busy trying to keep
his wing from falling back. St. Clair's clothes
were pierced by eight bullets, but he was himself
untouched. He wore a blanket coat with a hood;

St. Clair and Wayne 61

he had a long queue, and his thick gray hair flowed
from under his three-cornered hat; a lock of his
hair was carried off by a bullet.32 Several times he
headed the charges, sword in hand. General Butler
had his arm broken early in the fight, but he con-
tinued to walk to and fro along the line, his coat
off and the wounded arm in a sling. Another bul-
let struck him in the side, inflicting a mortal wound ;
and he was carried to the middle of the camp, where
he sat propped up by knapsacks. "Men and horses
were falling around him at every moment. St.
Clair sent an aid, Lieutenant Ebenezer Denny, to
ask how he was; he displayed no anxiety, and an-
swered that he felt well. While speaking, a young
cadet, who stood nearby, was hit on the kneecap by
a spent ball and at the shock cried aloud; whereat
the General laughed so that his wounded side shook.
The aid left him; and there is no further certain
record of his fate except that he was slain; but it
is said that in one of the Indian rushes a warrior
bounded toward him and sunk the tomahawk in his
brain before any one could interfere.

Instead of being awed by the bellowing artillery,
the Indians made the gunners a special object of at-
tack. Man after man was picked off, until every
officer was killed but one, who was wounded; and
most of the privates also were slain or disabled. The

39 McBride's "Pioneer Biography," I, 165. Narrative of
Thomas Irwin, a packer, who was in the fight. There are
of course discrepancies between the various accounts ; in the
confusion of such a battle even the most honest eye-wit-
nesses could not see all things alike.

-62 The Winning of the West

artillery was thus almost silenced, and the Indians
emboldened by success swarmed forward and seized
the guns, while at the same time a part of the left
wing of the army began to shrink back. But the
Indians were now on comparatively open ground,
where the regulars could see them and get at them;
and under St. Glair's own leadership the troops
rushed fiercely at the savages, with fixed bayonets,
and drove them back to cover. By this time the
confusion and disorder were great ; while from every
hollow and grass patch, from behind every stump
and tree and fallen log, the Indians continued their
fire. Again and again the officers led forward the
troops in bayonet charges ; and at first the men fol-
lowed them with a will. Each charge seemed for a
moment to be successful, the Indians rising in
swarms and running in headlong flight from the
bayonets. In one of the earliest, in which Colonel
Darke led his battalion, the Indians were driven sev-
eral hundred yards across the branch of the Wabash ;
but when the Colonel halted and rallied his men, he
found that the savages had closed in behind him,
and he had to fight his way back, while the foe he
had been driving at once turned and harassed his
rear. He was himself wounded, and lost most of
his command. On re-entering camp he found the
Indians again in possession of the artillery and bag-
gage, from which they were again driven ; they had
already scalped the slain who lay about the guns.
Major Thomas Butler had his thigh broken by a
bullet; but he continued on horseback, in command

St. Clair and Wayne 63

of his battalion, until the end of the fight, and led
his men in one of the momentarily successful bayonet
charges. The only regular regiment present lost
every officer killed or wounded. The commander
of the Kentucky militia, Colonel Oldham, was killed
early in the action, while trying to rally his men
and damning them for cowards.

The charging troops could accomplish nothing
permanent. The men were too clumsy and ill-trained
in forest warfare to overtake their fleet, half-naked
antagonists. The latter never received the shock;
but though they fled they were nothing daunted,
for they turned the instant the battalion did, and
followed firing. They skipped out of reach of the
bayonets, and came back as they pleased; and they
were only visible when raised by a charge.

Among the pack-horsemen were some who were
accustomed to the .use of the rifle and to life in the
woods; and these fought well. One, named Ben-
jamin Van Cleve, kept a journal, in which he de-
scribed what he saw of the fight.33 He had no gun,
but five minutes after the firing began he saw a
soldier near him with his arm swinging useless ; and
he borrowed the wounded man's musket and car-
tridges. The smoke had settled to within three
feet of the ground, so he knelt, covering himself
behind a tree, and only fired when he saw an In-
dian's head, or noticed one running from cover to
cover. He fired away all his ammunition, and the
bands of his musket flew off; he picked up another

33 "American Pioneer," II, 150; Van Cleve's memoranda.

64 The Winning of the West

just as two levy officers ordered a charge, and fol-
lowed the charging party at a run. By this time
the battalions were broken, and only some thirty
men followed the officers. The Indians fled before
the bayonets until they reached a ravine filled with
down timber; whereupon they halted behind the
impenetrable tangle of fallen logs. The soldiers
also halted, and were speedily swept away by the
fire of the Indians, whom they could not reach; but
Van Cleve, showing his skill as a woodsman, cov-
ered himself behind a small tree, and gave back
shot for shot until his ammunition was gone.
Before this happened his less skilful companions had
been slain or driven off, and he ran at full speed
back to camp. Here he found that the artillery
had been taken and re-taken again and again.
Stricken men lay in heaps everywhere, and the charg-
ing troops were once more driving the Indians
across the creek in front of the camp. Van Cleve
noticed that the dead officers and soldiers who
were lying about the guns had all been scalped and
that "the Indians had not been in a hurry, for their
hair was all skinned off." Another of the packers
who took part in the fight, one Thomas Irwin, was
struck with the spectacle offered by the slaughtered
artillerymen, and with grewsome homeliness com-
pared the reeking heads to pumpkins in a December
cornfield.

As the officers fell the soldiers, who at first stood
up bravely enough, gradually grew disheartened. No
words can paint the hopelessness and horror of such

St. Clair and Wayne 65

a struggle as that in which they were engaged.
They were hemmed in by foes who showed no
mercy and whose blows they could in no way return.
If they charged they could not overtake the Indians ;
and the instant the charge stopped the Indians came
back. If they stood they were shot down by an un-
seen enemy ; and there was no stronghold, no refuge
to which to flee. The Indian attack was relentless,
and could neither be avoided, parried, nor met by
counter assault. For two hours or so the troops
kept up a slowly lessening resistance ; but by degrees
their hearts failed. The wounded had been brought
toward the middle of the lines, where the baggage
and tents were, and an ever growing proportion of
un wounded men joined them. In vain the officers
tried, by encouragement, by jeers, by blows, to drive
them back to the fight. They were unnerved. As
in all cases where large bodies of men are put in
imminent peril of death, whether by shipwreck,
plague, fire, or violence, numbers were swayed by
a mad panic of utterly selfish fear, and others be-
came numbed and callous, or snatched at any animal
gratification during their last moments. Many
soldiers crowded round the fires and stood stunned
and confounded by the awful calamity; many broke
into the officers' marquees and sought for drink, or
devoured the food which the rightful owners had
left when the drums beat to arms.

There was but one thing to do. If possible the
remnant of the army must be saved, and it could
only be saved by instant flight, even at the cost of

66 The Winning of the West

abandoning the wounded. The broad road by which
the army had advanced was the only line of retreat.
The artillery had already been spiked and abandoned.
Most of the horses had been killed, but a few were
still left, and on one of these St. Clair mounted. He
gathered together those fragments of the different
battalions which contained the few men who still
kept heart and head, and ordered them to charge
and regain the road from which the savages had cut
them off. Repeated orders were necessary before
some of the men could be roused from their stupor
sufficiently to follow the charging party; and they
Jwere only induced to move when told that it was to
retreat.

Colonel Darke and a few officers placed them-
selves at the head of the column, the coolest and
boldest men drew up behind them, and they fell on
the Indians with such fury as to force them back
well beyond the road. This made an opening
through which, said Van Cleve the packer, the rest
of the troops "pressed like a drove of bullocks."
The Indians were surprised by the vigor of the
charge, and puzzled as to its object. They opened
out on both sides and half the men had gone through
before they fired more than a chance shot or two.
They then fell on the rear, and began a hot pursuit.
St. Clair sent his aid, Denny, to the front to try
to keep order, but neither he nor any one else could
check the flight. Major Clark tried to rally his
battalion to cover the retreat, but he was killed and
the effort abandoned.

St. Clair and Wayne 67

There never was a wilder rout. As soon as the
men began to run, and realized that in flight there
lay some hope of safety, they broke into a stampede
which soon became uncontrollable. Horses, soldiers,
and the few camp followers and women who had
accompanied the army were all mixed together.
Neither command nor example had the slightest
weight; the men were abandoned to the terrible
selfishness of utter fear. They threw away their
weapons as they ran. They thought of nothing but
escape, and fled in a huddle, the stronger and the few
who had horses trampling their way to the front
through the old, the weak, and the wounded; while
behind them raged the Indian tomahawk. Fortu-
nately the attraction of plundering the camp was so
overpowering that the savages only followed the
army about four miles; otherwise hardly a man
would have escaped.

St. Clair was himself in much danger, for he
tried to stay behind and stem the torrent of fugi-
tives; but he failed, being swept forward by the
crowd, and when he attempted to ride to the front
to rally them, he failed again, for his horse could
not be pricked out of a walk. The packer, Van
Cleve, in his journal, gives a picture of the flight.
He was himself one of the few who lost neither
courage nor generosity in the rout.

Among his fellow packers were his uncle and a
young man named Bonham, who was his close and
dear friend. The uncle was shot in the wrist, the
ball lodging near his shoulder; but he escaped.

68 The Winning of the West

Bonham, just before the retreat began, was shot
through both hips, so that he could not walk. Young
Van Cleve got him a horse, on which he was with
difficulty mounted ; then, as the flight began, Bonham
bade Van Cleve look to his safety, as he was on foot,
and the two separated. Bonham rode until the pur-
suit had almost ceased; then, weak and crippled, he
was thrown off his horse and slain. Meanwhile
Van Cleve ran steadily on foot. By the time he
had gone two miles most of the mounted men had
passed him. A boy, on the point of falling from
exhaustion, now begged his help; and the kind-
hearted backwoodsman seized the lad and pulled
him along nearly two miles further, when he him-
self became so worn-out that he nearly fell. There
were still two horses in the rear, one carrying three
men, and one two; and behind the latter Van Cleve,
summoning his strength, threw the boy, who es-
caped. Nor did Van Cleve's pity for his fellows
cease with this; for he stopped to tie his handker-
chief around the knee of a wounded man. His
violent exertions gave him a cramp in both thighs,
so that he could barely walk; and in consequence
the strong and active passed him until he was within
a hundred yards of the rear, where the Indians were
tomahawking the old and wounded men. So close
were they that for a moment his heart sunk in de-
spair; but he threw off his shoes, the touch of the
cold ground seemed to revive him, and he again
began to trot forward. He got around a bend in
the road, passing half a dozen other fugitives; and

St. Clair and Wayne 69

long afterward he told how well he remembered
thinking that it would be some time before they
would all be massacred and his own turn come.
However, at this point the pursuit ceased, and a few
miles further on he had gained the middle of the
flying troops, and like them came to a walk. He
fell in with a queer group, consisting of the sole
remaining officer of the artillery, an infantry cor-
poral, and a woman called Red-headed Nance. Both
of the latter were crying, the corporal for the loss
of his wife, the woman for the loss of her child.
The worn-out officer hung on the corporal's arm,
while Van Cleve "carried his fusee and accoutre-
ments and led Nance; and in this sociable way ar-
rived at Fort Jefferson a little after sunset."

Before reaching Fort Jefferson the wretched army
encountered the regular regiment which had been
so unfortunately detached a couple of days before
the battle. The most severely wounded were left
in the fort;34 and then the flight was renewed, un-
til the disorganized and half-armed rabble reached
Fort Washington, and the mean log huts of Cin-
cinnati. Six hundred and thirty men had been
killed and over two hundred and eighty wounded;
less than five hundred, only about a third of the
whole number engaged in the battle, remained un-
hurt. But one or two were taken prisoners, for
the Indians butchered everybody, wounded or un-

M Bradley MSS. The addition of two hundred sick and
wounded brought the garrison to such short commons that
they had to slaughter the pack-horses for food.

yo The Winning of the West

wounded, who fell into their hands. There is no
record of the torture of any of the captives, but there
was one single instance of cannibalism. The savage
Chippewas from the far-off north devoured one of
the slain soldiers, probably in a spirit of ferocious
bravado; the other tribes expressed horror at the
deed.35 The Indians were rich with the spoil. They
.got horses, tents, guns, axes, powder, clothing, and
blankets — in short everything their hearts prized.
Their loss was comparatively slight ; it may not have
been one-twentieth that of the whites. They did
not at the moment follow up their victory, each band
going off with its own share of the booty. But the
triumph was so overwhelming, and the reward so
great, that the war spirit received a great impetus
in all the tribes. The bands of warriors that
marched against the frontier were more numerous,
more formidable, and bolder than ever.

In the following January Wilkinson with a hun-
dred and fifty mounted volunteers marched to the
battle-field to bury the slain. The weather was bit-
terly cold, snow lay deep on the ground, and some of
the volunteers were frost bitten.36 Four miles from
the scene of the battle, where the pursuit had ended,
they began to firid the bodies on the road, and close

35 Brickell's Narrative.

36 McBride's" Pioneer Biography," John Reily's Narrative.
This expedition, in which not a single hostile Indian was en-
countered, has been transmuted by Withers and one or two
other border historians into a purely fictitious expedition of
revenge in which hundreds of Indians were slain on the field
of St. Clair's disaster.

St. Clair and Wayne 71

alongside, in the woods, whither some of the hunted
creatures had turned at the last, to snatch one more
moment of life. Many had been dragged from under
the snow and devoured by wolves. The others lay
where they had fallen, showing as mounds through
the smooth white mantle that covered them. On the
battle-field itself the slain lay thick, scalped, and
striped of all their clothing which the conquerors
deemed worth taking. The bodies, blackened by
frost and exposure, could not be identified ; and they
were buried in a shallow trench in the frozen ground.
The volunteers then marched home.

When the remnant of the defeated army reached
the banks of the Ohio, St. Clair sent his aid, Denny,
to carry the news to Philadelphia, at that time the
national capital. The river was swollen, there were
incessant snowstorms, and ice formed heavily, so
that it took twenty days of toil and cold before
Denny reached Wheeling and got horses. For ten
days more he rode over the bad winter roads, reach-
ing Philadelphia with the evil tidings on the evening
of December iQth. It was thus six weeks after the
defeat of the army before the news was brought to
the anxious Federal authorities.

The young officer called first on the Secretary
of War ; but as soon as the Secretary realized the im-
portance of the information he had it conveyed to
the President. Washington was at dinner, with
some guests, and was called from the table to listen
to the tidings of ill fortune. He returned with
unmoved face, and at the dinner, and at the reception

72 The Winning of the West

which followed he behaved with his usual stately
courtesy to those whom he was entertaining, not so
much as hinting at what he had heard. But when
the last guest had gone, his pent-up wrath broke
forth in one of those fits of volcanic fury which
sometimes shattered his iron outward calm. Walk-
ing up and down the room he burst out in wild regret
for the rout and disaster, and bitter invective against
St. Clair, reciting how, in that very room, he had
wished the unfortunate commander success and
honor and had bidden him above all things beware
of a surprise.37 "He went off with that last solemn
warning thrown into his ears," spoke Washington,
as he strode to and fro, "and yet to suffer that army
to be cut to pieces, hacked, butchered, tomahawked,
by a surprise, the very thing I guarded him against!
O God, O God, he's worse than a murderer! How
can he answer it to his country!" Then, calming

37 Tobias Lear, Washington's Private Secretary as quoted
by both Custis and Rush. The report of an eye-witness. See
also Lodge's "Washington," p. 94. Denny, in his journal,
merely mentions that he went at once to the Secretary of
War's office on the evening of the igth, and does not speak
of seeing Washington until the following morning. On the
strength of this omission one or two of St. Glair's apologists
have striven to represent the whole account of Washington's
wrath as apocryphal ; but the attempt is puerile ; the relation
comes from an eye-witness who had no possible motive to dis-
tort the facts. The Secretary of War, Knox, was certain to
inform Washington of the disaster the very evening he heard
of it; and whether he sent Denny, or another messenger, or
went himself, is unimportant. Lear might very well have
been mistaken as to the messenger who brought the news;
but he could not have been mistaken about Washington's
speech.

St. Clair and Wayne 73

himself by a mighty effort : "General St. Clair shall
have justice ... he shall have full justice."
And St. Clair did receive full justice, and mercy
too, from both Washington and Congress. For
the sake of his courage and honorable character
they held him guiltless of the disaster for which
his lack of capacity as a general was so largely
accountable.

Washington and his administration were not free
from blame. It was foolish to attempt the cam-
paign against the Northwestern Indians with men
who had only been trained for six months and who
were enlisted at the absurd price of two dollars a
month. Moreover, there were needless delays in
forwarding the troops to Fort Washington; and
the commissary department was badly managed.
Washington was not directly responsible for any
of these shortcomings; he very wisely left to the
Secretary of War, Knox, the immediate control
of the whole matter, seeking to avoid all interfer-
ence with him, so that there might be no clashing
or conflict of authority;38 but he was of course ul-
timately responsible for the little evil, no less than
for the great good, done by his administration.

The chief blunder was the selection of St. Clair.
As a commander he erred in many ways. He did
not, or could not, train his troops; and he had no
business to challenge a death fight with raw levies.
It was unpardonable of him to send back one of his

88 State Dept. MSS., Washington Papers. War Dept. Ex.
C., Washington to Knox, April i, 1791.
VOL. VIII.— 4

74 The Winning of the West

two regular regiments, the only trustworthy por-
tion of his force, on the eve of the battle. He
should never have posted the militia, his poorest
troops, in the most exposed situation. Above all
he should have seen that the patrols and pickets
were so numerous and performed their duty so
faithfully as to preclude the possibility of surprise.
With the kind of army furnished him he could
hardly have won a victory under any circumstances ;
but the overwhelming nature of the defeat was
mainly due to his incompetence.

CHAPTER V

MAD ANTHONY WAYNE; AND THE FIGHT OF THE
x- FALLEN TIMBERS, 1792-1795

THE United States Government was almost as
much demoralized by St. Clair's defeat as was
St. Clair's own army. The loosely-knit nation was
very poor, and very loth to undertake any work
which involved sustained effort and pecuniary sac-
rifice; while each section was jealous of every other
and was unwilling to embark in any enterprise un-
likely to inure to its own immediate benefit. There
was little national glory or reputation to be won
by even a successful Indian war; while another
defeat might prove a serious disaster to a govern-
ment which was as yet far from firm in its seat.
The Eastern people were lukewarm about a war
in which they had no direct interest; and the fool-
ish frontiersmen, instead of backing up the adminis-
tration, railed at it and persistently supported the
party which desired so to limit the powers and ener-
gies of the National Government as to produce mere
paralysis. Under such conditions the national ad-
ministration, instead of at once redoubling its ef-
forts to ensure success by shock of arms, was driven
to the ignoble necessity of yet again striving for a
hopeless peace.

It would be impossible to paint in too vivid colors

(75)

76 The Winning of the West

the extreme reluctance of the Government to enter
into, or to carry on, war with the Indians. It was
only after every other shift had been vainly tried
that resort was had to the edge of the sword. The
United States would gladly have made a stable
peace on honorable terms, and strove with weary
patience to bring about a friendly understanding.
But all such efforts were rendered abortive, partly
by the treachery and truculence of the savages, who
could only be cowed by a thorough beating, and
partly by the desire of the settlers for lands which
the red men claimed as their hunting grounds.

In pursuance of their timidly futile policy K of
friendliness, the representatives of the National
Government, in the spring of 1792, sent peace en-
voys, with a flag of truce, to the hostile tribes.
The unfortunate ambassadors thus chosen for sacri-
fice were Colonel John Hardin, the gallant but ill-
starred leader of Kentucky horse, who had so often
and with such various success encountered the In-
dians on the field of battle; and a Federal officer,
Major Alexander Trueman. In June they started
toward the hostile towns, with one or two com-
panions, and soon fell in with some Indians, who
on being shown the white flag, and informed
of the object of their visit, received them with
every appearance of good will. But this was
merely a mask. A few hours later the treach-
erous savages suddenly fell upon and slew the
messengers of peace.1 It was never learned

1 American State Papers, IV, 238, 239, etc. ; also Marshall.

St. Clair and Wayne 77

whether the deed was the mere wanton outrage of
some bloodthirsty young braves, or the result of
orders given by one of the Indian councils. At any
rate, the Indians never punished the treachery ; and
when the chiefs wrote to Washington they men-
tioned with cool indifference that "you sent us at
different times different speeches, the bearers where-
of our foolish young men killed on their way" ;2
not even expressing regret for the occurrence.

The truculent violence and bad faith of the sav-
ages merited severe chastisement; but the United
States Government was long-suffering and forbear-
ing to a degree. There was no attempt to avenge
the murder of the flag-of-truce men. On the con-
trary, renewed efforts were made to secure a peace
by treaty. In the fall of 1792 Rufus Putnam, on
behalf of the United States, succeeded in conclud-
ing a treaty with the Wabash and Illinois tribes,3
which at least served to keep many of their young
braves out of actual hostilities. In the following
spring, three commissioners — Benjamin Lincoln,
Beverly Randolph, and Timothy Pickering, all men
of note, — were sent to persuade the Miami tribes
and their allies to agree to a peace. In his letter
of instructions the Secretary of War impressed
upon them the desire of the people of the United
States for peace in terms that were almost hu-
miliating, and even directed them if necessary to

2 Canadian Archives, Indian affairs, M. 2, p. 224. The
Michigan and Wisconsin Historical Societies have performed
a great service by publishing so many of these papers.

3 American State Papers, IV, 338.

78 The Winning of the West

cede some of the lands already granted by the
Indians at previous treaties.

In May, 1793, the Commissioners went to Ni-
agara, where they held meetings with various Iro-
quois chiefs and exchanged friendly letters with
the British officers of the posts, who assured them
that they would help in the effort to conclude a
peace. Captain Brant, the Iroquois chief, acted as
spokesman for a deputation of the hostile Indians
from the Miami, where a great council was being
held, at which not only the Northwestern tribes,
but the Five Nations, were in attendance. The com-
missioners then sailed to the Detroit River, having
first sent home a strong remonstrance against the
activity displayed by the new commander on the
Ohio, Wayne, whose vigorous measures, they said,
had angered the Indians, and were considered by
the British "unfair and unwarrantable." This was
a preposterous complaint; throughout our history,
whether in dealing with Indians or with other
foes, our Peace Commissioners have invariably
shown to disadvantage when compared with the
military commandants, for whom they always be-
tray such jealousy. Wayne's conduct was eminently
proper; and it is difficult to understand the mental
attitude of the commissioners who criticised it be-
cause the British considered it "unwarrantable."
However, a few weeks later they learned to take
a more just view of Wayne, and to thank him
for the care with which he had kept the peace while
they were vainly trying to treat ; for at the Detroit

St. Clair and Wayne 79

they found they could do nothing. Brant and the
Iroquois urged the Northwestern tribes not to yield
any point, and promised them help, telling the Brit-
ish agent, McKee, evidently to his satisfaction, "we
came here not only to assist with our advice, but
other ways, . . . we came here with arms in our
hands" ; and they insisted that the country belonged
to the confederated tribes in common, and so could
not be surrendered save by all.4 Brant was the
inveterate foe of the Americans and the pensioner
of the British; and his advice to the tribes was
sound, and was adopted by them — though he mis-
led them by his never-fulfilled promise of support.
They refused to consider any proposition which
did not acknowledge the Ohio as the boundary be-
tween them and the United States; and so, toward
the end of August, the commissioners returned to
report their failure.5 The final solution of the prob-
lem was thus left to the sword of Wayne.

The attitude of the British gradually changed
from passive to active hostility. In 1792 and 1793
they still wished the Indians to make peace with the
Americans, provided always there were no such con-
cessions made to the latter as would endanger the
British control of the fur trade. But by the begin-
ning of 1794 the relations between Great Britain
and the United States had become so strained that
open war was threatened; for the advisers of the
King, relying on the weakness of the young Fed-

* Draper MSS., Brant to McKee, Aug. 4, 1793.
5 American State Papers, IV, 340-360.

80 The Winning of the West

eral Republic, had begun to adopt that tone of brutal
insolence which reflected well the general attitude
of the British people toward the Americans, and
which finally brought on the second war between the
two nations.

The British officials in Canada were quick to re-
flect the tone of the home government, and, as
always in such cases, the more zealous and bellig-
erent went a little further than they were author-
ized. On February loth Lord Dorchester, Gover-
nor of Canada, in an address of welcome to some
of the chiefs from the tribes of the north and west
said, speaking of the boundary : "Children, since
my return I find no appearance of a line remains;
and from the manner in which the people of the
United States push on and act and talk ... I shall
not be surprised if we are at war with them in the
course of the' present year ; and if so a line must
then be drawn by the warriors . . . we have acted
in the most peaceable manner and borne the language
and conduct of the people of the United States with
patience; but I believe our patience is almost ex-
hausted."6 Of course such a speech, delivered to
such an audience, was more than a mere incitement
to war; it was a direct appeal to arms. Nor did
the encouragement given the Indians end with

6 Rives' "Life and Times of James Madison," III, 418. A
verified copy of the speech from the archives of the London
foreign office. The authenticity of the speech was admitted
at the time by the British Minister ; yet, extraordinary to
say, not only British, but American historians, have spoken
of it as spurious.

St. Clair and Wayne 81

words; for in April, Simcoe, the Lieutenant-Gov-
ernor, himself built a fort at the Miami Rapids, in
the very heart of the hostile tribes, and garrisoned
it with British regulars, infantry and artillery;
which, wrote one of the British officials to another,
had "put all the Indians here in great spirits"7 to
resist the Americans.

The same officials further reported that the Span-
iards also were exciting the Indians to war, and
were in communication with Simcoe, their messen-
gers coming to him at his post on the Miami. At
this time the Spanish Governor, Carondelet, was
alarmed over Clark's threatened invasion of Louisi-
ana on behalf of the French Republic. He wrote to
Simcoe asking for English help in the event of such
invasion. Simcoe, in return, wrote expressing his
good will, and inclosing a copy of Dorchester's
speech to the Northern Indians; which, Carondelet
reported to the Court of Spain, showed that the
English were following the same system adopted
by the. Spaniards in reference to the Indians, whom
they were employing with great success against
the Americans.8 Moreover, the Spaniards, besides
communicating with the British, sent messages to
the Indians at the Miami, urging them to attack the
Americans, and promising help;9 a promise which
they never fulfilled, save that in a covert way they

1 Canadian Archives, Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew,
Detroit, April 16, 1794.

8 Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, letter of Carondelet,
July 9. 1794.

9 Canadian Archives, letter of McKee, May 7, 1794.

82 The Winning of the West

furnished the savages with arms and munitions of
war.

The Canadians themselves were excited and
alarmed by Dorchester's speech,10 copies of which
were distributed broadcast ; -for the general feeling
was that it meant that war was about to be de-
clared between Great Britain and the United States.
The Indians took the same view as to what the
speech meant ; but to them it gave unmixed pleasure
and encouragement. The British officials circulated
it everywhere among the tribes, reading it aloud to
the gathered chiefs and fighting men. "His Ex-
cellency Governor Simcoe has just now left my
house on his way to Detroit with Lord Dorchester's
speech to the Seven Nations," wrote Brant the Iro-
quois chief to the Secretary of Indian Affairs for
Canada, "and I have every reason to believe when
it is delivered that matters will take an immediate
change to the westward, as it will undoubtedly give
those Nations high spirits and enable them by a
perfect union to check General Wayne."11 In April,
Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler, of the British Army,
addressed a great council of chiefs near Buffalo,
beginning, "I have now a speech to deliver to you
from your father Lord Dorchester, which is of the
utmost consequence, therefore desire you will pay
strict attention to it."12 He then delivered the
speech, to the delight of the Indians, and continued :

10 Canadian Archives, Joseph Chew to Thomas Aston Coffin,
Montreal, February 27, 1794.

11 Canadian Archives, Brant to Chew, April 21, 1794.

12 Canadian Archives, Butler to Chew, April 27, 1794.

St. Clair and Wayne 83

"You have heard the great talk of our going to war
with the United States, and by the speech of your
Father just now delivered to you, you can not help
seeing there is a great prospect of it, I have there-
fore to recommend you to be all unanimous as
one man, and to call in all your people that may be
scattered about the Territories of the United States."
McKee, the British Indian agent among the North-
western tribes who were at war with the Ameri-
cans, reported with joy the rapid growth of war-
like spirit among the savages in consequence of
Dorchester's speech, and of the building of the Brit-
ish fort on the Miami. He wrote, "The face of the
Indian affairs in this country, I have the greatest
satisfaction in informing you, seems considerably
altered for the better. His Excellency Lord Dor-
chester's speech and the arrival here of speeches
from the Spaniards induce me to believe that a
very extensive union of the Indian Nations will be
the immediate consequence. The Lieutenant-Gov-
ernor has ordered a strong detachment of the 24th
Regt. to take post a mile & a half below this
place, this step has given great spirits to the In-
dians and impressed them with a hope of our ulti-
mately acting with them and affording a security
for their families, should the enemy penetrate to
their villages."18

Nor did the British confine their encouragement
to words. The Canadian authorities forwarded to
the Miami tribes, through the agent McKee, quan-

13 Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, May 8, 1794.

84 The Winning of the West

tities of guns, rifles, and gunlocks, besides vermilion
paint and tobacco.14 McKee was careful to get from
the home authorities the best firearms he could, ex-
plaining that his red proteges preferred the long
to the short rifles, and considered the common trade
guns makeshifts, to be used only until they could
get better ones.

The Indians made good use of the weapons thus
furnished them by the "neutral" British. A party
of Delawares and Shawnees, after a successful
skirmish with the Americans, brought to McKee
six of the scalps they had taken; and part of the
speech of presentation at the solemn council where
they were received by McKee, ran: "We had two
actions with [some of Wayne's troops who were
guarding convoys] in which a great many of our
enemies were killed. Part of their flesh we have
brought here with us to convince our friend of the
truth of their being now in great force on their
march against us; therefore, Father [addressing
McKee], we desire you to be strong and bid your
children make haste to our assistance as was prom-
ised by them." The speaker, a Delaware chief,
afterward handed the six scalps to a Huron chief,
that he might distribute them among the tribes.
McKee sent to the home authorities a full account
of this council, where he had assisted at the recep-
tion and distribution of the scalps the savages had
taken from the soldiers of a nation with which
the British still pretended to be at peace; and a

14 Canadian Archives, Chew to Coffin, June 23, 1794.

St. Clair and Wayne 85

few days later he reported that the Lake Indians
were at last gathering, and that when the fighting
men of the various tribes joined forces, as he had
reason to believe they shortly would, the British
posts would be tolerably secure from any attacks
by Wayne.15

The Indians served the British not only as a
barrier against the Americans, but as a police for
their own soldiers, to prevent their deserting. An
Englishman who visited the Lake Posts at this time
recorded with a good deal of horror the fate that
befell one of a party of deserters from the British
garrison at Detroit. The commander, on discov-
ering that they had gone, ordered the Indians to
bring them back dead or alive. When overtaken
one resisted, and was killed and scalped. The In-
dians brought in his scalp and hung it outside the
fort, where it was suffered to remain, that the om-
inous sight might strike terror to other discontented
soldiers.16

The publication of Lord Dorchester's speech
caused angry excitement in the United States.
Many thought it spurious; but Washington, then
President, with his usual clear-sightedness, at once
recognized that it was genuine, and accepted it as
proof of Great Britain's hostile feeling toward his
country. Through the Secretary of State he wrote
to the British Minister, calling him to sharp ac-

" Canadian Archives, McKee's letters May 25 and May 30,
1794.

16 Draper MSS. From Parliament Library in Canada, MS.
"Canadian Letters," descriptive of a tour in Canada in 1792-93.

86 The Winning of the West

count, not only for Dorchester's speech but for the
act of building a fort on the Miami, and for the
double-dealing of his government, which protested
friendship, with smooth duplicity, while their agents
urged the savages to war. "At the very moment
when the British Ministry were forwarding assur-
ances of good will, does Lord Dorchester foster
and encourage in the Indians hostile dispositions
toward the United States," ran the letter, "but this
speech only forebodes hostility; the intelligence
which has been received this morning is, if true,
hostility itself . . . Governor Simcoe has gone
to the foot of the Rapids of the Miami, followed
by three companies of a British regiment, in order
to build a fort there." The British Minister, Ham-
mond, in his answer said he was "willing to admit
the authenticity of the speech," and even the build-
ing of the fort; but sought to excuse both by re-
crimination, asserting that the Americans had
themselves in various ways shown hostility to Great
Britain.17 In spite of this explicit admission, how-
ever, the British statesmen generally, both in the
House of Lords and the House of Commons, dis-
avowed the speech, though in guarded terms;18 and
many Americans were actually convinced by their
denials.

Throughout this period, whatever the negotiators

11 Wait's State Papers and Publick Documents, I, 449, 451.
Letters of Randolph, May 20, 1794, and Hammond, May 22,
1794.

18 Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, Randolph to
Jay, Aug. 1 8, 1794.

St. Clair and Wayne 87

might say or do, the ravages of the Indian war
parties never ceased. In the spring following St.
Clair's defeat the frontiers of Pennsylvania suf-
fered as severely as those of Virginia, from bands
of savages who were seeking for scalps, prisoners,
and horses. Boats were waylaid and attacked as
they descended the Ohio; and the remote settle-
ments were mercilessly scourged. The spies or
scouts, the trained Indian fighters, were out all the
while, watching for the war bands; and when they
discovered one, a strong party of rangers or militia
was immediately gathered to assail it, if it could
be overtaken. Every variety of good and bad for-
tune attended these expeditions. Thus, in August,
1792, the spies discovered an Indian party in the
lower settlements of Kentucky. Thirty militia
gathered, followed the trail, and overtook the ma-
rauders at Rolling Fork, killing four, while the
others scattered; of the whites one was killed and
two wounded. About the same time Kenton found
a strong Indian camp which he attacked at dawn,
killing three warriors; but when they turned out
in force, and one of his own scouts was killed, he
promptly drew back out of danger. Neither the
Indians nor the wild white Indian fighters made
any point of honor about retreating. They wished
to do as much damage as possible to their foes, and
if the fight seemed doubtful they at once withdrew
to await a more favorable opportunity. As for
the individual adventures, their name was legion.
All the old annalists, all the old frontiersmen who

88 The Winning of the West

in after life recorded their memories of the Indian
wars, tell with interminable repetition stories, grew-
some in their blood-thirstiness, and as monotonous
in theme as they are varied in detail : — how such
and such a settler was captured by two Indians, and,
watching his chance, fell on his captors when they
sat down to dinner and slew them "with a squaw-
axe"; how another man was treacherously attacked
by two Indians who had pretended to be peaceful
traders, and how, though wounded, he killed them
both; how two or three cabins were surprised by
the savages and all the inhabitants slain; or how
a flotilla of flatboats was taken and destroyed while
moored to the bank of the Ohio; and so on without
end.19

The United States authorities vainly sought
peace ; while the British instigated the tribes to war,
and the savages themselves never thought of ceas-
ing their hostilities. The frontiersmen also wished
war, and regarded the British and Indians with an
equal hatred. They knew that the presence of the
British in the Lake Posts meant Indian war; they
knew that the Indians would war on them, whether
they behaved well or ill, until the tribes suffered
some signal overthrow; and they coveted the In-
dian lands with a desire as simple as it was brutal.
Nor were land hunger and revenge the only motives
that stirred them to aggression ; meaner feelings

19 Draper MSS., Major McCully to Captain Biddle, Pitts-
burg, May 5, 1792; B. Netherland to Evan Shelby, July 5,
1793, etc., etc. Also Kentucky "Gazette," Sept. i, 1792;
Charleston "Gazette," July 22, 1791, etc.

St. Clair and Wayne 89

were mixed with the greed for untilled prairie and
unfelled forest, and the fierce longing for blood.
Throughout our history as a nation, as long as we
had a frontier, there was always a class of frontiers-
men for whom an Indian war meant the chance
to acquire wealth at the expense of the government :
and on the Ohio in 1792 and '93 there were plenty
of men who, in the event of a campaign, hoped to
make profit out of the goods, horses, and cattle they
supplied the soldiers. One of Madison's Kentucky
friends wrote him with rather startling frankness
that the welfare of the new State hinged on the
advent of an army to assail the Indians, first, because
of the defence it would give the settlers, and, sec-
ondly, because it would be the chief means for in-
troducing into the country a sufficient quantity of
money for circulation.20 Madison himself evidently
saw nothing out of the way in this twofold motive
qf the frontiersmen for wishing the presence of an
army. In all the border communities there was a
lack of circulating medium, and an earnest desire
to obtain more by any expedient.

Like many other frontiersmen, Madison's corre-
spondent indulged almost equally in complaints of
the Indian ravages, and in denunciations of the reg-
ular army which alone could put an end to them
and of the national party which sustained the
army.21

M State Dept. MSS., Madison Papers, Hubbard Taylor to
Madison, Jan. 3, 1782.

21 Do., Taylor to Madison, April 16, 1792; May 8 and 17,
1792; May 23, 1793, etc.

90 The Winning of the West

Major-General Anthony Wayne, a Pennsylva-
nian, had been chosen to succeed St. Clair in the
command of the army; and on him devolved the
task of wresting victory from the formidable forest
tribes, fighting as the latter were in the almost im-
penetrable wilderness of their own country. The
tribes were aided by the support covertly, and often
openly, yielded them by the British. They had even
more effective Dallies in the suspicion with which the
backwoodsmen regarded the regular army, and the
supine indifference of the people at large, which
forced the administration to try every means to
obtain peace before adopting the only manly and
honorable course, a vigorous war.

Of all men, Wayne was the best fitted for the
work. In the Revolutionary War no other general,
American, British, or French, won such a reputation
for hard fighting, and for daring energy and dogged
courage. He felt very keenly that delight in the
actual shock of battle which the most famous fight-
ing generals have possessed. He gloried in the ex-
citement and danger, and shone at his best when the
stress was sorest; and because of his magnificent
courage his soldiers had affectionately christened
him "Mad Anthony." But his head was as cool
as his heart was stout. He was taught in a rough
school; for the early campaigns in which he took
part were waged against the gallant generals and
splendid soldiery of the British King. By expe-
rience he had grown to add caution to his dauntless
energy. Once, after the battle of Brandywine,

St. Clair and Wayne 91

when he had pushed close to the enemy, with his
usual fearless self -confidence, he was surprised in
a night attack by the equally daring British general
Grey, and his brigade was severely punished with
the bayonet. It was a lesson he never forgot; it
did not in any way abate his self-reliance or his
fiery ardor, but it taught him the necessity of fore-
thought, of thorough preparation, and of ceaseless
watchfulness. A few days later he led the assault
at Germantown, driving the Hessians before him
with the bayonet. This was always his favorite
weapon ; he had the utmost faith in coming to close
quarters, and he trained his soldiers to trust the
steel. At Monmouth he turned the fortunes of the
day by his stubborn and successful resistance to the
repeated bayonet charges of the Guards and Gren-
adiers. His greatest stroke was the storming of
Stony Point, where in person he led the midnight
rush of his troops over the walls of the British fort.
He fought with his usual hardihood against Corn-
wallis; and at the close of the Revolutionary War
he made a successful campaign against the Creeks
in Georgia. During this campaign the Creeks one
night tried to surprise his camp, and attacked with
resolute ferocity, putting to flight some of the
troops; but Wayne rallied them and sword in hand
he led them against the savages, who were over-
thrown and driven from the field. In one of the
charges he cut down an Indian chief; and the dying
man, as he fell, killed Wayne's horse with a pistol
shot.

92 The Winning of the West

As soon as Wayne reached the Ohio, in June,
1792, he set about reorganizing the army. He had
as a nucleus- the remnant of St. Clair's beaten forces ;
and to this were speedily added hundreds of recruits
enlisted under new legislation by Congress, and
shipped to him as fast as the recruiting officers could
send them. The men were of precisely the same
general character as those who had failed so dis-
mally under St. Clair, and it was even more difficult
to turn them into good soldiers, for the repeated
disasters, crowned by the final crushing horror, had
unnerved them and made them feel that their task
was hopeless, and that they were foredoomed to
defeat.22 The mortality among the officers had been
great, and the new officers, though full of zeal,
needed careful training. Among the men desertions
were very common ; and on the occasion of a sudden
alarm Wayne found that many of his sentries left
their posts and fled.23 Only rigorous and long con-
tinued discipline and exercise under a commander
both stern and capable could turn such men into
soldiers fit for the work Wayne had before him.
He saw this at once, and realized that a premature
movement meant nothing but another defeat; and
he began by careful and patient labor to turn his
horde of raw recruits into a compact and efficient
army, which he might use with his customary en-
ergy and decision. When he took command of the

M Bradley MSS. Letters and Journal of Captain Daniel
Bradley; see entry of May 7, 1793, etc.

53 "Major General Anthony Wayne," by Charles J. Stille,
P- 323-

St. Clair and Wayne 93

army — or "Legion," as he preferred to call it —
the one stipulation he made was that the campaign
should not begin until his ranks were full and his
men thoroughly disciplined.

Toward the end of the summer of '92 he estab-
lished his camp on the Ohio about twenty-seven
miles below Pittsburg. He drilled both officers
and men with unwearied patience, and gradually
the officers became able to do the drilling them-
selves, while the men acquired the soldierly self-
confidence of veterans. As the new recruits came
in they found themselves with an army which was
rapidly learning how to manoeuvre with precision,
to obey orders unhesitatingly, and to look forward
eagerly to a battle with the foe. Throughout the
winter Wayne kept at work, and by the spring he
had under him twenty-five hundred regular soldiers
who were already worthy to be trusted in a cam-
paign.

Wayne never relaxed his efforts to improve
them, though a man of weaker stuff might well
have been discouraged by the timid and hesitating
policy of the National Government. The Secretary
of War, in writing to him, laid stress chiefly on the
fact that the American people desired at every
hazard to avert an Indian war, and that on no ac-
count should offensive operations be undertaken
against the tribes. Such orders tied Wayne's hands,
for offensive operations offered the only means of
ending the war, but he patiently bided his time,
and made ready his army against the day when

94 The Winning of the West

his superiors should allow him to use the weapon
he had tempered.

In May, '93, he brought his army down the Ohio
to Fort Washington, and near it established a camp
which he christened Hobson's Choice. Here he was
forced to wait the results of the fruitless negotia-
tions carried on by the United States Peace Com-
missioners, and it was not until about the ist of
October that he was given permission to begin the
campaign. Even when he was allowed to move his
army forward he was fettered by injunctions not
to run any risks — and of course a really good fight-
ing general ought to be prepared to run risks. The
Secretary of War wrote him that above all things
he was to remember to hazard nothing, for a defeat
would be fraught with ruinous consequences to the
country. Wayne knew very well that if such was
the temper of the country and the Government, it
behooved him to be cautious, and he answered that,
though he would at once advance toward the Indian
towns, to threaten the tribes, he would not run the
least unnecessary risk. Accordingly he shifted his
army to a place some eighty miles north of Cin-
cinnati, where he encamped for the winter, building
a place of strength which he named Greeneville in
honor of his old comrade in arms, General Greene.
He sent forward a strong detachment of his troops
to the site of St. Clair's defeat, where they built a
post which was named Fort Recovery. The dis-
cipline of the army steadily improved, though now
and then a soldier deserted, usually fleeing to Ken-

St. Clair and Wayne 95

tucky, but in one or two cases striking through the
woods to Detroit. The bands of auxiliary militia
that served now and then for short periods with the
regulars, were of course much less well trained and
less dependable.

The Indians were always lurking about the forts,
and threatening the convoys of provisions and mu-
nitions as they marched slowly from one to the
other. Any party that left a fort was in imminent
danger. On one occasion the commander of Fort
Jefferson and his orderly were killed and scalped
but three hundred yards from the fort. A previous
commander of this fort while hunting in this neigh-
borhood had been attacked in similar fashion, and
though he escaped, his son and a soldier were slain.
On another occasion a dozen men, near the same
fort, were surprised while haying; four were killed
and the other eight captured, four of whom were
burned at the stake.24 Before Wayne moved down
the Ohio a band of Kentucky mounted riflemen,
under Major John Adair, were attacked under the
walls of one of the log forts — Fort St. Clair —
as they were convoying a large number of pack-
horses. The riflemen were in camp at the time,
the Indians making the assault at dawn. Most of
the horses were driven off or killed, and the men
fled to the fort, which, Adair dryly remarked,
proved "a place of safety for the bashful" ; but
he rallied fifty, who drove off the Indians, killing

94 Bradley MSS., Journal, entries of Feb. n, Feb. 24, June
24, July 12, 1792.

96 The Winning of the West

two and wounding others. Of his own men six
were killed and five wounded.25

Wayne's own detachments occasionally fared as
badly. In the fall of 1793, just after he had ad-
vanced to Greeneville, a party of ninety regulars,
who were escorting twenty heavily laden wagons,
were surprised and scattered, a few miles from the
scene of Adair's misadventure.26 The lieutenant
and ensign who were in command and five or six
of their men were slain, fighting bravely; half a
dozen were captured; the rest were panic struck
and fled without resistance. The Indians took off
about seventy horses, leaving the wagons standing
in the middle of the road, with their contents un-
injured; and a rescue party brought them safely
to Wayne. The victors were a party of Wyandots
and Ottawas under the chief Little Otter. On
October 24th the British agent at the Miami towns
met in solemn council with these Indians and with
another successful war party. The Indians had
with them ten scalps and two prisoners. Seven of
the scalps they sent off, by an Indian runner, a
special ally friend of the British agent, to be dis-
tributed among the different Lake Indians, to rouse
them to war. One of their prisoners, an Irishman,
they refused to surrender; but the other they gave
to the agent. He proved to be a German, a mer-
cenary who had originally been in Burgoyne's

25 Am. State Papers, IV., 335. Adair to Wilkinson. Nov.
6, 1792.
*6 Bradley MSS., Journal, entry of October 17, 1793.

St. Clair and Wayne 97

army.27 Later one of the remaining captives made
his escape, killing his two Indian owners, a man
and a woman, both of whom had been leaders of
war parties.

In the spring of 1794, as soon as the ground was
dry, Wayne prepared to advance toward the hostile
towns and force a decisive battle. He was delayed
for a long time by lack of provisions, the soldiers
being on such short rations that they could not
move. The mounted riflemen of Kentucky, who
had been sent home at the beginning of winter, again
joined him. Among the regulars, in the rifle com-
pany, was a young Kentuckian, Captain William
Clark, brother of George Rogers Clark, and after-
ward one of the two famous explorers who first
crossed the continent to the Pacific. In his letters
home Clark dwelt much on the laborious nature
of his duties, and mentioned that he was "like to
have starved," and had to depend on his rifle for
subsistence.28 In May he was sent from Fort
Washington with twenty dragoons and sixty infan-
try to escort 700 packhorses to Greeneville. When
eighteen miles from Fort Washington Indians at-
tacked his van, driving off a few packhorses; but
Clark brought up his men from the rear and after

n Canadian Archives, Duggan to Chew, February 3, 1794,
inclosing his journal for the fall of 1793. American State
Papers, IV, 361, Wayne to Knox, October 23, 1793. The
Americans lost 13 men; the Indian reports of course exag-
gerated this.

M Draper MSS., William Clark to Jonathan Clark, May 25,
1794.

VOL. VIII.— 5

98 The Winning of the West

a smart skirmish put the savages to flight. They
left behind one of their number dead, two wounded,
and seven rifles; Clark lost two men killed and two
wounded.29

On the last day of June a determined assault was
made by the Indians on Fort Recovery, which was
garrisoned by about two hundred men. Thanks
to the efforts of the British agents, and of the runners
from the allied tribes of the Lower Lakes, the Chip-
pewas and all the tribes of the Upper Lakes had
taken the tomahawk, and in June they gathered at
the Miami. Over two thousand warriors, all told,30
assembled; a larger body than had ever before
marched against the Americans.31 They were eager
for war, and wished to make a stroke of note against
their foes; and they resolved to try to carry Fort
Recovery, built on the scene of their victory over
St. Clair. They streamed down through the woods
in long columns, and silently neared the fort. With

29 Do. Also Canadian Archives, Duggan to Chew, May 30,
1794. As an instance of the utter untrustworthiness of these
Indian or British accounts of the American losses, it may be
mentioned that Duggan says the Indians brought off forty
scalps, and killed an unknown number of Americans in addi-
tion ; whereas in reality only two were slain. Even Duggan
admits that the Indians were beaten off.

30 Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, July 7, 1794.

31 Am. State Papers, IV, 488, Wayne to the Secretary of
War, 1794.

He says they probably numbered from 1500 to 2000 men,
which was apparently about the truth. Throughout this
campaign the estimate of the Americans as to the Indian
forces and losses were usually close to the facts, and were
often under rather than over statements.

St. Clair and Wayne 99

them went a number of English and French rangers,
most of whom were painted and dressed like the
Indians.

When they reached the fort they found camped
close to the walls a party of fifty dragoons and
ninety riflemen. These dragoons and riflemen had
escorted a brigade of packhorses from Greeneville
the day before, and having left the supplies in the
fort were about to return with the unladen pack-
horses. But soon after daybreak the Indians rushed
their camp. Against such overwhelming numbers
no effective resistance could be made. After a few
moments' fight the men broke and ran to the fort.
The officers, as usual, showed no fear, and were
the last to retreat, half of them being killed or
wounded, — one of the honorably noteworthy fea-
tures of all these Indian fights was the large relative
loss among the officers. Most of the dragoons and
riflemen reached the fort, including nineteen who
were wounded; nineteen officers and privates were
killed, and two of the packhbrsemen were killed and
three captured. Two hundred packhorses were cap-
tured. The Indians, flushed with success and ren-
dered over-confident by their immense superiority
in numbers, made a rush at the fort, hoping to
carry it by storm. They were beaten back at once
with severe loss; for in such work they were no
match for their foes. They then surrounded the
fort, kept up a harmless fire all day, and renewed
it the following morning. In the night they bore
off their dead, finding them with the help of torches ;

ioo The Winning of the West

eight or ten of those nearest the fort they could
not get. They then drew off and marched back to
the Miami towns. At least twenty-five32 of them
had been, killed, and a great number wounded;
whereas they had only succeeded in killing one and
wounding eleven of the garrison. They were much
disheartened at the check, and the Upper Lake In-
dians began to go home. The savages were as
fickle as they were ferocious; and though terrible
antagonists when fighting on their own ground and
in their own manner, they lacked the stability nec-
essary for undertaking a formidable offensive move-
ment in mass. This army of two thousand warriors,
the largest they had ever assembled, was repulsed
with loss in an attack on a wooden fort with a gar-
rison not one-sixth their strength, and then dissolved
without accomplishing anything at all.

Three weeks after the successful defence of Fort
Recovery, Wayne was joined by a large force of
mounted volunteers from Kentucky, under General
Scott; and on July 27th he set out toward the

32 Canadian Archives, G. La Mothe to Joseph Chew, Mich-
ilimackinac, July 19, 1794. McKee says, "17 men killed";
evidently he either wilfully understated the truth, or else
referred only to the particular tribes with which he was as-
sociated. ' La Mothe says, "they have lost twenty-five people
amongst different nations," but as he was only speaking of
the Upper Lake Indians, it may be that the total Indian loss
was 25 plus 17, or 42. McKee always understates the British
force and loss, and greatly overstates the loss and force of
the Americans. In this letter he says that the Americans
had 50 men killed, instead of 22; and that 60 "drivers" (pack-
horsemen) were taken and killed; whereas in reality 3 were
taken and 2 killed.

St. Clair and Wayne 101

Miami towns. The Indians who watched his march
brought word to the British that his army went
twice as far in a day as St. Glair's, that he kept his
scouts well out and his troops always in open order
and ready for battle; that he exercised the greatest
precaution to avoid an ambush or surprise, and that
every night the camps of the different regiments
were surrounded by breastworks of fallen trees so
as to render a sudden assault hopeless. Wayne was
determined to avoid the fates of Braddock and St.
Clair. His "legion" of regular troops was over
two thousand strong. His discipline was very
severe, yet he kept the loyal affection of his men.
He had made the officers devote much of their time
to training the infantry in marksmanship and the
use of the bayonet and the cavalry in the use of
the sabre. He impressed upon the cavalry and in-
fantry alike that their safety lay in charging home
with the utmost resolution. By steady drill he had
turned his force, which was originally not of a
promising character, into as fine an army, for its
size, as a general could wish to command.

The perfection of fighting capacity to which he
had brought his forces caused much talk among
the frontiersmen themselves. One of the contin-
gent of Tennessee militia wrote home in the highest
praise of the horsemanship and swordsmanship of
the cavalry, who galloped their horses at speed over
any ground, and leaped them over formidable ob-
stacles, and of the bayonet practice, and especially
of the marksmanship, of the infantry. He re-

102 The Winning of the West

marked that hunters were apt to undervalue the
soldiers as marksmen, but that Wayne's riflemen
were as good shots as any hunters he had ever seen
at any of the many matches he had attended in the
backwoods.33

Wayne showed his capacity as a commander by
the use he made of his spies or scouts. A few of
these were Chickasaw or Choctaw Indians; the rest,
twenty or thirty in number, were drawn from the
ranks of the wild white Indian-fighters, the men
who plied their trade of warfare and the chase right
on the hunting grounds of the hostile tribes. They
were far more dangerous to the Indians, and far
more useful to the army, than the like number of
regular soldiers or ordinary rangers.

It was on these fierce backwoods riflemen that
Wayne chiefly relied for news of the Indians, and
they served him well. In small parties, or singly,
they threaded the forest scores of miles in advance
or to one side of the marching army, and kept close
watch on the Indians' movements. As skilful and
hardy as the red warriors, much better marksmen,
and even more daring, they took many scalps, har-
rying the hunting parties, and hanging on the
outskirts of the big* wigwam villages. They cap-
tured and brought in Indian after Indian; from
whom Wayne got valuable information. The use
of scouts, and the consequent knowledge gained by
the examination of Indian prisoners, emphasized
the difference between St. Clair and Wayne.

33 "Knoxville Gazette," August 27, 1793.

St. Clair and Wayne 103

Wayne's reports are accompanied by many exam-
inations of Indian captives.34

Among these wilderness warriors who served
under Wayne were some who became known far
and wide along the border for their feats of reckless
personal prowess and their strange adventures.
They were of course all men of remarkable bodily
strength and agility, with almost unlimited power
of endurance, and the keenest eyesight; and they
were masters in the use of their weapons. Several
had been captured by the Indians when children,
and had lived for years with them before rejoining
the whites; so that they knew well the speech and
customs of the different tribes.

One of these men was the captain of the spies,
William Wells. When a boy of twelve he had been
captured by the Miamis, and had grown to man-
hood among them, living like any other young war-
rior; his Indian name was Black Snake, and he
married a sister of the great war-chief, Little Tur-
tle. He fought with the rest of the Miamis, and
by the side of Little Turtle, in the victories the
Northwestern Indians gained over Harmar and St.
Clair, and during the last battle he killed several
soldiers with his own hand. Afterward, by some
wayward freak of mind, he became harassed by the
thought that perhaps he had slain some of his own
kinsmen ; dim memories of his childhood came back

34 American State Papers, IV, 48r, 94. Examination of two
Pottawatomies captured on the $th of June; of two Shawnees
captured on the 22d of June; of a Shawnee captured on Aug.
nth, etc., etc.

104 The Winning of the West

to him; and he resolved to leave his Indian wife
and half-breed children and rejoin the people of
his own color. Tradition relates that on the eve
of his departure he made his purpose known to
Little Turtle, and added, "We have long been
friends; we are friends yet, until the sun stands
so high [indicating the place] in the heavens ; from
that time we are enemies and may kill one another."
Be this as it may, he came to Wayne, was taken
into high favor, and made chief of scouts, and
served loyally and with signal success until the end
of the campaign. After the campaign he was
joined by his Indian wife and his children; the
latter grew up and married well in the community,
so that their blood now flows in the veins of many
of the descendants of the old pioneers. Wells him-
self was slain by the Indians long afterward, in
1812, at the Chicago massacre..

One of Wells' fellow spies was William Miller.
Miller, like WTells, had been captured by the In-
dians when a boy, together with his brother Chris-
topher. When he grew to manhood he longed to
rejoin his own people, and finally did so, but he
could not persuade his brother to come with him,
for Christopher had become an Indian at heart.
In June, 1794, Wells, Miller, and a third spy, Rob-
ert McClellan, were sent out by Wayne with special
instructions to bring in a live Indian. McClellan,
who a number of years afterward became a famous
plainsman and Rocky Mountain man, was remark-
ably swift of foot. Near the Glaize River they

St. Clair and Wayne 105

found three Indians roasting venison by a fire, on
a high open piece of ground, clear of brushwood.
By taking advantage of the cover yielded by a fallen
treetop the three scouts crawled within seventy
yards of the camp-fire ; and Wells and Miller agreed
to fire at the two outermost Indians, while McClel-
lan, as soon as they had fired, was to dash in and
run down the third. As the rifles cracked the two
doomed warriors fell dead in their tracks; while
McClellan bounded forward at full speed, tomahawk
in hand. The Indian had no time to pick up his
gun; fleeing for his life he reached the bank of the
river, where the bluffs were twenty feet high, and
sprang over into the stream-bed. He struck a miry
place, and while he was floundering McClellan came
to the top of the bluff and instantly sprang down
full on him, and overpowered him. The others
came up and secured the prisoner, whom they found
to be a white man; and to Miller's astonishment it
proved to be his brother Christopher. The scouts
brought their prisoner, and the scalps of the two
slain warriors, back to Wayne. At first Christopher
was sulky and refused to join the whites; so at
Greeneville he was put in the guard house. After
a few days he grew more cheerful, and said he had
changed his mind. Wayne set him at liberty, and
he not only served valiantly as a scout through the
campaign, but acted as Wayne's interpreter. Early
in July he showed his good faith by assisting Mc-
Clellan in the capture of a Pottawatomie chief.
On one of Wells' scouts he and his companions

io6 The Winning of the West

came across a family of Indians in a canoe by the
river bank. The white wood rangers were as ruth-
less as their red foes, sparing neither sex nor age;
and the scouts were cocking their rifles when Wells
recognized the Indians as being the family into
which he had been adopted and by which he had
been treated as a son and brother. Springing
forward he swore immediate death to the first man
who fired, and then told his companions who the
Indians were. The scouts at once dropped their
weapons, shook hands with the Miamis, and sent
them off unharmed.

Wells' last scouting trip was made just before the
final battle of the campaign. As it was the eve of
the decisive struggle, Wayne was anxious to get
a prisoner. Wells went off with three companions
— McClellan, a man named Mahaffy, and a man
named May. May, like Wells and Miller, had lived
long with the Indians, first as a prisoner, and after-
ward as an adopted member of their tribe, but had
finally made his escape. The four scouts succeeded
in capturing an Indian man and woman, whom
they bound securely. Instead of returning at once
with their captives, the champions, in sheer dare-
devil, ferocious love of adventure, determined, as
it was already nightfall, to leave the two bound
Indians where they could find them again, and go
into one of the Indian camps to do some killing.
The camp they selected was but a couple of miles
from the British fort. They were dressed and
painted like Indians, and spoke the Indian tongues;

St. Clair and Wayne 107

so, riding boldly forward, they came right among
the warriors who stood grouped around the camp-
fires. They were at arm's-length before their dis-
guise was discovered. Immediately each of them,
choosing his man, fired into an Indian, and then
they fled, pursued by a hail of bullets. May's horse
slipped and fell in the bed of a stream, and he was
captured. The other three, spurring hard and lean-
ing forward in their saddles to avoid the bullets,
escaped, though both Wells and McClellan were
wounded; and they brought their Indian prisoners
into Wayne's camp that night. May was recognized
by the Indians as their former prisoner; and next
day they tied him up, made a mark on his breast
for a target, and shot him to death.35

With his advance effectually covered by his scouts,
and his army guarded by his own ceaseless vigi-

35 McBride collects or reprints a number of narratives deal-
ing with these border heroes ; some of them are by contem-
poraries who took part in their deeds. Brickell's narrative
corroborates these stories ; the differences are such as would
naturally be explained by the fact that different observers
were writing of the same facts from memory after a lapse
of several years. In their essentials the narratives are un-
doubtedly trustworthy. In the Draper collection there are
scores of MS. narratives of similar kind, written down from
what the pioneers said in their old age; unfortunately it is
difficult to sift out the true from the false, unless the stories
are corroborated from outside sources; and most of the tales
in the Draper MSS. are evidently hopelessly distorted. Wells'
daring attack on the Indian camp is alluded to in the Bradley
MSS. ; the journal, under date of August i2th, recites how
four white spies went down almost to Lake Erie, captured
two Indians, and then attacked the Indians in their tents,
three of the spies being wounded.

io8 The Winning of the West

lance, Wayne marched without opposition to the
confluence of the Glaize and the Maumee, where
the hostile Indian villages began, and whence they
stretched to below the British fort. The savages
were taken by surprise and fled without offering
opposition; while Wayne halted, on August 8th,
and spent a week in building a strong log stockade,
with four good block-houses as bastions; he chris-
tened the work Fort Defiance.36 The Indians had
cleared and tilled immense fields, and the troops
reveled in the fresh vegetables and ears of roasted
corn, and enjoyed the rest;37 for during the march
the labor of cutting a road through the thick forest
had been very severe, while the water was bad and
the mosquitoes were exceedingly troublesome. At
one place a tree fell on Wayne and nearly killed
him; but though somewhat crippled he continued
as active and vigilant as ever.38

From Fort Defiance Wayne sent a final offer of
peace to the Indians, summoning them at once to
send deputies to meet him. The letter was carried
by Christopher Miller and a Shawnee prisoner ; and
in it Wayne explained that Miller was a Shawnee
by adoption, whom his soldiers had captured "six
months since," while the Shawnee warrior had been

36 American State Papers, IV, 490, Wayne to Secretary of
War, Aug. 14, 1794.

31 Bradley MSS. Letter of Captain Daniel Bradley to
Ebenezer Banks, Grand Glaize, August 28, 1794.

38 "American Pioneer," I, 317, Daily Journal of Wayne's
Campaign. By -Lieutenant Boyer. Reprinted separately in
Cincinnati in 1866.

St. Clair and Wayne 109

taken but a couple of days before ; and he warned the
Indians that he had seven Indian prisoners, who had
been well treated, but who would be put to death if
Miller was harmed. The Indians did not molest
Miller, but sought to obtain delay, and would give
no definite answer; whereupon Wayne advanced
against them, having laid waste and destroyed all
their villages and fields.

His army marched on the I5th, and on the i8th
reached Roche du Bout, by the Maumee Rapids,
only a few miles from the British fort. Next day
was spent in building a rough breastwork to protect
the stores and baggage, and in reconnoitring the
Indian position.39

The Indians — Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots,
Ottawas, Miamis, Pottawatomies, Chippewas, and
Iroquois — were camped close to the British. There
were between fifteen hundred and two thousand
warriors ; and in addition there were seventy rangers
from Detroit, French, English, and refugee Ameri-
cans,, under Captain Caldwell, who fought with
them in the battle. The British agent McKee was
with them; and so was Simon Girty, the "white
renegade," and another partisan leader, Elliott. But
McKee, Girty, and Elliott did not actually fight in
the battle.40

39 American State Papers, 491, Wayne's Report to Secre-
tary of War, August 28, 1794.

40 Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, August 27, 1794.
McKee says there were 1,300 Indians, and omits all allusion
to Caldwell's rangers. He always underestimates the Indian
numbers and loss. In the battle one of Caldwell's rangers,

no The Winning of the West

On August 20, 1794, Wayne marched to battle
against the Indians.41 They lay about six miles
down the river, near the British fort, in a place
known as the Fallen Timbers, because there the
thick forest had been overturned by a whirlwind,
and the dead trees lay piled across one another in
rows. All the baggage was left behind in the breast-
work, with a sufficient guard. The army numbered
about three thousand men ; two thousand were regu-
lars, and there were a thousand mounted volunteers
from Kentucky under General Scott.

The army marched down the left or north branch
of the Maumee. A small force of mounted volun-
teers— Kentucky militia — were in front. On the
right flank the squadron of dragoons, the regular
cavalry, marched next to the river. The infantry,
armed with musket and bayonet, were formed in
two long lines, the second some little distance be-
hind the first; the left of the first line being contin-
ued by the companies of regular riflemen and light
troops. Scott, with the body of the mounted volun-

Antoine Lasselle, was captured. He gave in detail the num-
bers of the Indians engaged; they footed up to over 1,500. A
deserter from the fort, a British drummer of the 24th Regi-
ment, named John Bevin, testified that he had heard both
McKee and Elliott report the number of Indians as 2,000, in
talking to Major Campbell, the commandant of the fort, after
the battle. He and Lasselle agree as to Caldwell's rangers.
See their depositions, American State Papers, IV, 494.

41 Draper MSS., William Clark to Jonathan Clark, August
28, 1794. McBride, II, 129; "Life of Paxton." Many of the
regulars and volunteers were left in Fort Defiance and the
breastworks on the Maumee as garrisons.

St. Clair and Wayne in

teers, was thrown out on the left with instructions
to turn the flank of the Indians, thus effectually prp-
venting them from performing a similar feat at the
expense of the Americans. There could be no great-
er contrast than that between Wayne's carefully
trained troops, marching in open order to the attack,
and St. Clair's huddled mass of raw soldiers re-
ceiving an assault they were powerless to repel.

The Indians stretched in a line nearly two miles
long at right angles to the river, and began the bat-
tle confidently enough. They attacked and drove in
the volunteers who were in advance and the firing
then began along the entire front. But their suc-
cess was momentary. Wayne ordered the first line
of the infantry to advance with trailed arms, so as
to rouse the savages from their cover, then to fire
into their backs at close range, and to follow them
hard with the bayonet, so as to give them no time
to load. The regular cavalry were directed to
charge the left flank of the enemy; for Wayne had
determined "to put the horse hoof on the moc-
casin/' Both orders were executed with spirit and
vigor.

It would have been difficult to find more unfavor-
able ground for cavalry; nevertheless the dragoons
rode against their foes at a gallop, with broad-
swords swinging, the horses dodging in and out
among the trees and jumping the fallen logs. They
received a fire at close quarters which emptied a
dozen saddles, both captains being shot down. One,
the commander of the squadron, Captain Mis Camp-

ii2 The Winning of the West

bell,42 was killed; the other, Captain Van Rens-
selaer, a representative of one of the old Knicker-
bocker families of New York, who had joined the
army from pure love of adventure, was wounded.
The command devolved on Lieutenant Covington,
who led forward the troopers, with Lieutenant Webb
alongside him ; and the dragoons burst among the
savages at full speed, and routed them in a moment.
Covington cut down two of the Indians with his own
hand, and Webb one.

At the same time the first line of the infantry
charged with equal impetuosity and success. The
Indians delivered one volley and were then roused
from their hiding places with the bayonet; as they
fled they were shot down, and if they attempted to
halt they were at once assailed and again driven
with the bayonet. Theyvcould make no stand at all,
and the battle was won with ease. So complete was
the success that only the first line of regulars was
able to take part in the fighting ; the second line, and
Scott's horse-riflemen, on the left, in spite of their
exertions were unable to reach the battle-field until
the Indians were driven from it; "there not being
a sufficiency of the enemy for the Legion to play
on," wrote Clark. The entire action lasted under
forty minutes.43 Less than a thousand of the Amer-
icans were actually engaged. They pursued the
beaten and fleeing Indians for two miles, the cavalry
halting only when under the walls of the British fort.

42 A curious name, but so given in all the reports.

43 Bradley MSS., entry in the journal for August 2oth.

St. Clair and Wayne 113

Thirty-three of the Americans were killed and
one hundred wounded.44 It was an easy victory.
The Indians suffered much more heavily than the

44 Wayne's report; of the wounded n afterward died. He
gives an itemized statement. Clark in his letter makes the
dead 34 (including 8 militia instead of 7) and the wounded
only 70. Wayne reports the Indian loss as twice as great as
that of the whites; and says the woods were strewn with
their dead bodies and those of their white auxiliaries. Clark
says loo Indians were killed. The Englishman, Thomas
Duggan, writing from Detroit to Joseph Chew, Secretary
of the Indian Office, says officially that "great numbers" of
the Indians were slain. The journal of Wayne's campaign
says 40 dead were left on the field, and that there was con-
siderable additional, but unascertained, loss in the rapid two
miles pursuit. The member of Caldwell's company who was
captured was a French Canadian; his deposition is given by
Wayne. McKee says the Indians lost but 19 men, and that
but 400 were engaged, specifying the Wyandots and Ottawas
as being those who did the fighting and suffered the loss;
and he puts the loss of the Americans, although he admits
that they won, at between 300 and 400. He was furious at
the defeat, and was endeavoring to minimize it in every
way. He does not mention the presence of Caldwell's white
company; he makes the mistake of putting the American
cavalry on the wrong wing, in trying to show that only the
Ottawas and Wyandots were engaged ; and if his figures, 19
dead, have any value at all, they refer only to those two
tribes ; above I have repeatedly shown that he invariably un-
derestimated the Indian losses, usually giving the losses suf-
fered by the band he was with as being the entire loss. In
this case he speaks of the fighting and loss as being confined
to the Ottawas and Wyandots; but Brickell, who was with the
Delawares, states that "many of the Dela wares were killed
and wounded." All the Indians were engaged; and doubt-
less all the tribes suffered proportionately, and much more
than the Americans. Captain Daniel Bradley in his above
quoted letter of Aug. 28th to Ebenezer Banks (Bradley
MSS.) says that between 50 and 100 Indians were killed.

ii4 The Winning of the West

Americans ; in killed they probably lost two or three
'times as many. Among the dead were white men
from Caldwell's company; and one white ranger
was captured. It was the most complete and im-
portant victory ever gained over the Northwestern
Indians during the forty years' warfare, to which
it put an end ; and it was the only considerable
pitched battle in which they lost more than
their foes. They suffered heavily among their
leaders; no less than eight Wyandot chiefs were
slain.

From the fort the British had seen, with shame
and anger, the rout of their Indian allies. Their
commander wrote to Wayne to demand his inten-
tions ; Wayne responded that he thought; they were
made sufficiently evident by his successful battle
with the savages. The Englishman wrote in resent-
ment of this curt reply, complaining that Wayne's
soldiers had approached within pistol shot of the
fort, and threatening to fire upon them if the of-
fence were repeated. Wayne responded by summon-
ing him to abandon the fort; a summons which he
of course refused to heed. Wayne then gave orders
to destroy everything up to the very walls of the
fort, and his commands were carried out to the let-
ter; not only were the Indian villages burned and
their crops cut down, but all the houses and build-
ings of the British agents and traders, including
McKee's, were leveled to the ground. The British
commander did not dare to interfere or make good
his threats ; nor, on the other hand, did Wayne dare

St. Glair and Wayne 115

to storm the fort, which was well built and heavily
armed.

After completing his work of destruction Wayne
marched his army back to Fort Defiance. Here he
was obliged to halt for over a fortnight while he
sent back to Fort Recovery for provisions. He em-
ployed the time in work on the fort, which he
strengthened so that it would stand an attack by a
regular army. The mounted volunteers were turned
to account in a new manner, being employed not
only to escort the pack-animals but themselves to
transport the flour on their horses. There was much
sickness among the soldiers, especially from fever
and ague, and but for the corn and vegetables
they obtained from the Indian towns which were
scattered thickly along the Maumee they would
have suffered from hunger. They were espe-
cially disturbed because all the whiskey was
used up.45

On September I4th the Legion started westward
toward the Miami towns at the junction of the St.
Mary's and St. Joseph's rivers, the scene of Har-
mar's disaster. In four days the towns were
reached, the Indians being too cowed to offer re-
sistance. Here the army spent six weeks, burned
the towns and destroyed the fields and stores of the
hostile tribes, and built a fort which was christened
Fort Wayne. British deserters came in from time
to time; some of the Canadian traders made over-
tures to the army and agreed to furnish provisions

45 Daily Journal of Wayne's Campaign "American Pio-
neer," I, 351.

n6 The Winning of the West

at a moderate price; and of the savages only strag-
gling parties were seen. The mounted volunteers
grew mutinous, but were kept in order by their
commander Scott, a rough, capable backwoods sol-
dier. Their term of service at length expired and
they were sent home; and the regulars of the Le-
gion, leaving a. garrison at Fort Wayne, marched
back to Greeneville, and reached it on November
2d, just three months and six days after they started
from it on their memorable and successful expedi-
tion.

Wayne had shown himself the best general
ever sent to war with the Northwestern Indians;
and his victorious campaign was the most note-
worthy ever carried on against them, for it brought
about t^e first lasting peace on the border and put
an end to the bloody turmoil of forty years' fight-
ing. It was one of the most striking and weighty
feats in the winning of the West.

The army went into winter quarters at Greene-
ville. There was sickness among the troops, and there
were occasional desertions ; the discipline was severe,
and the work so hard and dangerous that the men
generally refused to re-enlist.46 The officers were
uneasy lest there should be need of a further cam-
paign. But their fears were groundless. Before
winter set in heralds arrived from the hostile tribes
to say that they wished peace.

The Indians were utterly downcast over their de-

46 Draper MSS., William Clark to Jonathan Clark, Novem-
ber 23, 1794.

St. Clair and Wayne 117

feat.47 The destruction of their crops, homes, and
stores of provisions was complete, and they were
put to sore shifts to live through the winter. Their
few cattle, and many even of their dogs, died; they
could not get much food from the British; and as
winter wore on they sent envoy after envoy to the
Americans, exchanged prisoners, and agreed to
make a permanent peace in the spring. They were
exasperated with the British, who, they said, had
not fulfilled a single promise they had made.48

The anger of the Indians against the British was
as just as it was general. They had been lured and
goaded into war by direct material aid, and by in-
direct promises of armed assistance ; and they were
abandoned as soon as the fortune of war went
against them. Brant, the Iroquois chief, was sorely
angered by the action of the British in deserting the
Indians whom they had encouraged by such delu-
sive hopes;49 and in his letter to the British
officials he reminded them of the fact that but
for their interference the Indians would have con-
cluded "an equitable and honorable peace in June,
1793" — thus offering conclusive proof that the
American commissioners, in their efforts to make
peace with the Indians in that year, had been foiled
by the secret machinations of the British agents, as
Wayne had always thought. Brant blamed the

41 Canadian Archives, William Johnson Chew to Joseph
Chew, December 7, 1794.

48 Brickell's Narrative.

49 Canadian Archives, Joseph Brant to Joseph Chew, Oct.
22, 1794; William J. Chew to J. Chew, Oct. 24, 1794.

n8 The Winning of the West

British agent McKee for ever having interfered in
the Indian councils, and misled the tribes to their
hurt ; and in writing to the Secretary of the Indian
Office for Canada he reminded him in plain terms of
the treachery with which the British had behaved to
the Indians at the close of- the Revolutionary War,
and expressed the hope that it would not be re-
peated; saying:50 "If there is a treaty between Great
Britain and the Yankees I hope our Father the King
will not forget the Indians as he did in the year '83."
When his forebodings came true and the British, in
assenting to Jay's treaty, abandoned their Indian
allies, Brant again wrote to the Secretary of the In-
dian Office, in repressed but bitter anger at the con-
duct of the King's agents in preventing the Indians
from making peace with the Americans while they
could have made it on advantageous terms, and
then in deserting them. He wrote: "This is the
second time the poor Indians have been left in
the lurch & I cannot avoid lamenting that they
were prevented at a time when they had it in
their power to make an Honorable and Advan-
tageous Peace." 51

McKee, the British Indian agent, was nearly as
frank as Brant in expressing his views of the con-
duct of the British toward their allies; he doubtless
felt peculiar bitterness as he had been made the ac-
tive instrument in carrying out the policy of his

50 Canadian Archives, Brant to Joseph Chew, Feb. 24, and
March 17, 1795.
81 Do., Brant to Chew, Jan. 19, 1796.

St. Clair and Wayne 119

chiefs, and had then seen that policy abandoned and
even disavowed. In fact he suffered the usual fate
of those who are chosen to do some piece of work
which unscrupulous men in power wish to have
done, but wish also to avoid the responsibility of
doing. He foretold evil results from the policy adopt-
ed, a policy under which, as he put it, "the dis-
tressed situation of the poor Indians who have long
fought for us and bled farely for us [is] no bar to
a Peaceable accomodation with America and . . .
they [are] left to shift for themselves." 52 That a
sentence of this kind could be truthfully written by
one British official to another was a sufficiently bit-
ing comment on the conduct of the British Govern-
ment.

The battle of the Fallen Timbers opened the eyes
of the Indians to more facts than one. They saw
that they could not stand against the Americans un-
assisted. Furthermore, they saw that though the
British would urge them to fight, and would secretly
aid them, yet that in the last resort the King's troops
would not come to their help by proceeding to actual
war. All their leaders recognized that it was time
to make peace. The Americans found an active ally
in the French Canadian, Antoine Lasselle, whom
they had captured in the battle. He worked hard
to bring about a peace, inducing the Canadian trad-
ers to come over to the American side, and making
every effort to get the Indians to agree to terms.
Being a thrifty soul, he drove a good trade with the

M Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, March 27, 1795.

120 The Winning of the West

savages at the councils, selling them quantities of
liquor.

In November the Wyandots from Sandusky sent
ambassadors to Wayne at Greeneville. Wayne
spoke to them with his usual force and frankness.
He told them he pitied them for their folly in listen-
ing to the British, who were very glad to urge them
to fight and to give them ammunition, but who had
neither the power nor the inclination to help them
when the time of trial came; that hitherto the In-
dians had felt only the weight of his little finger,
but that he would surely destroy all the tribes in the
near future if they did not make peace.53

The Hurons went away much surprised, and re-
solved on peace; and the other tribes followed their
example. In January, 1795, the Miamis, Chippe-
was, Sacs, Delawares, Pottawatomies, and Ottawas
sent ambassadors to Greeneville and agreed to
treat.54 The Shawnees were bent on continuing the
war; but when their allies deserted them they too
sent to Greeneville and asked to be included in the
peace.55 On February nth the Shawnees, Dela-
wares, and Miamis formally entered into a prelimi-
nary treaty.

This was followed in the summer of 1795 by the
formal Treaty of Greeneville, at which Wayne, on
behalf of the United States, made a definite peace

53 Canadian Archives, Geo. Ironside toMcK.ee, Dec. 13, 1794.
64 Do., Antoine Lasselle to Jacques Lasselle, Jan. 31, 1795.
55 Do., Letter of Lt.-Col. England, Jan. 30, 1795; also copy
of treaty of peace of Feb. nth.

St. Clair and Wayne 121

with all the Northwestern tribes. The Sachems,
war chiefs, and warriors of the different tribes be-
gan to gather early in June ; and formal proceedings
for a treaty were opened on June I7th. But many
of the tribes were slow in coming to the treaty
ground, others vacillated in their course, and un-
foreseen delays arose; so that it was not until Au-
gust /th that it was possible to come to a unanimous
agreement and ratify the treaty. No less than eleven
hundred and thirty Indians were present at the
treaty grounds, including a full delegation from
every hostile tribe. All solemnly covenanted to
keep the peace; and they agreed to surrender to the
whites all of what is now southern Ohio and south-
eastern Indiana, and various reservations elsewhere,
as at Fort Wayne, Fort Defiance, Detroit, and Mich-
ilimackinac, the lands around the French towns,
and the hundred and fifty thousand acres near the
Falls of the Ohio which had been allotted to Clark
and his soldiers. The Government, in its turn, ac-
knowledged the Indian title to the remaining terri-
tory, and agreed to pay the tribes annuities aggre-
gating nine thousand five hundred dollars. All pris-
oners on both sides were restored. There were in-
terminable harangues and councils while the treaty
was pending, the Indians invariably addressing
Wayne as Elder Brother, and Wayne in response
styling them Younger Brothers.

In one speech a Chippewa chief put into terse
form the reasons for making the treaty and for giv-
ing the Americans title to the land, saying, "Elder
VOL. VIII.— 6

122 The Winning of the West

Brother, you asked who were the true owners of the
land now ceded to the United States. In answer I
tell you, if any nations should call themselves the
owners of it they would be guilty of falsehood ; our
claim to it is equal; our Elder Brother has con-
quered it."56

Wayne had brought peace by the sword. It was
the first time the border had been quiet for over a
generation ; and for fifteen years the quiet lasted un-
broken. The credit belongs to Wayne and his
army, and to the Government which stood behind
both. Because it thus finally stood behind them we
can forgive its manifold shortcomings and vacilla-
tions, its futile efforts to beg a peace, and its re-
luctance to go to war. We can forgive all this;
but we should not forget it. Americans need to
keep in mind the fact that as a nation they have
erred far more often in not being willing enough
to fight than in being too willing. Once roused, they
have always been dangerous and hard-fighting foes ;
but they have been over-difficult to rouse. Their
educated classes, in particular, need to be perpetual-
ly reminded that, though it is an evil thing to brave
a conflict needlessly, or to bully and bluster, it is
an even worse thing to flinch from a fight for which
there is legitimate provocation, or to live in supine,
slothful, unprepared ease, helpless to avenge an in-
jury.

The conduct of the Americans in the years which
closed with Wayne's treaty did not shine very

56 American State Papers, IV, 562-583.

St. Clair and Wayne 123

brightly; but the conduct of the British was black,
indeed. On the Northwestern frontier they be-
haved in a way which can scarcely be too harshly
stigmatized. This does not apply to the British civil
and military officers at the Lake Posts; for they
were merely doing their duty as they saw it, and
were fronting their foes bravely, while with loyal
zeal they strove to carry out what they understood
to be the policy of their superiors. The ultimate
responsibility rested with these superiors, the
Crown's high advisers, and the King and Parlia-
ment they represented. Their treatment both of
the Indians, whom they professed to protect, and
of the Americans, with whom they professed to be
friendly, forms one of the darkest pages in the an-
nals of the British in America. Yet they have been
much less severely blamed for their behavior in this
matter than for far more excusable offences. Amer-
ican historians, for example usually condemn them
without stint because in 1814 the army of Ross and
Cockburn burned and looted the public buildings of
Washington; but by rights they should keep all
their condemnation for their own country, so far
as the taking of Washington is concerned ; for the
sin of burning a few public buildings is as nothing
compared with the cowardly infamy of which the
politicians of the stripe of Jefferson, and Madison,
and the people whom they represented, were guilty
in not making ready, by sea and land, to protect
their Capital and in not exacting full revenge for its
destruction.

124 The Winning of the West

These facts may with advantage be pondered by
those men of the present day who are either so
ignorant or of such lukewarm patriotism that
they do not wish to see the United States keep pre-
pared for war and show herself willing and able
to adopt a vigorous foreign policy whenever there is
need of furthering American interests or upholding
the honor of the American flag. America is bound
scrupulously to respect the rights of the weak; but
she is no less bound to make stalwart insistence on
her own rights as against the strong.

The count against the British on the Northwest-
ern frontier is, not that they insisted on their rights,
but that they were guilty of treachery to both friend
and foe. The success of the British was incompat-
ible with the good of mankind in general, and of
the English-speaking races in particular; for they
strove to prop up savagery, and to bar the westward
march of the settler-folk whose destiny it was to
make ready the continent for civilization. But the
British cannot be seriously blamed because they
failed to see this. Their fault lay in their aiding
and encouraging savages in a warfare which was
necessarily horrible ; and still more in their repeated
breaches of faith. The horror and the treachery
were the inevitable outcome of the policy on which
they had embarked ; it can never be otherwise when
a civilized government endeavors to use, as allies in
war, savages whose acts it can not control and for
whose welfare it has no real concern.

Doubtless the statesmen who shaped the policy

St. Clair and Wayne 125

of Great Britain never deliberately intended to break
faith, and never fully realized the awful nature of
the Indian warfare for which they were in part re-
sponsible; they thought very little of the matter at
all in the years which saw the beginning of their
stupendous struggle with France. But the acts of
their obscure agents on the far interior frontier were
rendered necessary and inevitable by their policy.
To encourage the Indians to hold their own against
the Americans, and to keep back the settlers, meant
to encourage a war of savagery against the border
vanguard of white civilization ; and such a war was
sure to teem with fearful deeds. Moreover, where
the interests of the British Crown were so mani-
fold it was idle to expect that the Crown's advisers
would treat as of much weight the welfare of the
scarcely-known tribes whom their agents had urged
to enter a contest which was hopeless except for
British assistance. The British statesmen were en-
gaged in gigantic schemes of warfare and diplo-
macy; and to them the Indians and the frontiers-
men alike were pawns on a great chessboard, to be
sacrificed whenever' necessary. When the British
authorities deemed it likely that there would be war
with America, the tribes were- incited to take up the
hatchet; when there seemed a chance of peace with
America the deeds of the tribes were disowned;
and peace was finally assured by a cynical abandon-
ment of their red allies. In short, the British, while
professing peace with the Americans, treacherously
incited the Indians to war against them; and, when

126 The Winning of the West

it suited their dwn interests, they treacherously
abandoned their Indian allies to the impending
ruin.57

67 The ordinary American histories, often so absurdly un-
just to England, are right in their treatment of the British
actions on the frontier in 1793-94. The ordinary British his-
torians simply ignore the whole affair. As a type of their
class, Mr. Percy Gregg may be instanced. His "History of
the United States" is a silly book; he is often intentionally
untruthful, but his chief fault is his complete ignorance of
the facts about which he is writing. It is, of course, needless
to criticise such writers as Mr. Gregg and his fellows. But
it is worth while calling attention to Mr. Goldwin Smith's
"The United States," for Mr. Goldwin Smith is a student,
and must be taken seriously. He says: "That the British
government or anybody by its authority was intriguing with
the Indians against the Americans is an assertion of which
there seems to be no proof." If he will examine the Cana-
dian Archives, from which I have quoted, and the authori-
ties which I cite, he will find the proof ready to hand. Prof.
A. C. McLaughlin has made a capital study of this question
in his pamphlet on "The Western Posts and the British
Debts." What he says can not well be controverted.

LOUISIANA AND AARON BURR

PREFACE

THIS volume covers the period which followed
the checkered but finally successful war waged
by the United States Government against the North-
western Indians, and deals with the acquisition and
exploration of the vast region that lay beyond the
Mississippi. It was during this period that the
West rose to real power in the Union. The boun-
daries of the old West were at last made certain,
and the new West, the Far West, the country be-
tween the Mississippi and the Pacific, was added
to the national domain. The steady stream of in-
coming settlers broadened and deepened year by
year; Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio became
States, Louisiana, Indiana, and Mississippi Territo-
ries. The population in the newly settled regions
increased with a rapidity hitherto unexampled; and
this rapidity, alike in growth of population and in
territorial expansion, gave the West full weight
in the national councils.

The victorious campaigns of Wayne in the North,
and the innumerable obscure forays and reprisals
of the Tennesseeans and Georgians in the South,
so cowed the Indians that they all, North and South
alike, made peace; the first peace the border had

(129)

130 Preface

known for fifty years. At the same time the treat-
ies of Jay and Pinckney gave us in fact the boun-
daries which the peace of 1783 had only given us
in name. The execution of these treaties put an
end in the North to the intrigues of the British,
who had stirred the Indians to hostility against the
Americans ; and in the South to the far more treach-
erous intrigues of the Spaniards, who showed as-
tounding duplicity, and whose intrigues extended
not only to the Indians but also to the baser sep-
aratist leaders among the Westerners themselves.

The cession of Louisiana followed. Its true his-
tory is to be found, not in the doings of the diplo-
mats who determined merely the terms upon which
it was made, but in the Western growth of the
people of the United States from 1769 to 1803,
which made it inevitable. The men who settled and
peopled the Western wilderness were the men who
won Louisiana; for it was surrendered by France
merely because it was impossible to hold it against
the American advance. Jefferson, through his
agents at .Paris, asked only for New Orleans; but
Napoleon thrust upon him the great West, because
Napoleon saw, what the American statesmen and
diplomats did not see, but what the Westerners felt ;
for he saw that no European power could hold the
country beyond the Mississippi when the Americans
had made good their foothold upon the hither bank.

It remained to explore the unknown land; and
this task fell, not to mere wild hunters, such as
those who had first penetrated the wooded wilder-

Preface 131

ness beyond the Alleghanies, but to officers of the
regular army, who obeyed the orders of the National
Government. Lewis, Clark, and Pike were the
pioneers in the exploration of the vast territory
the United States had just gained.

The names of the Indian fighters, the treaty-
makers, the wilderness wanderers, who took the lead
in winning and exploring the West, are memorable.
More memorable still are the lives and deeds of the
settler folk for whom they fought and toiled; for
the feats of the leaders were rendered possible only
by the lusty and vigorous growth of the young
commonwealths built up by the throng of west-
ward-pushing pioneers. The raw, strenuous, eager
social life of these early dwellers on the Western
waters must be studied before it is possible to under-
stand the conditions that determined the continual
westward extension of the frontier. Tennessee, dur-
ing the years immediately preceding her admission
to Statehood, is especially well worth study, both
as a typical frontier community, and because of
the opportunity afforded to examine in detail the
causes and course of the Indian wars.

In this volume I have made use of the material
to which reference was made in the first; besides
the American State Papers I have drawn on the Ca-
nadian Archives, the Draper Collection, including
especially the papers from the Spanish Archives, the
Robertson MSS., and the Clay MSS. for hitherto
unused matter. I have derived much assistance
from the various studies and monographs on special

132 Preface

phases of Western history; I refer to each in its
proper place. I regret that Mr. Stephen B. Weeks'
valuable study of the Martin family did not appear
in time for me to use it while writing about the
little State of Franklin, in my third volume.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

SAGAMORE HILL, LONG ISLAND,
May, 1896

LOUISIANA AND AARON BURR

CHAPTER I

TENNESSEE BECOMES A STATE, 1791-1796

'"PHE Territory of the United States of America
1 South of the River Ohio" was the official title
of the tract of land which had been ceded by North
Carolina to the United States, and which soon after
became the State of Tennessee. William Blount, the
newly appointed Governor, took charge late in 1790.
He made a tour of the various counties, as laid out
under authority of the State of North Carolina,
rechristening them as counties of the Territory,
and summoning before him the persons in each
county holding commissions from North Carolina,
at the respective court-houses, where he formally
notified them of the change. He read to them the
act of Congress accepting the cessions of the claims
of North Carolina; then he read his own commis-
sion from President Washington; and informed
them of the provision by North Carolina that Con-
gress should assume and execute the government
of the new Territory "in a manner similar to that
which they support northwest of the River Ohio."
Following this he formally read the ordinance for

(133)

134 The Winning of the West

the government of the Northwestern Territory. He
commented upon and explained this proclamation,
stating that under it the President had appointed
the Governor, the Judges, and the Secretary of the
new Territory, and that he himself, as Governor,
would now appoint the necessary county officers.

The remarkable feature of this address was that
he read to the assembled officers in each county,
as part of the law apparently binding upon them,
Article 6 of the Ordinance of 1787, which provided
that there should be neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude in the Northwestern Territory.1 It had
been expressly stipulated that this particular provi-
sion as regards slavery should not apply to the
Southwestern Territory, and of course Blount's
omission to mention this fact did not in any way
alter the case; but it is a singular thing that he
should without comment have read, and his listeners
without comment have heard, a recital that slavery
was abolished in their territory. It emphasizes the
fact that at this time there was throughout the
West no very strong feeling on the subject of
slavery, and what feeling there was, was if anything
hostile. The adventurous backwoods farmers who
composed the great mass of the population in Ten-
nessee, as elsewhere among and west of the Alle-
ghanies, were not a slave-owning people, in the
sense that the planters of the seaboard were. They

1 Blount MSS., Journal of Proceedings of William Blount,
Esq., Governor in and over the Territory of the United States
of America South of the River Ohio, in his executive depart-
ment, October 23, 1790.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 135

were pre-eminently folk who did their work with
their own hands. Master and man chopped and
plowed and reaped and builded side by side, and
even the leaders of the community, the militia gen-
erals, the legislators, and the judges, often did their
share of farm work, and prided themselves upon
their capacity to do it well. They had none of
that feeling which makes slave-owners look upon
manual labor as a badge of servitude. They were
often lazy and shiftless, but they never deified lazi-
ness and shiftlessness or made them into a cult.
The one thing they prized beyond all others was
their personal freedom, the right of the individual
to do whatsoever he saw fit. Indeed they often
carried this feeling so far as to make them condone
gross excesses, rather than insist upon the exercise
of even needful authority. They were by no means
entirely logical, but they did see and feel that slav-
ery was abhorrent, and that it was utterly incon-
sistent with the theories of their own social and
governmental life. As yet there was no thought
of treating slavery as a sacred institution, the right-
eousness of which must not be questioned. At the
Fourth of July celebrations toasts such as "The
total abolition of slavery" were not uncommon.2
It was this feeling which prevented any manifesta-
tion of surprise at Blount's apparent acquiescence
in a section of the ordinance for the government
of the Territory which prohibited slavery.

2 "Knoxville Gazette," July 17, 1795, etc. See also issue
Jan. 28, 1792.

136 The Winning of the West

Nevertheless, though slaves were not numerous,
they were far from uncommon, and the moral con-
science of the community was not really roused upon
the subject. It was hardly possible that it should
be roused, for no civilized people who owned Afri-
can slaves had as yet abolished slavery, and it was
too much to hope that the path toward abolition
would be pointed out by poor frontiersmen engaged
in a life and death struggle with hostile savages.
The slaveholders were not interfered with until they
gradually grew numerous enough and powerful
enough to set the tone of thought, and make it im-
possible to root out slavery save by outside action.

Blount recommended the appointment of Sevier
and Robertson as brigadier-generals of militia of
the Eastern and Western districts of the Territory,
and issued a large number of commissions to the
justices of the peace, militia officers, sheriffs, and
clerks of the county courts in the different counties.3
In his appointments he shrewdly and properly iden-
tified himself with the natural leaders of the fron-
tiersmen. He made Sevier and Robertson his right-
hand men, and strove always to act in harmony
with them, while for the minor military and civil
officers he chose the persons whom the frontiersmen
themselves desired. In consequence he speedily
became a man of great influence for good. The
Secretary of the Territory reported to the Federal
Government that the effect of Blount's character
on the frontiersmen was far greater than was the

8 Blount MSS., Journal of the Proceedings, etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 137

case with any other man, and that he was able
to get them to adhere to the principles of order
and to support the laws by his influence in a way
which it was hopeless to expect from their own
respect for governmental authority. Blount was
felt by the frontiersmen to be thoroughly in sym-
pathy with them, to understand and appreciate them,
and to be heartily anxious for their welfare; and
yet at the same time his influence could be counted
upon on the side of order, while the majority of the
frontier officials in any time of commotion were apt
to remain silent and inactive, or even to express their
sympathy with the disorderly element.4

No one but a man of great tact and firmness
could have preserved as much order among the
frontiersmen as Blount preserved. He was always
under fire from both sides. The settlers were con-
tinually complaining that they were deserted by the
Federal authorities, who favored the Indians, and
that Blount himself did not take sufficiently active
steps to subdue the savages; while on the other
hand the National Administration was continually
upbraiding him for being too active against the
Indians, and for not keeping the frontiersmen suf-
ficiently peaceable. Under much temptations, and
in a situation that would have bewildered any one,
Blount steadfastly followed his course of, on the
one hand, striving his best to protect the people
over whom he was placed as governor and to repel

4 American State Papers, IV; Daniel Smith to the Secre-
tary of War, Knoxville, July 19, 1793.

138 The Winning of the West

the savages, while, on the other hand, he suppressed
so far as lay in his power, any outbreak against the
authorities, and tried to inculcate a feeling of loy-
alty and respect for the National Government.5 He
did much in creating a strong feeling of attachment
to the Union among the rough backwoodsmen with
fwhom he had thrown in his lot.

Early in 1791 Blount entered into negotiations
with the Cherokees, and when the weather grew
warm he summoned them to a treaty. They met
on the Holston, all of the noted Cherokee chiefs and
hundreds of their warriors being present, and con-
cluded the treaty of Holston, by which, in consid-
eration of numerous gifts and of an annuity of a
thousand (afterward increased to fifteen hundred)
dollars, the Cherokees at last definitely abandoned
their disputed claims to the various tracts of land
which the whites claimed under various former
treaties. By this treaty with the Cherokees, and
by the treaty with the Creeks entered into at New
York the previous summer, the Indian title to most
of the present State of Tennessee was fairly and
legally extinguished. However, the westernmost
part was still held by the Chickasaws, and certain
tracts in the southeast by the Cherokees; while
the Indian hunting grounds in the middle of the
Territory were thrust in between the groups of
settlements on the Cumberland and the Holston.

On the ground where the treaty was held Blount
proceeded to build a little town, which he made the

8 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Feb. 13, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 139

capital of the Territory, and christened Knoxville,
in honor of Washington's Secretary of War. At
this town there was started, in 1791, under his own
supervision, the first newspaper of Tennessee,
known as the "Knoxville Gazette." It was four or
five years younger than the only other newspaper
of the then Far West, the "Kentucky Gazette." The
paper gives an interesting glimpse of many of the
social and political conditions of the day. In polit-
ical tone it showed Blount's influence very strongly,
and was markedly in advance of most of the similar
papers of the time, including the "Kentucky Ga-
zette" ; for it took a firm stand in favor of the Na-
tional Government, and against every form of dis-
order, of separatism, or of mob law. As with all of
the American papers of the day, even in the back-
woods, there was much interest taken in European
news, and a prominent position was given to long
letters, or extracts from seaboard papers, contain-
ing accounts of the operation of the English fleets
and. the French armies, or of the attitude of the
European Governments. Like most Americans, the
editorial writers of the paper originally sympathized
strongly with the French Revolution; but the news
of the beheading of Marie Antoinette, and of the
recital of the atrocities committed in Paris, worked
a reaction among those who loved order, and the
"Knoxville Gazette" ranged itself with them, taking
for the time being strong grounds against the
French, and even incidentally alluding to the In-
dians as being more bloodthirsty than any man

140 The Winning of the West

"not a Jacobin."6 The people largely shared these
sentiments. In 1793, at the Fourth of July celebra-
tion at Jonesborough there was a public dinner and
ball, as there was also at Knoxville; Federal troops
were paraded and toasts were drunk to the Presi-
dent, to the Judges of the Supreme Court, to Blount,
to General Wayne, to the friendly Chickasaw In-
dians, to Sevier, to the ladies of the Southwestern
Territory, to the American arms, and, finally, "to
the true liberties of France and a speedy and just
punishment of the murderers of Louis XVI." The
word "Jacobin" was used as a term of reproach
for some time.

The paper was at first decidedly Federalist in
sentiment. No sympathy was expressed with Genet
or with the efforts undertaken by the Western allies
of the French Minister to organize a force for the
conquest of Louisiana; and the Tennessee settlers
generally took the side of law and order in the
earlier disturbances in which the Federal Gov-
ernment was concerned. At the Fourth of July
celebration in Knoxville in 1795, one of the toasts
was "The four Western counties of Pennsylvania;
may they repent their folly, and sin no more" ; the
Tennesseeans sympathizing as little with the Penn-
sylvania whiskey revolutionists as four years later
they sympathized with the Kentuckians and Vir-
ginians in their nullification agitation against the
alien and sedition laws. Gradually, however, the
tone of the paper changed, as did the tone of

6 "Knoxville Gazette," March 27, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 141

the community, at least to the extent of becoming
Democratic and anti-Federal; for the people felt
that the Easterners did not sympathize with them
either in their contests with the Indians or in their
desire to control the Mississippi and the further
West. They grew to regard with particular vin-
dictiveness the Federalists, — the aristocrats, as they
styled them, — of the Southern seaboard States, nota-
bly of Virginia and South Carolina.

One pathetic feature of the paper was the recur-
rence of advertisements by persons whose friends
and kinsfolk had been carried off by the Indians,
and who anxiously sought any trace of them.

But the "Gazette" was used for the expression of
opinions not only by the whites, but occasionally
even by an Indian. One of the Cherokee chiefs, the
Red Bird, put into the "Gazette," for two buckskins,
a talk to the Cherokee chief of the Upper Towns,
in which he especially warned him to leave alone
one William Cocke, "the white man who lived
among the mulberry trees," for, said Red Bird,
"the mulberry man talks very strong and runs very
fast"; this same Cocke being afterward one of the
first two Senators from Tennessee. The Red Bird
ended his letter by the expression of the rather
quaint wish, "that all the bad people on both sides
were laid in- the ground, for then there would not
be so many mush men trying to make people to
believe they were warriors."7

Blount brought his family to Tennessee at once,

1 "Knoxville Gazette," November 3, 1792.

142 The Winning of the West

and took the lead in trying to build up institutions
for higher education. After a good deal of diffi-
culty an academy was organized under the title of
Blount College, and was opened as soon as a suffi-
cient number of pupils could be gotten together;
there were already two other colleges in the Ter-
ritory, Greenevillfc antl Washington, the latter being
the academy founded by Doak. Like almost all
other institutions of learning of the day these three
were under clerical control ; but Blount College was
chartered as a non-denominational institution, the
first of its kind in the United States.8 The clergy-
man and the lawyer, with the school-master, were
still the typical men of letters in all the frontier
communities. The doctor was not yet a prominent
feature of life in the backwoods, though there is in
the "Gazette" an advertisement of one who an-
nounces that he intends to come to practice "with a
large stock of genuine medicines."9

The ordinary books were still school books, books
of law, and sermons or theological writings. The
first books, or .pamphlets, published in Eastern Ten-
nessee were brought out about this time at the
"Gazette" office, and bore such titles as "A Sermon
on Psalmody, by Rev. Hezekiah Balch" ; "A Dis-
course by the Rev. Samuel Carrick"; and a legal
essay called "Western Justice."10 There was also
a slight effort now and then at literature of a lighter

8 See Edward T. Sanford's "Blount College and the Uni-
versity of Tennessee," p. 13.

9 "Knoxville Gazette," June 19, 1794.

10 "Knoxville Gazette," Jan. 30 and May 8, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 143

kind. The little Western papers, like those in the
East, had their poets' corners, often with the head-
ing of "Sacred to the Muses," the poems ranging
from "Lines to Myra" and "Epitaph on John Top-
ham" to "The Pernicious Consequences of Smok-
ing Cigars." In one of the issues of the "Knoxville
Gazette" there is advertised for sale a new song by
a "gentleman of Col. McPherson's Blues, on a late
expedition against the Pennsylvania Insurgents" ;
and also, in rather incongruous juxtaposition, "Top-
lady's Translation of Zanchi on Predestination."

Settlers were thronging into East Tennessee, and
many penetrated even to the Indian-harassed west-
ern district. In traveling to the western parts the
immigrants generally banded together in large par-
ties, led by some man of note. Among those who
arrived in 1792 was the old North Carolina Indian
fighter, General Griffith Rutherford. He wished
to settle on the Cumberland, and to take thither all
his company, with a large number of wagons, and
he sent to Blount begging that a road might be cut
through the wilderness for the wagons; or, if this
could not be done, that some man would blaze the
route, "in which case," said he, "there would be
hands of our own that could cut as fast as wagons
could march."11

In 1794, there being five thousand free male in-
habitants, as provided by law, Tennessee became
entitled to a Territorial Legislature, and the Gov-
ernor summoned the Assembly to meet at Knoxville

11 Blount MSS., Rutherford to Blount, May 25, 1792.

144 The Winning of the West

on August 1 7th. So great was the danger from the
Indians that a military company had to accompany
the Cumberland legislators to and from the seat of
government. For the same reason the judges on
their circuits had to go accompanied by a military
guard.

Among the first acts of this Territorial Legisla-
ture was that to establish higher institutions of
learning; John Sevier was made a trustee in both
Blount and Greeneville Colleges. A lottery was
established for the purpose of building the Cumber-
land road to Nashville, and another one to build a
jail and stocks in Nashville. A pension act was
passed for disabled soldiers and for widows and
orphans, who were to be given an adequate allow-
ance at the discretion of the county court. A poll
tax of twenty-five cents on all taxable white polls
was laid, and on every taxable negro poll fifty cents.
Land was taxed at the rate of twenty-five cents a
hundred acres, town lots one dollar; while a stud
horse was taxed four dollars. Thus, taxes were laid
exclusively upon free males, upon slaves, lands,
town lots and stud horses, a rather queer combina-
tion.12

Various industries were started, as the people be-
gan to demand not only the necessaries of life but the
comforts, and even occasionally the luxuries. There
were plenty of blacksmith shops; and a goldsmith
and jeweler set up his establishment. In his adver-

18 Laws of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1803. First Session of
Territorial Legislature, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 145

tisement he shows that he was prepared to do some
work which would be alien to his modern represen-
tative, for he notifies the citizens that he makes
"rifle guns in the neatest and most approved fash-
ion." 13

Ferries were established at the important cross-
ings, and taverns in the county-seats and small
towns. One of the Knoxville taverns advertises its
rates, which were one shilling for breakfast, one
shilling for supper, and one and sixpence for dinner ;
board and lodging for a week two dollars, and board
only for the same space of time nine shillings. Fer-
riage was three pence for a man and horse and two
shillings for a wagon and team.

Various stores were established in the towns, the
merchants obtaining most of their goods in the
great trade centres of Philadelphia and Baltimore,
and thence hauling them by wagon to the frontier.
Most of the trade was carried on by barter. There
was very little coin in the country and but few
bank-notes. Often the advertisement specified the
kind of goods that would be taken and the different
values at which they would be received. Thus, the
salt works at Washington, Virginia, in advertising
their salt, stated that they would sell it per bushel
for seven shillings and sixpence if paid in cash or
prime furs; at ten shillings if paid in bear or deer
skins, beeswax, hemp, bacon, butter or beef cattle;
and at twelve shillings if in other trade and country

13 "Knoxville Gazette," Oct. 20, 1792.
VOL. VIII.— 7

146 The Winning of the West

produce as was usual.14 The prime furs were mink,
coon, muskrat, wildcat, and beaver. Besides this
the stores advertised that they would take for their
articles cash, beeswax, and country produce or tal-
low, hogs' lard in white walnut kegs, butter, pork,
new feathers, good horses, and also corn, rye, oats,
flax, and "old Congress money," the old Congress
money being that issued by the Continental Con-
gress, which had depreciated wonderfully in value.
They also took certificates of indebtedness either
from the State or the nation because of services
performed against the Indians, and certificates of
land claimed under various rights. The value of
some of these commodities was evidently mainly
speculative. The storekeepers often felt that where
they had to accept such dubious substitutes for cash
they desired to give no credit, and some of the ad-
vertisements run : "Cheap, ready money store, where
no credit whatever will be given," and then proceed
to describe what ready money was, — cash, furs,
bacon, etc. The stores sold salt, iron-mongery,
pewterware, corduroys, rum, brandy, whiskey, wine,
ribbons, linen, calamancos, and in fact generally
what would be found at that day in any store in the
smaller towns of the older States. The best eight
by ten crown glass "was regularly imported," and
also "beautiful assortments of fashionable coat and
vest buttons," as well as "brown and loaf sugar,
coffee, chocolate, tea, and spices." In the towns the
families had ceased to kill their own meat, and beef

14 "Knoxville Gazette," June i, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 147

markets were established where fresh meat could
be had twice a week.

Houses and lots were advertised for sale, and one
result of the method of allowing the branded stock
to range at large in the woods was that there were
numerous advertisements for strayed horses, and
even cattle, with descriptions of the brands and ear-
marks. The people were already beginning to pay
attention to the breeding of their horses, and fine
stallions with pedigrees were advertised, though
some of the advertisements show a certain indiffer-
ence to purity of strain, one stallion being quoted
as of "mixed fox-hunting and dray" breed. Rather
curiously the Chickasaw horses were continually
mentioned as of special merit, together with those of
imported stock. Attention was paid both to pacers
and trotters.

The lottery was still a recognized method of rais-
ing money for every purpose, including the advance-
ment of education and religion. One of the adver-
tisements gives as one of the prizes a negro, valued
at one hundred and thirty pounds, a horse at ten
pounds, and five hundred acres of fine land without
improvements at twelve hundred pounds.

Journeying to the long-settled districts of the
East, persons went as they wished, in their own
wagons or on their own horses ; but to go from East
Tennessee either to Kentucky, or to the Cumberland
district, or to New Orleans, was a serious matter be-
cause of the Indians. The Territorial authorities
provided annually an escort for immigrants from

148 The Winning of the West

the Holston country to the Cumberland, a distance
of one hundred and ten miles through the wilder-
ness, and the departure of this annual escort was
advertised for weeks in advance.

Sometimes the escort was thus provided by the
authorities. More often adventurers simply banded
together, or else some enterprising man advertised
that on a given date he should start and would pro-
vide protection for those who chose to accompany
him. Thus, in the "Knoxville Gazette" for February
6, 1795, a boat captain gives public notice to all
persons who wish to sail from the Holston country
to New Orleans, that on March ist, if the waters
answer, his two boats will start, the Mary of
twenty-five tons, and the Little Polly of fifteen tons.
Those who had contracted for freight and passage
are desired to attend previous to that period.

There was of course a good deal of lawlessness
and a strong tendency to settle assault and battery
cases in particular out of court. The officers of jus-
tice at times had to subdue criminals by open force.
Andrew Jackson, who was District Attorney for
the Western District, early acquired fame by the
energy and success with which he put down any
criminal who resisted the law. The worst of-
fenders fled to the Mississippi Territory, there
to live among Spaniards, Creoles, Indians, and
lawless Americans. Lawyers drove a thriving
business; but they had their own difficulties, to
judge by one advertisement, which appears in the
issue of the "Gazette" for March 23, 1793, where

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 149

six of them give notice that hereafter they will
give no legal advice unless it is legally paid for.

All the settlers, or at least all the settlers who had
any ambition to rise in the world, were absorbed
in land speculations ; Blount, Robertson, and* the
other leaders as much so as anybody. They were
continually in correspondence with one another
about the purchase of land warrants, and about lay-
ing them out in the best localities. Of course there
was much jealousy and rivalry in the effort to get
the best sites. Robertson, being furthest on the
frontier, where there was most wild land, had pe-
culiar advantages. Very soon after he settled in
the Cumberland district at the close of the Revo-
lutionary War, Blount had entered into an agree-
ment with him for a joint land speculation. Blount
was to purchase land claims from both officers and
soldiers amounting in all to fifty thousand acres and
enter them for the Western Territory, while Rob-
ertson was to survey and locate the claims, receiv-
ing one-fourth of the whole for his reward.15 Their
connection continued during Blount's term as Gov-
ernor, and Blount's letters to Robertson contain
much advice as to how the warrants shall be laid
out. Wherever possible they were of course laid
outside the Indian boundaries; but, like every one
else, Blount and Robertson knew that eventually
the Indian lands would come into the possession of
the United States, and in view of the utter confusion

15 Blount MSS., Agreement between William Blount and
James Robertson, Oct. 30, 1783.

150 The Winning of the West

of the titles, and especially in view of the way the
Indians as well as the whites continually broke the
treaties and rendered it necessary to make new ones,
both Blount and Robertson were willing to place
claims on the Indian lands and trust to luck to make
the claims good if ever a cession was made. The
lands thus located were not lands upon which any
Indian village stood. Generally they were tracts of
wilderness through which the Indians occasionally
hunted, but as to which there was a question whether
they had yet been formally ceded to the govern-
ment.16

Blount also corresponded with many other men
on the question of these land speculations, and it is
amusing to read the expressions of horror of his
correspondents when they read that Tennessee had
imposed a land tax.17 By his activity he became a
very large landed proprietor, and when Tennessee
was made a State he was taxed on 73,252 acres in
all. The tax was not excessive, being but $i 79.72. 18
It was of course entirely proper for Blount to get
possession of the land in this way. The theory of
government on the frontier was that each man should
be paid a small salary, and be allowed to exercise
his private business just so long as it did not inter-
fere with his public duties. Blount's land specula-
tions were similar to those in which almost every

16 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, April 29, 1792.

11 Blount MSS., Thomas Hart to Blount, Lexington, Ky..
March 29, 1795.

18 Do., Return of taxable property of Blount, Nashville,
Sept. 9, 1796.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 151

other prominent American, in public or private life,
was engaged. Neither Congress nor the States had
as yet seen the wisdom of allowing the land to be
sold only in small parcels to actual occupants, and
the favorite kind of speculation was the organization
of land companies. Of course there were other
kinds of business in which prominent men took part.
Sevier was interested not only in land, but in vari-
ous mercantile ventures of a more or less speculative
kind; he acted as an intermediary with the big im-
porters, who were willing to furnish some of the
stores with six months' credit if they could be guar-
anteed a settlement at the end of that time.19

One of the characteristics of all the leading fron-
tiersmen was not only the way in which they com-
bined business enterprises with their work as Gov-
ernment officials and as Indian fighters, but the
readiness with which they turned from one business
enterprise to another. One of Blount's Kentucky
correspondents, Thomas Hart, the grandfather of
Benton, in his letter to Blount shows these traits
in typical fashion. He was engaged in various land
speculations with Blount,20 and was always writing
to him about locating land warrants, advertising
the same as required by law, and the like. He and
Blount held some tens of thousands of acres of
the Henderson claim, and Hart proposed that they
should lay it out in five-hundred-acre tracts, to be

19 Do., David Alison to Blount, Oct. 16, 1791.
90 Clay MSS., Blount to Hart, Knoxville, February 9, 1794.
This was just as Hart was moving to Kentucky.

152 The Winning of the West

rented to farmers, with the idea that each farmer
should receive ten cows and calves to start with;
a proposition which was of course helpless, as the
pioneers would not lease lands when it was so easy
to obtain freeholds. In his letters, Hart mentioned
cheerfully that though he was sixty-three years old
he was just as well able to carry on his manu-
facturing business, and, on occasion, to leave it,
and play pioneer, as he ever had been, remarking
that he "never would be satisfied in the world while
new countries could be found," and that his in-
tention, now that he had moved to Kentucky, was
to push the mercantile business as long as the In-
dian war continued and money was plenty, and
when that failed, to turn his attention to farming
and to divide up those of his lands he could not
till himself, to be rented by others.21

This letter to Blount shows, by the way, as was
shown by Madison's correspondent from Kentucky,
that the Indian war, scourge though it was to the
frontiersmen as a whole, brought some attendant
benefits in its wake by putting a stimulus on the
trade of the merchants and bringing ready money
into the country. It must not be forgotten, how-
ever, that men like Hart and Blount, though in
some ways they were benefited by the war, were in
other ways very mucfi injured, and that, moreover,
they consistently strove to do justice to the Indians
and to put a stop to hostilities.

In his letters Colonel Hart betrays a hearty,

21 Blount MSS., Thomas Hart to Blount, Dec. 23, 1793-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 153

healthy love of life, and capacity to enjoy it, and
make the best of it, which fortunately exist in many
Kentucky and Tennessee families to this day. He
wanted money, but the reason he wanted it was to
use it in having a good time for himself and his
friends, writing: "I feel all the ardor and spirit for
business I did forty years ago, and see myself more
capable to conduct it. Oh, if my old friend Uncle
Jacob was but living and in this country, what
pleasure we should have in raking up money and
spending it with our friends!" and he closed by
earnestly entreating Blount and his family to come
to Kentucky, which he assured him was the finest
country in the world, with, moreover, "a very pleas-
ant society, for," said he, "I can say with truth that
the society of this place is equal, if not superior,
to any that can be found in any inland town in the
United States, for there is not a day that passes
over our heads but I can have half a dozen strange
gentlemen to dine with us, and they are from all
parts of the Union."22

The one overshadowing fact in the history of
Tennessee during Blount's term a's governor was
the Indian warfare. Hostilities with the Indians
were never ceasing, and, so far as Tennessee was
concerned, during these six years it was the Indians,
and not the whites who were habitually the aggres-
sors and wrongdoers. The Indian warfare in the
Territory during these years deserves some study
because it was typical of what occurred elsewhere.

9S Blount MSS., Hart to Blount, Lexington, Feb. 15, 1795.

154 The Winning of the West

It illustrates forcibly the fact that under the actual
conditions of settlement wars were inevitable; for
if it is admitted that the land of the Indians had
to be taken and that the continent had to be settled
by white men, it must be further admitted that the
settlement could not have taken place save after
war. The whites might be to blame in some cases,
and the Indians in others; but under no combina-
tion of circumstances was it possible to obtain pos-
session of the country save as the result of war,
or of a peace obtained by the fear of war. Any
peace which did not surrender the land was
sure in the end to be broken by the whites; and
a peace which did surrender the land would be
broken by the Indians. The history of Tennessee
during the dozen years from 1785 to 1796 offers
an admirable case in point. In 1785 the United
States Commissioners concluded the treaty of Hope-
well with the Indians, and solemnly guaranteed
them certain lands. The whites contemptuously
disregarded this treaty and seized the lands which
it guaranteed to the Indians, being themselves the
aggressors, and paying no heed to the plighted word
of the Government, while the Government itself
was too weak to make the frontiersmen keep faith.
The treaties of New York and of Holston with the
Creeks and Cherokees in 1790 and 1791 were fairly
entered into by fully authorized representatives of
the tribes. Under them, for a valuable considera-
tion, and of their own motion, the Creeks and
Cherokees solemnly surrendered all title to what

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 155

is now the territory of Tennessee, save to a few
tracts mostly in the west and southeast; and much
of the land which was thus ceded they had ceded
before. Nevertheless, the peace thus solemnly made
was immediately violated by the Indians themselves.
The whites were not the aggressors in any way,
and, on the contrary, thanks to the wish of the
United States authorities for peace, and to the care
with which Blount strove to carry out the will of
the Federal Government, they for a long time re-
frained even from retaliating when injured; yet
the Indians robbed and plundered them even more
freely than when the whites themselves had been
the aggressors and had broken the treaty.

Before making the treaty of Holston Blount had
been in correspondence with Benjamin Hawkins,
a man who had always been greatly interested in
Indian affairs. He was a prominent politician in
North Carolina, and afterward for many years
agent among the Southern Indians. He had been
concerned in several of the treaties. He warned
Blount that since the treaty of Hopewell the whites,
and not the Indians, had been the aggressors; and
also warned him not to try to get too much land
from the Indians, or to take away too great an
extent of their hunting grounds, which would only
help the great land companies, but to be content
with the thirty-fifth parallel for a southern boun-
dary.23 Blount paid much heed to this advice,
and by the treaty of Holston he obtained from the

»3 Blount MSS., Hawkins to Blount, March 10, 1791.

156 The Winning of the West

Indians little more than what the tribes had pre-
viously granted, except that they confirmed to the
whites the country upon which the pioneers were
already settled. The Cumberland district had al-
ready been granted over and over again by the
Indians in special treaties, to Henderson, to the
North Carolinians and to the United States. The
Creeks in particular never had had any claim to
this Cumberland country, which was a hundred
miles and over from any of their towns. All the
use they had ever made of it was to visit it with
their hunting parties, as did the Cherokees, Choc-
taws, Chickasaws, Shawnees, Delawares, and many
others. Yet the Creeks and other Indians had the
effrontery afterward to assert that the Cumberland
country had never been ceded at all, and that as
the settlers in it were thus outside of the territory
properly belonging to the United States, they were
not entitled to protection under the treaty entered
into with the latter.

Blount was vigilant and active in seeing that none
of the frontiersmen trespassed on the Indian lands,
and when a party of men, claiming authority under
Georgia, started to settle at the Muscle Shoals, he
co-operated actively with the Indians in having them
brought back, and did his best, though in vain, to
persuade the Grand Jury to indict the offenders.24
He was explicit in his orders to Sevier, to Robert-
son, and to District-Attorney Jackson that they
should promptly punish any white man who vio-

24 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Sept. 3. I791-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 157

lated the provisions of the treaty; and over a year
after it had been entered into he was able to write
in explicit terms that "not a single settler had built
a house, or made a settlement of any kind, on the
Cherokee lands, and that no Indians had been killed
by the whites excepting in defence of their lives
and property."25 Robertson heartily co-operated
with Blount, as did Sevier, in the effort to keep
peace, Robertson showing much good sense and
self-control, and acquiescing in Blount's desire that
nothing should be done "inconsistent with the good
of the nation as a whole," and that "the faith of
the nation should be kept."26

The Indians as a body showed no appreciation
whatever of these efforts to keep the peace, and
plundered and murdered quite as freely as before
the treaties, or as when the whites themselves were
the aggressors. The Creek Confederacy was in a
condition of utter disorganization, McGillivray's
authority was repudiated, and most of the towns
scornfully refused to obey the treaty into which
their representatives had entered at New York. A
tory adventurer named Bowles, who claimed to have
the backing of the English Government, landed in
the nation and set himself in opposition to McGil-
livray. The latter, who was no fighter, and whose
tools were treachery and craft, fled to the protec-
tion of the Spaniards. Bowles, among other feats,

25 Do., Blount to Robertson, Jan. 2, 1792; to Bloody Fellow
Sept. 13, 1792.

26 Blount MSS., Robertson to Blount, Jan. 17, 1793.

158 The Winning of the West

plundered the stores of Panton, a white trader in
the Spanish interest, and for a moment his authority
seemed supreme; but the Spaniards, by a trick, got
possession of him and put him in prison.

The Spaniards still claimed as their own the
Southwestern country, and were untiring in their
efforts to keep the Indians united among themselves
and hostile to the Americans. They concluded a
formal treaty of friendship and of reciprocal
guarantee with the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks,
and Cherokees at Nogales, in the Choctaw country,
on May 14, I792.27 The Indians entered into this
treaty at the very time they had concluded wholly
inconsistent treaties with the Americans. On the
place of the treaty the Spaniards built a fort, which
they named Fort Confederation, to perpetuate, as
they hoped, the memory of the confederation they
had thus established among the Southern Indians.
By means of this fort they intended to control all
the territory inclosed between the rivers Mississippi,
Yazoo, Chickasaw, and Mobile. The Spaniards
also expended large sums of money in arming the
Creeks, and in bribing them to do, what they were
willing to do of their own accord, — that is, to
prevent the demarcation of the boundary line as
provided in the New York treaty; a treaty which
Carondelet reported to his Court as "insulting and
pernicious to Spain, the abrogation of which has

81 Draper MSS. , Spanish Documents ; Letter of Carondelet
to Duke of Alcudia, Nov. 24, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 159

lately been brought about by the intrigues with the
Indians." 28

At the same time that the bill for these expenses
was submitted for audit to the home government
the Spanish Governor also submitted his accounts
for the expenses in organizing the expedition against
the "English adventurer Bowles," and in negotiat-
ing with Wilkinson and other Kentucky sepa-
ratists, and also in establishing a Spanish post at
the Chickasaw Bluffs, for which he had finally ob-
tained the permission of the Chickasaws. The
Americans of course regarded the establishment
both of the fort at the Chickasaw Bluffs and the
fort at Nogales as direct challenges; and Caronde-
let's accounts show that the frontiersmen were en-
tirely justified in their belief that the Spaniards not
only supplied the Creeks with arms and munitions
of war, but actively interfered to prevent them from
keeping faith and carrying out the treaties which
they had signed. The Spaniards did not wish the
Indians to go to war unless it was necessary as a
last resort. They preferred that they should be
peaceful, provided always they could prevent the
intrusion of the Americans. Carondelet wrote:
"We have inspired the Creeks with pacific intentions
toward the United States, but with the precise re-
striction that there shall be no change of the boun-
daries," *9 and he added that "to sustain our allied

98 Draper MSS. , Letter of Carondelet, New Orleans, Sept.

25, 1795-
w Draper MSS., Spanish Docs. ; Carondelet's Report, Oct.

23, 1793-

160 The Winning of the West

nations [of Indians] in the possession of their lands
becomes therefore indispensable, both to preserve
Louisiana to Spain, and in order to keep the Ameri-
cans from the navigation of the Gulf." He ex-
pressed great uneasiness at the efforts of Robert-
son to foment war between the Chickasaws and
Choctaws and the Creeks, and exerted all his powers
to keep the Indian nations at peace with one an-
other and united against the settler-folk.30

The Spaniards, though with far more infamous
and deliberate deceit and far grosser treachery, were
pursuing toward the United States and the South-
western Indians the policy pursued by the British
toward the United States and the Northwestern
Indians; with the difference that the Spanish Gov-
ernor and his agents acted under the orders of the
Court of Spain, while the English authorities con-
nived at and profited by, rather than directly com-
manded, what was done by their subordinates. Ca-
rondelet expressly states that Colonel Gayoso and
his other subordinates had been directed to unite
the Indian nations in a defensive alliance, under the
protection of Spain, with the object of opposing
Blount, Robertson, and the frontiersmen, and of es-
tablishing the Cumberland River as the boundary
between the Americans and the Indians. The re-
ciprocal guarantee of their lands by the Creeks,
Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws was, said Ca-

30 Do., Carondelet to Don Louis De Las Casas, June 13,
1795, inclosing letters from Don M. G. De Lemos, Governor
of Natchez.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 161

rondelet, the only way by which the Americans could
be retained within their own boundaries.31 The
Spaniards devoted much attention to supporting
those traders among the Indians who were faithful
to the cause of Spain and could be relied upon to
intrigue against the Americans.32

The divided condition of the Creeks, some of
whom wished to carry out in good faith the treaty
of New York, while the others threatened to attack
whoever made any move toward putting the treaty
into effect, puzzled Carondelet nearly as much as it
did the United States authorities; and he endeav-
ored to force the Creeks to abstain from warfare
with the Chickasaws by refusing to supply them with
munitions of war for any such purpose, or for any
other except to oppose the frontiersmen. He put
great faith in the endeavor to treat the Americans
not as one nation, but as an assemblage of different
communities. The Spaniards sought to placate the
Kentuckians by promising to reduce the duties on
the goods that came down stream to New Orleans
by six per cent, and thus to prevent an outbreak on
their part ; at the same time the United States Gov-
ernment was kept occupied by idle negotiations.
Carondelet further hoped to restrain the Cumber-
land people by fear of the Creek and Cherokee na-
tions, who, he remarked, "had never ceased to com-
mit hostilities upon them and to profess implacable

31 Carondelet to Alcudia, Aug. 17, 1793.

32 Do., Manuel Gayoso De Lamos to Carondelet, Nogales,
July 25, 1793.

1 62 The Winning of the West

hatred for them." 33 He reported to the Spanish
Court that Spain had no means of molesting the
Americans save through the Indians, as it would not
be possible with an army to make a serious impres-
sion on the "ferocious and well-armed" frontier
people, favored as they would be by their knowledge
of the country ; whereas the Indians, if properly sup-
ported, offered an excellent defence, supplying from
the Southwestern tribes fifteen thousand warriors,
whose keep in time of peace cost Spain not more
than fifty thousand dollars a year, and even in time
of war not more than a hundred and fifty thou-
sand.34

The Spaniards in this manner actively fomented
hostilities among the Creeks and Cherokees. Their
support explained much in the attitude of these peo-
ples, but doubtless the war would have gone on any-
how until the savages were thoroughly cowed by
force of arms. The chief causes for the incessantly
renewed hostilities were the desire of the young
braves for blood and glory, a vague but well-founded
belief among the Indians that the white advance
meant their ruin unless stayed by an appeal to arms,
and, more important still, the absolute lack of any
central authority among the tribesmen which could
compel them all to war together effectively on the
one hand, or all to make peace on the other.

Blount was Superintendent of Indian Affairs for
the Southern Indians as well as Governor of the

33 Carondelet to De Lemos, Aug. 15, 1793.

34 Carondelet to Alcudia, Sept. 27, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 163

Territory; and in addition the Federal authorities
established an Indian agent, directly responsible to
themselves, among the Creeks. His name was James
Seagrove. He did his best to bring about a peace,
and, like all Indian agents, he was apt to take an
unduly harsh view of the deeds of the frontiersmen,
and to consider them the real aggressors in any
trouble. Of necessity his point of view was wholly
different from that of the border settlers. He was
promptly informed of all the outrages and aggres-
sions committed by the whites, while he heard little
or nothing of the parties of young braves, bent on
rapine, who continually fell on the frontiers ; where-
as the frontiersmen came in contact only with these
war bands, and when their kinsfolk had been mur-
dered and their cattle driven off, they were gener-
ally ready to take vengeance on the first Indians they
could find. Even Seagrove, however, was at times
hopelessly puzzled by the attitude of the Indians.
He was obliged to admit that they were the first
offenders, after the conclusion of the treaties of New
York and Holston, and that for a long time the set-
tlers behaved with great moderation in refraining
from revenging the outrages committed on them by
the Indians, which, he remarked, would have to be
stopped if peace was to be preserved.35

As the Government took no efficient steps to pre-
serve the peace, either by chastising the Indians or
by bribing the ill-judged vengeance of the frontier

85 American State Papers, IV, Seagrove to the Secretary
of War, St. Mary's, June 14, 1792.

164 The Winning of the West

inhabitants, many of the latter soon grew to hate
and despise those by whom they were neither pro-
tected nor restrained. The disorderly element got
the upper hand on the Georgia frontier, where the
backwoodsmen did all they could to involve the na-
tion in a general Indian war, and displayed the
most defiant and mutinous spirit toward the officers,
civil and military, of the United States Govern-
ment.36 As for the Creeks, Seagrove found it ex-
ceedingly hard to tell who of them were traitors and
who were not ; and indeed the chiefs would probably
themselves have found the task difficult, for they
were obliged to waver more or less in their course
as the fickle tribesmen were swayed by impulses to-
ward peace or war. One of the men whom Sea-
grove finally grew to regard as a confirmed traitor
was the chief, McGillivray. He was probably quite
right in his estimate of the half-breed's character;
and, on the other hand, McGillivray doubtless had
as an excuse the fact that the perpetual intrigues of
Spanish officers, American traders, British adven-
turers, Creek chiefs who wished peace and Creek
warriors who wished war, made it out of the ques-
tion for him to follow any settled policy. He wrote
to Seagrove: "It is no wonder the Indians are dis-
tracted, when they are tampered with on every side.
I am myself in the situation of a keeper of Bedlam,
and nearly fit for an inhabitant." 37 However, what

36 Do., Seagrove to the President, Rock Landing, on the
Oconee, in Georgia, July 17, 1792.

81 American State Papers, IV, McGillivray to Seagrove,
May 1 8, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 165

he did amounted to but little, for his influence had
greatly waned, and in 1793 he died.

On the Georgia frontier the backwoodsmen were
very rough and lawless, and were always prone to
make aggressions on the red men ; nevertheless, even
in the case of Georgia in 1791 and '92, the chief fault
lay with the Indians. They refused to make good
the land cession which they had solemnly guaran-
teed at the treaty of New York, and which certain
of their towns had previously covenanted to make
in the various more or less fraudulent treaties en-
tered into with the State of Georgia separately. In
addition to this their plundering parties continually
went among the Georgians. The latter, in their ef-
forts to retaliate, struck the hostile and the peaceful
alike ; and as time went on they made ready to take
forcible possession of the lands they coveted, with-
out regard to whether or not these lands had been
ceded in fair treaty.

In the Tennessee country the wrong was wholly
with the Indians. Some of the chiefs of the Chero-
kees went to Philadelphia at the beginning of the
year 1792 to request certain modifications of the
treaty of Holston, notably an increase in their an-
nuity, which was granted.38 The General Govern-
ment had conducted the treaties in good faith and
had given the Indians what they asked. The fron-
tiersmen did not molest them in any way or tres-
pass upon their lands; yet their ravages continued
without cessation. The authorities at Washington

38 Do., Secretary of War to Governor Blount, Jan. 31, 1792.

1 66 The Winning of the West

made but feeble efforts to check these outrages, and
protect the Southwestern settlers. Yet at this time
Tennessee was doing her full part in sustaining the
National Government in the war against the North-
western tribes ; a company of Tennessee militia, un-
der Captain Jacofy Tipton, joined St. Clair's army,
and Tipton was slain at the defeat, where he fought
with the utmost bravery.39 Not unnaturally the
Tennesseeans, and especially the settlers on the far-
off Cumberland, felt it a hardship for the United
States to neglect their defence at the very time that
they were furnishing their quota of soldiers for an
offensive war against nations in whose subdual they
had but an indirect interest. Robertson wrote to
Blount that their silence and remoteness was the
cause why the interests of the Cumberland settlers
were thus neglected, while the Kentuckians were
amply protected.40

Naturally the Tennesseeans, conscious that they
had not wronged the Indians, and had scrupulously
observed the treaty, grew imbittered over the wan-
ton Indian outrages. They were entirely at a loss
to explain the reason why the warfare against them
was waged with such ferocity. Sevier wrote to
Madison, with whom he frequently corresponded:
"This country is wholly involved in a war with the
Creek and Cherokee Indians, and I am not able to

89 "Knoxville Gazette," Dec. 17, 1791. I use the word "Ten-
nessee" for convenience; it was not at this time used in this
sense.

40 Robertson MSS., Robertson's letter, Nashville, Aug. 25,
1791.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 167

suggest the reasons or the pretended cause of their
depredations. The successes of the Northern
tribes over our late unfortunate armies have created
great exultation throughout the whole Southern In-
dians, and the probabilities may be they expect to
be equally successful. The Spaniards are making
use of all their art to draw over the Southern tribes,
and I fear may have stimulated them to commence
their hostilities. Governor Blount has indefatigably
labored to keep these people in a pacific humor, but
in vain. War is unavoidable, however ruinous and
calamitous it may be."41 The Federal Govern-
ment was most reluctant to look facts in the face
and acknowledge that the hostilities were serious,
and that they were unprovoked by the whites. The
Secretary of War reported to the President that
the offenders were doubtless merely a small banditti
of Creeks and Cherokees, with a few Shawnees who
possessed no fixed residence, and in groping for a
remedy he weakly suggested that inasmuch as many
of the Cherokees seemed to be dissatisfied with the
boundary line they had established by treaty it would
perhaps be well to alter it.42 Of course the adoption
of such a measure would have amounted to putting
a premium on murder and treachery.

If the Easterners were insensible to the Western
need for a vigorous Indian war, many of the West-
erners showed as little appreciation of the necessity

41 State Dept. MSS., Madison Papers, Sevier's letter, Oct.
30, 1792.

48 State Dept. MSS., Washington Papers, Secretary of War
to the President, July 28, and Aug. 5, 1792.

1 68 The Winning of the West

for any Indian war which did not immediately con-
cern themselves. Individual Kentuckians, individ-
ual colonels and captains of the Kentucky militia,
were always ready to march to the help of the Ten-
nesseeans against the Southern Indians; but the
highest officials of Kentucky were almost as anxious
as the Federal authorities to prevent any war save
that with the tribes northwest of the Ohio. One
of the Kentucky Senators, Brown, in writing to the
Governor, Isaac Shelby, laid particular stress upon
the fact that nothing but the most urgent necessity
could justify a war with the Southern Indians.43
Shelby himself sympathized with this feeling. He
knew what an Indian war was, for he had owed his
election largely to his record as an Indian fighter
and to the confidence the Kentuckians felt in his
power to protect them from their red foes.44 His
correspondence is filled with letters in relation to
Indian affairs, requests to authorize the use of spies,
requests to establish guards along the Wilderness
Road and to garrison block-houses on the frontier;
and sometimes there are more pathetic letters, from
a husband who had lost a wife, or from an "old,
frail woman," who wished to know if the Governor
could not by some means get news of her little
granddaughter who had been captured in the wil-
derness two years before by a party of Indians.45

48 Shelby MSS., J. Brown to Isaac Shelby, Philadelphia,
June 2, 1793.

44 Do., M. D. Hardin to Isaac Shelby, April 10, 1792, etc.,
etc.

45 Do., Letter of Mary Mitchell to Isaac Shelby, May i, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 169

He realized fully what hostilities meant, and had no
desire to see his State plunged into any Indian war
which could be avoided.

Yet, in spite of this cautious attitude, Shelby had
much influence with the people of the Tennessee ter-
ritory. They confided to him their indignation with
Blount for stopping Logan's march to the aid of
Robertson ; while on the other hand the Virginians,
when anxious to prevent the Cumberland settlers
from breaking the peace, besought him to use his
influence with them in order to make them do what
was right.46 When such a man as Shelby was re-
luctant to see the United States enter into open hos-
tilities with the Southern Indians, there is small
cause for wonder in the fact that the authorities at
the National capital did their best to deceive them-
selves into the belief that there was no real cause
for war.

Inability to look facts in the face did not alter
the facts. The Indian ravages in the Southern Ter-
ritory grew steadily more and more serious. The
difficulties of the settlers were enormously increased
because the United States strictly forbade any of-
fensive measures. The militia were allowed to drive
off any war bands found among the settlements with
evidently hostile intent; but, acting under the ex-
plicit, often repeated, and emphatic commands of
the General Government, Blount was obliged to or-

46 Shelby MSS., Arthur Campbell to Shelby, January 6,
1790; letter from Cumberland to Shelby, May n, 1793; John
Logan to Shelby, June 19, 1794; petition of inhabitants of
Nelson County, May 9, 1793.

VOL. VIII.— 8

i jo The Winning of the West

der the militia under no circumstances to assume the
offensive, or to cross into the Indian hunting grounds
beyond the boundaries established by the treaty of
Holston.47 The inhabitants of the Cumberland re-
gion, and of the frontier counties generally, peti-
tioned strongly against this, stating that "the fron-
tiers will break if the inroads of the savages are not
checked by counter expeditions."48 It was a very
disagreeable situation for Blount, who, in carrying
out the orders of the Federal authorities, had to
incur the ill-will of the people whom he had been ap-
pointed to govern; but even at the cost of being
supposed to be lukewarm in the cause of the settlers,
he loyally endeavored to execute the commands of
his superiors. Yet like every other man acquainted
by actual experience with frontier life and Indian
warfare, he knew the folly of defensive war against
Indians. At this very time the officers on the fron-
tier of South Carolina, which was not a State that
at all inclined to unjust aggression against the In-
dians, notified the Governor that the defensive war
was "expensive, hazardous, and distressing" to the
settlers, because the Indians "had such advantages,
being so wolfish in their manner and so savage in
their nature," that it was impossible to make war
upon them on equal terms if the settlers were con-
fined to defending themselves in their own country,
whereas a speedy and spirited counter-attack upon
them in their homes would probably reduce them to

41 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, April i, 1792.
48 Do., Feb. i, 1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 171

peace, as their mode of warfare fitted them much
less to oppose such an attack than to "take skulking,
wolfish advantages of the defenceless" settlers.49

The difficulties of Blount and the Tennessee fron-
tiersmen were increased by the very fact that the
Cherokees and Creeks still nominally remained at
peace. The Indian towns nearest the frontier knew
that they were jeopardized by the acts of their
wilder brethren, and generally strove to avoid com-
mitting any offence themselves. The war parties
from the remote towns were the chief offenders.
Band after band came up from among the Creeks
or from among the lower Cherokees, and, passing
through the peaceful villages of the upper Chero-
kees, fell on the frontier, stole horses, ambushed
men, killed or captured women and children, and
returned whence they had come. In most cases it
was quite impossible to determine even the tribe of
the offenders with any certainty; and all that the
frontiersmen knew was that their bloody trails led
back toward the very villages where the Indians
loudly professed that they were at peace. They soon
grew to regard all the Indians with equal suspicion,
and they were so goaded by the blows which they
could not return that they were ready to take ven-
geance upon any one with a red skin, or at least to
condone such vengeance when taken. The peaceful
Cherokees, though they regretted these actions and
were alarmed and disquieted at the probable con-

49 American State Papers, IV, Robert Anderson to the
Governor of South Carolina, Sept. 20, 1792.

1 72 The Winning of the West

sequences, were unwilling or unable to punish the
aggressors.

Blount was soon at his wits' ends to prevent the
outbreak of a general war. In November, 1792, he
furnished the War Department with a list of scores
of people — men, women, and children — who had
been killed in Tennessee, chiefly in the Cumberland
district, since the signing of the treaty of Holston.
Many others had been carried off, and were kept in
slavery. Among the wounded were General Rob-
ertson and one of his sons, who were shot, although
not fatally, in May, 1792, while working on their
farm. Both Creeks and Cherokees took part in the
outrages, and the Chickamauga towns on the Ten-
nessee, at Running Water, Nickajack, and in the
neighborhood, ultimately supplied the most persis-
tent wrongdoers.50

As Sevier remarked, the Southern, no less than
the Northern, Indians were much excited and en-
couraged by the defeat of St. Clair, coming as it
did so close upon the defeat of Harmar. The double
disaster to the American arms made the young
braves very bold, and it became impossible for the
elder men to restrain them.51 The Creeks harassed
the frontiers of Georgia somewhat, but devoted their
main attention to the Tennesseeans, and especially to

50 American State Papers, IV, Blount to Secretary of War,
Nov. 8, 1792; also page 330, etc. Many of these facts will be
found recited not only in the correspondence of Blount, but
in the Robertson MSS., in the "Knoxville Gazette," and in
Haywood, Ramsey, and Putnam.

51 American State Papers, IV, pp. 263, 439, etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 173

the isolated settlements on the Cumberland. The
Chickamauga towns were right at the crossing
place both for the Northern Indians when they
came south and for the Creeks when they went
north. Bands of Shawnees, who were at this time
the most inveterate of the enemies of the frontiers-
men, passed much time among them ; and the Creek
war parties, when they journeyed north to steal
horses and get scalps, invariably stopped among
them, and on their return stopped again to exhibit
their trophies and hold scalp dances. The natural
effect was that the Chickamaugas, who were mainly
Lower Town Cherokees, seeing the impunity with
which the ravages were committed, and appreciating
the fact that under the orders of the Government
they could not be molested in their own homes by
the whites, began to join in the raids; and their
nearness to the settlements soon made them the
worst offenders. One of their leading chiefs was
John Watts, who was of mixed blood. Among all
these Southern Indians, half-breeds were far more
numerous than among the Northerners, and when
the half-breeds lived with their mothers' people they
usually became the deadliest enemies of their fathers'
race. Yet, they generally preserved the father's
name. In consequence, among the extraordinary
Indian titles borne by the chiefs of the Creeks, Cher-
okees, and Choctaws — the Bloody Fellow, the Mid-
dle Striker, the Mad Dog, the Glass, the Breath —
there were also many names like John Watts,
Alexander Cornell, and James Colbert, which

174 The Winning of the West

were common among the frontiersmen them-
selves.

These Chickamaugas and Lower Cherokees had
solemnly entered into treaties of peace, and Blount
had been taken in by their professions of friendship,
and for some time was loath to believe that their
warriors were among the war parties who ravaged
the settlements. By the spring of 1792, however,
the fact of their hostility could no longer be con-
cealed. Nevertheless, in May of that year the chiefs
of the Lower Cherokee towns joined with those of
the Upper Towns in pressing Governor Blount to
come to a council at Coyatee, where he was met by
two thousand Cherokees, including all their prin-
cipal chiefs and warriors.52 The head men, not only
from the Upper Towns, but from Nickajack and
Running Water, including John Watts, solemnly as-
sured Blount of their peaceful intentions, and ex-
pressed their regret at the outrages which they
admitted had been committed by their young men.
Blount told them plainly that he had the utmost
difficulty in restraining the whites from taking ven-
geance for the numerous murders committed on the
settlers, and warned them that if they wished to
avert a war which would fall upon both the inno-
cent and the guilty they must themselves keep the
peace. The chiefs answered, with seeming earnest-
ness, that they were most desirous of being at peace,
and would certainly restrain their men; and they
begged for the treaty goods which Blount had in

82 Robertson's MSS., Blount to Robertson, May 20, 1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 175

his possession. So sincere did they seem that he
gave them the goods.53

This meeting began on the ijth of May, yet on
the 1 6th, within twelve miles of Knoxville, two boys
were killed and scalped while picking strawberries,
and on the I3th a girl had been scalped within four
miles of Nashville; and on the i/th itself, while
Judge Campbell of the Territorial Court was return-
ing from the Cumberland Circuit his party was at-
tacked and one killed.54

When such outrages were committed at the very
time the treaty was being held, it was hopeless to
expect peace. In September the Chickamaugas
threw off the mask and made open war. When the
news was received Blount called out the militia and
sent word to Robertson that some friendly Chero-
kees had given warning that a big war party was
about to fall on the settlements round Nashville.55
Finding that the warning had been given, the Chick-
amauga chiefs sought to lull their foes into security
by a rather adroit piece of treachery. Two of their
chiefs, The Glass and The Bloody Fellow, wrote to
Blount complaining that they had assembled their
warriors because they were alarmed over rumors of
a desire on the part of the whites to maltreat them ;
and on the receipt of assurances from Blount that

63 "Knoxville Gazette," March 24, 1792; American State
Papers, IV, Blount to Secretary of War, June 2, 1792, with
minutes of conference at Coyatee.

64 "Knoxville Gazette," June 2, 1792.

55 American State Papers, IV, Blount to Secretary of War,
Sept. ii, 1792.

176 The Winning of the West

they were mistaken, they announced their pleasure
and stated that no hostilities would be undertaken.
Blount was much relieved at this, and thought that
the danger of an outbreak was past. Accordingly
he wrote to Robertson telling him that he could dis-
band his troops, as there was no longer need of
them. Robertson, however, knew the Indian char-
acter as few men did know it, and, moreover, he
had received confidential information about the im-
pending raid from a half-breed and a Frenchman
who were among the Indians. He did not disband
his troops, and wrote to Blount that The Glass and
The Bloody Fellow had undoubtedly written as they
did simply to deceive him and to secure their villages
from a counter-attack while they were off on their
raid against the Cumberland people. Accordingly
three hundred militia were put under arms.56

It was well that the whites were on their guard.
Toward the end of September a big war party, un-
der the command of John Watts, and including some
two hundred Cherokees, eighty Creeks, and some
Shawnees, left the Chickamauga Towns and marched
swiftly and silently to the Cumberland district. They
attempted to surprise one of the more considerable
of the lonely little forted towns. It was known as
Buchanan's Station, and in it there were several
families, including fifteen "gun-men." Two spies

56 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Sept. 6, 1792;
Blount to The Bloody Fellow, Sept. 10, 1792; to Robertson,
Sept. 12; to The Glass, Sept. 13; to The Bloody Fellow, Sept.
13; to Robertson, Sept. 14; Robertson to Blount, Sept. 26.
1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 177

went out from it to scour the country and give
warning of any Indian advance ; but with the Chero-
kees were two very white half-breeds, whose Indian
blood was scarcely noticeable, and these two men
met the spies and decoyed them to their death.
The Indians then, soon after midnight on the 3Oth
of September, sought to rush the station by sur-
prise. The alarm was given by the running of the
frightened cattle, and when the sentinel fired at the
assailants they were not ten yards from the gate of
the block-house. The barred door withstood the
shock and the flame-flashes lighted up the night as
the gun-men fired through the loop-holes. The In-
dians tried to burn the fort, one of the chiefs, a half-
breed, leaping on the roof; he was shot through the
thigh and rolled off; but he stayed close to the logs
trying to light them with his torch, alternately blow-
ing it into a blaze and hallooing to the Indians to
keep on with the attack. However, he was slain, as
was the Shawnee head chief, and several warriors,
while John Watts, leader of the expedition, was shot
through both thighs. The log walls of the grim
little block-house stood out black in the fitful glare
of the cane torches ; and tongues of red fire streamed
into the night as the rifles rang. The attack had
failed, and the throng of dark, flitting forms faded
into the gloom as the baffled Indians retreated. So
disheartened were they by the check, and by the
loss they had suffered, that they did not further mo-
lest the settlements, but fell back to their strong-
holds across the Tennessee. Among the Cherokee

178 The Winning of the West

chiefs who led the raid were two signers of the
treaty of Holston.57

After this the war was open, so far as the Indians
of the Lower Cherokee Towns and of many of the
Creek Towns were concerned; but the whites were
still restrained by strict orders from the United
States authorities, who refused to allow them to re-
taliate. Outrage followed outrage in monotonously
bloody succession. The Creeks were the worst of-
fenders in point of numbers, but the Lower Chero-
kees from the Chickamauga towns did most harm
according to their power. Sometimes the bands that
entered the settlements were several hundred strong ;
but their chief object was plunder, and they rarely
attacked the strong places of the white frontiers-
men, though they forced them to keep huddled in
the stockaded stations; nor did they often fight a
pitched battle with the larger bodies of militia.
There is no reason for reciting in full the countless
deeds of rapine and murder. The incidents, though
with infinite variety of detail, were in substance the
same as in all the Indian wars of the backwoods.
Men, women, and children were killed or captured;
outlying cabins were attacked and burned ; the hus-
bandman was shot as he worked in the field, and
the housewife as she went for water. The victim
was now a militiaman on his way to join his com-
pany, now one of the party of immigrants, now a

57 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Oct. 17, 1792;
"Knoxville Gazette," Oct. 10, and Oct. 20, 1792; Brown's
Narrative, in "Southwestern Monthly."

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 179

settler on his lonely farm, and now a justice of the
peace going to Court, or a Baptist preacher striving
to reach the Cumberland country that he might
preach the word of God to the people who had
among them no religious instructor. The express
messengers and post riders, who went through the
wilderness from one commander to the other, al-
ways rode at hazard of their lives. In one of
Blount's letters to Robertson he remarks : "Your let-
ter of the 6th of February sent express by James
Russell was handed to me, much stained with his
blood, by Mr. Shannon, who accompanied him."
Russell had been wounded in an ambuscade, and his
fifty dollars were dearly earned.58

The Indians were even more fond of horse-steal-
ing than of murder, and they found a ready market
for their horses, not only in their own nations and
among the Spaniards, but among the American
frontiersmen themselves. Many of the unscrupulous
white scoundrels who lived on the borders of the
Indian country made a regular practice of receiving
the stolen horses. As soon as a horse was driven
from the Tennessee or Cumberland it was hurried
through the Indian country to the Carolina or Geor-
gia frontiers, where the red thieves delivered it to

58 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, March 8, 1794.
The files of the "Knoxville Gazette" are full of details of
these outrages, and so are the letters of Blount to the Secre-
tary of War given in the American State Papers, as well as
the letters of Blount and Robertson in the two bound vol-
umes of Robertson MSS. Many of them are quoted in more
accessible form in Haywood.

i8o The Winning of the West

the foul white receivers, who took it to some town
on the seaboard, so as effectually to prevent a re-
covery. At Swannanoa in North Carolina, among
the lawless settlements at the foot of the Oconee
Mountain in South Carolina, and at Tugaloo in
Georgia, there were regular markets for these stolen
horses.59 There were then, and continued to exist
as long as the frontier lasted, plenty of white men
who, though ready enough to wrong the Indians,
were equally ready to profit by the wrongs they in-
flicted on the white settlers, and to encourage their
misdeeds if profit was thereby to be made. Very
little evildoing of this kind took place in Tennessee,
for Blount, backed by Sevier and Robertson, was
vigilant to put it down ; but as yet the Federal Gov-
ernment was not firm in its seat, and its arm was not
long enough to reach into the remote frontier dis-
tricts, where lawlessness of every kind throve, and
the whites wronged one another as recklessly as they
wronged the Indians.

The white scoundrels throve in the confusion of
a nominal peace which the savages broke at will ; but
the honest frontiersmen really suffered more than
if there had been open war, as the Federal Govern-
men refused to allow raids to be carried into the In-
dian territory, and in consequence the marauding
Indians could at any time reach a place of safety.
The block-houses were of little consequence in put-

69 Blount to the Secretary of War, May 5, 1792, and Nov.
10, 1794. As before, I use the word "Tennessee" instead of
"Southwestern Territory" for convenience; it was not regu-
larly employed until 1796.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 181

ting a stop to Indian attacks. The most efficient
means of defence was the employment of the hard-
iest and best hunters as scouts or spies, for they
traveled hither and thither through the woods and
continually harried the war parties.60 The militia
bands also traveled to and fro, marching to the
rescue of some threatened settlement, or seeking to
intercept the attacking bands or to overtake those
who had delivered their stroke and were returning
to the Indian country. Generally they failed in the
pursuit. Occasionally they were themselves am-
bushed, attacked, and dispersed; sometimes they
overtook and scattered their foes. In such a case
they were as little apt to show mercy to the defeated
as were the Indians themselves. Blount issued strict
orders that squaws and children were not to be slain,
and the frontiersmen did generally refuse to copy
their antagonists in butchering the women and chil-
dren in cold blood. When an attack was made on
a camp, however, it was no uncommon thing to have
the squaws killed while jthe fight was hot. Blount,
in one of his letters to Robertson, after the Cumber-
land militia had attacked and destroyed a Creek war
party which had murdered a settler, expressed his
pleasure at the perseverance with which the militia
captain had followed the Indians to the banks of the
Tennessee, where he had been lucky enough to over-
take them in a position where not one was able to
escape. Blount especially complimented him upon

60 American State Papers, IV, p. 364 ; letter of Secretary of
War, May 30, 1793.

1 82 The Winning of the West

having spared the two squaws, "as all civilized peo-
ple should" ; and he added that in so doing the cap-
tain's conduct offered a most agreeable contrast to
the behavior of some of his fellow citizens under
like circumstances.61

Repeated efforts were made to secure peace with
the Indians. Andrew Pickens, of South Carolina,
was sent to the exposed frontier in 1792 to act as
Peace Commissioner. Pickens was a high-minded
and honorable man, who never hesitated to condemn
the frontiersmen when they wronged the Indians,
and he was a champion of the latter wherever pos-
sible. He came out with every hope and belief that
he could make a permanent treaty ; but after having
been some time on the border he was obliged to ad-
mit that there was no chance of bringing about even
a truce, and that the nominal peace that obtained
was worse for the settlers than actual war. He
wrote to Blount that though he earnestly hoped the
people of the border would observe the treaty, yet
that the Cherokees had done more damage, especially
in the way of horse stealing, since the treaty was
signed than ever before, and that it was not possible
to say what the frontier inhabitants might be pro-
voked to do. He continued : "While a part, and
that the ostensible ruling part, of a nation affect to
be at, and I believe really are for, peace, and the
more active young men are frequently killing peo-
ple and stealing horses, it is extremely difficult to
know how to act. The people, even the most ex-

61 Robertson MSS., Blount's letter. March 8, 1794-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 183

posed, would prefer an open war to such a situa-
tion. The reason is obvious. A man would then
know when he saw an Indian he saw an enemy, and
would be prepared to act accordingly."62

The people of Tennessee were the wronged, and
not the wrongdoers, and it was upon them that the
heaviest strokes of the Indians fell. The Georgia
.frontiers were also harried continually, although
much less severely; but the Georgians were them-
selves far from blameless. Georgia was the young-
est, weakest, and most lawless of the original thir-
teen States, and on the whole her dealings with the
Indians were far from creditable. More than once
she inflicted shameful wrong on the Cherokees. The
Creeks, however, generally wronged her more than
she wronged them, and at this particular period even
the Georgia frontiersmen were much less to blame
than were their Indian foes. By fair treaty the In-
dians had agreed to cede to the whites lands upon
which they now refused to allow them to settle.
They continually plundered and murdered the out-
lying Georgia settlers; and the militia, in their re-
taliatory expeditions, having no knowledge of who
the murderers actually were, quite as often killed the
innocent as the guilty. One of the complaints of the
Indians was that the Georgians came in parties to
hunt on the neutral ground, and slew quantities of
deer and turkeys by fire hunting at night and by still-
hunting with the rifle in the daytime, while they

68 American State Papers, Pickens to Blount, Hopewell,
April 28, 1792.

184 The Winning of the West

killed many bears by the aid of their "great gangs
of dogs." 63 This could hardly be called a legiti-
mate objection on the part of the Creeks, however,
for their own hunting parties ranged freely through
the lands they had ceded to the whites and killed
game wherever they could find it.

Evil and fearful deeds were done by both sides.
Peaceful Indians, even envoys, going to the treaty
grounds were slain in cold blood; and all that the
Georgians could allege by way of offset was that the
savages themselves had killed many peaceful whites.
The Georgia frontiersmen openly showed their sul-
len hatred of the United States authorities. The
Georgia State Government was too weak to enforce
order. It could neither keep the peace among its
own frontiersmen, nor wage effective war on the
Indians; for when the militia did gather to invade
the Creek country they were so mutinous and disor-
derly that the expeditions generally broke up with-
out accomplishing anything. At one period a mi-
litia general, Elijah Clark, actually led a large party
of frontiersmen into the unceded Creek hunting
grounds with the purpose of setting up an indepen-
dent government; but the Georgia authorities for
once summoned energy sufficient to break up this
lawless community.64

63 American State Papers, Timothy Barnard to James Sea-
grove, March 26, 1793.

64 American State Papers, IV, pp. 260, 295, 365, 394, 397,
410, 412, 417, 427, 473, etc.; "Knoxville Gazette," Sept. 26,
1794. For further allusion to Clark's settlement, see next
chapter.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 185

The Georgians were thus far from guiltless them-
selves, though at this time they were more sinned
against than sinning ; but in the Tennessee Territory
the white settlers behaved very well throughout these
years, and showed both patience and fairness in their
treatment of the Indians. Blount did his best to
prevent outrages, and Sevier and Robertson heartily
seconded him. In spite of the grumbling of the
frontiersmen, and in spite of repeated and almost
intolerable provocation in the way of Indian forays,
Blount steadily refused to allow counter-expeditions
into the Indian territory, and stopped both the Ten-
nesseeans and Kentuckians when they prepared to
make such expeditions.65 Judge Campbell, the same
man who was himself attacked by the Indians when
returning from his circuit, in his charge to the
Grand Jury at the end of 1791, particularly warned
them to stop any lawless attack upon the Indians.
In November, 1792, when five Creeks, headed by
a Scotch half-breed, retreated to the Cherokee town
of Chiloa with stolen horses, a band of fifty whites
gathered to march after them and destroy the Cher-
okee town; but Sevier dispersed them and made
them go to their own homes. The following Feb-
ruary a still larger band gathered to attack the
Cherokee towns and were dispersed by Blount him-
self. Robertson, in the summer of 1793, prevented
militia parties from crossing the Tennessee in re-
taliation. In October, 1794, the Grand Jury of

* Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Jan. 8, 1793; to
Benjamin Logan, Nov.i, 1794, etc.

1 86 The Winning of the West

Hamilton County entreated and adjured the people,
in spite of the Indian outrages to stand firmly by the
law, and not to try to be their own avengers; and
when some whites settled in Powell's Valley, on
Cherokee lands, Governor Blount promptly turned
them off.66

The unfortunate Indian agent among the Creeks,
Seagrove, speedily became an object of special de-
testation to the frontiersmen generally, and the in-
habitants of the Tennessee country in particular, be-
cause he persistently reported that he thought the
Creeks peaceable, and deemed their behavior less
blamable than that of the whites. His attitude was
natural, for probably most of the Creek chiefs with
whom he came in contact were friendly, and many
of those who were not professed to be so when in
his company, if only for the sake of getting the
goods he had to distribute; and of course they
brought him word whenever the Georgians killed a
Creek, either innocent or guilty, without telling him
of the offence which the Georgians were blindly try-
ing to revenge. Seagrove himself had some rude
awakenings. After reporting to the Central Gov-
ernment at Philadelphia that the Creeks were warm
in professing the most sincere friendship, he would
suddenly find, to his horror, that they were sending
off war parties and acting in concert with the Shaw-
nees; and at one time they actually, without any

66 "Knoxville Gazette," Dec. 31, 1791; Nov. 17, 1792; Jan.
25, 1793; Feb. 9, Mar. 23, July 13, Sept. 14, 1793; Nov. i and
15, 1794; May 8, 1795.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 187

provocation, attacked a trading store kept by his
own brother, and killed the two men who were man-
aging it.67 Most of the Creeks, however, professed,
and doubtless felt, regret at these outrages, and
Seagrove continued to represent their conduct in a
favorable light to the Central Government, though
he was forced to admit that certain of the towns
were undoubtedly hostile and could not be controlled
by the party which was for peace.

Blount was much put out at the fact that Sea-
grove was believed at Philadelphia when he reported
the Creeks to be at peace. In a letter to Seagrove,
at the beginning of 1794, Blount told him sharply
that as far as the Cumberland district was concerned
the Creeks had been the only ones to blame since
the treaty of New York, for they had killed or en-
slaved over two hundred whites, attacking them in
their houses, fields, or on the public roads, and had
driven off over a thousand horses, while the Ameri-
cans had done the Creeks no injuries whatever ex-
cept in defence of their homes and lives, or in pur-
suing war parties. It was possible of course that
occasionally an innocent hunter suffered with the
guilty marauders, but this was because he was off
his own hunting grounds; and the treaty explicitly
showed that the Creeks had no claim to the Cumber-
land region, while there was not a particle of truth
in their assertion that since the treaty had been en-
tered into there had been intrusion on their hunting

61 American State Papers, Seagrove to James Holmes, Feb.
24, 1793 ; to Mr, Payne, April 14, 1793.

1 88 The Winning of the West

grounds. Seagrove, in response, wrote that he be-
lieved the Creeks and Cherokees sincerely desired
peace. This was followed forthwith by new out-
rages, and Blount wrote to Robertson : "It does
really seem as if assurances from Mr. Seagrove of
the peaceful disposition of the Creeks was the pre-
lude to their murdering and plundering the inhabi-
tants of your district."68 The "Knoxville Gazette"
called attention to the fact that Seagrove had writ-
ten a letter to the effect that the Creeks were well
disposed, just four days before the attack on Bu-
chanan Station. On September 22d Seagrove wrote
stating that the Creeks were peaceable, that all their
chief men ardently wished for the cessation of hos-
tilities, and that they had refused the request of the
Cherokees to go to war with the United States ; and
his deputy agent, Barnard, reiterated the assertions
and stated that the Upper Creeks had remained
quiet, although six of their people had been killed
at the mouth of the Tennessee. The "Gazette" there-
upon published a list of twenty-one men, women,
and children who at that very time were held in
slavery in the Creek towns, and enumerated scores
of murders which had been committed by the Creeks
during precisely the period when Seagrove and
Barnard described them as so desirous of peace.69

Under such circumstances the settlers naturally
grew indignant with the United States because they

«8 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Feb. 13, 1793;
Blount to James Seagrove, Jan. 9, 1794; Seagrove to Blount,
Feb. 10, 1794; Blount to Robertson, March 8, 1794.

69 "Knoxville Gazette," Dec. 29; 1792; Dec, 19, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 189

were not protected, and were not even allowed to
defend themselves by punishing their foes. The
Creeks and Cherokees were receiving their annuities
regularly, and many presents in addition, while their
outrages continued unceasingly. The Nashville
people complained that the Creeks were "as busy in
killing and scalping as if they had been paid three
thousand dollars for doing so, in the room of fifteen
hundred dollars to keep the peace."70 A public ad-
dress was issued in the "Knoxville Gazette" by the
Tennesseeans on the subjects of their wrongs. In
respectful and loyal language, but firmly, the Ten-
nesseeans called the attention of the Government
authorities to their sufferings. They avowed the
utmost devotion to the Union and a determination
to stand by the laws, but insisted that it would
be absolutely necessary for them to take mieas-
tires to defend themselves by retaliating on the
Indians.

A feature of the address was its vivid picture of
the nature of the ordinary Indian inroad and of the
lack of any definite system of defence on the fron-
tier. It stated that the Indian raid or outbreak was
usually first made known either by the murder of
some defenceless farmer, the escape of some Indian
trader, or the warning of some friendly Indian who
wished to avoid mischief. The first man who re-
ceived the news, not having made any agreement
with the other members of the community as to his
course in such an emergency, ran away to his kins-

10 "Knoxville Gazette," March 23, 1793.

190 The Winning of the West

folk as fast as he could. Every neighbor caught the
alarm, thought himself the only person left to fight,
and got off on the same route as speedily as possible,
until, luckily for all, the meeting of the roads on the
general retreat, the difficulty of the way, the stray-
ing of horses, and sometimes the halting to drink
whiskey, put a stop to "the hurly-burly of the flight"
and reminded the fugitives that by this time they
were in sufficient force to rally ; and then they would
return "to explore the plundered country and to
bury the unfortunate scalped heads in the fag-end of
the retreat" ; whereas if there had been an appointed
rendezvous where all could rally it would have pre-
vented such a flight from what might possibly have
been a body of Indians far inferior in numbers to
the armed men of the settlements attacked.71

The convention of Mero district early petitioned
Congress for the right to retaliate on the Indians
and to follow them to their towns, stating that they
had refrained from doing so hitherto not from cow-
ardice, but only from regard to government, and
that they regretted that their "rulers" (the Fed-
eral authorities at Philadelphia) did not enter into
their feelings or seem to sympathize with them.72
When the Territorial Legislature met in 1794 it
petitioned Congress for war against the Creeks and
Cherokees, " reciting the numerous outrages com-
mitted by them upon the whites; stating that since
1792 the frontiersmen had been huddled together

11 "Knoxville Gazette," April 6, 1793.
" "Knoxville Gazette," August 13, 1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 191

two or three hundred to the station, anxiously ex-
pecting peace, or a legally authorized war from
which they would soon wring peace; and adding
that they were afraid of war in no shape, but that
they asked that their hands be unbound and they
be allowed to defend themselves in the only possible
manner, by offensive war. They went on to say
that, as members of the Nation, they heartily ap-
proved of the hostilities which were then being car-
ried on against the Algerines for the protection of
the seafaring men of the coast-towns, and con-
cluded : "The citizens who live in poverty on the
extreme frontier are as much entitled to be protected
in their lives, their families, and their little proper-
ties, as those who roll in luxury, ease, and affluence
in the great and opulent Atlantic cities," — for in
frontier eyes the little seaboard trading-towns as-
sumed a rather comical aspect of magnificence. The
address was on the whole dignified in tone, and it
undoubtedly set forth both the wrong and the rem-
edy with entire accuracy. The Tennesseeans felt
bitterly that the Federal Government did everything
for Kentucky and nothing for themselves, and they
were rather inclined to sneer at the difficulty expe-
rienced by the Kentuckians and the Federal army in
subduing the Northwestern Indians, while they
themselves were left single-handed to contend with
the more numerous tribes of the South. They were
also inclined to laugh at the continual complaints the
Georgians made over the comparatively trivial
wrongs they suffered from the Indians, and at their

192 The Winning of the West

inability either to control their own people or to
make war effectively.73

Such a state of things as that which existed in the
Tennessee territory could not endure. The failure
of the United States authorities to undertake active
offensive warfare and to protect the frontiersmen
rendered it inevitable that the frontiersmen should
protect themselves; and under the circumstances,
when retaliation began it was certain sometimes to
fall upon the blameless. The rude militia officers
began to lead their retaliatory parties into the In-
dian lands, and soon the innocent Indians suffered
with the guilty, for the frontiersmen had no means
of distinguishing between them. The Indians who
visited the settlements with peaceful intent were of
course at any time liable to be mistaken for their
brethren who were hostile, or else to be attacked by
scoundrels who were bent upon killing all red men
alike. Thus, on one day, as Blount reported, a
friendly Indian passing the home of one of the set-
tlers was fired upon and wounded; while in the
same region five hostile Indians killed the wife
and three children of a settler in his sight; and
another party stole a number of horses from a sta-
tion; and yet another party, composed of peaceful
Indian hunters, was attacked at night by some white
militia, one man being killed and another wounded.74

One of the firm friends of the whites was Scola-

73 "Knoxville Gazette," Feb. 26, 1794, March 27, 1794, etc.

74 State Department MSS., Washington Papers, War De-
partment, Ex. C., page 19, extract of letter from Blount to
Williamson April 14, 1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 193

cutta, the chief of the Upper Cherokees. He tried
to keep his people at peace, and repeatedly warned
the whites of impending attacks. Nevertheless, he
was unwilling or unable to stop by force the war
parties of Creeks and Lower Cherokees who came
through his towns to raid against the settlements
and who retreated to them again when the raids
were ended. Many of his young men joined the
bands of horse-thieves and scalp-hunters. The ma-
rauders wished to embroil him with the whites, and
were glad that the latter should see the bloody trails
leading back to his towns. For two years after the
signing of the treaty of Holston the war parties thus
passed and repassed through his country, and re-
ceived aid and comfort from his people, and
yet the whites refrained from taking vengeance;
but the vengeance was certain to come in the
end.

In March, 1793, Scolacutta's nearest neighbor,
an Indian living next door to him in his own town,
and other Indians of the nearest towns, joined one
of the war parties which attacked the settlements
and killed two unarmed lads.75 The Indians did
nothing to the murderers, and the whites forbore to
attack them ; but their patience was nearly exhausted.
In June following a captain, John Beard, with fifty
mounted riflemen, fell in with a small party of In-
dians who had killed several settlers. He followed
their trail to Scolacutta's town, where he slew eight

15 American State Papers, Blount's letter, March 20, 1793.
Scolacutta was usually known to the whites as Hanging Maw.
VOL. VIII.— 9

194 The Winning of the West

or nine Indians, most of whom were friendly.76 The
Indians clamored for justice and the surrender of
the militia who had attacked them. Blount warmly
sympathized with them, but when he summoned a
court-martial to try Beard it promptly acquitted
him, and the general frontier feeling was strongly in
his favor. Other militia commanders followed his
example. Again and again they trailed the war
parties, laden with scalps and plunder, and attacked
the towns to which they went, killing the warriors
and capturing squaws and children.77

The following January another party of red ma-
rauders was tracked by a band of riflemen to Scola-
cutta's camp. The militia promptly fell on the camp
and killed several Indians, both the hostile and the
friendly. Other Cherokee towns were attacked and
partially destroyed. In but one instance were the
whites beaten off. When once the whites fairly be-
gan to make retaliatory inroads they troubled them-
selves but little as to whether the Indians they as-
sailed were or were not those who had wronged
them. In one case, four frontiersmen dressed and
painted themselves like Indians prior to starting on
a foray to avenge the murder of a neighbor. They
could not find the trail of the murderers, and so went
at random to a Cherokee town, killed four warriors
who were asleep on the ground, and returned to the
settlements. Scolacutta at first was very angry with

16 Robertson MSS., Smith to Robertson, June 19, 1793, etc. ;
"Knoxville Gazette," June 15 and July 13, 1793, etc.
11 "Knoxville Gazette," July 13, July 27, 1793, etc., etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 195

Blount, and taunted him with his inability to punish
the whites, asserting that the frontiersmen were
"making fun" of their well-meaning governor; but
the old chief soon made up his mind that as long as
he allowed the war parties to go through his towns
he would have to expect to suffer at the hands of the
injured settlers. He wrote to Blount enumerating
the different murders that had been committed by
both sides, and stating that his people were willing
to let the misdeeds stand as offsetting one another.
He closed his letter by stating that the Upper Towns
were for peace, and added : "I want my mate, Gen-
eral Sevier, to see my talk . . . We have often told
lies, but now you may depend on hearing the truth,"
which was a refreshingly frank admission.78

When, toward the close of 1792, the ravages be-
came very serious, Sevier, the man whom the In-
dians feared more than any other, was called to take
command of the militia. For a year he confined
himself to acting on the defensive, and even thus he
was able to give much protection to the settlements.
In September, 1793, however, several hundred In-
dians, mostly Cherokees, crossed the Tennessee not
thirty miles from Knoxville. They attacked a small
station, within which there were but thirteen souls,
who, after some resistance, surrendered on condition
that their lives should be spared ; but they were
butchered with obscene cruelty. Sevier immedi-
ately marched toward the assailants, who fled back

78 American State Papers, IV, pp. 459, 460, etc.; "Knox-
ville Gazette," Jan. 16 and June 5, 1794.

196 The Winning of the West

to the Cherokee towns. Thither Sevier followed
them, and went entirely through the Cherokee coun-
try to the land of the Creeks, burning the towns and
destroying the stores of provisions. He marched
with his usual quickness, and the Indians were never
able to get together in sufficient numbers to oppose
him. When he crossed High Tower River there
was a skirmish, but he soon routed the Indians, kill-
ing several of their warriors, and losing himself but
three men killed and three wounded. He utterly
destroyed a hostile Creek town, the chief of which
was named Buffalo Horn. He returned late in Oc-
tober, and after his return the frontiers of Eastern
Tennessee had a respite from the Indian ravages.
Yet Congress refused to pay his militia for the time
they were out, because they had invaded the Indian
country instead of acting on the defensive.79

To chastise the Upper Cherokee Towns gave re-
lief to the settlements on the Holston, but the chief
sinners were the Chickamaugas of the Lower Chero-
kee Towns, and the chief sufferers were the Cumber-
land settlers. The Cumberland people were irritated
beyond endurance, alike by the ravages of these In-
dians and by the conduct of the United States in
forbidding them to retaliate. In September, 1794,
they acted for themselves. Early in the month Rob-
ertson received certain information that a large body
of Creeks and Lower Cherokees had gathered at the
towns and were preparing to invade the Cumber-

19 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Oct. 29, 1793;
"Knoxville Gazette." Oct. 12 and Nov. 23, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 197

land settlements. The best way to meet them was
by a stroke in advance, and he determined to send
an expedition against them in their strongholds.
There was no question whatever as to the hostility
of the Indians, for at this very time settlers were
being killed by war parties throughout the Cumber-
land country. Some Kentuckians, under Colonel
Whitley, had joined the Tennesseeans, who were
nominally led by a Major Ore ; but various frontier
fighters, including Kaspar Mansker, were really as
much in command as was Ore. Over five hun-
dred mounted riflemen, bold of heart and strong
of hand, marched toward the Chickamauga towns,
which contained some three hundred warriors.
When they came to the Tennessee they spent the
entire night in ferrying the arms across and swim-
ming the horses ; they used bundles of dry cane for
rafts, and made four "bull-boats" out of the hides of
steers. They passed over unobserved and fell on
the towns of Nickajack and Running Water, taking
the Indians completely by surprise ; they killed fifty-
five warriors and captured nineteen squaws and chil-
dren. In the entire expedition but one white man
was killed and three wounded.80

Not only the Federal authorities, but Blount him-

80 Robertson MSS., Robertson to Blount, Oct. 8, 1794;
Blount to Robertson, Oct. i, 1794, Sept. 9, 1794 (in which
Blount expresses the utmost disapproval of Robertson's con-
duct, and says he will not send on Robertson's original letter
to Philadelphia, for fear it will get him into a scrape ; and re-
quests him to send a formal report which can be forwarded) ;
"Knoxville Gazette," Sept. 26, 1794; Brown's Narrative.

198 The Winning of the West

self, very much disapproved of this expedition;
nevertheless, it was right and proper, and produced
excellent effects. In no other way could the hostile
towns have been brought to reason. It was fol-
lowed by a general conference with the Cherokees
at Tellico Block-house. Scolacutta appeared for the
Upper, and Watts for the Lower, Cherokee Towns.
Watts admitted that "for their folly" the Lower
Cherokees had hitherto refused to make peace, and
remarked frankly, "I do not say they did not de-
serve the chastisement they received." Scolacutta
stated that he could not sympathize much with the
Lower Towns, saying, "their own conduct brought
destruction upon them. The trails of murderers and
thieves was followed to those towns . . . Their bad
conduct drew the white people on me, who injured
me nearly unto death. . . . All last winter I was
compelled to lay in the woods by the bad conduct of
my own people drawing war on me." At last the
Cherokees seemed sincere in their desire for peace.81
These counter-attacks served a double purpose.
They awed the hostile Cherokees; and they forced
the friendly Cherokees, for the sake of their own
safety, actively to interfere against the bands of hos-
tile Creeks. A Cherokee chief, The Stallion, and
a number of warriors, joined with the Federal sol-
diers and Tennessee militia in repulsing the Creek
war parties. They acted under Blount's directions,
and put a complete stop to the passage of hostile In-

81 Robertson MSS., Blount's Minutes of Conference held
with Cherokees, Nov. 7 and 8, 1794, at Tellico Block-house.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 199

dians through their towns.82 The Chickasaws also
had become embroiled with the Creeks.83 For over
three years they carried on an intermittent warfare
with them, and were heartily supported by the fron-
tiersmen, who were prompt to recognize the value
of their services. At the same time the hostile In-
dians were much cowed at the news of Wayne's
victory in the North.

All these causes combined to make the Creeks sue
for peace. To its shame and discredit the United
States Government at first proposed to repeat to-
ward the Chickasaws the treachery of which the
British had just been guilty to the Northern In-
dians ; for it refused to defend them from the Creeks,
against whom they had been acting, partly, it is
true, for their own ends, but partly in the interest
of the settlers. The frontiersmen, however, took a
much more just and generous view of the affair.
Mansker and a number of the best fighters in the
Cumberland district marched to the assistance of
the Chickasaws; and the frontier militia generally
showed grateful appreciation of the way both the
Upper Cherokees and the Chickasaws helped them
put a stop to the hostilities of the Chickamaugas and
Creeks. Robertson got the Choctaws to interfere on
behalf of the Chickasaws and to threaten war with
the Creeks if the latter persisted in their hostilities.
Moreover, the United States agents, when the treaty

84 Robertson MSS., Ecooe to John McKee, Tellico, Feb. i,
1795, etc.
83 Blount MSS., James Colbert to Robertson, Feb. 10, 1792.

200 The Winning of the West

was actually made, behaved better than their supe-
riors had promised, for they persuaded the Creeks
to declare peace with the Chickasaws as well as with
the whites.84 Many of the peaceful Creeks had be-
come so alarmed at. the outbreak that they began to
exert pressure on their warlike brethren ; and at last
the hostile element yielded, though not until bitter
feeling had arisen between the factions. The fact
was, that the Creeks were divided much as they
were twenty years later, when the Red Sticks went
to war under the inspiration of the Prophet ; and it
would have been well if Wayne had been sent South,
to invade their country and anticipate by twenty
years Jackson's feats. But the nation was not yet
ready for such strong measures. The Creeks were
met half way in their desire for peace ; and the en-
tire tribe concluded a treaty the provisions of which
were substantially those of the treaty of New York.
They ceased hostilities, together with the Cherokees.
The concluding stage of the negotiations was
marked by an incident which plainly betrayed the
faulty attitude of the National Government toward
Southwestern frontiersmen. With incredible folly,
Timothy Pickering, at this time Secretary of War,
blindly refused to see the necessity of what had been
done by Blount and the Tennessee frontiersmen. In
behalf of the administration he wrote a letter to

84 Robertson MSS., Robertson to Blount, Jan. 13, 1795;
Blount to Robertson, Jan. 20, 1795, and April 26, 1795; Rob-
ertson to Blount, April 20, 1795; "Knoxville Gazette," Aug.
25, 1792, Oct. 12, 1793, June 19, 1794, July 17, Aug. 4, and
Aug. 15, 1794; American State Papers, pp. 284, 285, etc., etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 201

Blount which was as offensive as it was fatu-
ous. In it he actually blamed Blount for getting
the Cherokees and Chickasaws to help protect the
frontier against the hostile Indians. He forbade
him to give any assistance to the Chickasaws. He
announced that he disapproved of The Stallion's
deeds, and that the Cherokees must not destroy
Creeks passing through their country on the way
to the frontier. He even intimated that the sur-
render of The Stallion to the Creeks would be a
good thing. As for protecting the frontier from the
ravages of the Creeks, he merely vouchsafed the
statement that he would instruct Seagrove to make
"some pointed declarations" to the Creeks on the
subject ! He explained that the United States Gov-
ernment was resolved not to have a direct or indirect
war with the Creeks; and he closed by reiterating,
with futile insistency, that the instruction to the
Cherokees not to permit Creek war parties against
the whites to come through their country, did not
warrant their using force to stop them.85 He failed
to point out how it was possible, without force, to
carry out these instructions.

A more shameful letter was never written, and it
was sufficient of itself to show Pickering's conspicu-
ous incapacity for the position he held. The trouble
was that he represented not very unfairly the senti-
ment of a large portion of the Eastern, and espe-
cially the Northeastern, people. When Blount vis-
ited Philadelphia in the summer of 1793 to urge a

85 Robertson MSS., Pickering to Blount, March 23, 1795-

2O2 The Winning of the West

vigorous national war as the only thing which could
bring the Indians to behave themselves,86 he re-
ported that Washington had an entirely just idea of
the whole Indian business, but that Congress gen-
erally knew little of the matter and was not disposed
to act.87 His report was correct ; and he might have
added that the Congressmen were no more ignorant,
and no more reluctant to do right, than their constit-
uents.

The truth is that the United States Government
during the six years from 1791 to 1796 behaved
shamefully to the people who were settled along the
Cumberland and Holston. This was the more inex-
cusable in view of the fact that, thanks to the ex-
ample of Blount, Sevier, and Robertson, the Ten-
nesseeans, alone among the frontiersmen, showed an
intelligent appreciation of the benefits of the Union
and a readiness to render it loyal support. The
Kentuckians acted far less rationally; yet the Gov-
ernment tolerated much misconduct on their part,
and largely for their benefit carried on a great na-
tional war against the Northwestern Indians. In
the Southwest almost all that the Administration
did was to prohibit the frontiersmen from protecting
themselves. Peace was finally brought about largely
through the effect of Wayne's victory, and the
knowledge of the Creeks that they would have to
stand alone in any further warfare ; but it would not

86 Blount MSS., Blount to Smith, June 17, 1793.

87 Robertson MSS., Blount to gentleman in Cumberland,
Philadelphia, Aug. 28, 1793.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 103

have been obtained at all if Sevier and the other
frontier leaders had not carried on their destructive
counter-inroads into the Cherokee and Upper Creek
country, and if under Robertson's orders Nickajack
and Running Water had not been destroyed; while
the support of the Chickasaws and friendly Chero-
kees in stopping the Creek war parties was essential.
The Southwesterners owed thanks to General Wayne
and his army and to their own strong right hands;
but they had small cause for gratitude to the Fed-
eral Government. They owed still less to the North-
easterners, or indeed to any of the men of the East-
ern seaboard ; the benefits arising from Pinckney's
treaty form the only exception. This neglect brought
its own punishment. Blount and Sevier were nat-
urally inclined to Federalism, and it was probably
only the supineness of the Federal Government in
failing to support the Southwesterners against the
Indians which threw Tennessee, when it became a
State, into the arms of the Democratic party.

However, peace was finally wrung from the In-
dians, and by the beginning of 1796 the outrages
ceased. The frontiers, north and south alike, en-
joyed a respite from Indian warfare for the first
time in a generation ; nor was the peace interrupted
until fifteen years afterward.

Throngs of emigrants had come into Tennessee.
A wagon road had been chopped to the Cumberland
District, and as the Indians gradually ceased their
ravages, the settlements about Nashville began to
grow as rapidly as the settlements along the Hoi-

2O4 The Winning of the West

ston. In 1796 the required limit of population had
been reached, and Tennessee with over seventy-six
thousand inhabitants was formally admitted as a
State of the Federal Union; Sevier was elected
Governor, Blount was made one of the Senators,
and Andrew Jackson was chosen Representative in
Congress. In their State Constitution the hard-
working backwoods farmers showed a conservative
spirit which would seem strange to the radical De-
mocracy of new Western States to-day. An elective
Governor and two legislative houses were pro-
vided; and the representation was proportioned, not
to the population at large, but to the citizen who paid
taxes; for persons with some little property were
still considered to be the rightful depositaries of po-^
litical power. The Constitution established freedom
of the press, and complete religious liberty — a lib-
erty then denied in the parent State of North Caro-
lina; but it contained some unwise and unjust pro-
visions. The Judges were appointed by the Legis-
lature, and were completely subservient to it; and,
through the influence of the land speculators all
lands except town lots were taxed alike, so that the
men who had obtained possession of the best tracts
shifted to dther shoulders much of their own proper
burden.88

88 "Constitutional History of Tennessee," by Joshua W.
Caldwell, p. 101, another of Robert Clarke's publications; an
admirable study of institutional development in Tennessee.

CHAPTER II

INTRIGUES AND LAND SPECULATIONS — THE TREA-
TIES OF JAY AND PINCKNEY, 1 793" 1 797

THROUGHOUT the history of the winning of
of the West what is noteworthy is the current
of tendency rather than the mere succession of in-
dividual events. The general movement, and the
general spirit behind the movement, became evident
in many different forms, and if attention is paid
only to some particular manifestation we lose sight
of its true import and of its explanation. Particular
obstacles retarded or diverted, particular causes ac-
celerated, the current ; but the set was always in one
direction. The peculiar circumstances of each case
must always be taken into account, but it is also
necessary to understand that it was but one link in
the chain of causation.

Such events as Burr's conspiracy or the conquest
of Texas can not be properly understood if we fail
to remember that they were but the most spectacu-
lar or most important manifestations of what oc-
curred many times. The Texans won a striking vic-
tory and performed a feat of the utmost importance
in our history; and, moreover, it happened that at
the moment the accession of Texas was warmly fa-
vored by the party of the slave-holders. Burr had

(205)

206 The Winning of the West

been Vice-President of the United States, and was
a brilliant and able man, of imposing personality,
whose intrigues in the West attracted an attention
altogether disproportionate to their real weight. In
consequence each event is often treated as if it
were isolated and stood apart from the general cur-
rent of Western history ; whereas in truth each was
but the most striking or important among a host
of others. The feats performed by Austin and
Houston and the other founders of the Texan Re-
public were identical in kind with the feats merely
attempted, or but partially performed, by the men
who, like Morgan, Elijah Clark, and George Rogers
Clark, at different times either sought to found
colonies in the Spanish-speaking lands under Span-
ish authority, on else strove to conquer these lands
outright by force of arms. Boone settled in Mis-
souri when it was still under the Spanish Govern-
ment, and himself accepted a Spanish commission.
Whether Missouri had or had not been ceded first
by Spain to France and then by France to the
United States early in the present century, really
would not have altered its final destiny, so far at
least as concerns the fact that it would ultimately
have been independent of both France and Spain,
and would have been dominated by an English-
speaking people ; for when once the backwoodsmen,
of whom Boone was the forerunner, became suffi-
ciently numerous in the land they were certain to
throw off the yoke of the foreigner; and the fact
that they had voluntarily entered the land and put

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 207

themselves under this yoke would have made no
more difference to them than it afterward made
to the Texans. So it was with Aaron Burr. His
conspiracy was merely one, and by no means the
most dangerous, of the various conspiracies in which
men like Wilkinson, Sebastian, and many of the
members of the early Democratic societies in Ken-
tucky, bore a part. It was rendered possible only
by the temper of the people and by the peculiar cir-
cumstances which also rendered the earlier con-
spiracies possible; and it came to naught for the
same reasons that they came to naught, and was
even more hopeless, because it was undertaken later,
when the conditions were less favorable.

The movement deliberately entered into by many
of the Kentuckians in the years 1793 and 1794, to
conquer Louisiana on behalf of France, must be
treated in this way. The leader in this movement
was George Rogers Clark. His chance of success
arose from the fact that there were on the frontier
many men of restless, adventurous, warlike type,
who felt a spirit of unruly defiance toward the
home government, and who greedily eyed the rich
Spanish lands. Whether they got the lands by con-
quest or by colonization, and whether they warred
under one flag or another, was to them a matter of
little moment. Clark's career is of itself sufficient
to prove the truth of this. He had already been
at the head of a movement to make war against
the Spaniards, in defiance of the Central Govern-
ment, on behalf of the Western settlements. On

208 The Winning of the West

another occasion he had offered his sword to the
Spanish Government, and had requested permission
to found in Spanish territory a State, which should
be tributary to Spain and a barrier against the
American advance. He had thus already sought
to lead the Westerners against Spain in a warfare
undertaken purely by themselves and for their own
objects, and had also offered to form by the help
of some of these Westerners a State which should
be a constituent portion of the Spanish dominion.
He now readily undertook the task of raising an
army of Westerners to overrun Louisiana in the
interests of the French Republic. The conditions
which rendered possible these various movements
were substantially the same, although the immediate
causes, or occasions, were different. In any event
the result would ultimately have been the conquest
of the Spanish dominions by the armed frontiers-
men, and the upbuilding of English-speaking States
on Spanish territory.

The expedition which at the moment Clark pro-
posed to head took its peculiar shape from outside
causes. At this period Genet was in the midst of
his preposterous career as Minister from the French
Republic to the United States. The various bodies
of men who afterward coalesced into the Demo*-
cratic-Republican party were frantically in favor of
the French Revolution, regarding it with a fatuous
admiration quite as foolish as the horror with which
it affected most of the Federalists. They were
already looking to Jefferson as their leader, and

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 209

Jefferson, though at the time Secretary of State
under Washington, was secretly encouraging them,
and was playing a very discreditable part toward
his chief. The ultra-admirers of the French Revo-
lution not only lost their own heads, but turned
Genet's as well, and persuaded him that the people
were with him and were ready to oppose Washing-
ton and the Central Government in the interests of
revolutionary France. Genet wished to embroil
America with England, and sought to fit out Ameri-
can privateers on the seacoast towns to prey on the
English commerce, and to organize on the Ohio
River an armed, expedition to conquer Louisiana,
as Spain was then an ally of England and at war
with France. All over the country Genet's admirers
formed Democratic societies on the model of the
Jacobin Clubs of France. They were of course
either useless or noxious in such a country and un-
der such a government as that of the United States,
and exercised a very mischievous effect. Kentucky
was already under the influence of the same forces
that were at work in Virginia and elsewhere, and
the class of her people who were politically dom-
inant were saturated with the ideas of those doc-
trinaire politicians of whom Jefferson was chief.
These Jeffersonian doctrinaires were men who at
certain crises, in certain countries, might have ren-
dered great service to the cause of liberty and hu-
manity; but their influence in America was on the
. whole distinctly evil, save that, by a series of acci-
dents, they became the especial champions of the

no The Winning of the West

westward extension of the nation, and in conse-
quence were identified with a movement which was
all-essential to the national well-being.

Kentucky was ripe for Genet's intrigues, and he
found the available leader for the movement in the
person of George Rogers Clark. Clark was deeply
imbittered, not only with the United States Govern-
ment but with Virginia, for the Virginia Assembly
had refused to pay any of the debts he had contracted
on account of the State, and had not even reim-
bursed him for what he had spent.1 He had a right
to feel aggrieved at the State's penuriousness and
her indifference to her moral obligations; and just
at the time when he was most angered came the
news that Genet was agitating throughout the
United States for a war with England, in open de-
fiance of Washington, and that among his plans he
included a Western movement against Louisiana.
Clark at once wrote to him expressing intense sym-
pathy with the French objects and offering to under-
take an expedition for the conquest of St. Louis and
upper Louisiana if he was provided with the means
to obtain provisions and stores. Clark further in-
formed Genet that his country had been utterly un-
grateful to him, and that as soon as he received
Genet's approbation of what he proposed to do he
would get himself "expatriated." He asked for
commissions for officers, and stated his belief that
the Creoles would rise, that the adventurous West-
erners would gladly throng to the contest, and that

1 Draper MSS., J. Clark to G. R. Clark, Dec. 27, 1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 211

the army would soon be at the gates of New Or-
leans.2

Genet immediately commissioned Clark as a Ma-
jor-General in the service of the French Republic,
and sent out various Frenchmen — Michaux, La
Chaise, and others — with civil and military titles,
to co-operate with him, to fit out his force as well
as possible, and to promise him pay for his expenses.
Brown, now one of Kentucky's representatives at
Philadelphia, gave these men letters of introduction
to merchants in Lexington and elsewhere, from
whom they got some supplies; but they found they
would have to get most from Philadelphia.3 Mi-
chaux was the agent for the French Minister, though
nominally his visit was undertaken on purely scien-
tific grounds. Jefferson's course in the matter was
characteristic. Openly, he was endeavoring in a
perfunctory manner to carry out Washington's pol-
icy of strict neutrality in the contest between France
and England, but secretly he was engaged in tortu-
ous intrigues against Washington and was thwarting
his wishes, so far as he dared, in regard to Genet.
It is impossible that he could have been really mis-
led as to Michaux's character and the object of his
visits ; nevertheless, he actually gave him a letter of
introduction to the Kentucky Governor, Isaac Shel-
by.4 Shelby had shown himself a gallant and capa-

8 Do., Letter of George Rogers Clark, Feb. 5, 1793; also
Feb. 2d and Feb. jd.

* Draper MSS. , Michaux to George Rogers Clark, undated,
but early in 1793.

4 State Department MSS., Jefferson Papers, Series I, Vol.
V, p. 163.

212 The Winning of the West

ble officer in warfare against both the Indians and
the tories, but he possessed no marked political abil-
ity, and was entirely lacking in the strength of char-
acter which would have fitted him to put a stop to
rebellion and lawlessness. He hated England, sym-
pathized with France, and did not possess sufficient
political good sense to appreciate either the benefits
of the Central Government or the need of preserving
order.

Clark at once proceeded to raise what troops he
could, and issued a proclamation signed by himself
as Major-General of the Armies of France, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the French Revolutionary Le-
gions on the Mississippi. He announced that he
proposed to raise volunteers for the reduction of the
Spanish posts on the Mississippi and to open the
trade of that river, and promised all who would join
him from one to three thousand acres of any un-
appropriated land in the conquered regions, the offi-
cers to receive proportionately more. All lawful
plunder was to be equally divided according to the
customs of war.5 The proclamation thus frankly
put the revolutionary legions on the footing of a
gang of freebooters. Each man was to receive a
commission proportioned in grade to the number of
soldiers he brought to Clark's band. In short, it
was a piece of sheer filibustering, not differing ma-
terially from one of Walker's filibustering attempts
in Central America sixty years later, save that at
this time Clark had utterly lost his splendid vigor of

5 Marshall, II, page 103.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 213

body and mind and was unfit for the task he had set
himself. At first, however, he met with promises
of support from various Kentuckians of prominence,
including Benjamin Logan.6 His agents gathered
flat-boats and pirogues for the troops and laid in
stores of powder, lead, and beef. The nature of
some of the provisions shows what a characteristic
backwoods expedition it was; for Clark's agent no-
tified him that he had ready "upward of eleven hun-
dred weight of Bear Meat and about seventy or
seventy-four pair of Veneson Hams." 7

The Democratic Societies in Kentucky entered in-
to Clark's plans with the utmost enthusiasm, and
issued manifestoes against the Central Government
which were, in style, of hysterical violence, and, in
matter, treasonable. The preparations were made
openly, and speedily attracted the attention of the
Spanish agents, besides giving alarm to the repre-
sentatives of the Federal Government and to all
sober citizens who had sense enough to see that the
proposed expedition was merely another step toward
anarchy. St. Clair, the Governor of the Northwest-
ern Territory, wrote to Shelby to warn him of what
was being done, and Wayne, who was a much more
formidable person than Shelby or Clark or any of
their backers, took prompt steps to prevent the expe-
dition from starting, by building a fort near the
mouth of the Ohio, and ordering his lieutenants to

6 Draper MSS., Benjamin Logan to George Rogers Clark,
Dec. 31, 1793.

7 Draper MSS., John Montgomery to Geo. Rogers Clark,
Jan. 12, 1794.

214 The Winning of the West

hold themselves in readiness for any action he might
direct. At the same time the Administration wrote
to Shelby telling him what was on foot, and request-
ing him to see that no expedition of the kind was
allowed to march against the domains of a friendly
power. Shelby, in response, entered into a long
argument to show that he could not interfere with
the expedition, and that he doubted his constitutional
power to do anything in the matter ; his reasons be-
ing of the familiar kind usually advanced in such
cases, where a government officer, from timidity or
any other cause, refuses to do his duty. If his con-
tention as to his own powers and the powers of the
General Government had been sound, it would log-
ically have followed that there was no power any-
where to back up the law. Innes, the Federal Judge,
showed himself equally lukewarm in obeying the
Federal authorities.8

Blount, the Governor of the Southwestern Terri-
tory, acted as vigorously and patriotically as St.
Clair and Wayne, and his conduct showed in marked
contrast to Shelby's. He possessed far too much
political good sense not to be disgusted with the
conduct of Genet, which he denounced in unmeas-
ured terms. He expressed great pleasure when
Washington summarily rebuked the blatant French
envoy. He explained to the Tennesseeans that Genet
had as his chief backers the disappointed office-hunt-
ers and other unsavory characters in New York and

8 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, pp. 454, 460;
Marshall, II, 93.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 215

in the seacoast cities, but that the people at large
were beginning to realize what the truth was, and to
show a proper feeling for the President and his gov-
ernment.9 Some of the Cumberland people, be-
coming excited by the news of Clark's preparation,
prepared to join him, or to undertake a separate fili-
bustering attack on their own account. Blount im-
mediately wrote to Robertson directing him to ex-
plain to these "inconsiderate persons" that all they
could possibly do was to attempt the conquest of
West Florida, an'd that they would "lay themselves
liable to heavy Pains and Penalties, both pecuniary
and corporal, in case they ever returned to their in-
jured country." He warned Robertson that it was
his duty to prevent the attempt, and that the legal
officers of the district must proceed against any of
the men having French commissions, and must do
their best to stop the movement; which, he said,
proceeded "from the Machenations no doubt of that
Jacobin Incendiary, Genet, which is reason sufficient
to make every honest mind revolt at the Idea." Rob-
ertson warmly supported him, and notified the Span-
ish commander at New Madrid of the steps which
he was taking; at which the Spaniards expressed
great gratification.10

However, the whole movement collapsed when
Genet was recalled early in 1 794, Clark being forced

9 Robertson MSS., Blount's letter, Philadelphia, Aug. 28,
1793.

10 Robertson MSS., Blount to Robertson, Jan. 18, 1794; let-
ter from Portello, New Madrid, Jan. 17, 1794.

216 The Winning of the' West

at once to abandon his expedition.11 Clark found
himself out of pocket as the result of what he had
done ; and as there was no hope of reimbursing him-
self by Spanish plunder, he sought to obtain from
the French Government reimbursement for the ex-
penses, forwarding to the French Assembly, through
an agent in France, his bill for the "Expenses of
Expedition ordered by Citizen Genet." The agent
answered that he would try to secure the payment ;
and after he got to Paris he first announced himself
as hopeful; but later he wrote that he had discov-
ered that the French agents were really engaged in
a dangerous conspiracy against the Western coun-
try, and he finally had to admit that the claim was
disallowed.12 With this squabble between the French
and Americans the history of the abortive expedition
ends.

The attempt, of course, excited and alarmed the
Spaniards, and gave a new turn to their tortuous
diplomacy. In reading the correspondence of the
Spanish Governor, Baron Carondelet, both with his
subordinates and with his superiors, it is almost
amusing to note the frankness with which he avows
his treachery. It evidently did not occur to him that
there was such a thing as national good faith, or
that there was the slightest impropriety in any form
of mendacity when exercised in dealing with the
ministers or inhabitants of a foreign State. In this

11 Blount MSS., Blount to Smith, April 3, 1794.

12 Draper MSS., Clark's accounts, Aug. 23, 1794; Fulton to
Clark, Nantes, Nov. 16, 1794; Do., Paris, April 9 and 12, 1795.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 217

he was a faithful reflex of his superiors at the Span-
ish Court. At the same time that they were sol-
emnly covenanting for a definite treaty of peace with
the United States they were secretly intriguing to
bring about a rebellion in the Western States; and
while they were assuring the Americans that they
wrere trying their best to keep the Indians peaceful,
they were urging the savages to war.

As for any gratitude to the National Government
for stopping the piratical expeditions of the West-
erners, the Spaniards did not feel a trace. They
had early received news of Clark's projected expedi-
tion through a Frenchman who came to the Spanish
agents at Philadelphia;13 and when the army began
to gather they received from time to time from their
agents in Kentucky reports which, though exagger-
ated, gave them a fairly accurate view of what was
happening. No overt act of hostility was com-
mitted by Clark's people, except by some of those
who started to join him from the Cumberland dis-
trict, under the lead of a man named Montgomery.
These men built a wooden fort at the mouth of the
Cumberland River, and held the boats that passed to
trade with Spain ; one of the boats that they took
being a scow loaded with flour and biscuit sent up
stream by the Spanish Government itself. When
Wayne heard of the founding of this fort he acted
with his usual promptness, and sent an expedition
which broke it up and released the various boats.

13 Draper MSS. , Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Aleudia,
March 20, 1794.

VOL. VIII.— 10

2i 8 The Winning of the West

Then, to stop any repetition of the offence, and more
effectually to curb the overbearing truculence of the
frontiersmen, he himself built, as already mentioned,
a fort at Massac, not far from the Mississippi. All
this of course was done in the interests of the Span-
iards themselves and in accordance with the earnest
desire of the United States authorities to prevent
any unlawful attack on Louisiana; yet Carondelet
actually sent word to Gayoso de Lemos, the Gov-
ernor of Natchez and the upper part of the river,
to persuade the Chickasaws secretly to attack <his
fort and destroy it. Carondelet always had an ex-
aggerated idea of the warlike capacity of the Indian
nations, and never understood the power of the
Americans, nor appreciated the desire of their Gov-
ernment to act in good faith. Gayoso was in this
respect a much more intelligent man, and he posi-
tively refused to carry out the orders of his superior,
remonstrating directly to the Court of Spain, by
which he was sustained. He pointed out that the
destruction of the fort would merely encourage the
worst enemies of the Spaniards, even if accom-
plished ; and he further pointed out that it was quite
impossible to destroy it; for he understood fully
the difference between a fort garrisoned by Wayne's
regulars and one held by a mob of buccaneering
militia.14

It was not the first time that Gayoso's superior
knowledge of the Indians and of their American foes

14 Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Manuel Gayoso de
Lemos to the Duke de Alcudia, Natchez, Sept. 19, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 219

had prevented his carrying out the orders of his su-
perior officer. On one occasion Carondelet had di-
rected Gayoso to convene the Southern Indians, and
to persuade them to send deputies to the United
States authorities with proposals to settle the boun-
daries in accordance with the wishes of Spain, and
to threaten open war as an alternative. Gayoso re-
fused to adopt this policy, and persuaded Carondelet
to alter it, showing that it was necessary above all
things to temporize, that such a course as the one
proposed would provoke immediate hostilities, and
that the worst possible line for the Spaniards to fol-
low would be one of open war with the entire power
of the United States.15

Of course the action of the American Govern-
ment in procuring the recall of Genet and putting a
stop to Clark's operations lightened for a moment
the pressure of the backwoodsmen upon the Spanish
dominions ; but it was only for a moment. The West-
erners were bent on seizing the Spanish territory;
and they were certain to persist in their efforts until
they were either successful or were definitely beaten
in actual war. The acts of aggression were sure to
recur ; it was only the form that varied. When the
chance of armed conquest under the banner of the
French Republic vanished, there was an immediate
revival of plans for getting possession of some part
of the Spanish domain through the instrumentality
of the great land companies.

These land companies possessed on paper a weight

15 Do., De Lemos to Carondelet, Dec. 6, 1793.

220 The Winning of the West

which they did not have in actual history. They
occasionally enriched, and more often impoverished,
the individual speculators ; but in the actual peopling
of the waste lands they counted for little in compari-
son with the steady stream of pioneer farmers who
poured in, each to hold and till the ground he in fact
occupied. However, the contemporary documents of
the day were full of details concerning the com-
panies; and they did possess considerable impor-
tance at certain times in the settlement of the West,
both because they in places stimulated that settle-
ment, and because in other places they retarded it,
inasmuch as they kept out actual settlers, who could
not pre-empt land which had been purchased at low
rates from some legislative body by the speculators.
The companies were sometimes formed by men who
wished themselves to lead emigrants into the longed-
for region, but more often they were purely specu-
lative in character, and those who founded them
wished only to dispose of them at an advantage to
third parties. Their history is inextricably mixed
with the history of the intrigues with and against
the Spaniards and British in the West. The men
who organized them wished to make money. Their
object was to obtain title to or possession of the
lands, and it was quite a secondary matter with them
whether their title came from the United States,
England, or Spain. They were willing to form col-
onies on Spanish or British territory, and they were
even willing to work for the dismemberment of the
Western Territory from the Union, if by so doing

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 221

they could increase the value of the lands which they
sought to acquire. American adventurers had been
in correspondence with Lord Dorchester, the Gov-
ernor-General of Canada, looking to the possibility
of securing British aid for those desirous of embark-
ing in great land speculations in the West. These
men proposed to try to get the Westerners to join
with the British in an attack upon Louisiana, or even
to conduct this attack themselves in the British in-
terests, believing that with New Orleans in British
hands the entire province would be thrown open to
trade with the outside world and to settlement ; with
the result that the lands would increase enormously
in value, and the speculators and organizers of the
companies, and of the movements generally, grow
rich in consequence.16 They assured the British
agents that the Western country would speedily sep-
arate from the Eastern States, and would have to
put itself under the protection of some foreign State.
Dorchester considered these plans of sufficient
weight to warrant inquiry by his agents, but noth-
ing ever came of them.

Much the most famous, or, it would be more cor-
rect to say, infamous, of these companies were those
organized in connection with the Yazoo lands.17 The
country in what is now middle and northern Missis-

16 Canadian Archives, Dorchester to Sydney, June 7, 1789;
Grenville to Dorchester, May 6, 1790; Dorchester to Beck-
with, June 17, 1790; Dorchester to Grenville, Sept. 25, 1790.
See Brown's "Political Beginnings," 187.

11 The best and most thorough account of these is to be
found in Charles H. Haskin's"The Yazoo Land Companies."

222 The Winning of the West

sippi and Alabama possessed, from its great fertility,
peculiar fascinations in the eyes of the adventurous
land speculators. It was unoccupied by settlers, be-
cause as a matter of fact it was held in adverse pos-
session by the Indians, under Spanish protection.
It was claimed by the Georgians, and its cession was
sought by the United States Government, so that
there was much uncertainty as to the title, which
could in consequence be cheaply secured. Wilkin-
son, Brown, Innes, and other Kentuckians, had ap-
plied to the Spaniards to be allowed to take these
lands and hold them, in their own interests, but on
behalf of Spain, and against the United States. The
application had not been granted, and the next effort
was of a directly opposite character, the adventurers
this time proposing, as they could not hold the terri-
tory as armed subjects of Spain, to wrest it from
Spain by armed entry after getting title from
Georgia. In other words, they were going to carry
on war as a syndicate, the military operations for the
occupation of the ceded territory being part of the
business for which the company was organized.
Their relations with the Union were doubtless to be
determined by the course of events.

This company was the South Carolina Yazoo
Company. In 1789, several companies were formed
to obtain from the Georgia Legislature grants of the
Western territory which Georgia asserted to be hers.
One, the Virginia Company, had among its incor-
porators Patrick Henry, and received a grant of
nearly 20,000 square miles, but accomplished noth-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 223

ing. Another, the Tennessee Company, received a
grant of what is now most of northern Alabama,
and organized a body of men under the leadership
of an adventurer named Zachariah Cox, who drifted
down the Tennessee in flat-boats to take possession,
and repeated the attempt more than once. They
were, however, stopped, partly by Blount, and partly
by the Indians. The South Carolina Yazoo Com-
pany made the most serious effort to get possession
of the coveted territory. Its grant included about
15,000 square miles in what is now middle Missis-
sippi and Alabama ; the nominal price being $67,000.
One of the prime movers in this company was
a man named Walsh, who called himself Washing-
ton, a person of unsavory character, who, a couple
of years later, was hanged at Charleston for passing
forged paper money in South Carolina. All these
companies had hoped to pay the very small prices
they were asked for the lands in the depreciated
currency of Georgia; but they never did make the
full payments or comply with the conditions of the
grants, which therefore lapsed.

Before this occurred the South Carolina Yazoo
Company had striven to take possession of its pur-
chase by organizing a military expedition to go down
the Mississippi from Kentucky. For commander
of this expedition choice was made of a Revolution-
ary soldier named James O'Fallon, who went to
Kentucky, where he married Clark's sister. He en-
tered into relations with Wilkinson, who drew him
into the tangled web of Spanish intrigue. He raised

224 The Winning of the West

soldiers, and drew up a formal contract, entered into
between the South Carolina Yazoo Company and
their troops of the Yazoo Battalion — over five hun-
dred men in all, cavalry, artillery and infantry. Each
private was to receive two hundred and fifty acres
of "stipendiary" lands and the officers in proportion,
up to the Lieutenant-Colonel, who was to receive six
thousand. Commissions were formally issued, and
the positions of all the regular officers were filled, so
that the invasion was on the point of taking place.18
However, the Spanish authorities called the matter
to the attention of the United States, and the Fed-
eral Government put a prompt stop to the move-
ment.19 O'Fallon was himself threatened with ar-
rest by the Federal officers, and had to abandon his
project.20 He afterward re-established his rela-
tions with the Government, and became one of
Wayne's correspondents;21 but he entered heartily
into Clark's plans for the expedition under Genet
and, like all the other participators in that wretched
affair, became involved in broils with Clark and
every one else.22

In 1795 the land companies, encouraged by the
certainty that the United States would speedily take

18 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, James O'Fallon
to the President of the United States, Lexington, Sept. 25,
1790, etc., etc.

19 Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Alcudia,
Jan. i, 1794, and May 31, 1794.

*• Draper MSS., Clark and O'Fallon Papers, anonymous
letter to James O'Fallon, Lexington, March 30, 1791, etc., etc.

21 Draper MSS., Wayne to O'Fallon, Sept. 16, 1793.

22 Draper MSS., De Lemos to Carondelet, Dec. 23, 1793-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 225

possession of the Yazoo territory, again sprang into
life. In that year four, the Georgia, the Georgia-
Mississippi, the Tennessee, and the Upper Missis-
sippi, companies obtained grants from the Georgia
Legislature to a territory of over thirty millions of
acres, for which they paid but five hundred thousand
dollars, or less than two cents an acre. Among the
grantees were many men of note, Congressmen, Sen-
ators, even judges. The grants were secured by the
grossest corruption, every member of the Legisla-
ture who voted for them, with one exception, being
a stockholder in some one of the companies, while
the procuring of the cessions was undertaken by
James Gunn, one of the two Georgia Senators. The
outcry against the transaction was so universal
throughout the State that at the next session of the
Legislature, in 1796, the acts were repealed and the
grants rescinded. This caused great confusion, as
most of the original grantees had hastily sold out
to third parties ; the purchases being largely made in
South Carolina and Massachusetts. Efforts were
made by the original South Carolina Yazoo Com-
pany to sue Georgia in the Federal Courts, which led
to the adoption of the Constitutional provision for-
bidding such action. When, in 1802, Georgia ceded
the territory in question, including all of what is
now middle and northern Alabama and Mississippi,
to the United States for the sum of twelve hundred
and fifty thousand dollars, the National Government
became heir to these Yazoo difficulties. It was not
until 1814 that the matter was settled by a com-

226 The Winning of the West

promise, after interminable litigation and legisla-
tion.23 The land companies were more important
to the speculators than to the actual settlers of the
Mississippi; nevertheless, they did stimulate settle-
ment, in certain regions, and therefore increased by
just so much the Western pressure upon Spain.

Some of the aggressive movements undertaken by
the Americans were of so loose a nature that it is
hard to know what to call them. This was true of
Elijah Clark's company of Georgia freebooters in
1794. Accompanied by large bodies of armed men,
he on several occasions penetrated into the territory
southwest of the Oconee. He asserted at one time
that he was acting for Georgia and in defence of
her rights to the lands which the Georgians claimed
under the various State treaties with the Indians, but
which by the treaty of New York had been con-
firmed to the Creeks by the United States. On an-
other occasion he entitled his motley force the Sans
Culottes, and masqueraded as a major-general of the

23 American State Papers, Public Lands, I, pp. 99, 101, in,
165, 172, 188; Haskin's "Yazoo Land Companies." In Con-
gress, Randolph, on behalf of the ultra State rights people,
led the opposition to the claimants, whose special champions
were Madison and the Northern Democrats. Chief-Justice
Marshall, in the case of Fletcher vs. Peck, decided that the
rescinding act impaired the obligation of contracts, and was
therefore in violation of the Constitution of the United
States ; a decision further amplified in the Dartmouth case,
which has determined the national policy in regard to public
contracts. This decision was followed by the passage of the
Compromise Act by Congress in 1814, which distributed a
large sum of money obtained from the land sales in the ter-
ritory, in specified proportions among the various claimants.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 227

French army, though the French Consul denied hav-
ing any connection with him. He established for
the time being a little independent government, with
block-houses and small wooden towns, in the middle
of the unceded hunting grounds, and caused great
alarm to the Spaniards. The frontiersmen sympa-
thized with him, and when he was arrested in Wilkes
County the Grand Jury of the county ordered his
discharge, and solemnly declared that the treaty of
New York was inoperative and the proclamation of
the Governor of Georgia against Clark, illegal. This
was too much for the patience of the Governor. He
ordered out the State troops to co-operate with the
small Federal force, and Clark and his men were
ignominiously expelled from their new government
and forced to return to Georgia.24

In such a welter of intrigue, of land speculation,
and of more or less piratical aggression, there was
imminent danger that the West would relapse into
anarchy unless a firm government were established,
and unless the boundaries with England and Spain
were definitely established. As Washington's ad-
ministration grew steadily in strength and in the
confidence of the people the first condition was met.
The necessary fixity of boundary was finally ob-
tained by the treaties negotiated through John Jay
with England, and through Thomas Pinckney with
Spain.

Jay's treaty aroused a perfect torrent of wrath
throughout the country, and nowhere more than in

* Stevens' "Georgia," II, 401.

228 The Winning of the West

the West. A few of the coolest and most intelli-
gent men approved it, and rugged old Humphrey
Marshall, the Federalist Senator from Kentucky,
voted for its ratification ; but the general feeling
against it was intense. Even Blount, who by this
time was pretty well disgusted with the way he had
been treated by the Central Government, denounced
it, and expressed his belief that Washington would
have hard work to explain his conduct in procuring
its ratification.25

Yet the Westerners were the very people who had
no cause whatever to complain of the treaty. It
was not an entirely satisfactory treaty; perhaps a
man like Hamilton might have procured rather bet-
ter terms; but, taken as a whole, it worked an im-
mense improvement upon the condition of things
already existing. Washington's position was un-
doubtedly right. He would have preferred a better
treaty, but he regarded the Jay treaty as very much
better than none at all. Moreover, the last people
who had a right to complain of it were those who
were most vociferous in their opposition. The anti-
Federalist party was on the whole the party of weak-
ness and disorder, the party that was clamorous and
unruly, but ineffective in carrying out a sustained
policy, whether of offence or of defence, in foreign
affairs. The people who afterward became known
as Jeffersonian Republicans numbered in their ranks
the extremists who had been active as the founders
of Democratic societies in the French interest, and

55 Blount MSS., Blount to Smith, Aug. 24, 1795.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 229

they were ferocious in their wordy hostility to Great
Britain ; but they were not dangerous foes to any
foreign government which did not fear words. Had
they possessed the foresight and intelligence to
strengthen the Federal Government the Jay treaty
would not have been necessary. Only a strong, effi-
cient central government, backed by a good fleet
and a well organized army, could hope to wring
from England what the French party, the forerun-
ners of the Jeffersonian Democracy, demanded. But
the Jeffersonians were separatists and State rights
men. They believed in a government so weak as to
be ineffective, and showed a folly literally astound-
ing in their unwillingness to provide for the wars
which they were ready to provoke. They resolutely
refused to provide an army or a navy, or to give
the Central Government the power necessary for
waging war. They were quite right in their feeling
of hostility to England, and one of the fundamental
and fatal weaknesses of the Federalists was the
Federalist willingness to submit to England's ag-
gressions without retaliation ; but the Jeffersonians
had no gift for government, and were singularly de-
ficient in masterful statesmen of the kind impera-
tively needed by any nation which wishes to hold an
honorable place among other nations. They showed
their governmental inaptitude clearly enough later
on when they came into power, for they at once
stopped building the fleet which the Federalists had
begun, and allowed the military forces of the nation
to fall into utter disorganization, with, as a conse-

230 The Winning of the West

quence, the shameful humiliations of the War of
1812. This war was in itself eminently necessary
and proper, and was excellent in its results, but it
was attended by incidents of shame and disgrace to
America for which Jefferson and Madison and their
political friends and supporters among the politicians
and the people have never received a sufficiently se-
vere condemnation.

Jay's treaty was signed late in 1794 and was rati-
fied in I795-26 The indignation of the Kentuckians
almost amounted to mania. They denounced the
treaty with frantic intemperance, and even threat-
ened violence to those of their own number, headed
by Humphrey Marshall, who supported it; yet they
benefited much by it, for it got them what they
would have been absolutely powerless to obtain for
themselves, that is, the possession of the British posts
on the Lakes. In 1796, the Americans took formal
possession of these posts, and the boundary line in
the Northwest as nominally established by the treaty
of Versailles became in fact the actual line of de-
marcation between the American and the British pos-
sessions. The work of Jay capped the work of
Wayne. Federal garrisons were established at De-
troit and elsewhere, and the Indians, who had al-
ready entered into the treaty of Greeneville, were
prevented from breaking it by this intervention of
the American military posts between themselves and
their British allies. Peace was firmly established

™ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, pp. 479.
484, 489, 502, 519, etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 231

for the time being in the Northwest, and our boun-
daries in that direction took the fixed form they
still retain.27

In dealing with the British the Americans some-
times had to encounter bad faith, but more often
a mere rough disregard for the rights of others, of
which they could themselves scarcely complain with
a good grace, as they showed precisely the same
quality in their own actions. In dealing with the
Spaniards, on the other hand, they had to encounter
deliberate and systematic treachery and intrigue.
The open negotiations between the two governments
over the boundary ran side by side with a current of
muddy intrigue between the Spanish Government
on the one hand, and certain traitorous Americans
on the other; the leader of these traitors being, as
usual, the arch scoundrel Wilkinson.

The Spaniards trusted almost as much to Indian
intrigue as to bribery of American leaders; indeed
they trusted to it more for momentary effect, though
the far-sighted among them realized that in the long
run the safety of the Spanish possessions depended
upon the growth of divisional jealousies among the
Americans themselves. The Spanish forts were
built as much to keep the Indians under command
as to check the Americans. The Governor of
Natchez, De Lemos, had already established a fort
at the Chickasaw Bluffs, where there was danger of
armed collision between the Spaniards and either the

27 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, p. 573 ; Foreign
Relations, I, passim, etc., etc.

232 The Winning of the West

Cumberland settlers under Robertson or the Federal
troops. Among the latter, by the way, the officer
for whose ability the Spaniards seemed to feel an
especial respect was Lieutenant William Clark.28

The Chickasaws were nearly drawn into a war
with the Spaniards, who were intensely irritated over
their antagonism to the Creeks, for which the Span-
iards insisted that the Americans were responsible.29
The Americans, however, were able to prove conclu-
sively that the struggle was due, not to their advice,
but to the outrages of marauders from the villages
of the Muscogee confederacy. They showed by the
letter of the Chickasaw chief, James Colbert, that the
Creeks had themselves begun hostilities early in 1792
by killing a Chickasaw, and that the Chickasaws, be-
cause of this spilling of blood, made war on the
Creeks, and sent word to the Americans to join in
the war. The letter ran: "I hope you will exert
yourselves and join us so that we might give the
lads a Drubbeen for they have encroached on us this
great while not us alone you likewise for you have
suffered a good dale by them I hope you will think
of your wounds." 30 The Americans had "thought
of their wounds" and had aided the Chickasaws in
every way, as was proper; but the original aggres-
sors were the Creeks. The Chickasaws had entered
into what was a mere war of retaliation; though

88 Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Don
Louis de Las Casas, June 13, 1795; De Letnos to Caron-
delet, July 25, 1793.

49 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 305, etc.

*° Blount MSS., James Colbert to Robertson, Feb. 10, 1792.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 233

when once in they had fought hard, under the lead of
Opiamingo, their most noted war chief, who was
always friendly to the Americans and hostile to the
Spaniards.

At the Chickasaw Bluffs, and at Natchez, there
was always danger of a clash ; for at these places the
Spanish soldiers were in direct contact with the fore-
most of the restless backwoods host, and with the
Indians who were most friendly or hostile to them.
Open collision was averted, but the Spaniards were
kept uneasy and alert. There were plenty of Amer-
ican settlers around Natchez, who were naturally
friendly to the American Government ; and an agent
from the State of Georgia, to the horror of the
Spaniards, came out to the country with the especial
purpose of looking over the Yazoo lands, at the time
when Georgia was about to grant them to' the vari-
ous land companies. What with the land specula-
tors, the frontiersmen, and the Federal troops, the
situation grew steadily more harassing for the Span-
iards ; and Carondelet kept the advisers of the Span-
ish Crown well informed of the growing stress.

The Spanish Government knew it would be beaten
if the issue once came to open war, and, true to the
instincts of a weak and corrupt power, it chose as
its weapons delay, treachery, and intrigue. To in-
dividual Americans the Spaniards often behaved with
arrogance and brutality ; but they feared to give too
serious offence to the American people as a whole.
Like all other enemies of the American Republic,
from the days of the Revolution to those of the Civil

234 The Winning of the West

War, they saw clearly that their best allies were the
separatists, the disunionists, and they sought to en-
courage in every way the party which, in a spirit of
sectionalism, wished to bring about a secession of
one part of the country and the erection of a separate
government. The secessionists then, as always,
played into the hands of the men who wished the
new republic ill. In the last decade of the eighteenth
century the acute friction was not between North
and South, but between East and West. The men
who, from various motives, wished to see a new re-
public created, hoped that this republic would take
in all the people of the Western waters. These men
never actually succeeded in carrying the West with
them. At the pinch the majority of the Westerners
remained loyal to the idea of national unity; but
there was a very strong separatist party, and there
were very many men who, though not separatists,
were disposed to grumble loudly about the short-
comings of the Federal Government.

These men were especially numerous and power-
ful in Kentucky, and they had as their organ the sole
newspaper of the State, the "Kentucky Gazette." It
was filled with fierce attacks, not only upon the Gen-
eral Government, but upon Washington himself.
Sometimes these attacks were made on the author-
ity of the "Gazette" ; at other times they appeared in
the form of letters from outsiders, or of resolutions
by the various Democratic societies and political
clubs. They were written with a violence which,
in striving after forcefulness, became feeble. They

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 235

described the people of Kentucky as having been
"degraded and insulted," and as having borne these
insults with "submissive patience." The writers in-
sisted that Kentucky had nothing to hope from the
Federal Government, and that it was nonsense to
chatter about the infraction of treaties, for it was
necessary, at any cost, to take Louisiana, which was
"groaning under tyranny." They threatened the
United States with what the Kentuckians would do
if their wishes were not granted, announcing that
they would make the conquest of Louisiana an ulti-
matum, and warning the Government that they owed
no eternal allegiance to it and might have to sepa-
rate, and that if they did there would be small reason
to deplore the separation. The separatist agitators
failed to see that they could obtain the objects they
sought, the opening of the Mississippi and the acqui-
sition of Louisiana, only through the Federal Gov-
ernment, and only by giving that Government full
powers. Standing alone the Kentuckians would
have been laughed to scorn not only by England
and France, but even by Spain. Yet with silly fa-
tuity they vigorously opposed every effort to make
the Government stronger or to increase national feel-
ing, railing even at the attempt to erect a great Fed-
eral city as "unwise, impolitic, unjust," and "a mon-
ument to American folly." 31 The men who wrote
these articles, and the leaders of the societies and
clubs which inspired them, certainly made a pitiable
showing; they proved that they themselves were

81 "Kentucky Gazette," Feb. 8, 1794; Sept. 16, 1797, etc.

236 The Winning of the West

only learning, and had not yet completely mastered,
the difficult art of self-government.

It was the existence of these Western separatists,
nominally the fiercest foes of Spain, that in reality
gave Spain the one real hope of staying the Western
advance. In 1794, the American agents in Spain
were carrying on an interminable correspondence
with the Spanish Court in the effort to come to
some understanding about the boundaries.32 The
Spanish authorities were solemnly corresponding
with the American envoys, as if they meant peace;
yet at the same time they had authorized Carondelet
to do his best to treat directly with the American
States of the West so as to bring about their separa-
tion from the Union. In 1794, Wilkinson, who
was quite incapable of understanding that his in-
famy was heightened by the fact that he wore the
uniform of a Brigadier-General of the United States,
entered into negotiations for a treaty, the base of
which should be the separation of the Western
States from the Atlantic States.33 He had sent
two confidential envoys to Carondelet. Carondelet
jumped at the chance of once more trying to sepa-
rate the West from the East ; and under Wilkinson's
directions he renewed his efforts to try by purchase
and pension to attach some of the leading Kentuck-
ians to Spain. As a beginning he decided to grant

3J American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 443, etc. ;
letters of Carmichael and Short to Gardoqui, Oct. i, 1793; to
Alcudia, Jan. 7, 1794, etc., etc.

33 Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Al-
cudia, July 30, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 237

Wilkinson's request and send him twelve thousand
dollars for himself.34 De Lemos was sent to New
Madrid in October to begin the direct negotiations
with Wilkinson and his allies. The funds to further
the treasonable conspiracy were also forwarded, as
the need arose.

Carondelet was much encouraged as to the out-
come by the fact that De Lemos had not been dis-
possessed by force from the Chickasaw Bluffs. This
shows conclusively that Washington's administra-
tion was in error in not acting with greater decision
about the Spanish posts. Wayne should have been
ordered to use the sword, and to dispossess the Span-
iards from the east bank of the Mississippi. As so
often in our history, we erred, not through a spirit
of over-aggressiveness, but through a willingness to
trust to peaceful measures instead of proceeding to
assert our rights by force.

The first active step taken by Carondelet and De
Lemos was to send the twelve thousand dollars to
Wilkinson, as the foundation" and earnest of the
bribery fund. But the effort miscarried. The
money was sent by two men, Collins and Owen,
each of whom bore cipher letters to Wilkinson, in-
cluding some that were sewed into the collars of
their coats. Collins reached Wilkinson in safety,
but Owen was murdered, for the sake of the money
he bore, by his boat's crew while on the Ohio River.35

34 Do., De Lemos to Alcudia, Sept. 19, 1794.
85 Do., letters of Carondelet to Alcudia, Oct. 4, 1794, and
of De Lemos to Carondelet, Aug. 28, 1791.

238 The Winning of the West

The murderers were arrested and were brought be-
fore the Federal judge, Harry Innes. Owen was a
friend of Innes, andiiad been by him recommended
to Wilkinson as a trustworthy man for any secret
and perilous service. Nevertheless, although it was
his own friend who had been murdered, Innes re-
fused to try the murderers, on the ground that they
were Spanish subjects; a reason which was simply
nonsensical. He forwarded them to Wilkinson at
Fort Warren. The latter sent them back to New
Madrid. On their way they were stopped by the
officer at Fort Massac, a thoroughly loyal man, who
had not been engaged in the intrigues of Wilkinson
and Innes. He sent to the Spanish commander at
New Madrid for an interpreter to interrogate the
men. Of course the Spaniards were as reluctant as
Wilkinson and Innes that the facts as to the rela-
tions between Carondelet and Wilkinson should be
developed, and, like Wilkinson and Innes, they pre-
ferred that the murderers should escape rather than
that these facts should some to light. Accordingly
the interpreter did not divulge the confession of the
villains; all evidence as to their guilt was withheld,
and they were finally discharged. The Spaniards
were very nervous about the affair, and were even
afraid lest travelers might dig up Owen's body and
find the despatches hidden in his collar; which, said
De Lemos, they might send to the President of the
United States, who would of course take measures
to find out what the money and the ciphers meant.36

36 Do. , letter of De Lemos.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 239

Wilkinson's motives in acting as he did were of
course simple. He could not afford to have the
murderers of his friend and agent tried lest they
should disclose his own black infamy. The conduct
of Judge Innes is difficult to explain on any ground
consistent with his integrity and with the official
propriety of his actions. He may not have been a
party to Wilkinson's conspiracy, but he must cer-
tainly have known that Wilkinson was engaged in
negotiations with the Spaniards so corrupt that they
would not bear the light of exposure, or else he
would never have behaved toward the murderers in
the way that he did behave.37

Carondelet, through De Lemos, entered into cor-
respondence with Wayne about the fort built by his
orders at the Chickasaw Bluffs. He refused to give
up this fort; and as Wayne became more urgent in
his demands, he continually responded with new
excuses for delay. He was enabled to tell exactly
what Wayne was doing, as Wilkinson, who was
serving under Wayne, punctually informed the
Spaniard of all that took place in the American

M Marshall, II, 155; Green, p. 328. Even recently defend-
ers of Wilkinson and Innes have asserted, in accordance
with Wilkinson's explanations, that the money forwarded
him was due him from tobacco contracts entered into some
years previously with Miro. Carondelet in his letters above
quoted, however, declares outright that the money was ad-
vanced to begin negotiations in Kentucky, through Wilkin-
son and others, for the pensioning of Kentuckians in the
interests of Spain and the severance of the Western States
from the Union.

240 The Winning of the West

army.38 Carondelet saw that the fate of the Span-
ish-American province which he ruled, hung on the
separation of the Western States from the Union.39
As long as he thought it possible to bring about the
separation, he refused to pay heed even to the orders
of the Court of Spain, or to the treaty engagements
by which he was nominally bound. He was forced
to make constant demands upon the Spanish Court
for money to be used in the negotiations; that is,
to bribe Wilkinson and his fellows in Kentucky.
He succeeded in placating the Chickasaws, and got
from them a formal cession of the Chickasaw Bluffs,
which was a direct blow at the American preten-
sions. As with all Indian tribes, the Chickasaws
were not capable of any settled policy, and were not
under any responsible authority. While some of
them were in close alliance with the Americans and
were warring on the Creeks, the others formed a
treaty with the Spaniards and gave them the terri-
tory they so earnestly wished.40

However, neither Carondelet's energy and devo-
tion to the Spanish Government nor his unscrupu-
lous intrigues were able for long to defer the fate
which hung over the Spanish possessions. In 1795,
Washington nominated as Minister to Spain Thomas
Pinckney, a member of a distinguished family of
South Carolina statesmen, and a man of the utmost

38 Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Al-
cudia, Nov. i, 1793.

39 Do., Carondelet to Alcudia, Sept. 25, 1795.

10 Do., De Lemos to Carondelet, inclosed in Carondelet's
letter of Sept. 26, 1795.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 241

energy and intelligence. Pinckney finally wrung
from the Spaniards a treaty which was as beneficial
to the West as Jay's treaty, and was attended by
none of the drawbacks which marred Jay's work.
The Spaniards at the outset met his demands by a
policy of delay and evasion. Finally, he determined
to stand this no longer, and, on October 24, 1795,
demanded his passports, in a letter to Godoy, the
"Prince of Peace." The demand came at an oppor-
tune moment; for Godoy had just heard of Jay's
treaty. He misunderstood the way in which this
was looked at in the United States, and feared lest,
if not counteracted, it might throw the Americans
into the arms of Great Britain, with which country
Spain was on the verge of war. It is not a little
singular that Jay should have thus rendered an in-
voluntary but important additional service to the
Westerners who so hated him.

The Spaniards now promptly came to terms. They
were in no condition to fight the Americans; they
knew that war would be the result if the conflicting
claims of the two peoples were not at once definitely
settled, one way or the other; and they concluded
the treaty forthwith.41 Its two most important pro-
visions were the settlement of the Southern boundary
on the lines claimed by the United States, and the
granting of the right of deposit to the Westerners.
The boundary followed the thirty-first degree of lat-

41 Pinckney receives justice from Lodge, in his "Washing-
ton," II, 160. For Pinckney 's life, see the biography by Rev.
C. C. Pinckney, p. 129. etc.

VOL. VIII.— ii

242 The Winning of the West

itude from the Mississippi to the Chattahoochee,
down it to the Flint, thence to the head of the St.
Mary's, and down it to the ocean. The Spanish
troops were to be withdrawn from this territory
within the space of six months. The Westerners
were granted for three years the right of deposit
at New Orleans; after three years either the right
was to be continued, or another equivalent port of
deposit was to be granted somewhere on the banks
of the Mississippi. The right of deposit carried
with it the right to export goods from the place of
deposit free from any but an inconsiderable duty.42
The treaty was ratified in 1796, but with astonish-
ing bad faith the Spaniards refused to carry out its
provisions. At this time Carondelet was in the midst
of his negotiations with Wilkinson for the secession
of the West, and had high hopes that he could bring
it about. He had chosen as his agent an English-
man, named Thomas Power, who was a naturalized
Spanish subject, and very zealous in the service of
Spain.43 Power went to Kentucky, where he com-
municated with Wilkinson, Sebastian, Innes, and one
or two others, and submitted to them a letter from
Carondelet. This letter proposed a treaty, of which
the first article was that Wilkinson and his associates
should exert themselves to bring about a separation
of the Western country and its formation into an
independent government wholly unconnected with

48 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 533, etc. ;
Pinckney to Secretary of State, Aug. n, 1795; to Godoy (Al-
cudia), Oct. 24, 1795; copy of treaty, Oct. 27th, etc.

48 Gayarre, III, 345. Wilkinson's Memoirs, II, 225.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 243

that of the Atlantic States; and Carondelet in his
letter assured the men to whom he was writing that,
because of what had occurred in Europe since Spain
had ratified the treaty of October 27, the treaty
would not be executed by his Catholic Majesty.
Promises of favor to the Western people were held
out, and Wilkinson was given a more substantial
bribe, in the shape of ten thousand dollars, by Power.
Sebastian, Innes, and their friends were also prom-
ised a hundred thousand dollars for their good
offices ; and Carondelet, who had no more hesitation
in betraying red men than white, also offered to help
the Westerners subdue their Indian foes, these In-
dian foes being at the moment the devoted allies of
Spain.

The time had gone by, however, when it was pos-
sible to hope for success in such an intrigue. The
treaty with Spain had caused much satisfaction in
the West, and the Kentuckians generally were grow-
ing more and more loyal to the Central Government.
Innes and his friends, in a written communication,
rejected the offer of Carondelet. They declared that
they were devoted to the Union and would not con-
sent to break it up ; but they betrayed curiously little
surprise or indignation at the offer, nor did they in
rejecting it use the vigorous language which be-
seemed men who, while holding the commissions of
a government, were proffered a hundred thousand
dollars to betray that government.44 Power, at the

44 American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I, 928 ; deposition
of Harry Innes, etc.

244 The Winning of the West

close of 1797, reported to his superiors that nothing
could be done.

Meanwhile Carondelet and De Lemos had per-
sisted in declining to surrender the posts at the
Chickasaw Bluffs and Natchez, on pretexts which
were utterly frivolous.45 At this time the Spanish
Court was completely subservient to France, which
was hostile to the United States ; and the Spaniards
would not carry out the treaty they had made until
they had exhausted every device of delay and eva-
sion. Andrew Ellicott was appointed by Washing-
ton Surveyor-General to run the boundary; but
when, early in 1797, he reached Natchez, the Span-
ish representative refused point blank to run the
boundary or evacuate the territory. Meanwhile the
Spanish Minister at Philadelphia, Yrujo, in his cor-
respondence with the Secretary of State, was pursu-
ing precisely the same course of subterfuge and de-
lay. But these tactics could only avail for a time.
Neither the Government of the United States, nor
the Western people would consent to be balked much
longer. The negotiations with Wilkinson and his
associates had come to nothing. A detachment of
American regular soldiers came down the river to
support Ellicott. The settlers around Natchez arose
in revolt against the Spaniards and established a
Committee of Safety, under protection of the Amer-
icans. The population of Mississippi was very

45 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, pp. 20,
70, 78, 79; report of Timothy Pickering, January 22, 1798,
etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 245

mixed, including criminals fleeing from justice, land
speculators, old settlers, well-to-do planters, small
pioneer farmers, and adventurers of every kind ; and,
thanks to the large tory element, there was a British,
and a smaller Spanish party ; but the general feeling
was overwhelmingly for the United States. The
Spanish Government made a virtue of necessity and
withdrew its garrison, after for some time preserv-
ing a kind of joint occupancy with the Americans.46
Captain Isaac Guyon, with a body of United States
troops, took formal possession of both the Chicka-
saw Bluffs and Natchez in 1797. In 1798, the Span-
iards finally evacuated the country,47 their course
being due neither to the wisdom nor the good faith
of their rulers, but to the fear and worry caused by
the unceasing pressure of the Americans. Spain
yielded, because she felt that not to do so would in-
volve the loss of all Louisiana.48 The country was
organized as the Mississippi Territory in June,
I798.49

There was one incident, curious rather than im-
portant, but characteristic in its way, which marked
the close of the transactions of the Western Ameri-

46 B. A. Hinsdale: "The Establishment of the First South-
ern Boundary of the United States." Largely based upon
Ellicott's Journal. Both Ellicott and the leaders among
the settlers were warned of Blount's scheme of conquest and
land speculation, and were hostile to it.

41 Claiborne's "Mississippi," p. 176. He is a writer of
poor judgment; his verdicts on Ellicott and Wilkinson are
astounding.

48 Gayarre, 413, 418; Pontalba's Memoir, Sept. 15, 1800.

49 American State Papers, Public Lands, I, p. 209.

246 The Winning of the West

cans with Spain at this time. During the very years
when Carondelet, under the orders of his Govern-
ment, was seeking to delay the execution of the
boundary treaty, and to seduce the Westerners from
their allegiance to the United States, a Senator of
the United States, entirely without the knowledge
of his Government, was engaged in an intrigue for
the conquest of a part of the Spanish dominion. This
Senator was no less a person than William Blount.
Enterprising and ambitious, he was even more deeply
engaged in land speculations than were the other
prominent men of his time.50 He felt that he had
not been well treated by the United States authori-
ties, and, like all other Westerners, he also felt that
the misconduct of the Spaniards had been so great
that they were not entitled to the slightest consid-
eration. Moreover, he feared lest the territory
should be transferred to France, which would be a
much more dangerous neighbor than Spain; and he
had a strong liking for Great Britain. If he could
not see the territory taken by the Americans under
the flag of the United States, then he wished to see
them enter into possession of it under the standard
of the British King.

In 1797 he entered into a scheme which was in
part one of land speculation and in part one of armed
aggression against Spain. He tried to organize an
association with the purpose of seizing the Spanish
territory west of the Mississippi, and putting it un-
der the control of Great Britain, in the interests of

50 Clay MSS., Blount to Hart, March 13, 1799, etc., etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 247

the seizers. The scheme came to nothing. No defi-
nite steps were taken, and the British Government
refused to take any share in the movement. Finally
the plot was discovered by the President, who
brought it to the attention of the Senate, and Blount
was properly expelled from the Upper House for
entering into a conspiracy to conquer the lands of
one neighboring power in the interest of another.
The Tennesseeans, however, who cared little for the
niceties of international law, and sympathized warm-
ly with any act of territorial aggression against the
Spaniards, were not in the least affected by his ex-
pulsion. They greeted him \vith enthusiasm, and
elected him to high office, and he lived among them
the remainder of his days, honored and respected.51
Nevertheless, his conduct in this instance was inde-
fensible. It was an unfortunate interlude in an oth-
erwise honorable and useful public career.52

11 Blount MSS., letter of Hugh Williamson, March 3, 1808,
etc., etc.

M General Marcus J. Wright, in his "Life and Services of
William Blount," gives the most favorable view possible of
Blount's conduct.

CHAPTER III

THE MEN OF THE WESTERN WATERS, 1/98-1802

THE growth of the West was very rapid in the
years immediately succeeding the peace with
the Indians and the treaties with England and Spain.
As the settlers poured into what had been the In-
dian-haunted wilderness it speedily became necessary
to cut it into political divisions. Kentucky had al-
ready been admitted as a State in 1792; Tennessee
likewise became a State in 1796. The Territory of
Mississippi was organized in 1798, to include the
country west of Georgia and south of Tennessee,
which had been ceded by the Spaniards under Pinck-
ney's treaty.1 In 1800 the Connecticut Reserve,
in what is now northeastern Ohio, was taken by the
United States. The Northwestern Territory was
divided into two parts; the eastern was composed
mainly of what is now the State of Ohio, while the
western portion was called Indian Territory, and
was organized with W. H. Harrison as Governor,
his capital being at Vincennes.2 Harrison had been

1 Claiborne's "Mississippi," p. 220, etc.

8 "Annals of the West," by Thomas H. Perkins, p. 473.
A valuable book, showing much scholarship and research.
The author has never received proper credit. Very few in-
deed of the Western historians of his date showed either his
painstaking care or his breadth of view.
(248)

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 249

Wayne's aid-de-camp at the fight of the Fallen Tim-
bers, and had been singled out by Wayne for men-
tion because of his coolness and gallantry. After-
ward he had succeeded Sargent as Secretary of the
Northwestern Territory when Sargent had been
made Governor of Mississippi, and he had gone as
a Territorial delegate to Congress.3

In 1802 Ohio was admitted as a State. St. Clair
and St. Clair's supporters struggled to keep the Ter-
ritory from Statehood, and proposed to cut it down
in size, nominally because they deemed the extent
of territory too great for governmental purposes,
but really, doubtless, because they distrusted the peo-
ple, and did not wish to see them take the govern-
ment into their own hands. The effort failed, how-
ever, and the State was admitted by Congress, be-
ginning its existence in i8o3.4 Congress made the
proviso that the State Constitution should accord
with the Constitution of the United States, and
should embody the doctrines contained in the Ordi-
nance of 1787* The rapid settlement of south-
eastern Ohio was hindered by the fact that the
speculative land companies, the Ohio and Scioto
associations, held great tracts of territory which the
pioneers passed by in their desire to get to lands

* Jacob Burnett in "Ohio Historical Transactions," Part
II., Vol. I, p. 69.-

4 Atwater, "History of Ohio," p. 169.

5 The question of the boundaries of the Northwestern
States is well treated in "The Boundaries of Wisconsin," by
Reuben G. Thwaites, the Secretary of the State Historical
Society of Wisconsin.

250 The Winning of the West

which they could acquire in their own right. This
was one of the many bad effects which resulted from
the Government's policy of disposing of its land
in large blocks to the highest bidder, instead of al-
lotting it, as has since been done, in quarter sections
to actual settlers.6

Harrison was thoroughly in sympathy with the
Westerners. He had thrown in his lot with theirs ;
he deemed himself one of them, and was accepted
by them as a fit representative. Accordingly he
was very popular as Governor of Indiana. St. Clair
in Ohio and Sargent in Mississippi were both ex-
tremely unpopular. They were appointed by Fed-
eralist administrations, and were entirely out of
sympathy with the Western people among whom
they lived. One was a Scotchman, and one a New
Englander. They were both high-minded men, with
sound ideas on governmental policy, though Sargent
was the abler of the two ; but they were out of touch
with the Westerners. . They distrusted the frontier
folk, and were bitterly disliked in return. Each
committed the fundamental fault of trying to gov-
ern the Territory over which he had been put in
accordance with his own ideas, and heedless of the
wishes and prejudices of those under him. Doubt-
less each was conscientious in what he did, and each
of course considered the difficulties under which he
labored to be due solely to the lawlessness and the
many shortcomings of the settlers. But this was an

6 Mr. Eli Thayer, in his various writings, has rightly laid
especial stress on this point.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 251

error. The experience of Blount when he occupied
the exceedingly difficult position of Territorial Gov-
ernor of Tennessee showed that it was quite possible
for a man of firm belief in the Union to get into
touch with the frontiersmen and to be accepted by
them as a worthy representative; but the virtues of
St. Clair and Sargent were so different from the
backwoods virtues, and their habits of thought were
so alien, that they could not possibly get on with the
people among whom their lot had been cast. Neither
of them in the end took up his abode in the Terri-
tory of which he had been Governor, both returning
to the East. The codes of laws which they enacted
prior to the Territories possessing a sufficient num-
ber of inhabitants to become entitled to Territorial
legislatures were deemed by the settlers to be arbi-
trary and unsuited to their needs. There was much
popular feeling against them. On one occasion St.
Clair was mobbed in Chillicothe, the then capital of
Ohio, with no other effect than to procure a change
of capital to Cincinnati. Finally both Sargent and
St. Clair were removed by Jefferson, early in his
administration.

The Jeffersonian Republican party did very much
that was evil, and it advocated governmental prin-
ciples of such utter folly that the party itself was
obliged immediately to abandon them when it under-
took to carry on the government of the United
States, and only clung to them long enough to cause
serious and lasting damage to the country; but on
the vital question of the West, and its territorial

252 The Winning of the West

expansion, the Jeffersonian party was, on the whole,
emphatically right, and its opponents, the Federal-
ists, emphatically wrong. The Jeffersonians be-
lieved in the acquisition of territory in the West,
and the Federalists did not. The Jeffersonians
believed that the Westerners should be allowed to
govern themselves precisely as other citizens o"f the
United States did, and should be given their full
share in the management of national affairs. Too
many Federalists failed to see that these positions
were the only proper ones to take. In consequence,
notwithstanding all their manifold shortcomings,
the Jeffersonians, and not the Federalists, were those
to whom the West owed most.

Whether the Westerners governed themselves as
wisely as they should have mattered little. The es-
sential point was that they had to be given the right
of self-government. They could not be kept in
pupilage. Like other Americans, they had to be left
to strike out for themselves and to sink or swim
according to the measure of their own capacities.
When this was done it was certain that they would
commit many blunders, and that some of these
blunders would work harm not only to themselves
but to the whole nation. Nevertheless, all this had
to be accepted as part of the penalty paid for free
government. It was wise to accept it in the first
place, and in the second place, whether wise or not,
it was inevitable. Many of the Federalists saw
this; and to many of them, the Adamses, for in-
stance, and Jay and Pinckney, the West owed more

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 253

than it did to most of the Republican statesmen ; but
as a whole, the attitude of the Federalists, especially
in the Northeast, toward the West was ungenerous
and improper, while the Jeffersonians, with all their
unwisdom and demagogy, were nevertheless the
Western champions.

Mississippi and Ohio had squabbled with their
Territorial governors much as the Old Thirteen Col-
onies had squabbled with the governors appointed by
the Crown. One curious consequence of this was
common to both cases. When the old Colonies be-
came States, they in their constitutions usually im-
posed the same checks upon the executive they them-
selves elected as they had desired to see imposed
upon the executive appointed by an outside power.
The new Territories followed the same course.
When Ohio became a State it adopted a very foolish
constitution. This constitution deprived the execu-
tive of almost all power, and provided a feeble, short-
term judiciary, throwing the control of affairs into
the hands of the legislative body, in accordance with
what were then deemed Democratic ideas. The
people were entirely unable to realize that, so far as
their discontent with the Governor's actions was
reasonable, it arose from the fact that he was ap-
pointed, not by themselves, but by some body or
person not in sympathy with them. They failed to
grasp the seemingly self-evident truth that a gov-
ernor, one man elected by the people, is just as much
their representative and is just as certain to carry
out their ideas as is a Legislature, a body of men

254 The Winning of the West

elected by the people. They provided a government
which accentuated, instead of softening, the defects
in their own social system. They were in no dan-
ger of suffering from tyranny; they were in no
danger of losing the liberty which they so jealously
guarded. The perils that threatened them were
lawlessness, lack of order, and lack of capacity to
concentrate their efforts in time of danger from
within or from an external enemy ; and against these
perils they made no provision whatever.

The inhabitants of Ohio Territory were just as
bitter against St. Clair as the inhabitants of Missis-
sippi Territory were against Sargent. The Missis-
sippians did not object to Sargent as a Northern
man, but, in common with the men of Ohio, they
objected to governors who were Eastern men and
out of touch with the West. At the end of the
eighteenth century, and during the early years of the
nineteenth, the important fact to be remembered in
treating of the Westerners was their fundamental
unity, in blood, in ways of life, and in habits of
thought.7 They were predominantly of Southern,
not of Northern blood; though it was the blood of
the Southerners of the uplands, not of the low coast
regions, so that they were far more closely kin to
the Northerners than were the seaboard planters.
In Kentucky and Tennessee, in Indiana and Missis-
sippi, the settlers were of the same quality. They

1 Prof. Frederick A. Turner, of the University of Michi-
gan, deserves especial credit for the stress he has laid upon
this point.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 255

possessed the same virtues and the same shortcom-
ings, the same ideals and the same practices. There
was already a considerable Eastern emigration to
the West, but it went as much to Kentucky as to
Ohio, and almost as much to Tennessee and Missis-
sippi as to Indiana. As yet the Northeasterners
were chiefly engaged in filling the vacant spaces in
New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. The
great flood of Eastern emigration to the West, the
flood which followed the parallels of latitude, and
made the Northwest like the Northeast, did not be-
gin until after the War of 1812. It was no accident
that made Harrison, the first Governor of Indiana
and long the typical representative of the Northwest,
by birth a Virginian and the son of one of the
Virginian signers of the Declaration of Independ-
ence. The Northwest was at this time in closer
touch with Virginia than with New England.

There was as yet no hard and fast line drawn
between North and South among the men of the
Western waters. Their sense of political cohesion
was not fully developed, and the same qualities that
at times made them loose in their ideas of allegiance
to the Union at times also prevented a vivid realiza-
tion on their part of their own political and social
solidarity; but they were always more or less con-
scious of this solidarity, and, as a rule, they acted
together.

Most important of all, the slavery question, which
afterward rived in sunder the men west of the Al-
leghanies as it rived in sunder those east of them,

256 The Winning of the West

was of small importance in the early years. West
of the Alleghanies slaves were still to be found al-
most everywhere, while almost everywhere there
were also frequent and open expressions of hostility
to slavery. The Southerners still rather disliked
slavery, while the Northerners did not as yet feel
any very violent antagonism to it. In the Indiana
Territory there were hundreds of slaves, the prop-
erty of the old French inhabitants and of the Ameri-
can settlers who had come there prior to 1 787 ; and
the majority of the population of this Territory
actually wished to reintroduce slavery, and repeat-
edly petitioned Congress to be allowed the reintro-
duction. Congress, with equal patriotism and wis-
dom, always refused the petition; but it was not
until the new century was well under way that the
anti-slavery element obtained control in Indiana and
Illinois. Even in Ohio there was a considerable
party which favored the introduction of slavery, and
though the majority was against this, the people
had small sympathy with the negroes, and passed
very severe laws against the introduction of free
blacks into the State, and even against those already
in residence therein.8 On the other hand, when
Kentucky's first constitutional convention sat, a res-
olute effort was made to abolish slavery within the
State, and this effort was only defeated after a hard
struggle and a close vote. To their honor be it said
that all of the clergymen — three Baptists, one Meth-
odist, one Dutch Reformed, and one Presbyterian —

8 "Ohio," by Rufus King, pp. 290, 364, etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 257

who were members of the constitutional convention
voted in favor of the abolition of slavery.9 In Ten-
nessee no such effort was made, but the leaders of
thought did not hesitate to express their horror of
slavery and their desire that it might be abolished.
There was no sharp difference between the attitudes
of the Northwestern and the Southwestern -States
toward slavery.

North and South alike, the ways of life were sub-
stantially the same, though there were differences,
of course, and these differences tended to become
accentuated. Thus, in the Mississippi Territory the
planters, in the closing years of the century, began
to turn their attention to cotton instead of devoting
themselves to the crops of their brethren further
north ; and cotton soon became their staple product.
But as yet the typical settler everywhere was the
man of the .axe and rifle, the small pioneer farmer
who lived by himself, with his wife and his swarm-
ing children, on a big tract of wooded land, perhaps
three or four hundred acres in extent. Of this three
or four hundred acres he rarely cleared more than
eight or ten; and these were cleared imperfectly.
On this clearing he tilled the soil, and there he

9 John Mason Brown, "Political Beginnings of Kentucky,"
229. Among the men who deserve honor for thus voting
against slavery was Harry Innes. One of the Baptist preach-
ers, Gerrard, was elected Governor over Logan, four years
later ; a proof that Kentucky sentiment was very tolerant of
attacks on slavery. All the clergymen, by the way, also
voted to disqualify clergymen for service in the legisla-
tures.

258 The Winning of the West

lived in his rough log house with but one room, or
at most two and a loft.10

The man of the Western waters was essentially
a man who dwelt alone in the midst of the forest on
his rude little farm, and who eked out his living
by hunting. Game still abounded everywhere, save
in the immediate neighborhood of the towns ; so that
many of the inhabitants lived almost exclusively
by hunting and fishing, and, with their return to the
pursuits of savagery, adopted not a little of the
savage idleness and thriftlessness. Bear, deer, and
turkey were staple foods. Elk had ceased to be
common, though they hung on here and there in
out of the way localities for many years ; and by the
close of the century the herds of bison had been
driven west of the Mississippi.11 Smaller forms of
wild life swarmed. Gray squirrels existed in such
incredible numbers that they caused very serious
damage to the crops, and at one time the Kentucky
Legislature passed a law imposing upon every male
over sixteen years of age the duty of killing a cer-
tain number of squirrels and crows every year.12
The settlers possessed horses and horned cattle, but
only a few sheep, which were not fitted to fight for
their own existence in the woods, as the stock had
to. On the other hand, slab-sided, long-legged hogs
were the most plentiful of domestic animals, ranging
in great, half-wild droves through the forest.

10 F. A. Michaux, "Voyages" (in 1802), pp. 132, 214, etc.

11 Henry Ker, "Travels," p. 22.

" Michaux, 215, 236; Collins, I, 24.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 259

All observers were struck by the intense fondness
of the frontiersmen for the woods and for a restless,
lonely life.13 They pushed independence to an ex-
treme; they did not wish to work for others or to
rent land from others. Each was himself a small
landed proprietor, who cleared only the ground that
he could himself cultivate. Workmen were scarce
and labor dear. It was almost impossible to get men
fit to work as mill hands, or to do high-class labor in
forges even by importing them from Pennsylvania
or Maryland.14 Even in the few towns the inhabi-
tants preferred that their children should follow agri-
culture rather than become handicraftsmen; and
skilled workmen such as carpenters and smiths made
a great deal of money, so much so that they could
live a week on one day's wage.15

In addition to farming there was a big trade
along the river. Land transportation was very diffi-
cult indeed, and the frontiersman's whole life was
one long struggle with the forest and with poor
roads. The waterways were consequently of very
great importance, and the flatboatmen on the Mis-
sissippi and Ohio became a numerous and note-
worthy class. The rivers were covered with their
craft. There was a driving trade between Pitts-
burg and New Orleans, the goods being drawn to
Pittsburg from the seacoast cities by great four-

1S Crevecoeur, "Voyage dans la Haute Pennsylvania," etc.,
p. 265.
14 Clay MSS., Letter to George Nicholas, Baltimore, Sept.

3. i?96-
18 Michaux, pp. 96, 152.

160 The Winning of the West

horse wagons, and being exported in ships from
New Orleans to all parts of the earth. Not only
did the Westerners build river craft, but they even
went into shipbuilding; and on the upper Ohio, at
Pittsburg, and near Marietta, at the beginning of
the present century, seagoing ships were built and
launched to go down the Ohio and Mississippi, and
thence across the ocean to any foreign port.16 There
was, however, much risk in this trade; for the de-
mand for commodities at Natchez and New Orleans
was uncertain, while the waters of the Gulf swarmed
with British and French cruisers, always ready to
pounce like pirates on the ships of neutral powers.17
Yet the river trade was but the handmaid of fron-
tier agriculture. The Westerners were a farmer
folk who lived on the clearings their own hands had
made in the great woods, and who owned the land
they tilled. Towns were few and small. At the
end of the century there were some four hundred
thousand people in the West; yet the largest town
was Lexington, which contained less than three
thousand people.18 Lexington was a neatly built
little burg, with fine houses and good stores. The
leading people lived well and possessed much culti-
vation. Louisville and Nashville were each about
half its size. In Nashville, of the one hundred and

16 Thompson Mason Harris, "Journal of Tour," etc., 1803,
p. 140; Michaux, p. 77.

11 Clay MSS., W. H. Turner to Thomas Hart, Natchez,
May 27, 1797.

18 Perrin Du Lac, "Voyage," etc., 1801, 1803, p. 153; Mi-
chaux, 150.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 261

twenty houses but eight were of brick, and most of
them were mere log huts. Cincinnati was a poor
little village. Cleveland consisted of but two or
three log cabins, at a time when there were already
a thousand settlers in its neighborhood on the Con-
necticut Reserve, scattered out on their farms.19
Natchez was a very important town, nearly as large
as Lexington. It derived its importance from the
river traffic on the Mississippi. All the boatmen
stopped there, and sometimes as many as one hun-
dred and fifty craft were moored to the bank at the
same time. The men who did this laborious river
work were rude, powerful, and lawless, and when
they halted for a rest their idea of enjoyment was
the coarsest and most savage dissipation. At Nat-
chez there speedily gathered every species of pur-
veyor to their vicious pleasures, and the part of the
town known as "Natchez under the Hill" became a
byword for crime and debauchery.20

Kentucky had grown so in population, possessing
over two hundred thousand inhabitants, that she
had begun to resemble an Eastern State. When, in
1796, Benjamin Logan, the representative of the
old woodchoppers and Indian fighters, ran for gov-
ernor and was beaten, it was evident that Kentucky
had passed out of the mere pioneer days. It was
more than a mere coincidence that in the following
year Henry Clay should have taken up his residence
in Lexington. It showed that the State was already

19 "Historical Collections of Ohio," p. 120.
90 Henry Ker, "Travels," p. 41.

262 The Winning of the West

attracting to live within her borders men like those
who were fitted for social and political leadership
in Virginia.

Though the typical inhabitant of Kentucky was
still the small frontier farmer, the class of well-to-
do gentry had already attained good proportions.
Elsewhere throughout the West, in Tennessee, and
even here and there in Ohio and the Territories of
Indiana and Mississippi, there were to be found
occasional houses that were well built and well fur-
nished, and surrounded by pleasant grounds, fairly
well kept; houses to which the owners had brought
their stores of silver and linen and heavy, old-fash-
ioned furniture from their homes in the Eastern
States. Blount, for instance, had a handsome house
in Knoxville, well fitted, as beseemed that of a man
one of whose brothers still lived at Blount Hall, in
the coast region of North Carolina, the ancestral
seat of his forefathers for generations.21 But by
far the greatest number of these fine houses, and
the largest class of gentry to dwell in them, were in
Kentucky. Not only were Lexington and Louis-
ville important towns, but Danville, the first capital
of Kentucky, also possessed importance, and, in-
deed, had been the first of the Western towns to
develop an active and distinctive social and political
life. It was in Danville that, in the years immedi-
ately preceding Kentucky's admission as a State,
the Political Club met. The membership of this

21 Clay MSS., Blount to Hart, Knoxville, Feb. 9, 1794.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 263

club included many of the leaders of Kentucky's
intellectual life, and the record of its debates shows
the keenness with which they watched the course
of social and political development not only in Ken-
tucky but in the United States. They were men
of good intelligence and trained minds, and their
meetings and debates undoubtedly had a stimulating
effect upon Kentucky life, though they were tainted,
as were a very large number of the leading men of
the same stamp elsewhere throughout the country,
with the doctrinaire political notions common
among those who followed the French political theo-
rists of the day.22

Of the gentry many were lawyers, and the law
led naturally to political life; but even among the
gentry the typical man was still emphatically the
big landowner. The leaders of Kentucky life were
men who owned large estates, on which they lived in
their great roomy houses. Even when they prac-
ticed law they also supervised their estates; and if
they were not lawyers, in addition to tilling the land
they were always ready to try their hand at some
kind of manufacture. They were willing to turn
their attention to any new business in which there
was a chance to make money, whether it was to put
up a mill, to build a forge, to undertake a contract
for the delivery of wheat to some big flour mer-
chant, or to build a flotilla of flatboats, and take the
produce of a given neighborhood down to New Or-

« "The Political Club," by Thomas Speed, Filson Club
Publications.

264 The Winning of the West

leans for shipment to the West Indies.23 They were
also always engaged in efforts to improve the breed
of their horses and cattle, and to introduce new
kinds of agriculture, notably the culture of the
vine.24 They speedily settled themselves definitely
in the new country, and began to make ready for
their children to inherit their homes after them;
though they retained enough of the restless spirit
which had made them cross the Alleghanies to be
always on the lookout for any fresh region of ex-
ceptional advantages, such as many of them consid-
ered the lands along the lower Mississippi. They
led a life which appealed to them strongly, for it
was passed much in the open air, in a beautiful re-
gion and lovely climate, with horses and hounds,
and the management of their estates and their inter-
est in politics to occupy their time; while their
neighbors were men of cultivation, at least by their
own standards, so that they had the society for
which they most cared.25 In spite of their willing-

53 Clay MSS., Seitz & Lowan to Garret Darling, Lexing-
ton, January 23, 1797; agreement of George Nicholas, Octo-
ber 10, 1796, etc. This was an agreement on the part of
Nicholas to furnish Seitz & Lowan with all the flour manu-
factured at his mill during the season of 1797 for exportation,
the flour to be delivered by him in Kentucky. He was to re-
ceive $5.50 a barrel up to the receipt of $1,500; after that it
was to depend upon the price of wheat. Six bushels of wheat
were reckoned to a barrel of flour, and the price of a bushel
was put at four shillings ; in reality it ranged from three to six.

24 Do., "Minutes of meeting of the Directors of the Vine-
yard Society," June 27, 1800.

85 Do., James Brown to Thomas Hart, Lexington, April 3,
1804.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 265

ness to embark in commercial ventures and to build
mills, rope-walks, and similar manufactures, — for
which they had the greatest difficulty in procuring
skilled laborers, whether foreign or native, from the
Northeastern States26 — and in spite of their liking
for the law, they retained the deep-settled belief
that the cultivation of the earth was the best of all
possible pursuits for men of every station, high or
low.27

In many ways the life of the Kentuckians was
most like that of the Virginia gentry, though it
had peculiar features of its own. Judged by Puri-
tan standards, it seemed free enough ; and it is rather
curious to find Virginia fathers anxious to send
their sons out to Kentucky so that they could get
away from what they termed "the constant round
of dissipation, the scenes of idleness which boys are
perpetually engaged in" in Virginia. One Vir-
ginia gentleman of note, in writing to a prominent
Kentuckian to whom he wished to send his son,
dwelt upon his desire to get him away from a place

26 Do., J. Brown to Thomas Hart, Philadelphia, February
ii, 1797. This letter was brought out to Hart by a work-
man, David Dodge, whom Brown had at last succeeded in
engaging. Dodge had been working in New York at a rope-
walk, where he received $500 a year without board. From
Hart he bargained to receive $350 with board. It proved im-
possible to engage other journeymen workers, Brown express-
ing his belief that any whom he chose would desert a week
after they got to Kentucky, and Dodge saying that he would
rather take raw hands and train them to the business than
take out such hands as offered to go.

S7 Do., William Nelson to Col. George Nicholas, Caroline,
Va., December 29, 1794.

VOL. VIII.— 12

266 The Winning of the West

where boys of his age spent most of the time gal-
loping wherever they wished, mounted on blooded
horses. Kentucky hardly seemed a place to which
a parent would send a son if he wished him to avoid
the temptations of horse flesh; but this particular
Virginian at least tried to provide against this, as
he informed his correspondent that he should send
his son out to Kentucky mounted on an "indifferent
Nag," which was to be used only as a means of lo-
comotion for the journey, and was then immediately
to be sold.28

The gentry strove hard to secure a good educa-
tion for their children, and in Kentucky, as in Tenn-
essee, made every effort to bring about the building
of academies where their boys and girls could be
well taught. If this was not possible, they strove
to find some teacher capable of taking a class to
which he could teach Latin and mathematics; a
teacher who should also "prepare his pupils for be-
coming useful members of society and patriotic
citizens.29 Where possible the leading families sent
their sons to some Eastern college, Princeton being
naturally the favorite institution of learning with
people who dwelt in communities where the Pres-
byterians took the lead in social standing and culti-
vation.30

98 Do., William Nelson to Nicholas, November 9, 1792.

49 Shelby MSS., letter of Toulmin, January 7, 1794; Blount
MSS., January 6, 1792, etc.

30 Clay MSS., passim; letter to Thomas Hart, October 19,
1794; October 13, 1797, etc. In the last letter, by the way,
written by one John Umstead, occurs the following sen-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 267

All through the West there was much difficulty
in getting money. In Tennessee particularly money
was so scarce that the only way to get cash in hand
was by selling provisions to the few Federal garri-
sons.31 Credits were long, and payment made
largely in kind; and the price at which an article
could be sold under such conditions was twice as
large as that which it would command for cash
down. In the accounts kept by the landowners
with the merchants who sold them goods, and the
artisans who worked for them, there usually appear
credit accounts in which the amounts due on ac-
count of produce of various kinds are deducted from
the debt, leaving a balance to be settled by cash and
by orders. Owing to the fluctuating currency, and
to the wide difference in charges when immediate
cash payments were received as compared with
charges when the payments were made on credit and
in kind, it is difficult to know exactly what the prices
represent. In Kentucky currency mutton and beef
were fourpence a pound, in the summer of 1796,
while four beef tongues cost three shillings, and
a quarter of lamb three and sixpence. In 1798, on
the same account, beef was down to threepence a
pound.32 Linen cost two and fourpence, or three

tence: "I have lately heard a piece of news, if true, must be
a valuable acquisition to the Western World, viz., a boat of
a considerable burden making four miles and a half an hour
against the strongest current in the Mississippi River, and
worked by horses."

31 Do., Blount to Hart, Knoxville, March 13, 1799.

35 Do., Account of James Morrison and Melchia Myer, Oc-
tober 12, 1798.

268 The Winning of the West

shillings a yard ; flannel, four to six shillings ; calico
and chintz about the same ; baize, three shillings and
ninepence. A dozen knives and forks were eighteen
shillings, and ten pocket handkerchiefs two pounds.
Worsted shoes were eight shillings a pair, and but-
tons were a shilling a dozen. A pair of gloves
was three and ninepence; a pair of kid slippers,
thirteen and sixpence; ribbons were one and six-
pence.33 The blacksmith charged six shillings and
ninepence for a pair of shoes, and a shilling and six-
pence for taking off an old pair; and he did all the
iron work for the farm and the house alike, from
repairing bridle bits and sharpening coulters to
mounting "wafil irons"34 — for the housewives ex-
celled in preparing delicious waffles and hot cakes.
The gentry were fond of taking holidays, going
to some mountain resort, where they met friends
from other parts of Kentucky and Tennessee, and
from Virginia and elsewhere. They carried their
negro servants with them, and at a good tavern
the board would be three shillings a day for the
master and a little over a shilling for the man.
They lived in comfort and they enjoyed themselves;
but they did not have much ready money. From
the sales of their crops and stock and from their
mercantile ventures they got enough to pay the

88 Do., Account of Mrs. Marion Nicholas with Tilford, 1802.
On this bill appears also a charge for Hyson tea, for straw
bonnets, at eighteen shillings ; for black silk gloves, and for
one "^sop's Fables," at a cost of three shillings and nine-
pence.

84 Do., Account of Morrison and Hickey, 1798.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 269

blacksmith and carpenter, who did odd jobs for
them, and the Eastern merchants from whom they
got gloves, bonnets, hats, and shoes, and the cloth
which was made into dresses by the womankind on
their plantations. But most of their wants were
supplied on their own places. Their abundant tables
were furnished mainly with what their own farms
yielded. When they traveled they went in their
own carriages. The rich men, whose wants were
comparatively many, usually had on their estates
white hired men or black slaves whose labor could
gratify them; while the ordinary farmer, of the
class that formed the great majority of the popu-
lation, was capable of supplying almost all his needs
himself, or with the assistance of his family.

The immense preponderance of the agricultural,
land-holding, and land-tilling element, and the com-
parative utter insignificance of town development,
was highly characteristic of the Western settlement
of this time, and offers a very marked contrast to
what goes on to-day in the settlement of new
countries. At the end of the eighteenth century
the population of the Western country was about
as great as the population of the State of Washing-
ton at the end of the nineteenth, and Washington
is distinctly a pastoral and agricultural State, a
State of men who chop trees, herd cattle, and till
the soil, as well as trade; but in Washington great
cities, like Tacoma, Seattle, and Spokane, have
sprung up with a rapidity which was utterly un-
known in the West a century ago. Nowadays when

ijo The Winning of the West

new States are formed the urban population in them
tends to grow as rapidly as in the old. A hundred
years ago there was practically no urban popula-
tion at all in a new country. Colorado even during
its first decade of Statehood had a third of its pop-
ulation in its capital city. Kentucky during its first
decade did not have much more than one per cent of
its population in its capital city. Kentucky grew as
rapidly as Colorado grew, a hundred years later ; but
Denver grew thirty or forty times as fast as Lex-
ington had ever grown.

In the strongly marked frontier character no
traits were more pronounced than the dislike of
crowding and the tendency to roam to and fro,
hither and thither, always with a westward trend.
Boone, the typical frontiersman, embodied in his
own person the spirit of loneliness and restlessness
which marked the first venturers into the wilderness.
He had wandered in his youth from Pennsylvania
to Carolina, and, in the prime of his strength, from
North Carolina to Kentucky. When Kentucky be-
came well settled in the closing years of the century,
he crossed into Missouri, that he might once more
take up his life where he could see the game come
out of the woods at nightfall, and could wander
among trees untouched by the axe of the pioneer.
An English traveler of note who happened to en-
counter him about this time has left an interesting
account of the meeting. It was on the Ohio, and
Boone was in a canoe, alone with his dog and gun,
setting forth on a solitary trip into the wilderness

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 271

to trap beaver. He would not even join himself
to the other travelers for a night, preferring to
plunge at once into the wild, lonely life he so loved.
His strong character and keen mind struck the Eng-
lishman, who yet saw that the old hunter belonged
to the class of pioneers who could never themselves
civilize the land, because they ever fled from the
face of the very civilization for which they had made
ready the land. In Boone's soul the fierce impa-
tience of all restraint burned like a fire. He told
the Englishman that he no longer cared for Ken-
tucky, because its people had grown too easy of
life; and that he wished to move to some place
where men still lived untrammeled and unshackled,
and enjoyed uncontrolled the free blessings of nat-
ure.35 The isolation of his life and the frequency
with which he changed his abode brought out the
frontiersman's wonderful capacity to shift for him-
self, but it hindered the development of his power
of acting in combination with others of his kind.
The first comers to the new country were so restless
and so intolerant of the presence of their kind, that
as neighbors came in they moved ever westward.
They could not act with their fellows.

Of course in the men who succeeded the first
pioneers, and who were the first permanent settlers,
the restlessness and the desire for a lonely life were
much less developed. These men wandered only
until they found a good piece of land, not because the

35 Francis Bailey's "Journal of a Tour in Unsettled Parts
of North America in 1796 and 1797," p. 234.

The Winning of the West

country was lonely, but because it was fertile. They
hailed with joy the advent of new settlers and the up-
building of a little market town in the neighborhood.
They joined together eagerly in the effort to obtain
schools for their children. As yet there were no pub-
lic schools supported by the government in any part
of the West, but all the settlers of any pretension
to respectability were anxious to give their children
a decent education. Even the poorer people, who
were still engaged in the hardest and roughest strug-
gle for a livelihood, showed appreciation of the
need of schooling for their children; and wherever
the clearings of the settlers were within reasonable
distance of one another a log school-house was sure
to spring up. The school-teacher boarded around
among the different families, and was quite as apt
to be paid in produce as in cash. Sometimes he
was a teacher by profession; more often he took
up teaching simply as an interlude to some of his
other occupations. School-books were more com-
mon than any others in the scanty libraries of the
pioneers.

The settlers who became firmly established in the
land gave definite shape to its political career. The
county was throughout the West the unit of divi-
sion, though in the North it became somewhat
mixed with the township system. It is a pity that
the township could not have been the unit, as it
would have rendered the social and political devel-
opment in many respects easier, by giving to each
little community responsibility for, and power in,

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 273

matters concerning its own welfare; but the back-
woodsmen lived so scattered out, and the thinly-
settled regions covered so large an extent of terri-
tory, that the county was at first in some ways
more suited to their needs. Moreover, it was the
unit of organization in Virginia, to which State
more than to any other the pioneers owed their
social and governmental system. The people were
ordinarily brought but little in contact with the
Government. They were exceedingly jealous of
their individual liberty, and wished to be interfered
with as little as possible. Nevertheless, they were
fond of litigation. One observer remarks that
horses and lawsuits were their great subjects of
conversation.36

The vast extent of the territory and the scanti-
ness of the population forced the men of law, like
the religious leaders, to travel about rather than
stay permanently fixed in any one place. In the
few towns there were lawyers and clergymen who
had permanent homes; but as a rule both rode cir-
cuits. The judges and the lawyers traveled together
on the circuits to hold court. At the Shire-town all
might sleep in one room, or at least under one roof ;
and it was far from an unusual thing to see both
the grand and petty juries sitting under trees in
the open.37

The fact that the Government did so little for the
individual and left so much to be done by him ren-
dered it necessary for the individuals voluntarily

36 Michaux, p. 240. " Atwater, p. 177.

274 The Winning of the West

to combine. Huskings and house-raisings were
times when all joined freely to work for the man
whose corn was to be shucked or whose log cabin
was to be built, and ttirned their labor into a frolic
and merry-making, where the men drank much
whiskey and the young people danced vigorously
to the sound of the fiddle. Such merry-makings
were attended from far and near, offering a most
welcome break to the dreariness of life on the lonely
clearings in the midst of the forest. Ordinarily the
frontiersman at his home only drank milk or water;
but at the taverns and social gatherings there was
much drunkenness, for the men craved whiskey,
drinking the fiery liquor in huge draughts. Often
the orgies ended with brutal brawls. To outsiders
the craving of the backwoodsman for whiskey was
one of his least attractive traits.38 It must always
be remembered, however, that even the most friendly
outsider is apt to apply to others his own standards
in matters of judgment. The average traveler over-
stated the drunkenness of the backwoodsman, ex-
actly as he overstated his misery.

The frontiersman was very poor. He worked
hard and lived roughly, and he and his family had
little beyond coarse food, coarse clothing, and a rude
shelter. In the severe winters they suffered both
from cold and hunger. In the summers there was
sickness everywhere, fevers of various kinds scourg-
ing all the new settlements. The difficulty of com-
munication was so great that it took three months

38 Perrin Du Lac, p. 131 ; Michaux, 95, etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 275

for the emigrants to travel from Connecticut to the
Western Reserve near Cleveland, and a journey
from a clearing, over the forest roads, to a little
town not fifty miles off was an affair of moment
to be undertaken but once a year.39 Yet to the
frontiersmen themselves the life was far from unat-
tractive. It gratified their intense love of independ-
ence; the lack of refinement did not grate on their
rough, bold natures ; and they prized the entire qual-
ity of a life where there were no social distinctions,
and few social restraints. Game was still a staple,
being sought after for the flesh and the hide, and
of course all the men and boys were enthralled by
the delights of the chase. The life was as free as
it was rude, and it possessed great fascinations, not
only for the wilder spirits, but even for many men
who, when they had the chance, showed that they
possessed ability to acquire cultivation.

One old pioneer has left a pleasant account of
the beginning of an ordinary day's work in a log
cabin :40 "I know of no scene in civilized life more
primitive than such a cabin hearth as that of my
mother. In the morning, a buckeye back-log, a
hickory forestick, resting on stone and irons, with

39 "Historical Collections of Ohio," p. 120; Perrin Du Lac,
p. 143.

40 Drake's " Pioneer Life in Kentucky." This gives an ex-
cellent description of life in a family of pioneers, represent-
ing what might be called the average frontiersman of the
best type. Drake's father and mother were poor and illiter-
ate, but hardworking, honest, God-fearing folk, with an ear-
nest desire to do their duty by their neighbors and to see their
children rise in the world.

276 The Winning of the West

a johnny-cake, on a clean ash board, set before the
fire to bake ; a frying pan, with its long handle rest-
ing on a split-bottom turner's chair, sending out its
peculiar music, and the tea-kettle swung from a
wooden lug pole, with myself setting the table or
turning the meat, or watching the johnny-cake,
while she sat nursing the baby in the corner and
telling the little ones to hold still and let their sister
Lizzie dress them. Then came blowing the conch-
shell for father in the field, the howling of old Lion,
the gathering round the table, the blessing, the dull
clatter of pewter spoons and pewter basins, the talk
about the crop and stock, the inquiry whether Dan'l
(the boy) could be spared from the house, and the
general arrangements for the day. Breakfast over,
my function was to provide the sauce for dinner;
in winter, to open the potato or turnip hole, and
wash what I took out; in spring, to go into the field
and collect the greens; in summer and fall, to ex-
plore the truck patch, our little garden. If I after-
ward went to the field my household labors ceased
•until night; if not, they continued through the day.
As often as possible mother would engage in mak-
ing pumpkin pies, in which I generally bore a part,
and one of these more commonly graced the supper
than the dinner table. My pride was in the labors
of the field. Mother did the spinning. The stand-
ing dye-stuff was the inner bark of the white walnut,
from which we obtained that peculiar and perma-
nent shade of dull yellow, the butternut [so common
and typical in the clothing of the backwoods farm-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 277

er]. Oak bark, with copperas as a mordant, when
father had money to purchase it, supplied the ink
with which I learned to write. I drove the horses
to and from the range, and salted them. I tended
the sheep, and hunted up the cattle in the woods."41
This was the life of the thrifty pioneers, whose chil-
dren more than held their own in the world. The
shiftless men without ambition and without thrift,
lived in laziness and filth; their eating and sleeping
arrangements were as unattractive as those of an
Indian wigwam.

The pleasures and the toils of the life were alike
peculiar. In the wilder parts the loneliness and the
fierce struggle with squalid poverty, and with the
tendency to revert to savage conditions, inevitably
produced for a generation or two a certain falling
off from the standard of civilized communities. It
needed peculiar qualities to ensure success, and the
pioneers were almost exclusively native Americans.
The Germans were more thrifty and prosperous,
but they could not go first into the wilderness.42
Men fresh from England rarely succeeded.43 The
most pitiable group of emigrants that reached the

41 Do., pp. 90, in, etc., condensed.

49 Michaux, p. 63, etc.

43 Parkinson's "Tour in America, 1798-1800," pp. 504, 588,
etc. Parkinson loathed the Americans. A curious example
of how differently the same facts will affect different observ-
ers may be gained by contrasting his observations with those
of his fellow Englishman, John Davis, whose trip covered pre-
cisely the same period; but Parkinson's observations as to
the extreme difficulty of an Old Country farmer getting on
in the backwoods regions are doubtless mainly true.

278 The Winning of the West

West at this time was formed by the French who
came to found the town of Gallipolis, on the Ohio.
These were mostly refugees from the Revolution,
who had been taken in by a swindling land company.
They were utterly unsuited to life in the wilderness,
being gentlemen, small tradesmen, lawyers, and the
like. Unable to grapple with the wild life into
which they found themselves plunged, they sank
into shiftless poverty, not one in fifty showing in-
dustry and capacity to succeed. Congress took pity
upon them and granted them twenty-four thousand
acres in Scioto County, the tract being known as
the French grant; but no gift of wild land was
able to ensure their prosperity. By degrees they
were absorbed into the neighboring communities,
a few succeeding, most ending their lives in abject
failure.44

The trouble these poor French settlers had with
their lands was far from unique. The early system
of land sales in the West was most unwise. In
Kentucky and Tennessee the grants were made
under the laws of Virginia and North Carolina, and
each man purchased or pre-empted whatever he
could, and surveyed it where he liked, with a con-
sequent endless confusion of titles. The National
Government possessed the disposal of the land in
the Northwest and in Mississippi ; and it avoided the
pitfall of unlimited private surveying; but it made
little effort to prevent swindling by land companies,
and none whatever to people the country with actual

44 Atwater, p. 159; Michaux, p. 122, etc.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 279

settlers. Congress granted great tracts of lands to
companies and to individuals, selling to the highest
bidder, whether or not he intended personally to
occupy the country. Public sales were thus con-
ducted by competition, and Congress even declined
to grant to the men in actual possession the right
of pre-emption at the average rate of sale, refusing
the request of settlers in both Mississippi and In-
diana that they should be given the first choice to
the lands which they had already partially cleared.45
It was not until many years later that we adopted
the wise policy of selling the National domain in
small lots to actual occupants.

The pioneer in his constant struggle with poverty
was prone to look with puzzled anger at those who
made more money than he did, and whose lives were
easier. The backwoods farmer or planter of that
day looked upon the merchant with much the same
suspicion and hostility now felt by his successor for
the banker or the railroad magnate. He did not
quite understand how it was that the merchant, who
seemed to work less hard than he did, should make
more money; and being ignorant and suspicious,
he usually followed some hopelessly wrong-headed
course when he tried to remedy his wrongs. Some-
times these efforts to obtain relief took the form
of resolutions not to purchase from merchants or
traders such articles as woolens, linens, cottons, hats,
or shoes, unless the same could be paid for in

44 American State Papers, Public Lands, 1, 261 ; also pp. 71,
74, 99, etc.

280 The Winning of the West

articles grown or manufactured by the farmers
themselves. This particular move was taken because
of the alarming scarcity of money, and was aimed
particularly at the inhabitants of the Atlantic
States. It was of course utterly ineffective.46 A
much less wise and less honest course was that some-
times followed of refusing to pay debts when the
latter became inconvenient and pressing.47

The frontier virtue of independence and of im-
patience of outside direction found a particularly
vicious expression in the frontier abhorrence of
regular troops, and advocacy of a hopelessly feeble
militia system. The people were foolishly con-
vinced of the efficacy of their militia system, which
they loudly proclaimed to be the only proper mode
of National defence,48 while in the actual presence
of the Indians the stern necessities of border war-
fare forced the frontiersmen into a certain sem-
blance of discipline. As soon as the immediate pres-
sure was relieved, however, the whole militia system
sank into a mere farce. At certain stated occa-
sions there were musters for company or regimental
drill. These training days were treated as occasions
for frolic and merry-making. There were pony
races and wrestling matches, with unlimited fight-
ing, drunkenness, and general uproar. Such mus-

46 Marshall, II. p. 325.

41 The inhabitants of Natchez, in the last days of the Span-
ish dominion, became inflamed with hostility to their credi-
tors, the merchants, and insisted upon what were practically
stay laws being enacted in their favor. Gayarre and Claiborne.

48 Marshall, II, p. 279.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 281

ters were often called, in derision, cornstalk drills,
because many of the men, either having no guns
or neglecting to bring them, drilled with cornstalks
instead. The officers were elected by the men and
when there was no immediate danger of war they
were chosen purely for their social qualities. For a
few years after the close of the long Indian strug-
gle there were here and there officers who had seen
actual service and who knew the rudiments of drill ;
but in the days of peace the men who had taken
part in Indian fighting cared but little to attend the
musters, and left them more and more to be turned
into mere scenes of horseplay.

The frontier people of the second generation in
the West thus had no military training whatever,
and though they possessed a skeleton militia or-
ganization, they derived no benefit from it, because
their officers were worthless, and the men had no
idea of practicing self-restraint or of obeying orders
longer than they saw fit. The frontiersmen were
personally brave, but their courage was entirely un-
trained, and being unsupported by discipline, they
were sure to be disheartened at a repulse, to be dis-
trustful of themselves and their leaders, and to be
unwilling to persevere in the face of danger and
discouragement. They were hardy, and physically
strong, and they were good marksmen ; but here the
list of their soldierly qualities was exhausted. They
had to be put through a severe course of training
by some man like Jackson before they became fit
to contend on equal terms with regulars in the open

282 The Winning of the West

or with Indians in the woods. Their utter lack
of discipline was decisive against them at first in
any contest with regulars. In warfare with the
Indians there were a very few of their number, men
of exceptional qualities as woodsmen, who could
hold their own ; but the average frontiersman, though
he did a good deal of hunting and possessed much
knowledge of woodcraft, was primarily a tiller of the
soil and a feller of trees, and he was necessarily
at a disadvantage when pitted against an antagonist
whose entire life was passed in woodland chase and
woodland warfare. These facts must all be remem-
bered if we wish to get an intelligent explanation
of the utter failure of the frontiersmen when, in
1812, they were again pitted against the British and
the forest tribes. They must also be taken into
account when we seek to explain why it was possi-
ble but a little later to develop out of the frontiers-
men fighting armies which under competent generals
could overmatch the red coat and the Indian alike.
The extreme individualism of the frontier, which
found expression for good and for evil both in its
governmental system in time of peace and in its
military system in time of war, was also shown
in religious matters. In 1799 and 1800 a great re-
vival of religion swept over the West. Up to that
time the Presbyterian had been the leading creed
beyond the mountains. There were a few Episco-
palians here and there, and there were Lutherans,
Catholics, and adherents of the reformed Dutch and
German Churches; but, aside from the Presbyterians,

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 283

the Methodists and Baptists were the only sects
powerfully represented. The great revival of 1799
was mainly carried on by Methodists and Baptists,
and under their guidance the Methodist and Bap-
tist churches at once sprang to the front and be-
came the most important religious forces in the fron-
tier communities.49 The Presbyterian Church re-
mained the most prominent as regards the wealth
and social standing of its adherents, but the typical
frontiersman who professed religion at all became
either a Methodist or a Baptist, adopting a creed
which was intensely democratic and individualistic,
which made nothing of social distinctions, which
distrusted educated preachers, and worked under
a republican form of ecclesiastical government.

The great revival was accompanied by scenes of
intense excitement. Under the conditions of a vast
wooded wilderness and a scanty population the camp-
meeting was evolved as the typical religious festival.
To the great camp-meetings the frontiersmen flocked
from far and near, on foot, on horseback, and in
wagons. Every morning at daylight the multitude
was summoned to prayer by sound of trumpet. No
preacher or exhorter was suffered to speak unless he
had the power of stirring the souls of his hearers.
The preaching, the praying, and the singing went
on without intermission, and under the tremendous
emotional stress whole communities became fervent
professors of religion. Many of the scenes at these

49 McFerrin's "History of Methodism in Tennessee," 338.
etc. ; Spencer's "History of Kentucky Baptists," 69, etc.

284 The Winning of the West

camp-meetings were very distasteful to men whose
religion was not emotional and who shrank from
the fury of excitement into which the great masses
were thrown, for under the strain many individuals
literally became like men possessed, whether of good
or evil spirits, falling into ecstasies of joy or agony,
dancing, shouting, jumping, fainting, while there
were widespread and curious manifestations of a
hysterical character, both among the believers and
among the scoffers; but though this might seem
distasteful to an observer of education and self-
restraint, it thrilled the heart of the rude and sim-
ple backwoodsman and reached him as he could
not possibly have been reached in any other manner.
Often the preachers of the different denominations
worked in hearty unison; but often they were sun-
dered by bitter jealousy and distrust. The fiery
zeal of the Methodists made them the leaders; and
in their war on the forces of evil they at times
showed a tendency to include all non-Methodists —
whether Baptists, Lutherans, Catholics, or infidels —
in a common damnation. Of course, as always in
such a movement, many even of the earnest leaders
at times confounded the essential and the non-essen-
tial, and railed as bitterly against dancing as against
drunkenness and lewdness, or anathematized the
wearing of jewelry as fiercely as the commission of
crime.50 More than one hearty, rugged old preacher,
who did stalwart service for decency and morality,

50 Autobiography of Peter Cartwright, the Backwoods
Preacher.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 285

hated Calvinism as heartily as Catholicism, and yet
yielded to no Puritan in his austere condemnation
of amusement and luxury.

Often men backslid, and to a period of intense
emotional religion succeeded one of utter unbelief
and of reversion to the worst practices which had
been given up. Nevertheless, on the whole there
was an immense gain for good. The people re-
ceived a new light, and were given a sense of moral
responsibility such as they had not previously pos-
sessed. Much of the work was done badly or was
afterward undone, but very much was really accom-
plished. The whole West owes an immense debt
to the hard-working frontier preachers, sometimes
Presbyterian, generally Methodist or Baptist, who
so gladly gave their lives to their labors and who
struggled with such fiery zeal for the moral well-
being of the communities to which they penetrated.
Wherever there was a group of log cabins, thither
some Methodist circuit-rider made his way or there
some Baptist preacher took up his abode. Their
prejudices and narrow dislikes, their raw vanity and
sullen distrust of all who were better schooled than
they, count for little when weighed against their
intense earnestness and heroic self-sacrifice. They
proved their truth by their endeavor. They yielded
scores of martyrs, nameless and unknown men who
perished at the hands of the savages, or by sickness
or in flood or storm. They had to face no little
danger from the white inhabitants themselves. In
'some of the communities most of the men might

286 The Winning of the West

heartily support them, but in others, where the
vicious and lawless elements were in control, they
were in constant danger of mobs. The godless and
lawless people hated the religious with a bitter ha-
tred, and gathered in great crowds to break up their
meetings. On the other hand, those who had ex-
perienced religion were no believers in the doc-
trine of non-resistance. At the core, they were
thoroughly healthy men, and they fought as val-
iantly against the powers of evil in matters physical
as in matters moral. Some of the successful fron-
tier preachers were men of weak frame, whose in-
tensity of conviction and fervor of religious belief
supplied the lack of bodily powers ; but as a rule the
preacher who did most was a stalwart man, as strong
in body as in faith. One of the continually recur-
ring incidents in the biographies of the famous
frontier preachers is that of some particularly hard-
ened sinner who was never converted until, tempted
to assault the preacher of the Word, he was soundly
thrashed by the latter, and his eyes thereby rudely
opened through his sense of physical shortcomings
to an appreciation of his moral iniquity.

Throughout these years, as the frontiersmen
pressed into the West, they continued to fret and
strain against the Spanish boundaries. There was
no temptation to them to take possession of Canada.
The lands south of the Lakes were more fertile than
those north of the Lakes, and the climate was bet-
ter. The few American settlers who did care to
go into Canada found people speaking their own

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 287

tongue, and with much the same ways of life; so
that they readily assimilated with them, as they
could not assimilate with the French and Spanish
Creoles. Canada lay north, and the tendency of the
backwoodsman was to thrust west ; among the South-
ern backwoodsmen, the tendency was south and
southwest. The Mississippi formed no natural bar-
rier whatever. Boone, when he moved into Mis-
souri, was but a forerunner among the pioneers;
many others followed him. He himself became an
official under the Spanish Government, and received
a grant of lands. Of the other frontiersmen who
went into the Spanish territory, some, like Boone,
continued to live as hunters and backwoods farm-
ers.51 Others settled in St. Louis, or some other of
the little Creole towns, and joined the parties of
French traders who ascended the Missouri and the
Mississippi to barter paint, beads, powder, and
blankets for the furs of the Indians.

The Spanish authorities were greatly alarmed at
the incoming of the American settlers. Gayoso de
Lemos had succeeded Carondelet as Governor, and
he issued to the commandants of the different posts
throughout the colonies a series of orders in refer-
ence to the terms on which land grants were to be
given to immigrants; he particularly emphasized
the fact that liberty of conscience was not to be
extended beyond the first generation, and that the
children of the immigrant would either have to be-
come Catholics or else be expelled, and that this

11 American State Papers, Public Lands, II, pp. 10, 872.

288 The Winning of the West

should be explained to settlers who did not profess
the Catholic faith. He ordered, moreover, that no
preacher of any religion but the Catholic should be
allowed to come into the provinces.52 The Bishop
of Louisiana complained bitterly of the American
immigration and of the measure of religious tolera-
tion accorded the settlers, which, he said, had in-
troduced into the colony a gang of adventurers who
acknowledged no religion. He stated that the
Americans had scattered themselves over the coun-
try almost as far as Texas and corrupted the In-
dians and Creoles by the example of their own rest-
less and ambitious temper; for they came from
among people who were in the habit of saying to
their stalwart boys, "You will go to Mexico." Al-
ready the frontiersmen had penetrated even into
New Mexico from the district round the mouth of
the Missouri, in which they had become very nu-
merous; and the Bishop earnestly advised that the
places where the Americans were allowed to settle
should be rigidly restricted.53

When the Spaniards held such views it was ab-
solutely inevitable that a conflict should come.
Whether the frontiersman did or did not possess
deep religious convictions, he was absolutely certain
to refuse to he coerced into becoming a Catholic;
and his children were sure to fight as soon as they
were given the choice of changing their faith or
abandoning their country. The minute that the
American settlers were sufficiently numerous to

M Gayarr<§, III, p. 387. M Do., p. 408.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 289

stand a chance of success in the conflict it was cer-
tain that they would try to throw off the yoke of the
fanatical and corrupt Spanish Government. As
early as 1801 bands of armed Americans had pene-
trated here and there into the Spanish provinces
in defiance of the commands of the authorities, and
were striving to set up little bandit governments of
their own.54

The frontiersmen possessed every advantage of
position, of numbers, and of temper. In any contest
that might arise with Spain they were sure to take
possession at once of all of what was then called
Upper Louisiana. The immediate object of interest
to most of them was the commerce of the Missis-
sippi River and the possession of New Orleans ; but
this was only part of what they wished, and were
certain to get, for they demanded all the Spanish ter-
ritory that lay across the line of their westward
march. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
the settlers on the Western waters recognized in
Spain their natural enemy, because she was the power
who held the mouth and the west bank of the Mis-
sissippi. They would have transferred their hostil-
ity to any other power which fell heir to her posses-
sions, for these possessions they were bound one day
to make their own.

A thin range of settlement extended from the
shores of Lake Erie on the north to the boundary
of Florida on the south; and there were out-posts
here and there beyond this range, as at Fort Dear-

M Do., p. 447-
VOL. VIII.— 13

290 The Winning of the West

born, on the site of what is now Chicago; but the
only fairly well-settled regions were in Kentucky
and Tennessee. These two States were the oldest,
and long remained the most populous and influen-
tial, communities in the West. They shared quali-
ties both of the Northerners and of the Southerners,
and they gave the tone to the thought and the life
in the settlements north of them no less than the
settlements south of them. This fact of itself tended
to make the West homogeneous and to keep it a
unit with a peculiar character of its own, neither
Northern or Southern in political and social ten-
dency.

It was the middle West which was first settled,
and the middle West stamped its peculiar charac-
teristics on all the growing communities beyond the
Alleghanies. Inasmuch as west of the mountains
the Northern communities were less distinctively
Northern and the Southern communities less dis-
tinctively Southern than was the case with the East-
ern States on the seaboard, it followed naturally
that, considered with reference to other sections of
the Union, the West formed a unit, possessing
marked characteristics of its own. A distinctive
type of character was developed west of the Alle-
ghanies, and for the first generation the typical rep-
resentatives of this Western type were to be found
in Kentucky and Tennessee.

The settlement of the Northwest had been begun
under influences which in the end were to separate
it radically from the Southwest. It was settled

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 291

under governmental supervision, and because of and
in accordance with governmental action; and it was
destined ultimately to receive the great mass of its
immigrants from the Northwest; but as yet these
two influences had not become strong enough to
sunder the frontiersmen north of the Ohio by any
sharp line from those south of the Ohio. The set-
tlers on the Western waters were substantially the
same in character north and south.

In sum, the Western frontier folk, at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, possessed in com-
mon marked and peculiar characteristics, which the
people of the rest of the country shared to a much
less extent. They were backwoods farmers, each
man preferring to live alone on his own freehold,
which he himself tilled and from which he himself
had cleared the timber. The towns were few and
small; the people were poor, and often ignorant,
but hardy in body and in temper. They joined hos-
pitality to strangers with suspicion of them. They
were essentially warlike in spirit, and yet utterly
unmilitary in all their training and habits of
thought. They prized beyond measure their indi-
vidual liberty and their collective freedom, and were
so jealous of governmental control that they often,
to their own great harm, fatally weakened the very
authorities whom they chose to act over them. The
peculiar circumstances of their lives forced them
often to act in advance of action by the law, and this
bred a lawlessness in certain matters which their
children inherited for generations ; yet they knew

292 The Winning of the West

and appreciated the need of obedience to the law,
and they thoroughly respected the law.

The separatist agitations had largely died out.
In 1798 and 1799 Kentucky divided with Virginia
the leadership of the attack on the Alien and Sedi-
tion laws ; but her extreme feelings were not shared
by the other Westerners, and she acted not as a rep-
resentative of the West, but on a footing of equal-
ity with Virginia. Tennessee sympathized as little
with the nullification movement of these two States
at this time as she sympathized with South Carolina
in her nullification movement a generation later.
With the election of Jefferson the dominant politi-
cal party in the West became in sympathy with the
party in control of the nation, and the West became
stoutly loyal to the National Government.

The West had thus achieved a greater degree of
political solidarity, both as within itself and with the
nation as a whole, than ever before. Its wishes
were more powerful with the East. The pioneers
stood for an extreme Americanism, in social, politi-
cal, and religious matters alike. The trend of Amer-
ican thought was toward them, not away from
them. More than ever before, the Westerners were
able to make their demands felt at home and to
make their force felt in the event of a struggle with
a foreign power.

CHAPTER IV

THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA; AND BURROS CON-
SPIRACY, 1803-1807

A GREAT and growing race may acquire vast
stretches of scantily peopled territory in any
one of several ways. Often the statesman, no less
than the soldier, plays an all-important part in win-
ning the new land; nevertheless, it is usually true
that the diplomatists who by treaty ratify the acqui-
sition usurp a prominence in history to which they
are in no way entitled by the real worth of their
labors.

The territory may be gained by the armed forces
of the nation, and retained by treaty. It was
in this way that England won the Cape of Good
Hope from Holland; it was in this way that the
United States won New Mexico. Such a con-
quest is due, not to the individual action of members
of the winning race, but to the nation as a whole,
acting through her soldiers and statesmen. It was
the English Navy which conquered the Cape of
Good Hope for England; it was the English diplo-
mats that secured its retention. So it was the Amer-
ican Army which added New Mexico to the United
States ; and its retention was due to the will of the
politicians who had set that army in motion. In

(293)

294 The Winning of the West

neither case was there any previous settlement of
moment by the conquerors in the conquered terri-
tory. In neither case was there much direct pres-
sure by the people of the conquering races upon the
soil which was won for them by their soldiers and
statesmen. The acquisition of the territory must be
set down to the credit of these soldiers and states-
men, representing the nation in its collective capac-
ity; though in the case of New Mexico there would
of course ultimately have been a direct pressure of
rifle-bearing settlers upon the people of the ranches
and the mud-walled towns.

In such cases it is the government itself, rather
than any individual or aggregate of individuals,
which wins the new land for the race. When it is
won without appeal to arms, the credit, which would
otherwise be divided between soldiers and states-
men, of course accrues solely to the latter. Alaska,
for instance, was acquired by mere diplomacy. No
American settlers were thronging into Alaska. The
desire to acquire it among the people at large was
vague, and was fanned into sluggish activity only
by the genius of the far-seeing statesmen who pur-
chased it. The credit of such an acquisition really
does belong to the men who secured the adoption
of the treaty by which it was acquired. The honor
of adding Alaska to the national domain belongs to
the statesmen who at the time controlled the Wash-
ington Government. They were not figureheads in
the transaction. They were the vital, moving forces.

Just the contrary is true of cases like that of the

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 295

conquest of Texas. The Government of the United
States had nothing to do with winning Texas for
the English-speaking people of North -America.
The American frontiersmen won Texas for them-
selves, unaided either by the statesmen who con-
trolled the politics of the Republic, or by the sol-
diers who took their orders from Washington.

In yet other cases the action is more mixed.
Statesmen and diplomats have some share in shap-
ing the conditions under which a country is finally
taken ; in the eye of history they often usurp much
more than their proper share ; but in reality they are
able to bring matters to a conclusion only because
adventurous settlers, in defiance or disregard of
governmental action, have pressed forward into the
longed-for land. In such cases the function of the
diplomats is one of some importance, because they
lay down the conditions under which the land is
taken ; but the vital question as to whether the land
shall be taken at all, upon no matter what terms, is
answered not by the diplomats, but by the people
themselves.

It was in this way that the Northwest was won
from the British and the boundaries of the South-
west established by treaty with the Spaniards.
Adams, Jay, and Pinckney deserve much credit for
the way they conducted their several negotiations;
but there would have been nothing for them to ne-
gotiate about had not the settlers already thronged
into the disputed territories or strenuously pressed
forward against their boundaries.

296 The Winning of the West

So it was with the acquisition of Louisiana. Jef-
ferson, Livingston, and their fellow-statesmen and
diplomats concluded the treaty which determined
the manner in which it came into our possession;
but they did not really have much to do with fixing
the terms even of this treaty; and the part which
they played in the acquisition of Louisiana in no
way resembles, even remotely, the part which was
played by Seward, for instance, in acquiring Alaska.
If it had not been for Seward and the political lead-
ers who thought as he did, Alaska might never have
been acquired at all ; but the Americans would have
won Louisiana in any event, even if the treaty of
Livingston and Monroe had not been signed. The
real history of the acquisition must tell of the great
westward movement begun in 1769, and not merely
of the feeble diplomacy of Jefferson's administra-
tion. In 1802 American settlers were already clus-
tered here and there on the eastern fringe of the
vast region which then went by the name of Louisi-
ana. All the stalwart freemen, who had made their
rude clearings and built their rude towns on the
hither side of the mighty Mississippi, were straining
with eager desire against the forces which withheld
them from seizing with strong hand the coveted
province. They did not themselves know, and far
less did the public men of the day realize, the full
import and meaning of the conquest upon which
they were about to enter. For the moment the navi-
gation of the mouth of the Mississippi seemed to
them of the first importance. Even the frontiers-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 297

men themselves put second to this the right to peo-
ple the vast continent which lay between the Pacific
and the Mississippi. The statesmen at Washington
viewed this last proposition with positive alarm, and
cared only to acquire New Orleans. The winning
of Louisiana was due to no one man, and least of
all to any statesman or set of statesmen. It followed
inevitably upon the great westward thrust of the set-
tler-folk; a thrust which was delivered blindly, but
which no rival race could parry, until it was stopped
by the ocean itself.

Louisiana was added to the United States be-
cause the hardy backwoods settlers had swarmed
into the valleys of the Tennessee, the Cumberland,
and the Ohio by hundreds of thousands; and had
hardly begun to build their raw hamlets on the banks
of the Mississippi, and to cover its waters with their
flat-bottomed craft. Restless, adventurous, hardy,
they looked eagerly across the Mississippi to the
fertile solitudes where the Spaniard was the nomi-
nal, and the Indian the real, master; and with a
more immediate longing they fiercely coveted the
Creole province at the mouth of the river.

The Mississippi formed no barrier whatsoever
to the march of the backwoodsmen. It could be
crossed at any point; and the same rapid current
which made it a matter of extreme difficulty for any
power at the mouth of the stream to send reinforce-
ments up against the current would have greatly
facilitated the movements of the Ohio, Kentucky,
and Tennessee levies down-stream to attack the

298 The Winning of the West

Spanish provinces. In the days of sails and oars a
great river with rapid current might vitally affect
military operations if these depended upon sending
flotillas up or down stream. But such a river has
never proved a serious barrier against a vigorous
and aggressive race, where it lies between two peo-
ples, so that the aggressors have merely to cross it.
It offers no such shield as is afforded by a high
mountain range. The Mississippi served as a con-
venient line of demarcation between the Americans
and the Spaniards; but it offered no protection
whatever to the Spaniards against the Americans.

Therefore the frontiersmen found nothing serious
to bar their further march westward ; the diminutive
Spanish garrisons in the little Creole towns near the
Missouri were far less capable of effective resist-
ance than were most of the Indian tribes whom the
Americans were brushing out of their path. To-
ward the South the situation was different. The
Floridas were shielded by the great Indian confed-
eracies of the Creeks and Choctaws, whose strength
was as yet unbroken. What was much more im-
portant, the mouth of the Mississippi was com-
manded by the important seaport of New Orleans,
which was accessible to fleets, which could readily
be garrisoned by water, and which was the capital
of a region that by backwoods standards passed for
well settled. New Orleans by its position was ab-
solute master of the foreign trade of the Mississippi
valley ; and any power in command of the seas could
easily keep it strongly garrisoned. The vast region

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 299

that was then known as Upper Louisiana — the ter-
ritory stretching from the Mississippi to the Pacific
— was owned by the Spaniards, but only in shadowy
fashion, and could not have been held by any Eu-
ropean power against the sturdy westward pressure
of the rifle-bearing settlers. But New Orleans and
its neighborhood were held even by the Spaniards
in good earnest; while a stronger power, once in
possession, could with difficulty have been dislodged.
It naturally followed that for the moment the at-
tention of the backwoodsmen was directed much
more to New Orleans than to the trans-Mississippi
territory. A few wilderness lovers like Boone, a
few reckless adventurers of the type of Philip Nolan,
were settling around and beyond the Creole towns of
the North, or were endeavoring to found small
buccaneering colonies in dangerous proximity to the
Spanish commanderies in the Southwest. But the
bulk of the Western settlers as yet found all the va-
cant territory they wished east of the Mississippi.
What they needed at the moment was, not more
wild land, but an outlet for the products yielded by
the land they already possessed. The vital impor-
tance to the Westerners of the free navigation of
the Mississippi has already been shown. Suffice it
to say that the control of the mouth of the great
Father of Waters was of direct personal conse-
quence to almost every tree feller, every backwoods
farmer, every land owner, every townsman, who
dwelt beyond the Alleghanies. These men did not
worry much over the fact that the country on the

300 The Winning of the West

further bank of the Mississippi was still under the
Spanish Flag. For the moment they did not need
it, and when they did, they knew they could take it
without the smallest difficulty. But the ownership
of the mouth of the Mississippi was a matter of im-
mediate importance ; and though none of the settlers
doubted that it would ultimately be theirs, it was yet
a matter of much consequence to them to get pos-
session of it as quickly as possible, and with as little
trouble as possible, rather than to see it held, perhaps
for years, by a powerful hostile nation, and then to
see it acquired only at the cost of bloody, and per-
chance checkered, warfare.

This was the attitude of the backwoods people
as with sinewy, strenuous shoulder they pressed
against the Spanish boundaries. The Spanish atti-
tude on the other hand was one of apprehension so
intense that it overcame even anger against the
American nation. For mere diplomacy, the Span-
iards cared little or nothing; but they feared the
Westerners. Their surrender of Louisiana was due
primarily to the steady pushing and crowding of the
frontiersmen, and the continuous growth of the
Western commonwealths. In spite of Pinckney's
treaty the Spaniards did not leave Natchez until
fairly drowned out by the American settlers and
soldiers. They now felt the same pressure upon
them in New Orleans; it was growing steadily and
was fast becoming intolerable. Year by year, almost
month by month, they saw the numbers of their
foes increase, and saw them settle more and more

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 301

thickly in places from which it would be easy to
strike New Orleans. Year by year the offensive
power of the Americans increased in more than
arithmetical ratio as against Louisiana.

The more reckless and lawless adventurers from
time to time pushed southwest, even toward the
borders of Texas and New Mexico, and strove to
form little settlements, keeping the Spanish Govern-
ors and Intendants in a constant fume of anxiety.
One of these settlements was founded by Philip
Nolan, a man whom rumor had connected with
Wilkinson's intrigues, and who, like many another
lawless trader of the day, was always dreaming of
empires to be carved from, or wealth to be won in,
the golden Spanish realms. In the fall of 1800,
he pushed beyond the Mississippi with a score or so
of companions, and settled on the Brazos. The
party built pens or corrals, and began to catch wild
horses, for the neighborhood swarmed not only with
game but with immense droves of mustangs. The
handsomest animals they kept and trained, letting
the others loose again. The following March these
tamers of wild horses were suddenly set upon by a
body of Spaniards, three hundred strong, with one
field-piece. The assailants made their attack at day-
break, slew Nolan, and captured his comrades, who
for many years afterward lived as prisoners in the
Mexican towns.1 The menace of such buccaneering

1 Pike's letter, July 22, 1807, in Natchez "Herald"; in Col.
Durrett's collection; see Coue's edition of Pike's "Expedi-
tion," LII; also Gayarr6, III, 447.

302 The Winning of the West

movements kept the Spaniards alive to the imminent
danger of the general American attack which they
heralded.

Spain watched her boundaries with the most jeal-
ous care. Her colonial system was evil in its suspi-
cious exclusiveness toward strangers; and her re-
ligious system was marked by an intolerance still
almost as fierce as in the days of Torquemada. The
Holy Inquisition was a recognized feature of Span-
ish political life; and the rulers of the Spanish-
American colonies put the stranger and the heretic
under a common ban. The reports of the Spanish
ecclesiastics of Louisiana dwelt continually upon the
dangers with which the oncoming of the back-
woodsmen threatened the Church no less than the
State.2 All the men in power, civil, military, and
religious alike, showed toward strangers, and espe-
cially toward American strangers, a spirit which
was doubly unwise; for by their jealousy they cre-
ated the impression that the lands they so carefully
guarded must hold treasures of great price; and
by their severity they created an anger which when
fully aroused they could not well quell. The fron-
tiersmen, as they tried to peer into the Spanish do-
minions, were lured on by the attraction they felt
for what was hidden and forbidden; and there was
enough danger in the path to madden them, while
there was no exhibition of a strength sufficient to
cow them.

The Spanish rulers realized fully that they were
9 Report of Bishop Penalvert, Nov. i, 1795, Gayarr6.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 303

too weak effectively to cope with the Americans,
and as the pressure upon them grew ever heavier
and more menacing they began to fear not only for
Louisiana but also for Mexico. They clung tena-
ciously to all their possessions; but they were will-
ing to sacrifice a part, if by so doing they could
erect a barrier for the defence of the remainder.
Such a chance was now seemingly offered them by
France.

At the beginning of the century Napoleon was
First Consul; and the France over which he ruled
was already the mightiest nation in Europe, and yet
had not reached the zenith of her power. It was at
this time that the French influence over Spain was
most complete. Both the Spanish King and the
Spanish people were dazzled and awed by the splen-
dor of Napoleon's victories. Napoleon's magnifi-
cent and wayward genius was always striving after
more than merely European empire. As throne
after throne went down before him he planned con-
quests which should include the interminable wastes
of snowy Russia, and the sea-girt fields of England ;
and he always dreamed of yet vaster, more shadowy
triumphs, won in the realms lying eastward of the
Mediterranean, or among the islands and along the
coasts of the Spanish Main. In 1800 his dream of
Eastern conquest was over, but his lofty ambition
was planning for France the re-establishment in
America of that colonial empire which a generation
before had been wrested from her by England.

The need of the Spaniards seemed to Napoleon

304 The Winning of the West

his opportunity. By the bribe of a petty Italian
principality he persuaded the Bourbon King of
Spain to cede Louisiana to the French, at the treaty
of San Ildefonso, concluded in October, 1800. The
cession was agreed to by the Spaniards on the ex-
press pledge that the territory should not be trans-
ferred to any other power; and chiefly for the pur-
pose of erecting a barrier which might stay the
American advance, and protect the rest of the Span-
ish possessions.

Every effort was made to keep the cession from
being made public, and owing to various political
complications it was not consummated for a couple
of years; but meanwhile it was impossible to pre-
vent rumors from going abroad, and the mere hint
of such a project was enough to throw the West into
a fever of excitement. Moreover, at this moment,
before the treaty between France and Spain had
been consummated, Morales, the Intendant of New
Orleans, deliberately threw down the gage of battle
to the Westerners.3 On October 16, 1802, he pro-
claimed that the Americans had forfeited their right
of deposit in New Orleans. By Pinckney's treaty
this right had been granted for three years, with the
stipulation that it should then be extended for a
longer period, and that if the Spaniards chose to re-
voke the permit so far as New Orleans was
concerned, they should make some other spot
on the river a port of free entry. The Americans
had taken for granted that the privilege when

3 GayarrS, III, 456.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 305

once conferred would never be withdrawn ; but Mo-
rales, under pretence that the Americans had slept
on their rights by failing to discover some other spot
as a treaty port, declared that the right of deposit
had lapsed, and would not be renewed. The Gov-
ernor, Salcedo — who had succeeded Gayoso, when
the latter died of yellow fever, complicated by a
drinking-bout with Wilkinson — was not in sym-
pathy with the movement; but this mattered little.
Under the cumbrous Spanish colonial system, the
Governor, though he disapproved of the actions of
the Intendant, could not reverse them, and Morales
paid no heed to the angry protests of the Spanish
Minister at Washington, who saw that the Ameri-
cans were certain in the end to fight rather than to
lose the only outlet for the commerce of the West.4
It seems probable that the Intendant's action was
due to the fact that he deemed the days of Spanish
dominion numbered, and, in his jealousy of the
Americans, wished to place the new French authori-
ties in the strongest possible position; but the act
was not done with the knowledge of France.

Of this, however, the Westerners were ignorant.
They felt sure that any alteration in policy so fatal
to their interests must be merely a foreshadowing
of the course the French intended thereafter to fol-

4 Gayarr6, III, 576. The King of Spain, at the instigation
of Godoy, disapproved the order of Morales, but so late that
the news of the disapproval reached Louisiana only as the
French were about to take possession. However, the rever-
sal of the order rendered the course of the further negotia-
tions easier.

306 The Winning of the West

low. They believed that their worst fears were jus-
tified. Kentucky and Tennessee clamored for in-
stant action, and Claiborne offered to raise in the
Mississippi territory alone a force of volunteer rifle-
men sufficient to seize New Orleans before its trans-
fer into French hands could be effected.

Jefferson was President, and Madison Secretary
of State. Both were men of high and fine qualities
who rendered, at one time or another, real and great
service to the country. Jefferson in particular played
in our political life a part of immense importance.
But the country has never had two statesmen less
capable of upholding the honor and dignity of the
nation, or even of preserving its material well-be-
ing, when menaced by foreign foes. They were
peaceful men, quite unfitted to grapple with an
enemy who expressed himself through deeds rather
than words. When stunned by the din of arms they
showed themselves utterly inefficient rulers.

It was these two timid, well-meaning statesmen
who now found themselves pitted against Napoleon,
and Napoleon's Minister, Talleyrand; against the
greatest warrior and lawgiver, and against one of
the greatest diplomats, of modern times ; against
two men, moreover, whose sodden lack of con-
science was but heightened by the contrast with
their brilliant genius and lofty force of character;
two men who were unable to so much as appreciate
that there was shame in the practice of venality, dis-
honesty, mendacity, cruelty, and treachery.

Jefferson was the least warlike of presidents, and

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 307

he loved the French with a servile devotion. But
his party was strongest in precisely those parts of
the country where the mouth of the Mississippi
was held to be of right the property of the United
States; and the pressure of public opinion was too
strong for Jefferson to think of resisting it. The
South and the West were a unit in demanding that
France should not be allowed to establish herself on
the lower Mississippi. Jefferson was forced to tell
his French friends that if their nation persisted in
its purpose America would be obliged to marry itself
to the navy and army of England. Even he could
see that for the French to take Louisiana meant war
with the United States sooner or later ; and as above
all things else he wished peace, he made every effort
to secure the coveted territory by purchase.

Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New York
represented American interests in Paris; but at the
very close of the negotiation he was succeeded by
Monroe, whom Jefferson sent over as a special en-
voy. The course of the negotiations was at first
most baffling to the Americans.5 Talleyrand lied
with such unmoved calm that it was impossible to
put the least weight upon anything he said; more-
over, the Americans soon found that Napoleon was
the sole and absolute master, so that it was of no

5 In Henry Adams' "History of the United States," the ac-
count of the diplomatic negotiations at this period, between
France, Spain, and the United States, is the most brilliant
piece of diplomatic history, so far as the doings of the diplo-
mats themselves are concerned, that can be put to the credit
of any American writer.

308 The Winning of the West

use attempting to influence any of his subordinates,
save in so far as these subordinates might in their
turn influence him. For some time it appeared that
Napoleon was bent upon occupying Louisiana in
force and using it as a basis for the rebuilding of
the French colonial power. The time seemed ripe
for such a project. After a decade of war with all
the rest of Europe, France in 1802 concluded the
Peace of Amiens, which left her absolutely free
to do as she liked in the New World. Napoleon
thoroughly despised a republic, and especially a re-
public without an army or navy. After the Peace
of Amiens he began to treat the Americans with
contemptuous disregard ; and he 'planned to throw
into Louisiana one of his generals with a force of
veteran troops sufficient to hold the country against
any attack.

His hopes were in reality chimerical. At the
moment France was at peace with her European
foes, and could send her ships of war and her trans-
ports across the ocean without fear of the British
navy. It would therefore have been possible for
Napoleon without molestation to throw a large body
of French soldiers into New Orleans. Had there
been no European war such an army might have
held New Orleans for some years against American
attack, and might even have captured one or two
of the American posts on the Mississippi, such as
Natchez; but the instant it had landed in New Or-
leans the entire American people would have ac-
cepted France as their deadliest enemy, and all

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 309

American foreign policy would have been determined
by the one consideration of ousting the French from
the mouth of the Mississippi. To the United States,
France was by no means as formidable as Great
Britain, because of her inferiority as a naval power.
Even if unsupported by any outside alliance the
Americans would doubtless in the end have driven
a French army from New Orleans, though very
probably at the cost of one or two preliminary re-
buffs. The West was stanch in support of Jef-
ferson and Madison; but in time of stress it was
sure to develop leaders of more congenial temper,
exactly as it actually did develop Andrew Jackson
a few years later. At this very time the French
failed to conquer the negro republic which Toussaint
L'Ouverture had founded in Hayti. What they thus
failed to accomplish in one island, against insurgent
negroes, it was folly to think they could accomplish
on the American continent, against the power of the
American people. This struggle with the revolu-
tionary slaves in Hayti hindered Napoleon from im-
mediately throwing an army into Louisiana; but it
did more, for it helped to teach him the folly of
trying to carry out such a plan at all.

A very able and faithful French agent in the
meanwhile sent a report to Napoleon plainly point-
ing out the impossibility of permanently holding
Louisiana against the Americans. He showed that
on the western waters alone it would be possible
to gather armies amounting in the aggregate to
twenty or thirty thousand men, all of them inflamed

310 The Winning of the West

with the eager desire to take New Orleans.6 The
Mississippi ran so as to facilitate the movement of
any expedition against New Orleans, while it of-
fered formidable obstacles to counter-expeditions
from New Orleans against the American common-
wealths lying further up stream. An expeditionary
force sent from the mouth of the Mississippi,
whether to assail the towns and settlements along
the Ohio, or to defend the Creole villages near the
Missouri, could at the utmost hope for only transient
success, while its ultimate failure was certain. On
the other hand, a backwoods army could move down
stream with comparative ease ; and even though such
an expedition were defeated, it was certain that
the attempt would be repeated again and again,
until by degrees the mob of hardy riflemen changed
into a veteran army, and brought forth some gen-
eral like "Old Hickory," able to lead to victory.

The most intelligent French agents on the ground
saw this. Some of Napoleon's ministers were
equally far-sighted. One of them, Barbe Marbois,
represented to him in the strongest terms the hope-
lessness of the undertaking on which he proposed
to embark. He pointed out that the United States
was sure to go to war with France if France took
New Orleans, and that in the end such a war could
only result in victory for the Americans.

6 Pontalba's Memoir. He hoped that Louisiana might, in
certain contingencies, be preserved for the French, but he
insisted that it could only be by keeping peace with the
American settlers, and by bringing about an immense in-
crease of population in the province.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 31 1

We can now readily see that this victory was
certain to come even had the Americans been left
without allies. France could never have defended
the vast region known as Upper Louisiana, and
sooner or later New Orleans itself would have fallen,
though it may well be only after humiliating defeats
for the Americans and much expenditure of life and
treasure. But as things actually were the Ameri-
cans would have had plenty of powerful allies. The
Peace of Amiens lasted but a couple of years before
England again went to war. Napoleon knew, and
the American statesmen knew, that the British in-
tended to attack New Orleans upon the outbreak
of hostilities, if it were in French hands. In such
event Louisiana would have soon fallen; for any
French force stationed there would have found its
reinforcements cut off by the English navy, and
would have dwindled away until unable to offer
resistance.

Nevertheless, European wars, and the schemes
and fancies of European statesmen, could determine
merely the conditions under which the catastrophe
was to take place, but not the catastrophe itself.
The fate of Louisiana was already fixed. It was
not the diplomats who decided its destiny, but the
settlers of the Western States. The growth of the
teeming folk who had crossed the Alleghanies and'
were building- their rude, vigorous commonwealths
in the northeastern portion of the Mississippi basin,
decided the destiny of all the lands that were drained
by that mighty river. The steady westward move-

312 The Winning of the West

ment of the Americans was the all-important factor
in determining the ultimate ownership of New Or-
leans. Livingston, the American minister, saw
plainly the inevitable outcome of the struggle. He
expressed his wonder that other Americans should
be uneasy in the matter, saying that for his part
it seemed as clear as day that no matter what trouble
might temporarily be caused, in the end Louisiana
was certain to fall into the grasp of the United
States.7

There were many Americans and many French-
men of note who were less clear-sighted. Living-
ston encountered rebuff after rebuff, and delay after
delay. Talleyrand met him with his usual front
of impenetrable duplicity. He calmly denied every-
thing connected with the cession of Louisiana until
even the details became public property, and then
admitted them with unblushing equanimity. His
delays were so tantalizing that they might well have
revived unpleasant memories of the famous X. Y. Z.
negotiations, in which he tried in vain to extort
bribe-money from the American negotiators;8 but

7 Livingston to Madison, Sept. i, 1802, Later Livingston
himself became uneasy, fearing lest Napoleon's wilfulness
might plunge him into an undertaking which, though cer-
tain to end disastrously to the French, might meanwhile
cause great trouble to the Americans-.

8 Jefferson was guilty of much weak and undignified con-
duct during these negotiations, but of nothing weaker and
more petty than his attempt to flatter Talleyrand by pre-
tending that the Americans disbelieved his admitted venal-
ity, and were indignant with those who had exposed it. See
Adams.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 313

Livingston, and those he represented, soon realized
that it was Napoleon himself who alone deserved
serious consideration. Through Napoleon's char-
acter, and helping to make it great, there ran an
imaginative vein which at times bordered on the
fantastic; and this joined with his imperious self-
will, brutality, and energy to make him eager to
embark on a scheme which, when he had thought
it over in cold blood, he was equally eager to aban-
don. For some time he seemed obstinately bent on
taking possession of Louisiana, heedless of the atti-
tude which this might cause the Americans to
assume. He designated as commander of his army
of occupation Victor, a general as capable and
brave as he was insolent, who took no pains to
conceal from the American representatives his in-
tention to treat their people with a high hand.

Jefferson took various means, official and unoffi-
cial, of impressing upon Napoleon the strength of
the feeling in the United States over the matter;
and his utterances came as near menace as his pacific
nature would permit. To the great French Con-
queror, however, accustomed to violence and to the
strife of giants, Jefferson's somewhat vacillating
attitude did not seem impressive ; and the one course
which would have impressed Napoleon was not fol-
lowed by the American President. Jefferson refused
to countenance any proposal to take prompt posses-
sion of Louisiana by force or to assemble an army
which would act with immediate vigor in time of
need ; and as he was the idol of the Southwesterners,
VOL. VIII.— 14

314 The Winning of the West

who were bitterly anti-federalist in sympathy, he
was able to prevent any violent action on their part
until events rendered this violence unnecessary. At
the same time, Jefferson himself never for a mo-
ment ceased to feel the strong pressure of Southern
and Western public sentiment; and so he continued
resolute in his purpose to obtain Louisiana.

It was no argument of Jefferson's or of the Ameri-
can diplomats, but the inevitable trend of events
that finally brought about a change in Napoleon's
mind. The army he sent to Hayti wasted away by
disease and in combat with the blacks, and thereby
not only diminished the forces he intended to throw
into Louisiana, but also gave him a terrible object
lesson as to what the fate of these forces was cer-
tain ultimately to be. The attitude of England and
Austria grew steadily more hostile, and his most
trustworthy advisers impressed on Napoleon's mind
the steady growth of the Western-American com-
munities, and the implacable hostility with which
they were certain to regard any power that seized
or attempted to hold New Orleans. Napoleon could
not afford to hamper himself with the difficult de-
fence of a distant province, and to incur the hos-
tility of a new foe, at the very moment when he was
entering on another struggle with his old European
enemies. Moreover, he needed money in order to
carry on the struggle. To be sure he had promised
Spain not to turn over Louisiana to another power ;
but he was quite as incapable as any Spanish states-
man, or as Talleyrand himself, of so much as con-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 315

sidering the question of breach of faith or loss of
honor, if he could gain any advantage by sacrificing
either. Livingston was astonished to find that Na-
poleon had suddenly changed front, and that there
was every prospect of gaining what for months had
seemed impossible. For some time there was hag-
gling over the terms. Napoleon at first demanded
an exorbitant sum; but having once made up his
mind to part with Louisiana his impatient disposi-
tion made him anxious to conclude the bargain.
He rapidly abated his demands, and the cession
was finally made for fifteen millions of dollars.

The treaty was signed in May, 1803. The defini-
tion of the exact boundaries of the ceded territory
was purposely left very loose by Napoleon. On the
East, the Spanish Government of the Floridas still
kept possession of what are now several parishes
in the State of Louisiana. In the far West the
boundary lines which divided upper Louisiana from
the possessions of Britain on the North and of Spain
on the South led through a wilderness where no
white man had ever trod, and they were of course
unmapped, and only vaguely guessed at.

There was one singular feature of this bargain,
which showed, as nothing else could have shown,
how little American diplomacy had to do with ob-
taining Louisiana, and how impossible it was for
any European power, even the greatest, to hold the
territory in the face of the steady westward growth
of the American people. Napoleon forced Liv-
ingston and Monroe to become the reluctant pur-

316 The Winning of the West

chasers not merely of New Orleans, but of all the
immense territory which stretched vaguely north-
westward to the Pacific. Jefferson at moments felt
a desire to get all this western territory ; but he was
too timid and too vacillating to insist strenuously
upon anything which he feared Napoleon would
not grant. Madison felt a strong disinclination to
see the national domain extended west of the Mis-
sissippi; and he so instructed Monroe and Living-
ston. In their turn the American envoys, with sol-
emn fatuity, believed it might impress Napoleon
favorably if they made much show of moderation,
and they spent no small part of their time in ex-
plaining that they only wished a little bit of Louis-
iana, including New Orleans and the east bank
of the lower Mississippi. Livingston indeed went
so far as to express a very positive disinclination
to take the territory west of the Mississippi at
any price, stating that he should much prefer to
see it remain in the hands of France or Spain, and
suggesting, by way of apology for its acquisition,
that it might be re-sold to some European power!
But Napoleon saw clearly that if the French ceded
New Orleans it was a simple physical impossibility
for them to hold the rest of the Louisiana territory.
If his fierce and irritable vanity had been touched
he might, through mere wayward anger, have dared
the Americans to a contest which, however disas-
trous to them, would ultimately have been more so
to him; but he was a great statesman and a still
greater soldier, and he did not need to be told that

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 317

it would be worse than folly to try to keep a coun-
try when he had given up the key-position.

The region west of the Mississippi could become
the heritage of no other people save that which had
planted its populous communities along the eastern
bank of the river. It was quite possible for a pow-
erful European nation to hold New Orleans for
some time, even though all upper Louisiana fell
into the hands of the Americans; but it was entirely
impossible for any European nation to hold upper
Louisiana if New Orleans became a city of the
United States. The Westerners, wiser than their
rulers, but no wiser than Napoleon at the last, felt
this, and were not in the least disturbed over the
fate of Louisiana, provided they were given the
control of the mouth of the Mississippi. As a matter
of fact, it is improbable that the fate of the great
territory lying west of the upper Mississippi would
even have been seriously delayed had it been nom-
inally under the control of France or Spain. With
the ,mouth of the Mississippi once in American
hands it was a physical impossibility in any way
to retard the westward movement of the men who
were settling the Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

The ratification of the treaty brought on some
sharp debates in Congress. Jefferson had led his
party into power as the special champion of State
Rights and the special opponent of national sover-
eignty. He and they rendered a very great service
to the nation by acquiring Louisiana; but it was at
the cost of violating every precept which they had

3i8 The Winning of the West

professed to hold dear, and of showing that their
warfare on the Federalists had been waged on behalf
of principles which they were obliged to confess
were shams the moment they were put to the test.
But the Federalists of the Northeast, both in the
Middle States and in New England, at this juncture
behaved far worse than the Jeffersonian Republi-
cans. These Jeffersonian Republicans did indeed
by their performance give the lie to their past prom-
ise, and thereby emphasize the unworthiness of their
conduct in years gone by; nevertheless, at this junc-
ture they were right, which was far more important
than being logical or consistent. But the Northeast-
ern Federalists, though with many exceptions, did
as a whole stand as th)e opponents of national
growth. They had very properly, though vainly,
urged Jefferson to take prompt and effective steps
to sustain the national honor, when it seemed prob-
able that the country could be won from France
only at the cost of war; but when the time actually
came to incorporate Louisiana into the national
domain, they showed that jealous fear of Western
growth which was the most marked defect in North-
eastern public sentiment until past the middle of
the present century. It proved that the Federalists
were rightly distrusted by the West; and it proved
that at this crisis the Jeffersonian Republicans, in
spite of their follies, weaknesses, and crimes, were
the safest guardians of the country, because they
believed in its future, and strove to make it greater.
The jeremiads of the Federalist leaders in Con-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 319

gress were the same in kind as those in which many
cultivated men of the East always indulged when-
ever we enlarged our territory, and in which many
persons like them would now indulge were we at
the present day to make a similar extension. The
people of the United States were warned that they
were incorporating into their number men who were
wholly alien in every respect, and who could never
be assimilated. They were warned that when they
thus added to their empire, they merely rendered
it unwieldy and assured its being split into two or
more confederacies at no distant day. Some of the
extremists, under the lead of Quincy, went so far
as to threaten dissolution of the Union because of
what was done, insisting that the Northeast ought
by rights to secede because of the injury done it by
adding strength to the South and West. Fortu-
nately, however, talk of this kind did not affect the
majority; the treaty was ratified and Louisiana be-
came part of the United States.

Meanwhile the Creoles themselves accepted their
very rapidly changing fates with something much
like apathy. In March, 1803, the French Prefect
Laussat arrived to make preparations to take pos-
session of the country. He had no idea that Na-
poleon intended to cede it to the United States.
On the contrary, he showed that he regarded the
French as the heirs, not only to the Spanish terri-
tory, but of the Spanish hostility to the Americans.
He openly regretted that the Spanish Government
had reversed Morales' act taking away from the

320 The Winning of the West

Americans the right of deposit ; and he made all his
preparations as if on the theory that New Orleans
was to become the centre of an aggressive military
government.

His dislikes, however, were broad, and included
the Spaniards as well as the Americans. There was
much friction between him and the Spanish officials;
he complained bitterly to the home government of
the insolence and intrigues of the Spanish party.
He also portrayed in scathing terms the. gross cor-
ruption of the Spanish authorities. As to this cor-
ruption he was borne out by the American observers.
Almost every high Spanish official was guilty of
peculation at the expense of the government, and of
bribe-taking at the expense of the citizens.

Nevertheless the Creoles were far from ill-satisfied
with Spanish rule. They were not accustomed to
self-government, and did not demand it; and they
cared very little for the fact that their superiors
made money improperly. If they paid due deference
to their lay and clerical rulers they were little in-
terfered with ; and they were in full accord with the
governing classes concerning most questions, both
of principle or lack of principle, and of prejudice.
The Creoles felt that they were protected, rather
than oppressed, by people -who shared their tastes,
and who did not interfere with the things they held
dear. On the whole they showed only a tepid joy
at the prospect of again becoming French citizens.

Laussat soon discovered that they were to remain
French citizens for a very short time indeed; and

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 321

he prepared faithfully to carry out his instructions,
and to turn the country over to the Americans. The
change in the French attitude greatly increased the
friction with the Spaniards. The Spanish home
government was furious with indignation at Na-
poleon for having violated his word, and only the
weakness of Spain prevented war between it and
France. The Spanish party in New Orleans mut-
tered its discontent so loud that Laussat grew
alarmed. He feared some outbreak on the part of
the Spanish sympathizers, and, to prevent such a
mischance, he not only embodied the comparatively
small portion of the Creole militia whom he could
trust, but also a number of American volunteers,
concerning whose fidelity in such a crisis as that
he anticipated there could be no question. It was
not until December first, 1803, that he took final
'possession of the provinces. Twenty days after-
ward he turned it over to the American authorities.
Wilkinson, now commander of the American
army, — the most disgraceful head it has ever had —
was intrusted with the governorship of all of Upper
Louisiana. Claiborne was made governor of Lower
Louisiana, officially styled the Territory of Orleans.
He was an honest man, loyal to the Union, but had
no special qualifications for getting on well with the
Creoles. He could not speak French, and he regard-
ed the people whom he governed with a kindly con-
tempt which they bitterly resented. The Americans,
pushing and masterful, were inclined to look down
on their neighbors, and to treat them overbearingly ;

322 The Winning of the West

while the Creoles in their turn disliked the Ameri-
cans as rude and uncultivated barbarians. For some
time they felt much discontent with the United
States, nor was this discontent allayed when in 1804
the Territory of Orleans was reorganized with a gov-
ernment much less liberal than that enjoyed by In-
diana or Mississippi ; nor even when in 1805 an
ordinary territorial government was provided. A
number of years were to pass before Louisiana felt
itself, in fact no less than in name, part of the
Union.

Naturally there was a fertile field for seditious
agitation in New Orleans, a city of mixed popula-
tion, where the, numerically predominant race felt
a puzzled distrust for the nation of which it sudden-
ly found itself an integral part, and from past ex-
perience firmly believed in the evanescent nature of
any political connection it might have, whether with
Spain, France, or the United States. The Creoles
murmured because they were not given the same
privileges as American citizens in the old States,
and yet showed themselves indifferent to such priv-
ileges as they were given. They were indignant be-
cause the National Government prohibited the im-
portation of slaves into Louisiana, and for the mo-
ment even the transfer thither of slaves from the
old States — a circumstance, by the way, which cu-
riously illustrated the general dislike and disap-
proval of slavery then felt, even by an administra-
tion under Southern control. The Creoles further
complained of Claiborne's indifference to their

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 323

wishes; and as he possessed little tact he also be-
came embroiled with the American inhabitants, who
were men of adventurous and often lawless temper,
impatient of restraint. Representatives of the French
and Spanish governments still remained in Louisi-
ana, and by their presence and their words tended
to keep alive a disaffection for the United States
Government. It followed from these various causes
that among all classes there was a willingness to
talk freely of their wrongs and to hint at righting
them by methods outlined with such looseness as to
make it uncertain whether they did or did not com-
port with entire loyalty to the United States Gov-
ernment.

Furthermore, there already existed in New Or-
leans a very peculiar class, representatives of which
are still to be found in almost every Gulf city of
importance. There were in the city a number of
men ready at any time to enter into any plot for
armed conquest of one of the Spanish-American
countries.9 Spanish America was feeling the stir
of unrest that preceded the revolutionary outbreak
against Spain. Already insurrectionary leaders like
Miranda were seeking assistance from the Ameri-
cans. There were in New Orleans a number of
exiled Mexicans who were very anxious to raise
some force with which to invade Mexico, and there
erect the banner of an independent sovereignty.
The bolder spirits among the Creoles found much
that was attractive in such a prospect; and reckless

' Wilkinson's "Memoirs," II, 284.

324 The Winning of the West

American adventurers by the score and the hundred
were anxious to join in any filibustering expedition
of the kind. They did not care in the least what
form the expedition took. They were willing to
join the Mexican exiles in an effort to rouse Mexico
to throw off the yoke of Spain, or to aid any prov-
ince of Mexico to revolt from the rest, or to help the
leaders of any defeated faction who wished to try
an appeal to arms, in which they should receive aid
from the sword of the stranger. Incidentally they
were even more willing to attempt the conquest on
their own account ; but they did not find it necessary
to dwell on this aspect of the case when nominally
supporting some faction which chose to make use
of such watchwords as liberty and independence.

Under such conditions New Orleans, even more
than the rest of the West, seemed to offer an invit-
ing field for adventurers whose aim was both revo-
lutionary and piratical. A particularly spectacular
adventurer of this type now appeared in the person
of Aaron Burr. Burr's conspiracy attracted an
amount of attention, both at home and in the pages
of history, altogether disproportioned to its real con-
sequence. His career had been striking. He had
been Vice-President of the United States. He had
lacked but one vote of being made President, when
the election of 1800 was thrown into the House of
Representatives. As friend or as enemy he had been
thrown intimately and on equal terms with the
greatest political leaders of the day. He had sup-
plied almost the only feeling which Jefferson, the

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 325

chief of the Democratic party, and Hamilton, the
greatest Federalist, ever possessed in common; for
bitterly though Hamilton and Jefferson had hated
each other, there was one man whom each of them
had hated more, and that was Aaron Burr. There
was not a man in the country who did not know
about the brilliant and unscrupulous party leader who
had killed Hamilton in the most famous duel that
ever took place on American soil, and who by a
nearly successful intrigue had come within one vote
of supplanting Jefferson in the presidency.

In New York Aaron Burr had led a political
career as stormy and checkered as the careers of
New York politicians have generally been. He had
shown himself as adroit as he was unscrupulous in
the use of all the arts of the machine manager. The
fitful and gusty breath of popular favor made him
at one time the most prominent and successful politi-
cian in the State, and one of the two or three most
prominent and successful in the nation. In the State
he was the leader of the Democratic party, which
under his lead crushed the Federalists; and as a re-
ward he was given the second highest office in the
nation. Then his open enemies and secret rivals all
combined against him. The other Democratic lead-
ers in New York, and in the nation as well, turned
upon the man whose brilliant abilities made them
afraid, and whose utter untrustworthiness forbade
their entering into alliance with him. Shifty and
fertile in expedients, Burr made an obstinate fight
to hold his own. Without hesitation, he turned

326 The Winning of the West

for support to his old enemies, the Federalists; but
he was hopelessly beaten. Both his fortune and his
local political prestige were ruined; he realized that
his chance for a career in New York was over.

He was no mere New York politician, however.
He was a statesman of national reputation; and he
turned his restless eyes toward the West, which for
a score of years had seethed in a turmoil out of
which it seemed that a bold spirit might make its
own profit. He had already been obscurely con-
nected with separatist intrigues in the Northeast;
and he determined to embark in similar intrigues
on an infinitely grander scale in the West and South-
west. He was a cultivated man, of polished man-
ners and pleasing address, and of great audacity
and physical courage; and he had shown himself
skilled in all the baser arts of political management.

It is small wonder that the conspiracy of which
such a man was head should make a noise out of all
proportion to its real weight. The conditions were
such that if Burr journeyed West he was certain
to attract universal attention, and to be received
with marked enthusiasm. No man of his prom-
inence in national affairs had ever traveled through
the wild new commonwealths on the Mississippi.
The men who were founding States and building
towns on the wreck of the conquered wilderness
were sure to be flattered by the appearance of so
notable a man among them, and to be impressed not
only by his reputation, but by his charm of manner
and brilliancy of intellect. Moreover they were

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 327

quite ready to talk vaguely of all kinds of dubious
plans for increasing the importance of the West.
Very many, perhaps most, of them had dabbled at
one time or another in the various saparatist schemes
of the preceding two decades ; and they felt strongly
that much of the Spanish domain would and should
ultimately fall into their hands — and the sooner the
better.

There was thus every chance that Burr would be
favorably received by the West, and would find plenty
of men of high standing who would profess friend-
ship for him and would show a cordial interest in his
plans so long as he refrained from making them too
definite; but there was in reality no chance what-
ever for anything more than this to happen. In
spite of Burr's personal courage he lacked entirely
the great military qualities necessary to successful
revolutionary leadership of the kind to which he as-
pired. Though in some ways the most practical of
politicians he had a strong element of the visionary
in his character; it was perhaps this, joined to his
striking moral defects, which brought about and
made complete his downfall in New York. Great
political and revolutionary leaders may, and often
must, have in them something of the visionary ; but
it must never cause them to get out of touch with
the practical. Burr was capable of conceiving revo-
lutionary plans on so vast a scale as to be fairly ap-
palling, not only from their daring but from their
magnitude. But when he tried to put his plans into
practice, it at once became evident that they were

328 The Winning of the West

even more unsubstantial than they were audacious.
His wild schemes had in them too strong an element
of the unreal and the grotesque to be in very fact
dangerous.

Besides, the time for separatist movements in the
West had passed, while the time for arousing the
West to the conquest of part of Spanish-America
had hardly yet come. A man of Burr's character
might perhaps have accomplished something mis-
chievous in Kentucky when Wilkinson was in the
first flush of his Spanish intrigues ; or when the po-
litical societies were raving over Jay's treaty; or
when the Kentucky Legislature was passing its nulli-
fication resolutions. But the West had grown loyal
as the Nineteenth Century came in. The Western-
ers were hearty supporters of the Jeffersonian Dem-
ocratic-Republican party; Jefferson was their idol;
they were strongly attached to the Washington ad-
ministration, and strongly opposed to the chief op-
ponents of that administration, the Northeastern
Federalists. With the purchase of Louisiana all
deeply-lying causes of Western discontent had van-
ished. The West was prosperous, and was attached
to the National Government. Its leaders might still
enjoy a discussion with Burr or among themselves
concerning separatist principles in the abstract, but
such a discussion was at this time purely academic.
Nobody of any weight in the community would al-
low such plans as those of Burr to be put into effect.
There was, it is true, a strong buccaneering spirit,
and there were plenty of men ready to enlist in an

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 329

invasion of the Spanish dominions under no matter
what pretext ; but even those men of note who were
willing to lead such a movement were not willing to
enter into it if it was complicated with open disloy-
alty to the United States.

Burr began his treasonable scheming before he
ceased to be Vice-President. He was an old friend
and crony of Wilkinson; and he knew much about
the disloyal agitations which had convulsed the West
during the previous two decades. These agitations
a'lways took one or the other of two forms that at
first sight would seem diametrically opposed. Their
end was always either to bring about secession of
the West from the East by the aid of Spain or some
other foreign power ; or else a conquest of the Span-
ish dominions by the West, in defiance of the wishes
of the East and of the Central Government. Burr
proposed to carry out both of these plans.

The exact shape which his proposals took would
be difficult to tell. Seemingly they remained nebu-
lous even in his own mind. They certainly so re-
mained in the minds of those to whom he confided
them. .At any rate, his schemes, though in reality
less dangerous than those of his predecessors in
Western treason, were in theory much more com-
prehensive. He planned the seizure of Washing-
+on, the kidnapping of the President, and the corrup-
tion of the United States Navy. He also endeavored
to enlist foreign powers on his side. His first ad-
vances were made to the British. He proposed to
put the new empire, no matter what shape it might

33° The Winning of the West

assume, under British protection, in return for the
assistance of the British fleet in taking New Orleans.
He gave to the British ministers full — and false —
accounts of the intended uprising, and besought the
aid of the British Government on the ground that
the secession of the West would so cripple the Union
as to make it no longer a formidable enemy of Great
Britain. Burr's audacity and plausibility were such
that he quite dazzled the British minister, who de-
tailed the plans at length to his home government,
putting them in as favorable a light as he could.
The statesmen at London, however, although at
this time almost inconceivably stupid in their deal-
ings with America, were not sunk in such abject-
folly as to think Burr's schemes practicable, and they
refused to have anything to do with them.

In April, 1805, Burr started on his tour to the
West. One of his first stoppages was at an island
on the Ohio near Parkersburg, where an Irish gen-
tleman named Blennerhassett had built what was,
for the West, an unusually fine house. Only Mrs.
Blennerhassett was at home at the time; but Blen-
nerhassett later became a mainstay of the "conspir-
acy." He was a warm-hearted man, with no judg-
ment and a natural tendency toward sedition, who
speedily fell under Burr's influence, and entered into
his plans with eager zeal. With him Burr did not
have to be on his guard, and to him he confided
freely his plans ; but elsewhere, and in dealing with
less emotional people, he had to be more guarded.

It is always difficult to find out exactly what a

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 331

conspirator of Burr's type really intended, and ex-
actly how guilty his various temporary friends and
allies were. Part of the conspirator's business is to
dissemble the truth, and in after-time it is nearly
impossible to differentiate it from the false, even
by the most elaborate sifting of the various untruths
he has uttered. Burr told every kind of story, at
one time or another, and to different classes of au-
ditors. It would be unsafe to deny his having told
a particular falsehood in any given case or to any
given man. On the other hand, when once the plot
was unmasked those persons to whom he had con-
fided his plans were certain to insist that he had
really kept them in ignorance of his true intention.
In consequence it is quite impossible to say exactly
how much guilty knowledge his various companions
possessed. When it comes to treating of his rela-
tionship with Wilkinson all that can be said is that
no single statement ever made by either man,
whether during the conspiracy or after it, whether
to the other or to an outsider, can be considered
as either presumptively true or presumptively false.
It is therefore impossible to say exactly how far
the Westerners with whom Burr was intimate were
privy to his plans. It is certain that the great mass
of the Westerners never seriously considered enter-
ing into any seditious movement under him. It is
equally certain that a number of their leaders were
more or less compromised by their associations with
him. It seems probable that to each of these leaders
he revealed what he thought would most attract him

332 The Winning of the West

in the scheme ; but that to very few did he reveal an
outright proposition to break up the Union. Many
of them were very willing to hear the distinguished
Easterner make vague proposals for increasing the
power of the West by means which were hinted at
with sinister elusiveness; and many others were de-
lighted to go into any movement which promised
an attack upon the Spanish territory; but it seems
likely that there were only a few men — Wilkinson,
for instance, and Adair of Kentucky — who were
willing to discuss a proposition to commit down-
right treason.

Burr stopped at Cincinnati, in Ohio, and at one
or two places in Kentucky. In both States many
prominent politicians, even United States Senators,
received him with enthusiasm. He then visited
Nashville, where he became the guest of Andrew
Jackson. Jackson was now Major-General of the
Tennessee militia; and the possibility of war, espe-
cially of war with the Spaniards, roused his hot nat-
ure to uncontrollable eagerness.10 Burr probably
saw through Jackson's character at once, and real-
ized that with him it was important to dwell solely
upon that part of the plan which contemplated an
attack upon the Spaniards.

The United States was at this time on the verge
of war with Spain. The Spanish Governor and In-
tendant remained in New Orleans after the cession,
and by their conduct gave such offence that it finally
became necessary to order them to leave. Jefferson

10 Adams, III, 221.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 333

claimed, as part of Louisiana, portions of both West
Florida and Texas. The Spaniards refused to ad-
mit the justice of the claim and gathered in the dis-
puted territories armies which, although small, out-
numbered the few regular troops that Wilkinson
had at his disposal. More than once a collision
seemed imminent. The Westerners clamored for
war, desiring above all things to drive the Spaniards
by force from the debatable lands. For some time
Jefferson showed symptoms of yielding to their
wishes; but he was too timid and irresolute to play
a high part, and in the end he simply did nothing.
However, though he declined to make actual war on
the Spaniards, he also refused to recognize their
claims as just, and his peculiar, hesitating course,
tended to inflame the Westerners, and to make them
believe that their government would not call them
to account for acts of aggression. To Jackson
doubtless Burr's proposals seemed quite in keeping
with what he hoped from the United States Gov-
ernment. He readily fell in with views so like his
own, and began to make preparations for an ex-
pedition against the Spanish dominions; an expe-
dition which in fact would not have differed essen-
tially from the expeditions he actually did make into
the Spanish Floridas six or eight years afterward,
or from the movement which still later his fellow-
Tennesseean, Houston, headed in Texas.

From Nashville Burr drifted down the Cumber-
land, and at Fort Massac, on the Ohio, he met Wil-
kinson, a kindred spirit, who possessed neither honor

334 The Winning of the West

nor conscience, and could not be shocked by any pro-
posal. Moreover, Wilkinson much enjoyed the early
stages of a seditious agitation, when the risk to
himself seemed slight; and as he was at this time
both the highest military officer of the United
States, and also secretly in the pay x>f Spain, the
chance to commit a double treachery gave an added
zest to his action. He entered cordially into Burr's
plans, and as soon as he returned to his headquar-
ters, at St. Louis, he set about trying to corrupt his
subordinates, and seduce them from their allegi-
ance.

Meanwhile Burr passed down the Mississippi to
New Orleans, where he found himself in the so-
ciety of persons who seemed more willing than oth-
ers he had encountered to fall in with his plans.
Even here he did not'clearly specify his purposes,
but he did say enough to show that they bordered
on the treasonable ; and he was much gratified at the
acquiescence of his listeners. His gratification,
however, was over-hasty. The Creoles, and some
of the Americans, were delighted to talk of their
wrongs and to threaten any course of action which
they thought might yield vengeance; but they had
little intention of proceeding from words to deeds.
Claiborne, a straightforward and honest man, set
his face like a flint against all of Burr's doings.

From New Orleans Burr retraced his steps and
visited Wilkinson at St. Louis. But Wilkinson was
no longer in the same frame of mind as at Fort
Massac. He had tested his officers, to see if they

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 335

could be drawn into any disloyal movement, and
had found that they were honorable men, firm in
their attachment to the Union; and he was begin-
ning to perceive that the people generally were quite
unmoved by Burr's intrigues. Accordingly, when
Burr reached him he threw cold water on his plans,
and though he did not denounce or oppose them, he
refrained from taking further active part in the se-
ditious propaganda.

After visiting Harrison, the Governor of the In-
diana territory, Burr returned to Washington. If
he had possessed the type of character which would
have made him really dangerous as a revolutionist,
he would have seen how slight was his hope of stir-
ring up revolt in the West; but he would not face
facts, and he still believed he could bring about an
uprising against the Union in the Mississippi Valley.
His immediate need was money. This he hoped to
obtain from some foreign government. He found
that nothing could be done with Great Britain ; and
then, incredible though it may seem, he turned to
Spain, and sought to obtain from the Spaniards
themselves the funds with which to conquer their
own territories.

This was the last touch necessary to complete the
grotesque fantasy which his brain had evolved. He
approached the Spanish Minister first through one
of his fellow conspirators and then in his own per-
son. At one time he made his request on the pre-
tence that he wished to desert the other filibusterers,
and save Spain by committing a double treachery,

336 The Winning of the West

and betraying the treasonable movement into which
he had entered; and again he asked funds on the
ground that all he wished to do was to establish a
separate government in the West, and thus destroy
the power of the United States to molest Spain.
However, his efforts came to naught, and he was
obliged to try what he could do unaided in the
West.

In August, 1806, he again crossed the Allegha-
nies. His first stop of importance was at Blenner-
hassett's. Blennerhassett was the one person of any
importance who took his schemes so seriously as to
be willing to stake his fortune on their success. Burr
took with him to Blennerhassett's his daughter, The-
odosia, a charming woman, the wife of a South
Carolinian, Allston. The attractions of the daugh-
ter, and Burr's own address and magnetism, com-
pletely overcame both Blennerhassett and his wife.
They gave the adventurer all the money they could
raise, with the understanding that they would re-
ceive it back a hundred-fold as the result of a land
speculation which was to go hand in hand with the
expected revolution. Then Blennerhassett began,
in a very noisy and ineffective way, to make what
preparations were possible in the way of rousing the
Ohio settlers, and of gathering a body of armed men
to serve under Burr when the time rame. It was
all done in a way that savored of farce rather than
of treason.

There was much less comedy, however, in what
went on in Kentucky and Tennessee, where Burr

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 337

next went. At Nashville he was received with open
arms by Jackson and Jackson's friends. This was
not much to Jackson's credit, for by this time he
should have known Burr's character; but the temp-
tation of an attack on the Spaniards proved irre-
sistible. As Major-General, he called out the mi-
litia of West Tennessee, and began to make ready
in good earnest to invade Florida or Mexico. At
public dinners he and his friends and Burr made
speeches in which they threatened immediate war
against Spain, with which country the United
States was at peace; but they did not threaten any
attack on the Union, and indeed Jackson exacted
from Burr a guarantee of his loyalty to the Union.
From Nashville the restless conspirator returned
to Kentucky to see if he could persuade the most
powerful of the Western States to take some decided
step in his favor. Senator John Adair, former com-
panion-in-arms of Wilkinson in the wars against
the Northwestern Indians, enlisted in support of
Burr with heart and soul. Kentucky society gen-
erally received him with enthusiasm. But there was
in the State a remnant of the old Federalist party,
which although not formidable in numbers, pos-
sessed weight because of the vigor and ability of its
leaders. The chief among them were Humphrey
Marshall, former United States Senator, and Joseph
H. Daviess, who was still District Attorney, not
having, as yet, been turned out by Jefferson.11 These

11 For the Kentucky episode, see Marshall and Green.
Gayarre is the authority for what occurred in New Orleans.
For the whole conspiracy, see Adams.
VOL. VIII.— 15

338 The Winning of the West

men saw — what Eastern politicians could not see —
the connection between Burr's conspiracy and the
former Spanish intrigues of men like Wilkinson,
Sebastian, and Innes. They were loyal to the
Union; and they felt a bitter factional hatred for
their victorious foes in whose ranks were to be
found all the old-time offenders; so they attacked
the new conspiracy with a double zest. They not
only began a violent newspaper war upon Burr and
all the former conspirators, but also proceeded to
invoke the aid of the courts and the Legislature
against them. Their exposure of the former Span-
ish intrigues, as well as of Burr's plots, attracted
widespread attention in the West, even at New Or-
leans;12 but the Kentuckians, though angry and
ashamed, were at first reluctant to be convinced.
Twice Daviess presented Burr for treason before
the Grand Jury; twice the Grand Jury declared in
his favor; and the leaders of the Kentucky Democ-
racy gave him their countenance, while Henry Clay
acted as his counsel. Daviess, by a constant succes-
sion of letters, kept Jefferson fully informed of all
that was done. Though his attacks on Burr for
the moment seemed failures, they really accomplished
their object. They created such uneasiness that the
prominent Kentuckians made haste to clear them-
selves of all possible connection with any treasonable
scheme. Henry Clay demanded and received from
Burr a formal pledge that his plans were in no wise
hostile to the Union; and the other people upon

18 Gayarrfe, IV, 180.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 339

whom Burr counted most, both in Ohio and Ken-
tucky, hastily followed this example. This imme-
diate defection showed how hopeless Burr's plans
were. The moment he attempted to put them into
execution, their utter futility was certain to be ex-
posed.

Meanwhile Jefferson's policy with the Spaniards,
which neither secured peace nor made ready for
war, kept up constant irritation on the border. Both
the Spanish Governor Folch, in West Florida, and
the Spanish General Herrera, in Texas, menaced
the Americans.13 Wilkinson hurried with his little
army toward Herrera, until the two stood face to
face, each asserting that the other was on ground
that belonged to his own nation. Just at this time
Burr's envoys, containing his final propositions,
reached Wilkinson. But Wilkinson now saw as
clearly as any one that Burr's scheme was fore-
doomed to fail ; and he at once determined to make
use of the only weapon in which he was skilled, —
treachery. At this very time he, the commander
of the United States Army, was in the pay of Spain,
and was in secret negotiation with the Spanish offi-
cials against whom he was supposed to be acting;
he had striven to corrupt his own army and had
failed ; he had found out that the people of the West
were not disloyal. He saw that there was no hope
of success for the conspirators; and he resolved to
play the part of defender of the nation, and to act
with vigor against Burr. Having warned Jeffer-

13 Gayarre, IV, 137, 151, etc.

34° The Winning of the West

son, in language of violent alarm, about Burr's
plans, he prepared to prevent their execution. He
first made a truce with Herrera in accordance with
which each was to retire to his former position, and
then he started for the Mississippi.

When Burr found that he could do nothing in
Kentucky and Tennessee, he prepared to go to New
Orleans. The few boats that Blennerhassett had
been able to gather were sent hurriedly down stream
lest they should be interfered with by the Ohio
authorities. Burr had made another visit to Nash-
ville. Slipping down the Cumberland, he joined his
little flotilla, passed Fort Massac, and began the
descent of the Mississippi.

The plot was probably most dangerous at New
Orleans, if it could be said to be dangerous any-
where. Claiborne grew very much alarmed about
it, chiefly because of the elusive mystery in which it
was shrouded. But when the pinch came it proved
as unsubstantial there as elsewhere. The leaders
who had talked most loosely about revolutionary
proceedings grew alarmed, as the crisis approached,
lest they might be called on to make good their
words; and they hastened to repudiate all connec-
tion with Burr, and to avow themselves loyal to the
Union. Even the Creole militia, — a body which
Claiborne regarded with just suspicion, — volun-
teered to come to the defence of the Government
when it was thought that Burr might actually at-
tack the city."

But Burr's career was already ruined. Jefferson,

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 341

goaded into action, had issued a proclamation for his
arrest; and even before this proclamation was is-
sued, the fabric of the conspiracy had crumbled into
shifting dust. The Ohio Legislature passed reso-
lutions demanding prompt action against the con-
spirators; and the other Western communities fol-
lowed suit. There was no real support for Burr
anywhere. All his plot had been but a dream; at
the last he could not do anything which justified,
in even the smallest degree, the alarm and curiosity
he had excited. The men of keenest insight and
best judgment feared his unmasked efforts less than
they feared Wilkinson's dark and tortuous treach-
ery.14 As he drifted down the Mississippi with his
little flotilla, he was overtaken by Jefferson's proc-
lamation, which was sent from one to another of
the small Federal garrisons. Near Natchez, in Jan-
uary, 1807, he surrendered his flotilla, without re-
sistance, to the Acting-Governor of Mississippi Ter-
ritory. He himself escaped into the land of the
Choctaws and Creeks, disguised as a Mississippi
boatman; but a month later he was arrested near
the Spanish border, and sent back to Washington.

Thus ended ingloriously the wildest, most spec-
tacular, and least dangerous, of all the intrigues for
Western disunion. It never contained within itself
the least hope of success. It was never a serious
menace to the National Government. It was not
by any means even a good example of Western
particularistic feeling. It was simply a sporadic

14 E. G. Cowles Meade; see Gayarre, IV, 169.

342 The Winning of the West

illustration of the looseness of national sentiment,
here and there, throughout the country; but of no
great significance, because it was in no sense a popu-
lar movement, and had its origin in the fantastic
imagination of a single man.

It left scarcely a ripple in the West. When the
danger was over Wilkinson appeared in New Or-
leans, where he strutted to the front for a little
while, playing the part of a fussy dictator and arrest-
ing, among others, Adair of Kentucky. As the
panic subsided, they were released. No Louisianian
suffered in person or property from any retaliatory
action of the Government; but lasting good was
done by the abject failure of the plot and by the ex-
hibition of unused strength by the American people.
The Creoles ceased to mutter discontent, and all
thought of sedition died away in the province.

The chief sufferers, aside from Blennerhassett,
were Sebastian and Innes, of Kentucky. The for-
mer resigned from the bench, and the latter lost a
prestige he never regained. A few of their intimate
friends also suffered. But their opponents did not
fare much better. Daviess and Marshall were the
only men in the West whose action toward Burr had
been thoroughly creditable, showing alike vigor, in-
telligence, and loyalty. To both of them the coun-
try was under an obligation. Jefferson showed his
sense of this obligation in a not uncharacteristic way
by removing- Daviess from office; Marshall was al-
ready in private life, and all that could be done was
to neglect him.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 343

As for Burr, he was put on trial for high treason,
with Wilkinson as State's evidence. Jefferson made
himself the especial champion of Wilkinson; never-
theless the General cut a contemptible figure at the
trial, for no explanation could make his course square
with honorable dealing. Burr was acquitted on a
technicality. Wilkinson, the double traitor, the
bribe-taker, the corrupt servant of a foreign gov-
ernment, remained at the head of the American
Army.

THE EXPLORERS OF THE FAR WEST, 1804-1807

Far West, the West beyond the Mississippi,
1 had been thrust on Jefferson, and given to the
nation, by the rapid growth of the Old West,
the West that lay between the Alleghanies and the
Mississippi. The actual title to the new territory
had been acquired by the United States Government,
acting for the whole nation. It remained to explore
the territory thus newly added to the national do-
main. The Government did not yet know exactly
what it had acquired, for the land was not only un-
mapped but unexplored. Nobody could tell what
were the boundary lines which divided it from Brit-
ish America on the north and Mexico on the south,
for nobody knew much of the country through
which these lines ran ; of most of it, indeed, nobody
knew anything. On the new maps the country now
showed as part of the United States; but the In-
dians who alone inhabited it were as little affected
by the transfer as was the game they hunted.

Even the Northwestern portion of the land defi-
nitely ceded to the United States by Great Britain in
Jay's treaty was still left in actual possession of the
Indian tribes, while the few whites who lived among
them were traders owing allegiance to the British

(344)

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 345

Government. The headwaters of the Mississippi
and the beautiful country lying round them were
known only in a vague way; and it was necessary
to explore and formally take possession of this land
of lakes, glades, and forests.

Beyond the Mississippi all that was really well
known was the territory in the immediate neighbor-
hood of the little French villages near the mouth of
the Missouri. The Creole traders of these villages,
and an occasional venturous American, had gone up
the Mississippi to the country of the Sioux and the
Mandans, where they had trapped and hunted and
traded for furs with the Indians. At the northern-
most points that they reached they occasionally en-
countered traders who had traveled south or south-
westerly from the wintry regions where the British
fur companies reigned supreme. The headwaters
of the Missouri were absolutely unknown; nobody
had penetrated the great plains, the vast seas of
grass through which the Platte, the Little Missouri,
and the Yellowstone ran. What lay beyond them,
and between them and the Pacific, was not even
guessed at. The Rocky Mountains were not
known to exist, so far as the territory newly ac-
quired by the United States was concerned, although
under the name of "Stonies" their Northern exten-
sions in British America were already down on some
maps.

The West had passed beyond its first stage of un-
controlled individualism. Neither exploring nor
fighting was thenceforth to be the work only of the

346 The Winning of the West

individual settlers. The National Government was
making its weight felt more and more in the West,
because the West was itself becoming more and
more an important integral portion of the Union.
The work of exploring these new lands fell, not to
the wild hunters and trappers, such as those who
had first explored Kentucky and Tennessee, but to
officers of the United States Army, leading parties
of United States soldiers, in pursuance of the com-
mand of the Government or of its representatives.
The earliest and most important expeditions of
Americans into the unknown country which the na-
tion had just purchased were led by young officers of
the regular army.

The first of these expeditions was planned by Jef-
ferson himself and authorized by Congress. Nomi-
nally its purpose was in part to find out the most
advantageous places for the establishment of trading
stations with the Indian tribes over which our gov-
ernment had acquired the titular suzerainty; but in
reality it was purely a voyage of exploration,
planned with intent to ascend the Missouri to its
head, and thence to cross the continent to the Pa-
cific. The explorers were carefully instructed to re-
port upon the geography, physical characteristics,
and zoology of the region traversed, as well as upon
its wild human denizens. Jefferson was fond of
science, and in appreciation of the desirability of
non-remunerative scientific observation and investi-
gation he stood honorably distinguished among the
public men of the day. To him justly belongs the

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 347

credit of originating this first exploring expedition
ever undertaken by the United States Government.

The two officers chosen to carry through the work
belonged to families already honorably distinguished
for service on the Western border. One was Cap-
tain Meriwether Lewis, representatives of whose
family had served so prominently in Dunmore's
war; the other was Lieutenant (by courtesy Cap-
tain) William Clark, a younger brother of George
Rogers Clark.1 Clark had served with credit through
Wayne's campaigns, and had taken part in the vic-
tory of the Fallen Timbers.2 Lewis had seen his
first service when he enlisted as a private in the
forces which were marshaled to put down the
whiskey insurrection. Later he served under Clark
in Wayne's army. He had also been President Jef-
ferson's private secretary.

The young officers started on their trip accom-
panied by twenty-seven men who intended to make
the whole journey. Of this number one, the inter-
preter and incidentally the best hunter of the party,
was a half-breed; two were French voyageurs; one
was a negro servant of Clark; nine were volunteers
from Kentucky, and fourteen were regular soldiers.
All, however, except the black slave, were enlisted
in the army before starting, so that they might be
kept under regular discipline. In addition to these

1 He had already served as captain in the army ; see Coues'
edition of the "History of the Expedition," LXXI.

2 See his letters, quoted in Part V, Chap. V. There is a
good deal of hitherto unused material about him in the
Draper MSS.

348 The Winning of the West

twenty-seven men there were seven soldiers and
nine voyageurs who started only to go to the Man-
dan villages on the Missouri, where the party in-
tended to spend the first winter. They embarked in
three large boats, abundantly supplied with arms,
powder, and lead, clothing, gifts for the Indians,
and provisions.

The starting point was St. Louis, which had only
just been surrendered to the United States Govern-
ment by the Spaniards, without any French inter-
mediaries. The explorers pushed off in May, 1804,
and soon began stemming the strong current of the
muddy Missouri, to whose unknown sources they in-
tended to ascend. For two or three weeks they oc-
casionally passed farms and hamlets. The most
important of the little towns was St. Charles, where
the people were all Creoles; the explorers in their
journal commented upon the good temper and vi-
vacity of these habitants, but dwelt on the shiftless-
ness they displayed and their readiness to sink back
toward savagery, although they were brave and
hardy enough. The next most considerable town
was peopled mainly by Americans, who had already
begun to make numerous settlements in the new
land. The last squalid little village they passed
claimed as one of its occasional residents old Daniel
Boone himself.

After leaving the final straggling log cabins of
the settled country, the explorers, with sails and pad-
dles, made their way through what is now the State
of Missouri. They lived well, for their hunters

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 349

killed many deer and wild turkey and some black
bear and beaver, and there was an abundance of
breeding water fowl. Here and there were Indian
encampments, but not many, for the tribes had gone
westward to the great plains of what is now Kansas
to hunt the buffalo. Already buffalo and elk were
scarce in Missouri, and the party did not begin to
find them in any numbers until they reached the
neighborhood of what is now southern Nebraska.

From there onward the game was found in vast
herds and the party began to come upon those char-
acteristic animals of the Great Plains which were as
yet unknown to white men of our race. The buffalo
and the elk had once ranged eastward to the Alle-
ghanies and were familiar to early wanderers
through the wooded wilderness; but in no part of
the East had their numbers ever remotely approached
the astounding multitudes in which they were found
on the Great Plains. The, curious prong-buck or
prong-horned antelope was unknown east of the
Great Plains; so was the blacktail, or mule deer,
which our adventurers began to find here and there
as they gradually worked their way northwestward ;
so were the coyotes, whose uncanny wailing after
nightfall varied the sinister baying of the gray
wolves ; so were many of the smaller animals, nota-
bly the prairie dogs, whose populous villages awak-
ened the lively curiosity of Lewis and Clark.

In their note-books the two captains faithfully
described all these new animals and all the strange
sights they saw. They were men with no preten-

350 The Winning of the West

sions to scientific learning, but they were singularly
close and accurate observers and truthful narrators.
Very rarely have any similar explorers described so
faithfully not only the physical features but the ani-
mals and plants of a newly discovered land. Their
narrative was not published until some years later,
and then it was badly edited, notably the purely
scientific portion ; yet it remains the best example of
what such a narrative should be. Few explorers
who did and saw so much that was absolutely new
have written of their deeds with such quiet absence
of boastfulness, and have drawn their descriptions
with such complete freedom from exaggeration.

Moreover, what was of even greater importance,
the two young captains possessed in perfection the
qualities necessary to pilot such an expedition
through unknown lands and among savage tribes.
They kept good discipline among the men; they
never hesitated to punish severely any wrong-doer;
but they were never over-severe; and as they did
their full part of the work, and ran all the risks and
suffered all the hardship exactly like the other mem-
bers of the expedition, they were regarded by their
followers with devoted affection, and were served
with loyalty and cheerfulness. In dealing with the
Indians they showed good humor and common-sense
mingled with ceaseless vigilance and unbending reso-
lution. Only men who possessed their tact and
daring could have piloted the party safely among
the warlike tribes they encountered. Any act of
weakness or timidity on the one hand, or of harsh-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 351

ness or cruelty on the other, would have been fatal
to the expedition ; but they were careful to treat the
tribes well and to try to secure their good-will, while
at the same time putting- an immediate stop to any
insolence or outrage. Several times they were in
much jeopardy when they reached the land of the
Dakotas and passed among the various ferocious
tribes whom they knew, and whom we yet know, as
the Sioux. The French traders frequently came up
river to the country of the Sioux, who often mal-
treated and robbed them. In consequence Lewis
and Clark found that the Sioux were inclined to re-
gard the whites as people whom they could safely
oppress. The resolute bearing of the newcomers
soon taught them that they were in error, and after
a little hesitation the various tribes in each case be-
came friendly.

With all the Indian tribes the two explorers held
councils, and distributed presents, especially medals,
among the head chiefs and warriors, informing them
of the transfer of the territory from Spain to the
United States and warning them that henceforth
they must look to the President as their protector,
and not to the King, whether of England or of
Spain. The Indians all professed much satisfac-
tion at the change, which of course they did not
in the least understand, and for which they cared
nothing. This easy acquiescence gave much ground-
less satisfaction to Lewis and Clark, who further,
in a spirit of philanthropy, strove to make each
tribe swear peace with its neighbors. After some

The Winning of the West

hesitation the tribe usually consented to this 'also,
and the explorers, greatly gratified, passed on. It
is needless to say that as soon as they had disap-
peared the tribes promptly went to war again, and
that in reality the Indians had only the vaguest idea
as to what was meant by the ceremonies, and the
hoisting of the American Flag. The wonder is that
Clark, who had already had some experience with
Indians, should have supposed that the councils,
advice, and proclamations would have any effect of
the kind hoped for upon these wild savages. How-
ever, together with the love of natural science incul-
cated by the fashionable philosophy of the day, they
also possessed the much less admirable, though en-
tirely amiable, theory of universal unintelligent phi-
lanthropy which was embodied in this philosophy.
A very curious feature of our dealings with the In-
dians, not only in the days of Lewis and Clark, but
since, has been the combination of extreme and in-
deed foolish benevolence of purpose on the part of
the Government, with, on the part of the settlers, a
brutality of action which this benevolent purpose
could in no wise check or restrain.

As the fall weather grew cold the party reached
the Mandan village, where they halted and went
into camp for the winter, building huts and a stout
stockade, which they christened Fort Mandan.
Traders from St. Louis and also British traders
from the North reached these villages, and the in-
habitants were accustomed to dealing with the
whites. Throughout the winter the party was well

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 353

treated by the Indians, and kept in good health and
spirits; the journals frequently mention the fondness
the men showed for dancing, although without part-
ners of the opposite sex. Yet they suffered much
from the extreme cold, and at times from hunger, for
it was hard to hunt in the winter weather, and the
game was thin and poor. Generally game could be
killed in a day's hunt from the fort ; but occasionally
small parties of hunters went off for a trip of sev-
eral days, ana returned laden with meat ; in one case
they killed thirty-two deer, eleven elk, and a buffalo;
in another forty deer, sixteen elk, and three buffalo ;
thirty-six deer and fourteen elk, etc. The buffalo
remaining in the neighborhood during the winter
were mostly old bulls, too lean to eat; and as the
snows came on most of the antelope left for the
rugged country further west, swimming the Mis-
souri in great bands. Before the bitter weather be-
gan the explorers were much interested by the meth-
ods of the Indians in hunting, especially when they
surrounded and slaughtered bands of buffalo on
horseback; and by the curious pens, with huge V-
shaped wings, into which they drove antelope.

In the spring of 1805 Lewis and Clark again
started westward, first sending down-stream ten of
their companions, to carry home the notes of their
trip so far, and a few valuable specimens. The party
that started westward numbered thirty-two adults,
all told ; for one sergeant had died, and two or three
persons had volunteered at the Mandan villages, in-
cluding a rather worthless French "squaw-man,"

354 The Winning of the West

with an intelligent Indian wife, whose baby was but
a few weeks old.

From this point onward, when they began to
travel west instead of north, the explorers were in
a country where no white man had ever trod. It
was not the first time the continent had been crossed.
The Spaniards had crossed and recrossed it, for two
centuries, further south. In British America Mac-
kenzie had already penetrated to the Pacific, while
Hearne had made a far more noteworthy and diffi-
cult trip than Mackenzie, when he wandered over
the terrible desolation of the Barren Grounds, which
lie under the Arctic Circle. But no man had ever
crossed or explored that part of the continent which
the United States had just acquired ; a part far bet-
ter fitted to be the home of our stock than the regions
to the north or south. It was the explorations of
Lewis and Clark, and not those of Mackenzie on the
north or of the Spaniards in the south which were
to bear fruit, because they pointed the way to the
tens of thousands of settlers who were to come after
them, and who were to build thriving common-
wealths in the lonely wilderness which they had
traversed.

From the Little Missouri on to the head of the
Missouri proper the explorers passed through a re-
gion where they saw few traces of Indians. It lit-
erally swarmed with game, for it was one of the
finest hunting grounds in all the world.3 There

3 It so continued for three-quarters of a century. Until
after 1880 the region around the Little Missouri was essen-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 355

were great numbers of sage fowl, sharp-tailed prairie
fowl, and ducks of all kinds; and swans, and tall
white cranes; and geese, which nested in the tops
of the cottonwood trees. But the hunters paid no
heed to birds, when surrounded by such teeming
myriads of big game. Buffalo, elk, and antelope,
whitetail and blacktail deer, and bighorn sheep
swarmed in extraordinary abundance throughout the
lands watered by the upper Missouri and the Yellow-
stone; in their journals the explorers dwell contin-
ually on the innumerable herds they encountered
while on these plains, both when traveling up-
stream and again the following year, when they were
returning. The antelopes were sometimes quite
shy; so were the bighorn, though on occasions both
kinds seemed to lose their wariness, and in one in-
stance the journal specifies the fact that, at the
mouth of the Yellowstone, the deer were somewhat
shy, while the antelope, like the elk and buffalo, paid
no heed to the men whatever. Ordinarily all the
kinds of game were very tame. Sometimes one of
the many herds of elk that lay boldly, even at mid-
day, on the sand-bars or on the brush-covered
points, would wait until the explorers were within
twenty yards of them before starting. The buffalo
would scarcely move out of the path at all, and the

tially unchanged from what it was in the days of Lewis and
Clark : game swarmed, and the few white hunters and trap-
pers who followed the buffalo, the elk, and the beaver were
still at times in conflict with hunting parties from various
Indian tribes. While ranching in this region I myself killed
every kind of game encountered by Lewis and Clark.

356 The Winning of the West

bulls sometimes, even when unmolested, threatened
to assail the hunters. Once, on the return voyage,
when Clark was descending the Yellowstone River,
a vast herd of buffalo, swimming and wading,
plowed its way across the stream where it was a
mile broad, in a column so thick that the explorers
had to draw up on shore and wait for an hour, until
it passed by, before continuing their journey. Two
or three times the expedition was thus brought to a
halt ; and as the buffalo were so plentiful, and so easy
to kill, and as their flesh was very good, they were
the mainstay for the explorers' table. Both going
and returning this wonderful hunting country was
a place of plenty. The party of course lived almost
exclusively on meat, and they needed much ; for,
when they could get it, they consumed either a buf-
falo, or an elk and a deer, or four deer, every day.
There was one kind of game which they at times
found altogether too familiar. This was the grisly
bear, which they were the first white men to dis-
cover. They called it indifferently the grisly, gray,
brown, and even white bear, to distinguish it from
its smaller, glossy, black-coated brother with which
they were familiar in the Eastern woods. They
found that the Indians greatly feared these bears,
and after their first encounters they themselves
treated them with much respect. The grisly was
then the burly lord of the Western prairie, dreaded
by all other game, and usually shunned even by the
Indians. In consequence it was very bold and sav-
age. Again and again these huge bears attacked

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 357

the explorers of their own accord, when neither mo-
lested nor threatened. They galloped after the hunt-
ers when they met them on horseback even in the
open; and they attacked them just as freely when
they found them on foot. To go through the brush
was dangerous; again and again one or another of
the party was charged and forced to take to a tree,
at the foot of which the bear sometimes mounted
guard for hours before going off. When wounded
the beasts fought with desperate courage, and
showed astonishing tenacity of life, charging any
number of assailants, and succumbing but slowly
even to mortal wounds. In one case a bear that was
on shore actually plunged into the water and swam
out to attack one of the canoes as it passed. How-
ever, by this time all of the party had become good
hunters, expert in the use of their rifles, and they
killed great numbers of their ursine foes.

Nor were the bears their only brute enemies. The
rattlesnakes were often troublesome. Unlike the
bears, the wolves were generally timid, and preyed
only on the swarming game; but one night a wolf
crept into camp and seized a sleeper by the hand;
when driven off he jumped upon another man, and
was shot by a third. A less intentional assault was
committed by a buffalo bull which one night blun-
dered past the fires, narrowly escaped trampling on
the sleepers, and had the whole camp in an uproar
before it rushed off into the darkness. When hunted
the buffalo occasionally charged; but there was not
much danger in their chase.

358 The Winning of the West

All these larger foes paled into insignificance
compared with the mosquitoes. There are very
few places on earth where these pests are so for-
midable as in the bottom lands of the Missouri, and
for weeks and even months they made the lives of
our explorers a torture. No other danger, whether
from hunger or cold, Indians or wild beasts, was so
dreaded by the explorers as these tiny scourges.

In the plains country the life of the explorers was
very pleasant save only for the mosquitoes and the
incessant clouds of driving sand along the river
bottoms. On their journey west through these
true happy hunting grounds they did not meet with
any Indians, and their encounters with the bears
were only just sufficiently dangerous to add excite-
ment to their life. Once or twice they were in peril
from cloudbursts, and they were lamed by the cac-
tus spines on the prairie, and by the stones and sand
of the river bed while dragging the boats against
the current; but all these trials, labors, and risks
were only enough to give zest to their exploration
of the unknown land. At the Great Falls of the
Missouri they halted, and were enraptured with their
beauty and majesty; and here, as everywhere, they
found the game so abundant that they lived in plenty.
As they journeyed up-stream through the bright
summer weather, though they worked hard, it was
work of a kind which was but a long holiday. At
nightfall they camped by the boats on the river bank.
Each day some of the party spent in hunting, either
along the river bottoms through the groves of cot-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 359

tonwoods with shimmering, rustling leaves, or away
from the river where the sunny prairie stretched into
seas of brown grass, or where groups or rugged hills
stood, fantastic in color and outline, and with stunted
pines growing on the sides of their steep ravines.
The only real suffering was that which occasionally
befell some one who got lost, and was out for days
at a time, until he exhausted all his powder and lead
before finding the party.

Fall had nearly come when they reached the head-
waters of the Missouri. The end of the holiday-
time was at hand, for they had before them the labor
of crossing the great mountains so as to strike the
head-waters of the Columbia. Their success at this
point depended somewhat upon the Indian wife of
the Frenchman who had joined them at Mandan.
She had been captured from one of the Rocky Moun-
tain tribes, and they relied on her as interpreter.
Partly through her aid, and partly by their own
exertions, they were able to find, and make friends
with, a band of wandering Shoshones, from whom
they got horses. Having cached their boats and
most of their goods they started westward through
the forest-clad passes of the Rockies; before this
they had wandered and explored in several direc-
tions through the mountains and the foothills. The
open country had been left behind, and with it the
timeyOf plenty. In the mountain forests the game
was far less abundant than on the plains and far
harder to kill ; though on the tops of the high peaks
there was one new game animal, the white antelope-

360 The Winning of the West

goat, which they did not see, though the Indians
brought them hides. The work was hard, and the
party suffered much from toil and hunger, living
largely on their horses, before they struck one of the
tributaries of the Snake sufficiently low down to en-
able them once more to go by boat.

They now met many Indians of various tribes,
all of them very different from the Indians of the
Western Plains. At this time the Indians, both
east and west of the Rockies, already owned num-
bers of horses. Although they had a few guns,
they relied mainly on the spears and tomahawks,
and bows and arrows with which they had warred
and hunted from time immemorial; for only the
tribes on the outer edges had come in contact with
the whites, whether with occasional French and En-
glish traders who brought them goods, or with the
mixed bloods of the Northern Spanish settlements,
upon which they raided. Around the mouth of the
Columbia, however, the Indians knew a good deal
about the whites; the river had been discovered by
Captain Gray of Boston thirteen years before, and
ships came there continually, while some of the In-
dian tribes were occasionally visited by traders from
the British fur companies.

With one or two of these tribes the explorers had
some difficulty, and owed their safety to their un-
ceasing vigilance, and to the prompt decision with
which they gave the Indians to understand that they
would tolerate no bad treatment, while yet them-
selves refraining carefully from .committing any

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 361

wrong. By most of the tribes they were well re-
ceived, and obtained from them not only informa-
tion of the route, but also a welcome supply of food.
At first they rather shrank from eating the dogs
which formed the favorite dish of the Indians; but
after a while they grew quite reconciled to dog's
flesh ; and in their journals noted that they preferred
it to lean elk and deer meat, and were much more
healthy while eating it.

They reached the rain-shrouded forests of the
coast before cold weather set in, and there they
passed the winter, suffering somewhat from the
weather, and now and then from hunger, though the
hunters generally killed plenty of elk, and deer of a
new kind, the blacktail of the Columbia.

In March, 1806, they started eastward to retrace
their steps. At first they did not live well, for it
was before the time when the salmon came up-
stream, and game was not common. When they
reached the snow-covered mountains4 there came an-
other period of toil and starvation, and they were
glad indeed when they emerged once more on the
happy hunting-grounds of the Great Plains. They
found their caches undisturbed. Early in July they
separated for a time, Clark descending the Yellow-
stone and Lewis the Missouri, until they met at the
junction of the two rivers. The party which went
down the Yellowstone at one time split into two,

4 The Bitter Root range, which they had originally crossed.
For the bibliography, etc., of this expedition see Coues' book.
The MS. diary of one of the soldiers, Gass, has since been dis-
covered in the Draper collection.

VOL. VIII.— 16

362 The Winning of the West

Clark taking command of one division, and a ser-
geant of the other ; they built their own canoes, some
of them made out of hollowed trees, while the others
were bull boats, made of buffalo hides stretched on
a frame. As before they reveled in the abundance
of the game. They marveled at the incredible num-
bers of the buffalo, whose incessant bellowing at this
season filled the air with one continuous roar, which
terrified their horses; they were astonished at the
abundance and tameness of the elk ; they fought their
old enemies the grisly bears, and they saw and noted
many strange and wonderful beasts and birds.

To Lewis there befell other adventures. Once,
while he was out with three men, a party of eight
Blackfeet warriors joined them and suddenly made
a treacherous attack upon them and strove to carry
off their guns and horses. But the wilderness vet-
erans sprang to arms with a readiness that had be-
come second nature. One of them killed an Indian

•

with a knife thrust ; Lewis himself shot another In-
dian, and the remaining six fled, carrying with them
one of Lewis' horses, but losing four of their own,
which the whites captured. This was the begin-
ning of the long series of bloody skirmishes between
the Blackfeet and the Rocky Mountain explorers
and trappers. Clark at about the same time suffered
at the hands of the Crows, who stole a number
of his horses.

None of the party was hurt by the Indians, but
some time after the skirmish with the Blackfeet
Lewis was accidentally shot by one of the French-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 363

men of the party and suffered much from the wound.
Near the mouth of. the Yellowstone Clark joined
him, and the reunited company floated down the Mis-
souri. Before they reached the Mandan villages
they encountered two white men, the first strangers
of their own color the party had seen for a year and
a half. These were two American hunters named
Dickson and Hancock, who were going up to trap
the headwaters of the Missouri on their own account.
They had come from the Illinois country a year be-
fore, to hunt and trap ; they had been plundered, and
one of them wounded in an encounter with the fierce

*

Sioux, but were undauntedly pushing forward into
the unknown wilderness toward the mountains.

These two hardy and daring adventurers formed
the little vanguard of the bands of hunters and trap-
pers, the famous Rocky Mountain men, who were
to roam hither and thither across the great West
in lawless freedom for the next three-quarters of a
century. They accompanied the party back to the
Mandan village; there one of the soldiers joined
them, a man named Colter, so fascinated by the life
of the wilderness that he was not willing to leave it,
even for a moment's glimpse of the civilization from
which he had been so long exiled.5 The three
turned their canoe up-stream, while Lewis and Clark
and the rest of the party drifted down past the
Sioux.

The further voyage of the explorers was un-

5 For Colter, and the first explorers of this region, see "The
Yellowstone National Park," by Captain H. M. Chittenden.

364 The Winning of the West

eventful. They had difficulties with the Sioux of
course, but they held them at bay. They killed game
in abundance, and went down-stream as fast as sails,
oars, and current could carry them. In September,
they reached St. Louis and forwarded to Jefferson
an account of what they had done.

They had done a great deed, for they had opened
the door into the heart of the far West. Close on
their tracks followed the hunters, trappers, and fur
traders who themselves made ready the way for the
settlers whose descendants were to possess the land.
As for the two leaders of the explorers, Lewis was
made Governor of Louisiana Territory, and a couple
of years afterward died, as was supposed, by his
own hand, in a squalid log cabin on the Chickasaw
trace — though it was never certain that he had not
been murdered. Clark was afterward Governor of
the Territory, when its name had been changed to
Missouri, and he also served honorably as Indian
agent. But neither of them did anything further
of note; nor indeed was it necessary, for they had
performed a feat which will always give them a
place on the honor roll of American worthies.

While Lewis and Clark were descending the Co-
lumbia and recrossing the continent from the Pa-
cific coast, another army officer was conducting
explorations which were only less important than
theirs. This was Lieut. Zebulon Montgomery
Pike. He was not by birth a Westerner, being
from New Jersey, the son of an officer of the Revo-
lutionary army ; but his name will always be indeli-

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 365

bly associated with the West. His two voyages of
exploration, one to the headwaters of the Missis-
sippi, the other to the springs of the Arkansas and
the Rio Grande, were ordered by Wilkinson, with-
out authority from Congress. When Wilkinson's
name was smirched by Burr's conspiracy the lieu-
tenant likewise fell under suspicion, for it was be-
lieved that his southwestern trip was undertaken in
pursuance of some of Wilkinson's schemes. Un-
questionably this trip was intended by Pike to throw
light on the exact nature of the Spanish boundary
claims. In all probability he also intended to try
to find out all he could of the military and civil situ-
ation in the northern provinces of Mexico. Such
information could be gathered but for one purpose;
and it seems probable that Wilkinson had hinted to
him that part of his plan which included an assault
of some kind or other on Spanish rule in Mexico;
but Pike was an ardent patriot, and there is not the
slightest ground for any belief that Wilkinson dared
to hint to him his own dislo'yalty to the Union.

In August, 1805, Pike turned his face toward
the headwaters of the Mississippi, his purpose being
both to explore the sources of that river, and to
show to the Indians, and to the British fur traders
among them, that the United States was sovereign
over the country in fact as well as in theory. He
started in a large keel boat, with twenty soldiers of
the regular army. The voyage up-stream was un-
eventful. The party lived largely on game they
shot, Pike himself doing rather more hunting than

366 The Winning of the West

any one else, and evidently taking much pride in his
exploits; though in his journal he modestly dis-
claimed any pretensions to special skill. Unlike the
later explorers, but like Lewis and Clark, Pike could
not avail himself of the services of hunters having
knowledge of the country. He and his regulars
were forced to be their own pioneers and to do their
own hunting, until by dint of hard knocks and hard
work they grew experts, both as riflemen and as
woodsmen.

The expedition occasionally encountered parties
of Indians. The savages were nominally at peace
with the whites, and although even at this time they
occasionally murdered some solitary trapper or
trader, they did not dare meddle with Pike's well
armed and well prepared soldiers, confining them-
selves to provocation that just fell short of causing
conflict. Pike handled them well, and speedily
brought those with whom he came into contact to
a proper frame of mind, showing good temper and
at the same time prompt vigor in putting down any
attempt at bullying. On the journey up-stream only
one misadventure befell the party. A couple of the
men got lost while hunting and did not find the boat
for six days, by which time they were nearly starved,
having used up all their ammunition, so that they
could not shoot game.

The winter was spent in what is now Minnesota.
Pike made a permanent camp where he kept most
of his men, while he himself traveled hither and
thither, using dog sleds after the snow fell. They

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 367

lived almost purely on game, and Pike, after the
first enthusiasm of the sport had palled a little, com-
mented on the hard slavery of a hunter's life and its
vicissitudes; for on one day he might kill enough
meat to last the whole party a week, and when that
was exhausted they might go three or four days
without anything at all.6 Deer and bear were the
common game, though they saw both buffalo and
elk, and killed several of the latter. Pike found his
small-bore rifle too light for the chase of the buffalo.

At the beautiful falls of St. Anthony, Pike held
a council with the Sioux, and got them to make a
grant of about a hundred thousand acres in the
neighborhood of the falls; and he tried vainly to
make peace between the Sioux and the Chippewas.
In his search for the source of the Mississippi he
penetrated deep into the lovely lake-dotted region
of forests and prairies which surrounds the head-
waters of the river. He did not reach Lake Itasca ;
but he did explore the Leech Lake drainage system,
which he mistook for the true source.

At the British trading-posts, strong log structures
fitted to repel Indian attacks, Pike was well re-
ceived. Where he found the British flag flying he
had it hauled down and the American flag hoisted
in its place, making both the Indians and the traders
understand that the authority of the United States
was supreme in the land. In the spring he floated
down-stream and reached St. Louis on the last day
of April, 1806.

' Pike's Journal, entry of November 16, 1865.

368 The Winning of the West

In July he was again sent out, this time on a far
more dangerous and important trip. He was to
march west to the Rocky Mountains, and explore
the country toward the head of the Rio Grande,
where the boundary line between Mexico and Louisi-
ana was very vaguely determined. His party num-
bered twenty-three all told, including Lieutenant J.
B. Wilkinson, a son of the general, and a Dr. J. H.
Robinson, whose special business it was to find out
everything possible about the Spanish provinces,
or, in plain English, to act as a spy. The party was
also accompanied by fifty Osage Indians, chiefly
women and children who had been captured by the
Pottawatomies, and whose release and return to their
homes had been brought about by the efforts of the
United States Government. The presence of these
redeemed captives of course kept the Osages in good
humor with Pike's party.

The party started in boats, and ascended the Osage
River as far as it was navigable. They then pro-
cured horses and traveled to the great Pawnee vil-
lage known as the Pawnee Republic, which gave its
name to the Republican River. Before reaching the
Pawnee village they found that a Spanish military
expedition, several hundred strong, under an able
commander named Malgares, had anticipated them,
by traveling through the debatable land, and seeking
to impress upon the Indians that the power of the
Spanish nation was still supreme. Malgares had
traveled from New Mexico across the Arkansas into
the Pawnee country ; during much of his subsequent

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 369

route Pike followed the Spaniard's trail. .The Paw-
nees had received from Malgares Spanish flags, as
tokens of Spanish sovereignty. Doubtless the cere-
mony meant little or nothing to them ; and Pike had
small difficulty in getting the chiefs and warriors of
the village to hoist the American flag instead. But
they showed a very decided disinclination to let
him continue his journey westward. However, he
would not be denied. Though with perfect good
temper, he gave them to understand that he would
use force if they ventured to bar his passage; and
they finally let him go by. Later he had a some-
what similar experience with a large Pawnee war
party.

The explorers had now left behind them the fer-
tile, tree-clad country, and had entered on the great
plains, across which they journeyed to the Arkansas,
and then up that river. Like Lewis and Clark, Pike
found the country literally swarming with game;
for all the great plains region, from the Saskatche-
wan to the Rio Grande, formed at this time one of
the finest hunting grounds to be found in the whole
world. At one place just on the border of the
plains Pike mentions that he saw from a hill buffalo,
elk, antelope, deer, and panther, all in sight at the
same moment. When he reached the plains proper
the three characteristic animals were the elk, ante-
lope, and, above all, the buffalo.

The myriads of huge shaggy-maned bison formed
the chief feature in this desolate land ; no other wild
animal of the same size, in any part of the world,

37° The Winning of the West

then existed in such incredible numbers. All the
early travelers seem to have been almost equally
impressed by the interminable seas of grass, the
strange, shifting, treacherous plains, rivers, and the
swarming multitudes of this great wild ox of the
West. Under the blue sky the yellow prairie spread
out in endless expanse ; across it the horseman might
steer for days and weeks through a landscape almost
as unbroken as the ocean. It was a region of light
rainfall ; the rivers ran in great curves through beds
of quicksand, which usually contained only trickling
pools of water, but in times of freshet would in a
moment fill from bank to bank with boiling muddy
torrents. Hither and thither across these plains led
the deep buffalo-trails, worn by the hoofs of the
herds that had passed and repassed through count-
less ages. For hundreds of miles a traveler might
never be out of sight of buffalo. At noon they lay
about in little groups all over the prairie, the yellow
calves clumsily frisking beside their mothers, while
on the slight mounds the great bulls moaned and
muttered and pawed the dust. Toward nightfall the
herds filed down in endless lines to drink at the
river, walking at a quick, shuffling pace, with heads
held low and beards almost sweeping the ground.
When Pike reached the country the herds were go-
ing south from the Platte toward their wintering
grounds below the Arkansas. At first he passed
through nothing but droves of bulls. It was not
until he was well toward the mountains that he came
upon great herds of cows.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 371

The prairie was dotted over with innumerable an-
telope. These have always been beasts of the open
country; but the elk, once so plentiful in the great
Eastern forests, and even now plentiful in parts of
the Rockies, then also abounded on the plains,
where there was not a tree of any kind, save the few
twisted and wind-beaten cottonwoods that here and
there, in sheltered places, fringed the banks of the
rivers.

Lewis and Clark had seen the Mandan horsemen
surround the buffalo herds and kill the great clumsy
beasts with their arrows. Pike records with the ut-
most interest how he saw a band of Pawnees in
similar fashion slaughter a great gang of elk, and
he dwells with admiration on the training of the
horses, the wonderful horsemanship of the naked
warriors, and their skill in the use of bow and
spear. It was a wild hunting scene, such as be-
longed properly to times primeval. But indeed the
whole life of these wild red nomads, the plumed and
painted horse-Indians of the great plains, belonged
to time primeval. It was at once terrible and pic-
turesque, and yet mean in its squalor and laziness.
From the Blackfeet in the North to the Comanches
in the South they were all alike; grim lords of war
and the chase; warriors, hunters, gamblers, idlers;
fearless, ferocious, treacherous, inconceivably cruel ;
revengeful and fickle; foul and unclean in life and
thought ; disdaining work, but capable at times of un-
dergoing unheard-of toil and hardship, and of brav-
ing every danger; doomed to live with ever before

372 The Winning of the West

their eyes death in the form of famine or frost, bat-
tle or torture, and schooled to meet it, in whatever
shape it came, with fierce and mutterless fortitude.7

When the party reached the Arkansas late in Oc-
tober Wilkinson and three or four men journeyed
down it and returned to the settled country. Wilkin-
son left on record his delight when he at last escaped
from the bleak windswept plains and again reached
the land where deer supplanted the buffalo and ante-
lope and where the cottonwood was no longer the
only tree.

The others struck westward into the mountains,
and late in November reached the neighborhood of
the bold peak which was later named after Pike
himself. Winter set in with severity soon after
they penetrated the mountains. They were poorly
clad to resist the bitter weather, and they endured
frightful hardships while endeavoring to thread the
tangle of high cliffs and sheer canyons. Moreover,
as winter set in, the blacktail deer, upon which the
party had begun to rely for meat, migrated to the
wintering grounds, and the explorers suffered even
more from hunger than from cold. They had noth-
ing to eat but the game, not even salt.

The traveling through the deep snow, whether
exploring or hunting, was heart-breaking work. The
horses suffered most; the extreme toil, and scant

1 Fortunately these horse-Indians, and the game they chiefly
hunted, have found a fit historian. In his books, especially
upon the Pawnees and Blackfeet, Mr. George Bird Grinnell
has portrayed them with a master hand ; it is hard to see how
his work can be bettered.

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 373

pasturage weakened them so that some died from
exhaustion ; others fell over precipices ; and the mag-
pies proved evil foes, picking the sore backs of the
wincing, saddle-galled beasts. In striving to find
some pass for the horses the whole party was more
than once strung out in detachments miles apart,
through the mountains. Early in January, near the
site of the present Canyon City, Pike found a valley
where deer were plentiful. Here he built .a fort of
logs, and left the saddle-band and pack-animals in
charge of two of the members of the expedition ; in-
tending to send back for them when he had discov-
ered some practicable route.

He himself, with a dozen of the hardiest soldiers,
struck through the mountains toward the Rio
Grande. Their sufferings were terrible. They
were almost starved, and so cold was the weather
that at one time no less than nine of the men froze
their feet. Pike and Robinson proved on the whole
the hardiest, being kept up by their indomitable will,
though Pike mentions with gratification that but
once, in all their trials, did a single member of the
party so much as grumble.

Pike and Robinson were also the best hunters;
and it was their skill and stout-heartedness, shown
in the time of direst need, that saved the whole party
from death. In the Wet Mountain Valley, which
they reached in mid- January, 1807, at the time that
nine of the men froze their feet, starvation stared
them in the face. There had been a heavy snow-
storm; no game was to be seen; and they had been

374 The Winning of the West

two days without food. The men with frozen feet,
exhausted by hunger, could no longer travel. Two
of the soldiers went out to hunt, but got nothing.
At the same time, Pike and Robinson started, deter-
mined not to return at all unless they could bring
back meat. Pike wrote that they had resolved to
stay out and die by themselves, rather than to go
back to camp "and behold the misery of our poor
lads." All day they tramped wearily through the
heavy snow. Toward evening they came on a buf-
falo, and wounded it ; but faint and weak from hun-
ger, they shot badly, and the buffalo escaped; a
disappointment literally as bitter as death. That
night they sat up among some rocks, all night long,
unable to sleep because of the intense cold, shivering
in their thin rags ; they had not eaten for three days.
But they were men of indomitable spirit, and next
day, trudging painfully on, they at last succeeded,
after another heart-breaking failure, in killing a buf-
falo. At midnight they staggered into camp with
the meat, and all the party broke their four days'
fast. Two men lost their feet through frost-bite,
and had to be left in this camp, with all the food.
Only the fact that a small band of buffalo was win-
tering in the valley had saved the whole expedition
from death by starvation.

After leaving this valley Pike and the remaining
men of the expedition finally reached the Rio
Grande, where the weather was milder and deer
abounded. Here they built a little fort over which
they flew the United States flag, though Pike well

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 375

knew that he was in Spanish territory. When the
Spanish commander at Santa Fe learned of their
presence he promptly sent out a detachment of
troops to bring- them in, though showing great cour-
tesy and elaborately pretending to believe that Pike
had merely lost his way.

From Santa Fe Pike was sent home by a round-
about route through Chihuahua, and through Texas,
where he noted the vast droves of wild horses, and
the herds of peccaries. He was much impressed
by the strange mixture of the new world savagery
and old world feudalism in the provinces through
which he passed. A nobility and a priesthood
which survived unchanged from the middle ages
held sway over serfs and made war upon savages.
The Apache and Comanche raided on the outlying
settlements; the mixed bloods, and the "tame" In-
dians on the great ranches and in the hamlets were
in a state of peonage ; in the little walled towns the
Spanish commanders lived in half civilized, half
barbaric luxury, and shared with the priests abso-
lute rule over the people roundabout. The American
lieutenant, used to the simplicity of his own service,
was struck by the extravagance and luxury of the
Spanish officers, who always traveled with sumpter
mules laden with delicacies; and he was no less
struck with the laxity of discipline in all ranks. The
Spanish cavalry were armed with lances and shields ;
the militia carried not only old fashioned carbines
but lassos and bows and arrows. There was small
wonder that the Spanish authorities, civil, military,

376 The Winning of the West

and ecclesiastical alike, should wish to keep intrud-
ers out of the land, and should jealously guard the
secret of their own weakness.

When Pike reached home he found himself in
disfavor, as was every one who was suspected of'
having any intimate relations with Wilkinson.
However, he soon cleared himself, and continued
to serve in the army. He rose to be a brigadier-
general, and died gloriously in the hour of tri-
umph, when in command of the American force
which defeated the British and captured York.

Lewis, Clark, and Pike had been the pioneers in
the exploration of the far West. The wandering
trappers and traders were quick to follow in their
tracks, and to roam hither and thither exploring on
their own accord. In 1807 one of these restless ad-
venturers reached Yellowstone Lake, and another
Lake Itasca; and their little trading stations were
built far up the Missouri and the Platte.

While these first rough explorations of the far
West were taking place, the old West was steadily
filling with population and becoming more and more
a coherent portion of the Union. In the treaties
made from time to time with the Northwestern
Indians, they ceded so much land that at last the
entire northern bank of the Ohio was in the hands
of the settlersi. But the Indians still held north-
western Ohio and the northern portions of what are '
now Indiana and Illinois, so that the settlement at
Detroit was quite isolated, as were the few little
stockades, or groups of fur-traders' huts, in what

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 377

are now northern Illinois and Wisconsin. The
southern Indians also surrendered much territory,
in various treaties. Georgia got control of much of
the Indian land within her State limits. All the
country between Knoxville and Nashville became
part of Tennessee, so that the eastern and middle
portions of the State were no longer sundered by
a jutting fragment of wilderness, infested by In-
dian war parties whenever there were hostilities
with the savages. The only Indian lapds in Ten-
nessee or Kentucky were those held by the Chicka-
saws, between the Tennessee and the Mississippi ;
and the Chickasaws were friendly to the Americans.

Year by year the West grew better able to defend
itself if attacked, and more formidable in the event
of its being- necessary to undertake offensive war-
fare. Kentucky and Tennessee had become populous
States, no longer fearing Indian inroads, but able on
the contrary to equip powerful armies for the aid of
the settlers in the more scantily peopled regions
north and south of them. Ohio was also growing
steadily; and in the territory of Indiana, including
what is now Illinois and the territory of Missis-
sippi, including what is now northern Alabama,
there were already many settlers.

Nevertheless the shadow of desperate war hung
over the West. Neither the northern nor the south-
ern Indians were yet subdued; sullen and angry
they watched the growth of the whites, alert to seize
a favorable moment to make one last appeal to arms
before surrendering their hunting grounds. More-

378 The Winning of the West

over in New Orleans and Detroit the Westerners
possessed two outposts which it would be difficult to
retain in the event of war with England, the only
European nation that had power seriously to injure
them. These two outposts were sundered from the
rest of the settled Western territory by vast regions
tenanted only by warlike Indian tribes. Detroit was
most in danger from the Indians, the British being
powerless against it unless in alliance with the for-
midable tribes that had so long battled against
American supremacy. Their superb navy gave the
British the power to attack New Orleans at will.
The Westerners could rally to the aid of New Or-
leans much more easily than to the aid of Detroit;
for the Mississippi offered a sure channel of com-
munication, and New Orleans, unlike Detroit, pos-
sessed some capacity for self-defence; whereas the
difficulties of transit through the Indian-haunted
wilderness south of the Great Lakes were certain to
cause endless dangers and delays if it became neces-
sary for the Westerners either to reinforce or to re-
capture the little city which' commanded the straits
between Huron and Erie.

During the dozen years which opened with
Wayne's campaigns, saw the treaties of Jay and
Pinckney, and closed with the explorations of Lewis,
Clark, and Pike, the West had grown with the
growth of a giant, and for the first time had achieved
peace ; but it was not yet safe from danger of outside
attack. Territories which had been won by war

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 379

from the Indians and by treaty from Spain, France,
and England, and which had been partially explored,
were not yet entirely our own. Much had been ac-
complished by the deeds of the Indian-fighters,
treaty-makers, and wilderness-wanderers; far more
had been accomplished by the steady push of the
settler folk themselves, as they thrust ever westward,
and carved States out of the forest and the prairie;
but much yet remained to be done before the West
would reach its natural limits, would free itself
forever from the pressure of outside foes, and would
fill from frontier to frontier with populous common-
wealths of its own citizens.

APPENDIX

IT is a pleasure to be able to say that the valuable
Robertson manuscripts are now in course of publi-
cation, under the direction of a most competent edi-
tor in the person of Mr. W. R. Garrett, Ph.D. They
are appearing in the "American Historical Maga-
zine," at Nashville, Tennessee; the first instalment
appeared in January, and the second in April, 1896.
The "Magazine" is doing excellent work, exactly
where this work is needed; and it could not render
a better service to the study of American history
than by printing these Robertson papers.

After the present volume was in press Mr. Os-
wald Garrison Villard, of Harvard, most kindly
called my attention to the Knox Papers, in the ar-
chives of the New England Historical and Genea-
logical Society, of Boston. These papers are of
great interest. They are preserved in a number of
big volumes. I was able to make only a most cur-
sory examination of them; but Mr. Villard with
great kindness went carefully through them, and
sent me copies of those which I deemed important.
There are a number of papers referring to matters

connected with the campaigns against the Western
(380)

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 381

Indians. The most interesting and valuable is a
long letter from Col. Darke giving a very vivid
picture of St. Clair's defeat, and of the rout which
followed. While it can hardly be said to cast any
new light on the defeat, it describes it in a very
striking manner, and brings out well the gallantry of
the officers and the inferior quality of the rank and
file; and it gives a very unpleasant picture of St.
Clair and Hamtranck.

Besides the Darke letter there are several other
manuscripts containing information of value. In
Volume XXIII, page 169, there is a letter from
Knox to General Harmar, dated New York, Sep-
tember 3, 1790. After much preliminary apology,
Knox states that it "has been reported, and under
circumstances which appear to have gained pretty
extensive credit on the frontiers, that you are too
apt to indulge yourself to excess in a convivial
glass"; and he then points out the inevitable ruin
that such indulgence will bring to the General.

A letter from St. Clair to Knox, dated Lexing-
ton,*September 4, 1791, runs in part : "Desertion and
sickness have thinned our ranks. Still, if I can only
get them into action before the time of the levies
expires, I think my force sufficient, though that
opinion is founded on the calculation of the proba-
ble number that is opposed to us, having no manner
of information as to the force collected to oppose
us." On the I5th he writes from Ft. Washington
about the coming expiration of enlistments and says :
"I am very sensible how hazardous it is to approach,

382 The Winning of the West

under such circumstances, and my only expectation
is that the men will find themselves so far engaged
that it will be obviously better to go forward than
to return, at the same time it precludes the estab-
lishment of another post of communication how-
ever necessary, but that indeed is precluded also
from our decreasing numbers, and the very little de-
pendence that is to be placed upon the militia."

Col. Winthrop Sargent writes to General Knox
from Ft. Washington, on January 2, 1792. He
states that there were fourteen hundred Indians op-
posed to St. Clair in the battle, and repeats a rumor
that six hundred Indians from the Lakes quarreled
with the Miamis over the plunder, and went home
without sharing any part, warning their allies that
thereafter they should fight their battles alone. Sar-
gent dwells upon the need of spies, and the service
these spies would have rendered St. Clair. A few
days afterward he writes in reference to a rumor
that his own office is to be dispensed with, protesting
that this would be an outrage, and that he has al-
ways discharged his duties well, having entered the
service simply from a desire to be of use to his
country. He explains that the money he receives
would hardly do more than equip him, and that he
only went into the army because he valued reputa-
tion and honor more than fortune.

The letters of the early part of 1792 show that
the survivors of St. Glair's army were torn by jeal-
ousy, and that during the winter following his defeat
there was much bitter wrangling among the various

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 383

officers. Wilkinson frequently wrote to Knox giv-
ing his estimate of the various officers, and evidently
Knox thought very well of him. Wilkinson spoke
well of Sargent; but most of the other officers,
whom he mentions at all, he mentions with some
disfavor, and he tells at great length of the squab-
bles among them, his narrative being diversified at
times by an account of some other incident such as
"a most lawless outrage" by "a party of the sol-
diery on the person of a civil magistrate in the vil-
lage of Cincinnati." Knox gives his views as to
promotions in a letter to Washington, which shows
that he evidently felt a good deal of difficulty in get-
ting men whom he deemed fit for high command,
or even for the command of a regiment.

One of the worst quarrels was that of the Quar-
termaster, Hodgdon, first with Major Zeigler and
then with Captain Ford. The Major resigned, and
the Captain publicly insulted the Quartermaster and
threatened to horsewhip him.

In one letter Caleb Swan, on March n, 1792,
advises Wilkinson that he had been to Kentucky
and had paid off the Kentucky militia who had
served under St. Clair. Wilkinson, in a letter of
March 13, expresses the utmost anxiety for the re-
tention of St. Clair in command. Among the nu-
merous men whom Wilkinson had complained of
was Harmar, who, he said, was not only addicted
to drink, but was also a bad disciplinarian. He
condemned the Quartermaster also, although less se-
verely than most of the other officers.

384 The Winning of the West

Darke's letter is worth quoting in full. Its spell-
ing and punctuation are extraordinary ; and some of
the words can not be deciphered.

Letter from Col. Darke to George Washington, President
of the U. S., dated at Fort Washington, Nineth of Novr. 1791,
(Knox- Papers, Vol. XXX, p. 12.)

I take the liberty to Communicate to your Ex-
cellency the disagreeable News of our defeat.

We left fort Washington the Begining of Septr
a Jornel of our march to the place of action and the
whole proseeding on our march I hoped to have had
the honour to inclose to you but that and all other
papers cloathing & &c., was Taken by the Indians,
this Jornel I know would have gave you pain but
thought it not amis to Give you a State of facts and
Give you every Information in my power and had
it Ready to Send to you the Very Morning we were
actacked.

We advanced 24 miles from fort Washington and
bult a Small fort which we I thought were long
about from thence we advanced along the banks of
the Meamme River where the fort was arected 44^2
Miles on a Streight Line by the Compass west J4
north though farther the way the Road went and
bult another fort, which we Left on the 23 October
and from that time to the 3d Novr Got 31 Miles
where we incamped in two Lines about 60 yards
apart the Right whing in frunt Commanded by Gen-
eral Butler, the Left in the Rear which I com-
manded, our piccquets Decovered Some Sculking

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 385

Indians about Camp in the Night and fired on
them. Those we expected were hors-stealers as
they had Taken Many of our horses near fort
Washington, and on the way and killed a few of
our Men.

As Soon as it was Light in the Morning of the
4th Novr the advanced Guards of the Meletia fired
the Meletia Being incamped a Small distance in
frunt a Scattering fire Soon Commenced The Troops
were instandly formed to Reserve them and the pan-
nack Struck Meletia Soon broke in to the Center of
our incampment in a few Munities our Guards were
drove in and our whole Camp Surrounded by Sav-
ages advencing up nere to our Lines and Made from
behind trees Logs &c., Grate Havoke with our Men
I for Some time having no orders [indevanced?]
to prevent the Soldiers from braking and Stil finding
the enemy Growing More bold and Coming to the
very Mouths of our Cannon and all the brave ar-
tilery officers Killed I ordered the Left whing to
Charge which with the assistance of the Calient offi-
cers that were then Left I with deficuaty prevailed
on them to do, the Second U S Regt was then the
Least disabled the Charge begat with them on the
Left of the Left whing I placed a Small Company
of Rifelmen on that flank on the Bank of a Small
Crick and persued the enemy about four hundred
yards who Ran off in all directions but this time
the Left flank of the Right whing Gave way and
Number of the Indians Got into our Camp and Got
possession of the Artilery and Scalped I Sopose a

VOL. VIII.— 17

386 The Winning of the West

hundred men or more I turned back and beat them
quite off the Ground and Got posesion of the Can-
non and had it been possible to Get the troops to
form and push them we Should then have Soon beat
them of the Ground but those that Came from the
Lelf whing Run in a huddle with those of the Right
the enemys fire being allmost over for Many Munites
and all exertions Made by many of the brave officer
to Get them in Some order to persue Victory was
all in Vain, they would not form in any order in
this Confution they Remained until the enemy find-
ing they were not pushed and I dare say Active
officers with them and I believe Several of them
white they Came on again, and the whole Army Ran
toGether Like a Mob at a fair and had it not been
for the Gratest Exertions of the officers would have
stood there til all killed the Genl then Sent to me
if possible to Get them off that Spot by Making a
Charge I found my Endevours fruitless for Some
time but at Length Got Several Soldiers together
that I had observed behaving brave and Incoraged
them to lead off which they did with charged bay-
onetts Success the whole followed with Grate Ra-
pidity I then endevoured to halt the frunt to Get
them in Some order to turn and fire a few Shots but
the horse I Rode being Good for little and I wounded
in the thigh Early in the Action and having fatigued
my Self much was So Stif I could make a poor hand
of Running, the Confution in the Retreat is be-
yound description the Men throughing away their
arms not withstanding all the indevour of the few

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 387

Remaining Brave officers I think we must have Lost
looo Stand of arms Meletia included. It is impos-
sible to Give any Good account of the Loss of men
at this time but from the Loss of officers you may
Give Some Gess a list of their Names you have In
Closed the Brave and Much to be Lemented G. B.
at their Head I have Likewise in Closed you a Small
Rough Scetch of the feald of battle. I at this time
am Scarcely able to write being worn out with fa-
tigue Not having Slept 6 hours Since the defeat.
This fatigue has been occationed by the Cowardly
behaviour of Major John F. Hamtramck, and I
am Sorry to say Not the Same exertions of the
Govenor that I expected. Hamtramck was about
Twenty four Miles in our Rear with the first U S
Regiment Consisting of upwards of 300 effective
men and on hearing of our defeat insted of Coming
on as his orders was I believe to follow us Retreated
back 7 miles to fort Jefferson we knowing of his
being on his march after us and was in hopes of
Grate Releif from him in Covering the Retreat of
perhaps upwards of 200 or 300 wounded men Many
of whom might easily bean Saved with that fresh
Regiment with whom I should not have been afraid
to have passed the whole Indian army if they had
persued as the would have bean worn down with the
Chace and in Grate Disorder when we Got to the
fort 31 miles in about 9 hours no one having eat
any from the day before the action, we found the
Garison without more than one days bred and no
meat having bean on half alowence two days there

388 The Winning of the West

was a Council Called to which I aftar I beleive they
had agreed what was to be done was called it was
Concluded to march of & Recommence the Retreat
at 10 oclock which was begun I think an hour before
that time more than 300 wounded and Tired in our
Rear the Govenor assured me that he expected pro-
vition on every hour I at first Concluded to stay with
my Son who was very dangerously and I expected
Mortaly wounded but after Geting Several officers
dressed and as well provided for as possible and
Seing the Influance Hamtramck had with the Genl
about twelve oclock I got a horse and followed the
army as I thought from apearences that Major Ham-
tramck had Influance anough to pervent the Garison
from being Supplied with the provition Coming on
by Keeping the first Regt as a guard for himself.
I Rode alone about ten Miles from twelve oclock at
night until I overtook the Regiment and the Genl
I still kept on until I met the pack horses about day-
light Much alarmed at having heard Something of
the defeat, the Horse master Could Not prevail on
the drivers to Go on with him until I assured then
-I would Go back with them Lame as I was I or-
dered the horses to be loaded immediately and I
Returned as fast as I could to hault the first Regi-
ment as a guard, and when I met them told them to
halt and make fires to Cook immediately as I made
Sure they would be sent back with the provitions,
but when I met the Govenor and Major Hamtramck
I prevailed with Genl St. Clair to order 60 men
back only which was all I could possibly get and

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 389

had the bulock drivers known that was all the guard
they were to have they would not have gone on
nuther would the horse drivers I believe in Sted of
the 1 20 hors loads Got on all the Rest went back
with the army and though the Men had bean So
Long Sterving and we then 47 miles from the place
of action I could not pervail on them the Genl and
his fammily or [advisers?] to halt for the sterved
worn down Soldiers to Cook, nor did they I believe
even Kill a bullock for their Releaf I went back to
fort Jefferson that Night with the flour beaves &c.
where they was No kind of provision but a Miser-
able Poor old horse and many Valuable officers
wound there and perhaps 200 soldiers it was Night
when I Got back I Slept not one moment that Night
my son and other officers being in Such Distress,
the next day I was busy all day — Getting —
made to Carry of the wounded officers there being
no Medison there Nor any Nourishment not even a
quart of Salt but they were not able to bare the Mo-
tion of the horses. That Night I Set off for this
place and Rode til about 12 oclock by which time my
thigh was amassingly Sweld Near as large as my
body and So hot that I could feel the warmth with
my hand 2 foot off of it I could Sleep none and have
Slept very Little Since the wounds begin to Sepa-
rate and are much esier I am aprehensive that fort
Jeferson is now besieged by the indians as Certain
Information has bean Received that a large body
were on Sunday night within fifteen miles of it Com-
ing on the Road we Marched out and I am Sorey to

390 The Winning of the West

Se no exertions to Releive it I Cannot tel whether
they have the Cannon they took from us or Not if
they have not, they Cannot take it Nor I don't think
they Can with for want of Ball which they have No
Grate Number of. They took from us eight pieces
of ordenence 130 bullocks, about 300 horses upwards
of 200 Tents and a Considerable quantity of flour
amunition and all the officers and Soldiers Cloath-
ing and bagage except what they had on I believe
they gave quarters to none as most of the Women
were Killed before we left the Ground I think the
Slaughter far Grater than Bradocks there being 33
brave officers Killd Dead on the Ground 27 wounded
that we know of and Some Mising exclusive of the
Meletia and I know their Cole, and two Captains
were Killed I do not think our Loss so Grate as to
Strike the Surviving officers with Ideas of despair
as it Seems to. the Chief of the Men Killd are of
the Levies and indeed many of them are as well out
of the world as in it as for the Gallent officers they
are much to be Lamented as the behaviour of all-
most all of them would have done honour to the first
Veterans in the world, the few that escaped without
wounds it was Chiefly axedent that Saved them as
it is impossible to Say more in their praise than they
deserve.

In the few horse officers though they had no
horses Good for anything Capt. Truman Lieut.
Sedam Debuts Boins and Gleer behaved Like Sol-
diers. Capt. Snowder is I think Not Calculated for
the army and Suliven Quartermaster and Commt is

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 391

as Grate a poltoon as I ever saw in the world.1 En-
sign Shambury of the first United States Regiment
is as brave Good and determined a Hero as any in
the work Lieutenant James Stephenson from Ber-
keley of the Levies aded to one of the most unspoted
and Respectable Carectors in the world in private
Life as Good an officer as ever drew breth, his Gal-
lent behavior in Action drew the attention of every
officer that was Near him more than any other, There
is one Bisel perhaps a volenteer in the Second U S
Regiment who Richly deserved preferment for his
bravery through the whole action he made the freeest
use of the Baonet of any Man I noticed in the Car-
cases of the Savages. John Hamelton I cant say
too much in praise of who was along with the army
a packhorse master he picked up the dead mens guns
and used them freely when he found them Loaded
and when the Indians entered the Camp he took up
an ax and at them with it. I am Intirely at a loss
to Give you any idea what General St. Clair intends
to do. I well know what I would do if I was in his
place and would venture to forfet my Life if the In-
dians have not moved the Cannon farther than the
Meamme Towns if I did not Retake them by Going
there in three days insted of two months I well know
the have Lost many of their braves & wariors and
I make no doubt the have Near 100 wounded Their
killed I cannot think Bare any perpotion to ours as
they Lay so Concealed but many I know were killd
and those the most dareing fellows which has weak-

1 Written and lined as above.

392 The Winning of the West

ened them Grately and I know we were able to beat
them and that a violent push with one hundred
brave men when the Left whing Returned from per-
suing them would have turned the Scale in our fa-
vor indeed I think fifty would in the Scatered State
they were in and five or Six hundred Mounted Rifle-
men from Conetuck aded to the force we have would
Be as Sure of Suchsess as they went many have
offer to Go with me a number of officers ofer to Go
as privates and I never was Treated with So much
Respect in any part of the world as I have bean
this day in this wilderness in the time I am offered
My Choice of any horse belonging to the town as
I Lost all my own horses I shall Se the General in
the morning and perhaps be no more Satisfied than
I am now. Though I have Spoke of all the officers
with that Respect they Richly deserve I Cannot in
Justice to Capt. Hannah help mentioning him as
when all his men were killed wounded and Scatered
except four Got a ( ?) that belonged to Capt.
Darkes Company when the Cannon was Retaken
the Artilery men being all killed and Lying in heaps
about the Peases who he draged away and Stood
to the Cannon himSelf til the Retreat and then with-
in a few yards of the enemy Spiked the Gun with
his Baonet Capt. Brack (?) and all the Captains of
the Maryland Line I cannot Say too much in their
praise. I have taken the Liberty of Writing So per-
ticculer to you as I think no one Can Give a better
account nor do I think you will Get an account from
any that Saw So much of the action Genl. St. Clair

Louisiana and Aaron Burr 393

not Being able to Run about as I was if his inclina-
tion had been as Grate as I hope in the Course of
the winter to have the pleasure of Seeing you when
I may have it in my power to answer any questions
you are pleased to ask Concerning the unfortunate
Campain. I

Have the Honour to be
your Excellencys most obt.
and most humble servent
WM. DARKE.

10 Novr. I have prevailed on the Good Genl. to
send a Strong party To Carry Supplies to fort Jefer-
son which I hope will be able to Releve it and as I
have polticed wound and the Swelling much As-
swaged if I find myself able to Set on hors back will
Go with the party as I Can be very warm by Laping
myself with blankets.

WM. DARKE.
His Excellency
The President of the United States.

END OP VOLUME EIGHT

University of Toronto
library

DO NOT

REMOVE

THE

CARD

FROM

THIS

POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket

Under Pat. "Ref . Index Flit"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU